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ABSTRACT 
Governing the Economy at the Limits of Neoliberalism: 




This dissertation traces the genealogy of systemic risk as a pathology of monetary government of 
the economy and systemic risk regulation as a regulatory regime to govern this governmental 
problem as instituted under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. Using resilience 
and vulnerability as diagnostic categories, it reconstructs the history of economic government 
since the New Deal as a recursive problem-solving process, plagued with negative feedback 
loops. It shows how different groups of experts, acting as policy entrepreneurs, problematized 
and framed the economy as a crisis-prone system and how they tried to reduce the catastrophe 
risk in the economy without restricting economic activity and growth. In doing this, the 
dissertation details the proposals as well as the actual governmental apparatuses set up to 
represent and format the economy. It argues that systemic risk regulation emerges at the 
intersection of two distinct, but historically interrelated genealogical threads, systemic risk and 
vulnerability reduction. It shows that while systemic risk has been articulated in different ways 
since the 1920s, its emergence in its contemporary form took place with the rise of the monetary 
government in the 1970s. Under monetary government, the financial system was reformatted as a 
vital credit-supply infrastructure that functioned as a monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
A critical aspect of this reformatting was the cultivation of an increasingly leveraged financial 
system that relied on short-term lending markets for operational liquidity. The outcome of this 
 
development, in turn, was the reframing of systemic risk as the catastrophe risk that the failure of 
a firm participating in these markets would result in a system-wide collapse and thereby a 
depression. Vulnerability reduction, in contrast, was conceived by a group of experts working in 
New Deal resource planning agencies between the early 1930s and the mid-1950s. This 
governmental technology was concerned with the resilience of the economic system to low 
probability but high impact macroeconomic shocks. Within this governmental strategy, the 
primary objective was to reduce the vulnerability of certain points of interdependence that were 
considered to be critical and strategic nodes within the economic system. The dissertation argues 
that the rise of systemic risk regulation signifies the convergence of systemic risk and 
vulnerability reduction for the first time since these two genealogical threads were separated in 
the post-Truman period. In this respect, this development points to the remapping of 
vulnerability reduction onto financial ontology of substantive credit flows and thus the 
rearticulation of monetary government with systemic tools such as network and catastrophe 
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Before the financial crisis of 2008, policymakers at the Federal Reserve were certain that the 
final chapter in the history of economic governance had been written. Underscoring their success 
at mitigating severe financial crises throughout the 1990s, they concluded that monetary policy 
and deregulation were all that was needed to ensure the resilience of the economy. In 2004, Fed 
Chairman Alan Greenspan and Fed Governor Ben Bernanke celebrated the period since the 
1980s as the “Great Moderation” and presented two distinct but complimentary accounts to 
explain the underlying cause behind this remarkable success at sustaining an extended period of 
economic stability. Bernanke celebrated policymakers’ ability to manage the business cycle. He 
held that policymakers had mastered the art of governing the economy and were finally able to 
stabilize it, drastically reducing macroeconomic volatility.1 For Greenspan, resilience was 
primarily the result of the economy’s “structural flexibility,” particularly that of the financial 
system. Flexibility allowed markets to absorb and neutralize the destabilizing effects of 
catastrophic shocks. He argued that because such shocks were unpredictable and thus 
unpreventable, it was not possible for policymakers to respond to them in a timely and hence 
effective manner. Increasing flexibility by means of deregulation, thus, was the only way to 
                                                
1 According to Bernanke, the US had only three quarterly declines in real GDP exceeding one percent at an annual 
rate since the early 1980s. Ben S. Bernanke, “The Great Moderation” (presented at the Eastern Economic 




enhance resilience.2 Taken together, these two visions entailed a minimalist schema of 
governance that is associated with the neoliberal utopia of deregulated and self-governing 
markets operating in a stable monetary environment.3 For Greenspan and Bernanke, the future of 
economic governance, therefore, would only involve improving monetary policy and advancing 
deregulation. 
The study of economic governance by critical social scientists and political historians both 
implicitly and explicitly reaffirms the conventional wisdom held by the leading policymakers. 
The historiography treats the history of economic governance as though a historical continuum 
existed between two diametrically opposed visions of governance, New Deal interventionism 
and the neoliberalism of the post-1980s.4 The first vision, most closely associated with the early 
New Deal, is characterized by intensive interventionism in an economy that was believed to be 
                                                
2 This view rested on the assumption that deregulation would render markets more competitive and thereby force 
financial institutions to innovate more effective risk management instruments. As firms became more efficient in 
allocating capital, the ability of markets to govern themselves would also be enhanced. Alan Greenspan, “Economic 
Flexibility” (presented at the HM Treasury Enterprise Conference, London, England, January 26, 2004), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040126; Alan Greenspan, “Economic Flexibility” 
(presented at the National Association for Business Economics Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, September 27, 
2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2005/20050927. 
3 This schema corresponds to Friedman’s description of neoliberalism in the early 1950s. For Friedman, a neoliberal 
order would involve (a) a monetary government of the economy, (b) competitive markets, and (c) a guarantee of 
humanitarian conditions for the economically disadvantaged. Within this schema, the state would only intervene in 
the economy beyond monetary policy to curb social and economic externalities that harm others. Milton Friedman, 
“Neo-Liberalism and Its Prospects (1951),” in The Indispensable Milton Friedman: Essays on Politics and 
Economics (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2012). 
4 Since reproducing this literature in its detail is beyond the scope of this introduction, some primary examples 
should suffice: Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); Alonzo L. Hamby, “The Vital Center, the Fair Deal, and the 
Quest for a Liberal Political Economy,” The American Historical Review 77, no. 3 (June 1, 1972): 653–78; 
Theodore Rosenof, Patterns of Political Economy in America: The Failure to Develop a Democratic Left Synthesis, 
1933-1950 (New York, N.Y.: Garland Pub., 1983); Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in 
Recession and War (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995); Theodore Rosenof, Economics in the Long Run: New 
Deal Theorists and Their Legacies, 1933-1993 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Robert M 
Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); 
Michael A Bernstein, A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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shot through with destabilizing market failures. Over time, however, the New Deal’s 
interventionist agenda was scaled back in the face of a counter-offensive by special interests, 
particularly an alliance between a conservative business elite and budding neoliberal 
economists.5 Despite some periods of increased intervention, the overall trend is portrayed as a 
sustained reduction in the intensity of intervention, culminating in the rise of neoliberalism in the 
1980s and the celebration of the free enterprise system with the end of the Cold War in the early 
1990s.6 These two developments resulted in the rise of a second vision of governance, which 
called for minimal state intervention and a faith in the self-regulating market. Resting their work 
on these historiographical assumptions, social scientists abandoned the study of the state and 
policymaking altogether and initiated a research program that explored the ways in which 
markets and individuals governed themselves as rational economic agents.7 Accounts that did 
                                                
5 See Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan 
(New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009); Rob Van Horn and Philip Mirowski, “The Rise of the Chicago 
School of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism,” in The Road from Mont Pèlerin the Making of the Neoliberal 
Thought Collective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
6 This overarching perspective is best presented in Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: 
The Battle between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modern World (New York, N.Y.: Simon 
& Schuster, 1998).  
7 This literature can be analyzed under the rubric of the British governmentality studies and the social studies of 
finance (SSF). On the one hand, the governmentality school assumed neoliberalism, or advanced liberalism in their 
terms, to rest on a governmental technology to govern subjects from a distance. From this diagnosis, a series of 
studies that analyzed various ways in which individuals were governed by the techniques of freedom and choice 
proliferated. On the other hand, SSF undertook an ambitious agenda to reveal the techno-political conditions that 
allowed markets to functions as the new center of economic calculation in the neoliberal age, which in turn muted 
the question of the role of the state in an economy that rests on the orderly operation of financial markets. For the 
core of the governmentality research program, see Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, 
and Nikolas S Rose, Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom Reframing Political Thought 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter Miller and Nikolas S Rose, Governing the 
Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). For a critique of the limits of 
governmentality studies, see Mariana Valverde, “Genealogies of European States: Foucaultian Reflections,” 
Economy and Society 36, no. 1 (2007): 159–78; Stephen J. Collier, “Topologies of Power Foucault’s Analysis of 
Political Government beyond ‘Governmentality,’” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 6 (November 1, 2009): 78–
108. For an exemplary array of work produced by the SSF scholars, see Michel Callon, Laws of the Markets 




focus on the state did only so to expose the neoliberal project to disassemble the state and 
explain the effects of neoliberalism ex post facto.8 Overall, both historians and critical scholars 
reaffirm the existence of a minimalist schema of government that lets the economy govern itself, 
overlooking the ways in which the state continued to intervene in the economy.9   
Looking back on the period since the crisis, one can discern three developments that cast doubt 
on this conventional narrative. First, the crisis itself revealed that the economy was not as 
resilient as policymakers believed. Second, the state undertook a massive intervention in the 
economy to prevent a second Great Depression. The nature of this intervention made it a source 
of doubt. The founders of monetarism, notably Milton Friedman and Alan Meltzer, would have 
preferred the intervention to be limited to flooding the economy with liquidity by lending freely 
to solvent financial institutions with open market operations.10 Instead, policymakers in the Fed 
and the Council of Economic Advisors designed a comprehensive emergency response that made 
use of all the policy instruments at their disposal. In addition to open market operations, they 
relied on the discount window to lend directly to all financial institutions facing liquidity 
problems regardless of whether they were solvent, effectively bailing out many insolvent firms, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Markets?: On the Performativity of Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Michel Callon, Yuval 
Millo, and Fabian Muniesa, Market Devices (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2007). 
8 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Greta R Krippner, 
Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
9 In the US context, the exceptions to this misrecognition are the work of Fred Block and Timothy Mitchell. Both 
scholars show in their recent work the existence of governmental apparatuses despite the discourse of laissez faire. 
F. Block, “Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States,” Politics 
& Society 36, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 169–206; Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of 
Oil (London: Verso Books, 2011). 
10 Milton Friedman, “A Program for Monetary Stability,” in Readings in Financial Institutions (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 1965), 189–209; Allan H. Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 2 (University of 
Chicago Press, 2010). 
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including bankrupt ones like Bear Sterns and the American Insurance Group. They introduced 
new tools to boost confidence in the solvency of the financial system such as system-wide stress 
tests. And most strikingly, they resurrected discretionary fiscal policy, a policy instrument many 
analysts believed to be abandoned with the rise of neoliberalism. In a matter of months, the 
government budget was turned into a powerful governmental device to stimulate economic 
activity as monetary policy attempted to restore the flow of credit into the economy.11 Finally, 
and most importantly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Regulation Reform Act of 2010 constituted 
systemic risk as a new macroeconomic object and instituted a new regulatory regime, systemic 
risk regulation, to govern it. The Act granted a vast range of intrusive powers to the new 
Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Fed, allowing them to reach inside firms and 
intervene in any part of the financial system deemed to pose a threat to financial stability.  
The question that must be answered in our present is what to make of these developments, 
especially the final one, systemic risk regulation. I argue that as long as one insists on seeing the 
history of economic governance through the lens of the historical continuum between 
Keynesianism and neo-liberalism, there are only two possible interpretations. On the one hand, 
one can construe these developments as a reversal of the trend toward less government.12 On the 
                                                
11 Under the authority of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Obama administration injected 
$831 billion into the economy. The Act was passed in February, only five months after the Lehman collapse and 90 
percent of the stimulus was already spent by the end of 2011. Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Impact of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from October 2010 through 
December 2010 (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, February 2011), 1. 
12 This view is best articulated by the preeminent monetarists Alan Meltzer and John Taylor. For their reaction to the 
Fed’s actions during the crisis as well as their views on the Dodd-Frank Act, see Allan H. Meltzer (The Allan H. 
Meltzer University Professor of Political Economy and Visiting Scholar, the American Enterprise Institute), 
“Testimony on Regulatory Reform and the Federal Reserve before the Senate Committee on Banking,” July 23, 
2009; John B Taylor, “Monetary Policy and Systemic Risk Regulation: Granting the Fed New Regulatory Power 
Will Negatively Affect Its Independence,” Defining Ideas, no. 1 (2010): 13–17. Also see the epilogue to Meltzer’s A 
History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 2. 
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other, one can take a cynical point of view and dismiss them altogether as either a temporary 
deviation from the trend or even a disingenuous attempt to preserve the status quo.13 This cynical 
interpretation considers the emergency measures as inevitable ad hoc exceptions to the rule and 
the new systemic risk regulation regime as a symbolic concession to forestall a return to the 
heavy-handed regulations of the New Deal’s Glass-Steagall. The problem with these alternative 
explanations is not so much their validity as their truth-claims. It is rather that they pose a 
paradoxical puzzle: How can the same phenomenon be interpreted in diametrically opposed and 
contradictory ways?  
The solution to this puzzle lies in the form of intervention on which the systemic risk regulation 
regime rests. This intervention form is founded upon a new governmental logic that is too 
intrusive to be called neoliberal, and yet too cautious and restricted to be considered fully 
interventionist. While this new regime proposes an aggressive way of governing, it envisions 
limiting the freedom of financial actors to the least possible degree. Contrary to the expectations 
of the critics of deregulation, it does not ban financial products that have come to be called 
“financial weapons of mass destruction” such as derivatives, nor does it reintroduce the firewalls 
of Glass-Steagall, whose repeal in 1999 many believe paved the way for the crisis. Instead, 
systemic risk regulation strives to resolve the freedom-security dilemma of liberalism within a 
novel system-security strategy that rests on resilience enhancement and vulnerability reduction. 
                                                
13 This alternative position is held by the left-leaning critics of the Dodd-Frank Act. Primarily economists Simon 
Johnson and Joseph Stiglitz believe that any measure short of reducing the size of banks and reintroducing a version 
of Glass-Steagall would fall short of preventing the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future. Modernizing 
America's Financial Regulatory Structure: Hearing Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress, First Session, January 14, 2009. 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz, University 
Professor at Columbia Business School); Simon Johnson, “A Roosevelt Moment for America’s Megabanks?,” 




The goal within this strategy is to enhance the resilience of the system to shocks in order to 
ensure the undisrupted, continuous supply of credit to the real economy. The principle means of 
accomplishing this goal is building redundancies in strategic locations within the system without 
hindering its ability to reproduce capital and reallocate it in the form of credit.  
Within this strategy, the resilience of the financial system to withstand catastrophic shocks is 
seen to be inversely correlated with the vulnerability of certain nodes and financial flows within 
the system. Firms, markets and market infrastructures, such as large-value payment and 
settlement systems, occupying these nodes are categorized as “systemically important.”14 As a 
result, these nodes are effectively declared spaces of exception and are subjected to enhanced 
and intrusive supervisory rules and discretionary intervention in the name of enhancing the 
ability of the financial system to absorb shocks at a systemic scale. Regulators are not only 
required to impose considerably higher capital adequacy requirements on systemically important 
firms. They are also given the authority to initiate “prompt corrective action” to counter financial 
activities that are determined to pose a risk to financial stability. Furthermore, the Act gives 
regulators the authority to designate any financial product that is deemed to pose vulnerability to 
the financial system a source of systemic risk and require firms holding such assets to set aside 
considerably higher levels of collateral in the form of capital reserves. Finally, regulators are 
granted the power to undertake structural reforms in systemically important markets and 
infrastructures. In this respect, the seemingly hybrid nature of systemic risk regulation cannot be 
captured adequately in the analytical register provided by the framework of a continuum between 
New Deal interventionism and neo-liberal laissez faire. This is precisely why we need an 
                                                
14 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Public Law 111-203, July 21, 2010. 
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alternative account of governmental change that can offer a coherent and consistent account of 
systemic risk regulation. 
Argument.
In this dissertation, I provide such an account by tracing the genealogy of systemic risk as a 
governmental problem. This account rests on four interdependent arguments. First, I argue that 
systemic risk refers to a long-standing governmental problem of catastrophe risk whose 
emergence is endemic to the invention of the economy in the United States in the late 1920s. 
Since then, this problem has been articulated in different ways under recursive problematizations 
of economic catastrophe. Using “resilience” and “vulnerability” as diagnostic categories, I 
identify five distinct but interrelated conceptualizations in the domain of macroeconomic 
governance as delineated below. What is common to all these conceptualizations is that they 
underline the vulnerability of the national economy to a sudden and random disturbance that can 
potentially result in a depression. These disturbances are conceived as ontologically distinct from 
and orthogonal to the cyclical fluctuations commonly associated with the business cycle. Each 
conceptualization identifies the locus of vulnerability in a different “vital component” of the 
economy and addresses the question of why the economy is not resilient enough to withstand 
depressive forces triggered by a given disturbance. In each problematization, vulnerability is 
framed as the product of the accumulation of a specific imbalance within a particular component. 
Depending on the conceptualization of vulnerability, the specific form this problem takes also 
changes. Nevertheless what is common to all these problematizations is the indeterminate risk of 
a system-wide collapse. A given accumulated imbalance in a specific part of the economy could 
burst and trigger a deflationary spiral that spreads in the economy in the form of a chain-reaction, 
causing a depression. Thus, I put forth that systemic risk at large corresponds to a category of 
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economic vulnerability that signifies a generic problem of imbalance in the economy. 
My second argument is a response to the question of what sets the “modern” conception of 
systemic risk apart from previous iterations. I argue that the reproblematization of systemic risk 
as specific to finance was made possible by the rise of the monetary government of the economy 
in the early 1970s. The implication of the endeavor to govern the economy from the Fed through 
the monetary apparatus was that the financial system came to be seen as a vital component of the 
economy. This reframing had two consequences. First, the monetary conceptualization of the 
economy established the financial system as the primary locus of economic vulnerability. 
Second, this vision asserted that the financial system had to function as a monetary policy 
transmission mechanism that was responsive to the Fed’s policy decisions. Governing the 
economy with the monetary apparatus, therefore, required the reprogramming of the financial 
system so that financial institutions were willing to take risk and lend more freely. The result of 
this policy decision was an increasingly leveraged financial system that relied on financial 
markets such as the money market for short-term financing.  
The combination of these two factors led to the problematization of a new type of financial 
crisis, the limited liquidity crisis. According to policymakers at the Fed, these crises occurred in 
short-term lending markets and posed a systemic threat to the financial system. What made these 
crises so dangerous was the formation of a new financial ontology in these markets. As the 
financial institutions’ dependence on these markets for short-term liquidity increased, they 
became integrated into a counterparty liability network that interlinked previously unrelated 
financial institutions. The outcome of this development was the creation of new complex 
interdependencies between creditors, their debtors’ counterparties and the markets these firms 
participated in. In this sense, systemic risk was born as a financial pathology of the economy 
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resulting from the new interdependencies in the financial system. 
Defending the Fed’s rescue of large banks in line with this framing in the early 1990s, Fed 
Governor John LaWare underlined that “[t]he only analogy that [he could] think of for the failure 
of a major international institution of great size [was] a meltdown of a nuclear generating plant 
like Chernobyl.”15 Discerning the threat that limited liquidity crises posed to critical markets that 
contained this new financial ontology, policymakers began to govern the sector that is most 
closely associated with free market capitalism contrary to the most basic principle of the free 
enterprise system, private risk-reward. Before the emergence of systemic risk, policymakers 
were only concerned with protecting the quantity of money circulating in the economy. Under 
this perspective, it was sufficient to protect the circuit of money by the means of loosening the 
money supply to ease stresses on the flow of money. Once systemic risk in critical markets 
became intelligible to policymakers, however, they framed the problem as protecting the circuit 
of credit. The rationale behind this policy perspective was that asymmetric shocks, as opposed to 
macroeconomic ones, could easily result in a systemic liquidity crisis if they were to freeze 
critical interbank short-term lending markets that provided operational liquidity to the banking 
system. Initially, this risk was conceived in terms of a supply shock as credit circuit mostly 
interfaced with producers of goods and services in finance as well as the real economy. Over the 
decades, the credit circuit extended to consumers and consequently credit found its way to 
greater aspects of collective life such as education, welfare, and consumption. As a result, the 
                                                
15 A similar view was also vocalized in the early 1990s by the Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene Ludwig. 
According to Ludwig, “[t]he financial system [was] different from other sectors because of its centrality to the 
economy. […] You don’t get a run on Toys “Я” US because of rumors about Barbie.” Quoted in Daniel Yergin and 
Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle between Government and the Marketplace That Is 
Remaking the Modern World (New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1998); Quoted in George G. Kaufman, “Bank 




problem came to be conceived as both a supply and a demand shock. In addition to unsettling 
production processes, a collapse in the credit circuit would also disrupt consumption. The 
secondary effects of such a systemic event would extend to non-economic aspect of collective 
life that depend on credit and markets such as retirement, access to higher education, and even 
the general wellbeing and the survival of the population. In a financialized economy, therefore, 
policymakers came to believe that the credit circuit would have to be protected at all cost.16 
The final question that this dissertation answers is why it took four decades for policymakers to 
regulate systemic risk. In contrast to what the critics of the Fed claim, my answer does not rely 
on the deregulation hypothesis.17 To the contrary I argue that the reason systemic risk regulation 
was not instituted until after the 2008 crisis was paradoxically because policymakers believed 
they had a regulatory regime in place that could manage systemic risk. This regime, which I call 
aggregationist regulation regime, consisted of two main strategies, distributed risk management 
regulation and financial emergency mitigation. The former strategy, often referred to as 
prudential regulation, was supposed to reinforce sound and prudent risk management at the level 
of financial institutions and ensure that firms balanced the risk of a catastrophic failure against 
efficient allocation of capital within the firm. This mechanism would maintain the aggregate 
financial risk in the system at an optimal level, minimizing the risk of a systemic crisis while 
                                                
16 Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis; Gerald F Davis, Managed by the Markets: How Finance Reshaped America 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
17 The hypothesis that deregulation was responsible for the crisis has been advanced by a wide range of academic 
and popular commentators in recent years. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of 
the World Economy (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010); Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 
Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (Vintage), Reprint edition (Vintage, 2010); 
John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities (New York, N.Y.: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2009); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save 
the Financial System from Crisis--and Themselves (New York, N.Y.: Viking, 2009). 
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maximizing the supply of credit. In case of a systemic event, policymakers would initiate an 
emergency lending program to mitigate the destabilizing impact of the event on the system.  
Within the framework of this regime, systemic risk was assumed to be the undesirable outcome 
of a market failure. This was partially due to the inability of financial institutions to manage their 
risks effectively and partially due to the lack of adequate financial information, especially on 
counterparty risk. In other words, policymakers identified the source of systemic risk to be 
financial firms on an individual basis as well as information asymmetries and lack of 
transparency as opposed to conceiving it as a structural property of the financial system. 
Policymakers, therefore, believed that the new financial ontology of interdependence was not the 
cause of vulnerability, but rather the mechanism that transmitted shocks triggered by the failure 
of systemically important financial institutions. As a result, they assumed that as the ability of 
firms to manage risk improved, the system’s resilience would be enhanced, rendering systemic 
risk a manageable problem within the Fed’s existing crisis management strategy.  
I argue that the institution of a systemic risk regulation regime became possible only in the wake 
of the crisis when aggregationist policymakers came to accept the inability of this overall 
regulatory regime to manage systemic risk. Only once they recognized that the regulatory regime 
had reached its functional limits, did they consider augmenting this regime with a new one that 
would reduce the vulnerability of the system to catastrophic shocks. In this social learning 
process, the framing and subsequent leveraging of the crisis as a “systemic event” by an 
emerging group of policymakers was critical. These actors conceptualized systemic risk as an 
ontological category of economic pathology as opposed to an epistemic category of financial 
emergency. From this perspective, systemic risk was the effect of interdependency and hence an 
inherent structural property of the financial system and its constituent components, namely 
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interbank short-term lending markets such as the money, capital and federal funds markets, 
securities markets, and large-value payment and settlement systems. While it could not be 
completely eradicated, it could nevertheless be reduced to an economically, socially and 
politically optimal level. Only once this was accomplished, could systemic risk be rendered a 
governable phenomenon and could the Fed manage it with its emergency lending program as 
well as its macroeconomic aggregationist tools.  
The rise of the vulnerability reduction regime signifies a major defeat on the part of the seven 
decade old nominalist project to govern the economy at the level of nominal flows with 
aggregate macroeconomic indicators. This methodological preference implied that one could 
govern the economy without a knowledge infrastructure representing the substantive structure of 
the economy. The establishment of the vulnerability reduction apparatus, therefore, marks not 
only the return of a form of governmental expertise concerned with the substantive flows and 
their structure. It also points to the return of a set of analytical techniques that were ousted from 
the domain of macroeconomic government in the post-Truman period and were continued to be 
developed within the domain of national security by the Cold War defense mobilization agencies 
to measure and reduce the vulnerability of the economy to physical shocks such as nuclear 
attack, natural disasters and labor strikes. In this respect, under this regime vulnerability 
reduction as a governmental technology and systemic risk as a governmental problem find 
themselves after six decades of separation. 
Approach.
Instead of construing the history of economic governance as a teleological transition from 
Keynesianism to neo-liberalism, this account constructs an alternative framework of historical 
change. As a starting point it shares the neo-Marxian assumption that capitalism is a crisis-prone 
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and hence unstable economic system that poses unrelenting challenges to economic governance 
within a liberal political ontology. As James O’Connor, David Harvey and Giovanni Arrighi 
argue, process of capital accumulation is ridden with crisis tendencies that produce its own 
imbalances and excesses over time.18 Since the 1970s, finance has increasingly taken on the role 
of distributing and postponing the crisis in a similar manner the welfare state and the government 
budget previously did. As in the case of the fiscal crisis of the state, finance has also become a 
repository of the crisis tendencies. However, I diverge from neo-Marxians in two major aspects. 
I do not see the crisis as an inevitable outcome, but rather a potentiality that can be governed. As 
detailed further below, I focus on policymakers and experts with a drive for subduing crisis 
tendencies as the primary drivers of history and change as opposed to (neo-conservative) 
politicians vested with class interests.  
Within a liberal political ontology and a post-agrarian context, the critical problem, therefore, is 
how to contain such tendencies without limiting economic activity and growth. To answer this 
question I turn to Michel Foucault and his analysis of power. Throughout the dissertation I detail 
a series of governmental reform proposals as well as actual dispositifs (apparatuses) that are 
constructed for governing the economy.19 This allows me to shift the analytical register from the 
question of “how much” the state intervenes to “what kind” of an intervention takes place.20 I 
conceptualize economic governance as an onion-like domain with intrinsic layers that can be 
                                                
18 James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1973); David Harvey, The 
Limits to Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: 
Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (London: Verso, 1994). 
19 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1977); Michel Foucault, 
“Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview 
with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104. 
20 Peter B Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 10. 
 
15 
pealed off one after the other. According to this analogy, each layer rests on a particular type of 
intervention and its removal thereby reconstitutes the economy in a new way. As the layers peal 
off, not only does the amount and kind of government change, but the very grounds of the 
economy are also modified. This implies that in each layer, the resilience of the economy rests 
on a different form of vulnerability whose locus moves from one layer to the next. In this 
respect, the critical question is how the objects as well as the instruments of intervention are 
recrafted in each layer to address a given form of vulnerability.  
I conceptualize the causal mechanism behind governmental change to be what Jeffery Haydu 
calls “reiterative problem solving.”21 The dispositifs that are set up in each layer to represent and 
govern the economy attempts to format the object in a new way. This formatting process, in turn, 
results in either unexpected complications and/or the phenomenon of looping that produces its 
own form of crisis. The complications occur because of unforeseen difficulties that obstruct the 
effective operation of a given dispositif. These difficulties stem from the embedding of a given 
dispositif within the social and political environment in which it is supposed to operate. In effect, 
the attempts to offset the crisis of the capitalist system create their own feedback loops that 
produces a crisis of governance. These disruptive outcomes gives way to a muddling through-
like process in search of a vantage point from which one can govern the economy with the least 
amount of friction and contact with the social and the political. In this process, each occasion 
becomes a site where different groups of actors seek to leverage the crisis to advance their own 
vision of economic government and their own framing of the crisis. Drawing from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s field analysis, I concur that while some of these attempts are carried out in 
                                                
21 Jeffrey Haydu, “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem 
Solving,” American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 2 (September 1998): 339–71. 
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cooperation, others take the form of intense struggles between different groups, their allies 
within and outside the state.22  
I undertake this analysis by focusing on a kind of actor that I call policy entrepreneurs. These 
actors resemble Michel Callon’s “economists in the wild.”23 They operate under practical 
concerns distinct from their academic peers and therefore subscribe to “grayer areas” of 
economics that help them formulate practical and reliable solutions to challenging problems with 
no clear answer. Most often these actors find themselves in time-sensitive situations in which 
they lack the complete set of information that an academic economist would demand for solving 
problems. As a result, these actors work under a set of norms and assumptions that are unique to 
the field of policymaking. The entrepreneurs I focus on in this dissertation are the ones 
concerned with the threat posed to economic prosperity and stability by depressions. As I do, 
they also share the neo-Marxist assumption of capitalism as a crisis-prone system. While all of 
these actors conceive the threat of depression as a general form of economic imbalance and 
vulnerability, they differ in terms of where they locate vulnerabilities in the economic structure. 
This is a critical element of governmental change, since the conception of vulnerability results in 
delayering and the creation of new layers of governance.  
Finally, this analytical approach allows us to conceive of governmental change in a new way. To 
address vulnerabilities, policymakers initiate a recombinatorial process in which elements from 
                                                
22 Pierre Bourdieu, “Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber’s Sociology of Religion,” in Max Weber, 
Rationality and Modernity (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 119–36; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique 
of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
23 Michel Callon, Cécile Méadel, and Vololona Rabeharisoa, “The Economy of Qualities,” Economy and Society 31, 
no. 2 (2002): 194–217. 
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previous layers are combined with new elements to constitute a new layer.24 Each layer, in turn, 
rests on a more refined information infrastructure and a more precise and often intensive form of 
intervention. In this process, previous ways of thinking about economic vulnerability are folded 
into a new way of thinking and reproblematized within a new framework.25 In contrast to the 
continuum perspective, I follow Theada Skockpol’s lead and postulate that the history of 
economic governance is not about the successive defeats of the New Deal and scaling back of 
government, but it is about the ways in which elements that constituted the New Deal 
governmental layer are taken up in new ways in the layers that succeed it and reach all the way 
to our present way of governing.26 In this dissertation, therefore, I provide an alternative 
historiography of the government of the economy in the 20th century that allows us to reconsider 
what makes our way of governing in light of the rise of systemic risk regulation today.  
In this analysis, I analyze the layers of economic governance around three oppositions and the 
possible permutations of their combinations: substantivist-nominalist, fiscal-monetary, and 
aggregationist-systemic. The novelty of this approach, therefore, is that while nearly all accounts 
of history of economic governance rely on the narrative of a transition from Keynesianism to 
neo-liberalism, I provide an analytically powerful recombinatorial account. This account is 
composed of multiple permutations of governmental elements that co-exist in the form of 
                                                
24 I borrow the concept “recombinatorial” from Paul Rabinow. As Stephen Collier points out, “recombination” is an 
overlooked aspect of Michel Foucault’s late work and has been taken up by theorists such as Ulrich Beck. Paul 
Rabinow, Anthropos Today Reflections on Modern Equipment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
Also see Ulrich Beck and Christoph Lau, “Second Modernity as a Research Agenda: Theoretical and Empirical 
Explorations in the ‘meta-Change’ of Modern Society,” The British Journal of Sociology 56, no. 4 (2005): 525–57; 
Cited in Stephen J. Collier, “Enacting Catastrophe: Preparedness, Insurance, Budgetary Rationalization,” Economy 
and Society 37, no. 2 (May 2008): 245 fn. 4. 
25 For the concept of folding, see Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
26 Theda Skocpol, “Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the 
New Deal,” Politics & Society 10, no. 2 (March 1, 1980): 155–201. 
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governmental layers in different eras and developing in areas that are segregated from each one 
another. The decisive transition in this historical trajectory is when the monetary dispositif is 
finally articulated with the systemic tools developed in the substantivist dispositifs. From this 
perspective, the rise of systemic risk regulation marks a tectonic rupture that results in the 
problems and techniques that were developed within the substantivist layers to be remapped onto 
the nominalist layer for the first time ever since nominalist and systemic elements have been 
separated from each other in the postwar period.  
In this dissertation, I identify five layers of economic governance that are constructed by 
combining these oppositions, each layer resting on a distinct form of governmental expertise. 
(See Tables 1 & 2 below.) The first two layers are sectoral and macro-substantivism, which are 
associated with the Hooverian era of the 1920s and the New Deal respectively. Both of these 
layers rest on a form of expertise that represents the economy as a substantive totality made up of 
economic activities described in great physical and statistical detail. This substantivist 
representation takes the form of both a geographical and an abstract space made up of material 
and nominal flows as well as such stocks. Sectoral substantivism locates economic vulnerability 
in intra- and inter-sectoral imbalances. While the former is caused by overproduction in the firm, 
the latter is the product of overinvestment in certain sectors relative to others. Depressions, in 
turn, are the outcome of the accumulation of these imbalances in the economy over the course of 
the business cycle. Once a critical point in the cycle is reached, either the over-accumulated 
inventories or the overinvested sector bursts and a deflationary spiral is unleashed, spreading 
rapidly to other sectors and bringing the economy down with it. As a remedy, sectoral 



















DOC: Department of Commerce 
NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research 
Monetary Nominalism 
Milton Friedman, Arthur 
Burns, Gerhard Corrigan 
Fed 
Overaccumulation of 
Aggregate Financial Risk 
Panic-Induced Liquidity 
Crises: (a) General & 
(b) Limited 
Resilience Enhancement 
(Financial Institutions) & 
Emergency Mitigation 
NIPA 
Flow of Funds Accounts 
Fiscal Nominalism 
Gerhard Colm, Lauchlin 
Currie 




Weaknesses in the 
Consumption Component 
of the Economy 
Resilience Enhancement 
(the Economy) & 
Emergency Mitigation 
NIPA 
NIPA: National Income & Product Accounts 
NRPB: National Resources Planning Board 
Macro-substantivism 














































Prompt Corrective Action 
System-Wide Stress Tests 
Network Analysis 









Substantive & Nominal 





Capital Adequacy Ratios 
Value at Risk 
Stress Testing 
(a) Open Market 
Operations 






















































Nature of Intervention 












Table 2 – Typology of Intervention 
 
 21 
Macro-substantivism conceives of the economy’s vulnerability as the result of a structural 
breakdown in the functioning of the price mechanism in a modern economy that relies on large 
corporations. This implies that the imbalance is an endogenous part of the business cycle and 
therefore has to be remedied with supplementary mechanisms external to the market that will act 
as countervailing forces against the cycle’s inclination toward depressions. In both layers, the 
problem of imbalance points to a double ontological differentiation from the problem of the 
business cycle. It first marks a distinction between cyclical fluctuations and systemic 
vulnerability as two forms of instability. It also puts forward a conception of economic instability 
that is triggered by a sudden systemic event that can neither be predicted nor prevented by 
economic actors themselves. 
The next two layers, which historically follow, are fiscal and monetary nominalism. The forms 
of governmental expertise that constitute these layers represent the economy as an abstract 
object of nominal flows and measure its output in an aggregate form denominated in terms of 
national income, GNP, i.e. Gross National Product. Fiscal nominalism abstracts the substantivist 
representation of the economy and folds it into a structure composed of functional components 
such as consumption and production. This structure, in turn, is represented in the form of an 
equation made up of vertically aggregated macroeconomic variables that measure each 
component in money terms.27 In this way of thinking, vulnerability is conceptualized as an 
imbalance between the production and consumption components. The phenomena of 
                                                
27 This process of folding has been described in great detail by Mary Morgan in her work on the history of 
econometric modeling. Particularly see chapter three on Jan Tinbergen’s work, Mary S. Morgan, The History of 
Econometric Ideas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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overproduction and overinvestment, therefore, are seen as symptoms of an underlying 
weaknesses in the economic structure. Inventory accumulation, which is understood as a cause of 
depressions by the sectoral substantivists, is reproblematized as an early warning indicator 
signaling structural imbalances in the economy. Depressions, in turn, are conceived as the result 
of a shock that triggers a deflationary spiral. While substantivists believe such spirals are caused 
by cyclical imbalances, fiscal nominalists think that what allows the spiral to gain momentum 
within the economy is ultimately economic vulnerability and not the business cycle in and of 
itself. From a nominalist perspective, the cycle, therefore, is reframed as an effect of the deeper 
structural imbalances plaguing the economy. As a solution, fiscal nominalists propose to reduce 
economic vulnerability by balancing the components of the economy relative to each other and 
resolving emergent maladjustments during ordinary times. Against deflationary spirals, they 
advocate an emergency mitigation strategy that is centered on countervailing discretionary fiscal 
policy. 
In contrast to its fiscal counterpart, monetary nominalism refines the representation of the 
economy a step further and pulls the monetary away from both the substantive and nominal 
elements that constitute the previous layers of governance. As a result, it recasts the economy as 
a domain that is facilitated by monetary transactions and thereby grounded upon the circulation 
of money in the economy. Thus, it focuses only on the relationship between the quantity of 
money in the economy and the macroeconomic indicators, GNP and inflation. For monetary 
nominalists, while the source of economic vulnerability is a disturbance in the money circuit, the 
primary locus of vulnerability is in the financial system, and particularly the banking sector 
where money stocks are accumulated in the economy in the form of savings. From this 
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perspective, depressions are also the result of a deflationary spiral, but this spiral results from a 
disruption in the money circuit. These disruptions can take two forms, general and limited 
liquidity crises. General liquidity crises result from a shock that triggers an exponential increase 
in the demand for liquidity, particularly cash, facilitated by a collapse in the banking system. In 
contrast, limited liquidity crises stem from bank failures in critical financial markets that provide 
short-term liquidity to financial institutions as well as industrial and commercial companies. 
Since the failure can trigger a knock-on effect within a chain of liability relationships among 
counterparties in the market, monetary nominalists believe that such situations can develop into a 
devastating chain-reaction that would not only bring down the market, but also the financial 
system and even the economy with it. The proper measure against situations that pose “systemic 
risks” to the financial system is effective crisis management, which depends on rapid emergency 
mitigation by injecting liquidity into the affected parts of the financial system. For monetary 
nominalists, systemic risk, therefore, is tantamount to a situation of absolute indeterminacy 
created by limited liquidity crises.28 This conceptualization implies that systemic risk is 
conceived as an epistemic category of financial emergency and that the adequate response to 
such situations is emergency mitigation. In this respect, monetary nominalism reframes the 
deflationary spirals of fiscal nominalism as a monetary phenomenon that occurs in critical 
markets and pose systemic risks. 
                                                
28 According to Brian Wynne, indeterminacy is a property of open systems. Processes in these systems rest on 
complex causal chains that escape determinate cause-effect calculations. Since without such calculations uncertainty 
cannot be translated into risk in the form of odds, one is faced with genuine indeterminacy. In the case of monetary 
nominalists and systemic risk, it would be more accurate to say they lacked the tools to represent such situations of 
indeterminacy in the form of risk. Neither are they interested reducing the vulnerability of the financial system as 
they believe they can contain situations of financial emergency that pose systemic risks to the financial system. 
Brian Wynne, “Uncertainty and Environmental Learning,” Global Environmental Change 2, no. 2 (1992): 111–27. 
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The final layer, systemic risk regulation, is created by peeling off a very thin but precise slice of 
monetary nominalism. Like the apparatuses assembled within other layers, systemic risk 
regulation apparatus also results from a recombinatorial process through which the elements of a 
former regime of power are extracted and inserted into a new regime to serve new functions. It 
operates on the assumption that the financial system can be ontologically separated from the real 
economy. In accordance with this view, systemic risk regulation carves the financial system out 
of the economy and constitutes it as its object of intervention. In this layer, systemic risk is 
reproblematized as a sui generis ontological pathology that exists in the financial system. 
Because one cannot intervene in systemic risk directly, the main objective of systemic risk 
regulation is to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system to low probability but high 
impact shocks that pose a plausible threat to financial stability. This has two implications. First, 
it marks a shift away from the crisis management of monetary nominalism and a return of the 
vulnerability reduction strategy of fiscal nominalism. This move rests on the assumption that 
financial emergencies that pose systemic risk can be mitigated only at a politically, economically 
and socially unacceptable cost when the system’s vulnerability exceeds a certain point. Thus, the 
function of systemic risk regulation is first to reduce vulnerability and then to monitor the 
financial system on an ongoing basis to ensure that vulnerability stays at an acceptable level. 
Second, systemic risk regulation conceives of the financial system as a governmental object that 
needs to be protected from internal and external threats. The stochastic, i.e. random, nature of 
these threats implies that their timing cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be prevented. 
Even if they can be predicted, regulators most often either do not have the purview, or cannot 
control such threats. This is why protecting the system has to take the form of preparing for such 
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threats in advance by means of vulnerability reduction.  
Systemic risk regulation remaps systemic risk onto the new financial ontology of 
interdependency and recasts the economy as a complex of interlocking financial flows and 
nodes.29 And it recasts the question of criticality that was raised by macro-substantivism in light 
of this new ontology. It asks which nodes are critical for the stability of the financial system. 
Depending on the scale of analysis, the critical node can be a firm, a market or even an entire 
financial infrastructure that facilitates the operation of markets. The entity considered to be 
critical, in turn, is classified as a systemically important financial institution (SIFI), market or 
market infrastructure and subjected to enhanced prudential regulation. As noted above, this 
implies that regulators can intervene in these entities in ways that would be unimaginable for 
fiscal and monetary nominalists. While regulators can mandate SIFIs to hold more capital against 
their activities relative to non-SIFIs, they can also impose new rules on systemically important 
markets and infrastructures to reduce their vulnerability to shocks. In cases where they conclude 
that a SIFI or a particular financial product poses a threat to the system, they can initiate “prompt 
corrective action” to neutralize the threat. In short, systemic risk regulation symbolizes a return 
to substantivism in an entirely new way. It seeks to collect information on the risk positions of 
financial firms, develop a substantive form of knowledge on critical markets and infrastructures 
and even puts the option of intervening in the internal affairs of SIFIs on the table. Ironically 
                                                
29 In principle, these flows extend beyond the traditional confines of the financial sector and would ideally cover 
nonfinancial companies that are originators and end-users of financial products, such as auto dealers, airway 
companies and large industrial enterprises like General Electric. In the Dodd-Frank Act, however, nonfinancial 
nodes have been excluded from the purview of regulators thanks to the intense lobbying of interest groups. Robert G 
Kaiser, Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t, (New York, N.Y.: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2013). 
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enough, it introduces all these extremely intrusive forms of intervention in order to avoid a return 
to the suppressive regulatory regime of the New Deal, which restricted and suppressed 
speculative financial activity at the level of the entire financial system. 
Finally, what necessitates this new regime is the dark pockets of risk that accumulate in parts of 
the financial system and thereby introduce a new form of imbalance to the economy. The 
creation of a vantage point from which policymakers can monitor systemic risk, therefore, is a 
response to this problem which rests on two forms of opacity systemic risk poses. On the one 
hand, the accumulation of such risks was not discernible from the perspective of any one of the 
nodes within the system. Regardless how competent firms were at managing risk, prudential risk 
management would not ensure the security of the system. While there were efforts to provide 
more information to financial institutions, these attempts were bound to fail due to the 
proprietary nature of financial information.30 On the other hand, regulators were also unable to 
detect these dark pockets. This was partially due to the fact that certain parts of the system, such 
as insurance, were outside their purview, and partially due to the fact that they did not have 
access to information on risk-positions at the scale of individual financial institutions. This meant 
that regulators were not only unaware of the extent to which risk was accumulating in a 
concentrated manner in these pockets, but also simply did not know the structure of 
interdependencies and thus the vulnerabilities that were embedded in the system. The Dodd-
Frank Act tried to remedy this situation by extending the purview of the Fed effectively to the 
entire financial system and giving the new Office of Financial Research (OFR), located in the 
                                                
30 This effort was undertaken by former New York Fed President and Goldman Sachs President Gerald Corrigan and 
his Counter-Party Risk Management Group.  
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Treasury, the authority to collect any type of financial data that is on or related to systemically 
important entities, which in practice means that OFR can harness data on the entire financial 
system. Overall, therefore, the new systemic risk regulation regime presents us with a form of 
governmental technology that operates on an incredibly precise and detailed type of economic 
information and that intervenes its objects at a level of intensity that could only be imagined in 
the macro-substantivist layer of governance. The emergence of this new layer, thus, signifies the 
closure of a circle that began in the late 1920s as part of an endeavor to unconceal the imbalances 
of the economy within a substantive form of knowledge. Now we are back to the same problem, 
only the problem is located within the financial system and it is a financial form of imbalance. 
Significance.
This dissertation makes four sets of contributions to the study of economic governance, two 
substantive and two methodological. First and foremost, tracing the genealogy of systemic risk 
as a governmental problem, I show that economic resilience and vulnerability have been central 
governmental norms guiding policymakers in the domain of macroeconomic governance since 
the 1930s. In turn, this allows me to demonstrate that contrary to conventional wisdom, the state 
continued to intervene in the economy even at the height of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the 
1990s. Second, this genealogy allows me to provide the first constructionist account of the 
emergence of systemic risk as a specific conception of economic vulnerability. As far as the 
methodological contributions are concerned, my work proposes a shift in the way in which 
economic governance is studied. I advocate moving the locus of such studies away from the 
study of academic economists, theories, ideologies, and schools of thought. Instead, I argue we 
should focus on policy entrepreneurs and powerbrokers within and in the orbit of the state as 
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well as the governmental apparatuses and regulatory regimes they institute to address specific 
problems of collective life. 
Constitution.of.the.Economy.as.a.Vulnerable.Object.
Since the 1990s, a group of historically-oriented scholars of economic science and knowledge 
demonstrated that the economy, just like society, is a modern invention. In her pioneering work 
on the birth of econometrics, Mary Morgan discerned two critical breaks in business cycles 
research in the first half of the 20th century that facilitated the emergence of the economy. She 
located the first break in Wesley Mitchell’s assertion that cyclical fluctuations in economic 
activity was the result of secular causal forces endogenous to the cycle. This recognition allowed 
one to make a distinction between economic and non-economic factors of economic instability. 
As the second break, Morgan pointed to the transition from Mitchell’s statistical analysis of 
business cycles to the macroeconomic modeling of the economy in the 1930s. As Morgan 
argued, in the work of two Scandinavian economists who received the first Nobel prize for 
economics in 1969, Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tinbergen, the economy was modeled as a dynamic 
system of economic interrelationships. Under this approach, instability was conceived to be the 
effect of external random shocks and their propagation within the economic structure.31 Building 
on Morgan’s work, Timothy Mitchell and Daniel Breslau showed that the economy was invented 
as a conceptual construct during the interwar period. Breslau traced the emergence of the 
economy as an abstract domain with its own logic and laws to a set of intellectual innovations 
Wesley Mitchell and Irving Fischer introduced in their efforts to analyze economic activity with 
                                                
31 Morgan, The History of Econometric Ideas. 
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mathematical tools.32 In a series of articles, Timothy Mitchell argued that what was distinctive 
about the modern conception of the economy was Keynes’s recognition that the economy was a 
monetary phenomenon that could potentially grow ad infinitum, independent of any geographic 
constraint.33 As Mitchell and others pointed out, the establishment of national income accounting 
and the creation of Gross National Product to measure the size of the economy in nominal terms 
was a testament to the institutionalization of the modern conception of the economy as a 
governmental object in the state.34 
Building on the work of these scholars, I uncover an overlooked aspect of the economy as a 
governmental object, vulnerability and hence resilience.35 From this perspective, the economy 
has been conceived by policymakers not just as an object of growth, but also as an object that is 
potentially vulnerable to shocks. Since the constitution of the economy as a governmental object 
in the 1930s, a major challenge confronting policymakers has been how to render it resilient 
                                                
32 Daniel Breslau, “Economics Invents the Economy: Mathematics, Statistics, and Models in the Work of Irving 
Fisher and Wesley Mitchell,” Theory and Society 32, no. 3 (June 2003): 379–411.  
33 Timothy Mitchell, “Fixing the Economy,” Cultural Studies 12, no. 1 (January 1998): 82–101; “Society, Economy, 
and the State Effect,” in State/culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press, 1999); “Economists and the Economy in the Twentieth Century,” in The Politics of Method in the Human 
Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others, Politics, History, and Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2005a). 
34 Mark Perlman, “Political Purpose and the National Accounts,” in The Politics of Numbers (New York, N.Y.: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1987); Mark Perlman and Morgan Marietta, “The Politics of Social Accounting: Public 
Goals and the Evolution of the National Accounts in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States,” Review 
of Political Economy 17, no. 2 (April 2005): 211–30; Miller and Rose, Governing the Present; Daniel Speich, “The 
Use of Global Abstractions: National Income Accounting in the Period of Imperial Decline,” Journal of Global 
History 6, no. 1 (March 2011): 7–28; Alden Young, “Measuring the Sudanese Economy: A Focus on National 
Growth Rates and Regional Inequality, 1959–1964,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne 
D’études Du Développement 35, no. 1 (January 9, 2014): 44–60. 
35 While Stephen Collier pointed to this aspect of the economy on his innovative work on structural adjustment 
reforms in Russia, Mary Morgan also hinted at it in her work. Morgan, The History of Econometric Ideas; Stephen J. 
Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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against such disturbances that can potentially cause a depression. Analyzing economic 
governance from this angle provides an alternative perspective on the history of economic 
governance. As already noted, it allows us to discern various ways in which the state continued 
to intervene in the economy to reduce vulnerability even in periods stereotypically identified 
with neo-liberal anti-interventionism. The vulnerability perspective, therefore, expands what it 
means to manage the economy beyond its narrow definition of Keynesian macroeconomic 
management and “fine tuning” its growth trajectory. It establishes ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’ 
as the object and goal of governmental intervention in the sub-domain of economic stability. 
Moreover, analyzing the ways in which vulnerability becomes a problem for macroeconomic 
policymaking gives us the opportunity to observe the reconstitution of the state to obviate the 
problems instigated by a specific form of vulnerability. Such moments of reconstitution involve 
the creation of new governmental apparatuses or the modification of existing ones as well as the 
institution of new regulatory regimes. These apparatuses require not only the institution of 
knowledge infrastructures, but also experts with new types of expertise.36 The end result of this 
process, therefore, is not just a new type of state, but also a particular vision of the economy that 
is associated with a given vulnerability. This is a critical point, because as Michel Callon points 
out government of the economy is not limited to governing an already existing object. It also 
involves the reformatting of the economy.37 This means that reducing a given vulnerability 
requires the state to reconstitute the economy as well. What kind of an economy we will have, 
                                                
36 On the concept of knowledge infrastructure, see Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate 
Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010).  
37 Koray Çalışkan and Michel Callon, “Economization, Part 1: Shifting Attention from the Economy towards 
Processes of Economization,” Economy and Society 38, no. 3 (2009): 369–98. 
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thus, depends on what kind of a state we envision.  
Toward.a.Sociological.Study.of.Systemic.Risk.
The second substantive contribution of my work is that it brings the rising importance of 
systemic risk in economic governance to the attention of critical social scientists. Until very 
recently, systemic risk has gone unnoticed by social scientists, including academic economists.38 
In the period between the early 1980s and the mid-2000s it was almost exclusively studied by a 
network of policy economists located in the Fed and other central banks throughout the world. 
The reason for this was threefold. First, systemic risk was invented as a native concept signifying 
a specific and practical set of problems policymakers faced in their mission to regulate the 
financial system whereas academic economists have been interested in theoretical problems and 
theory-building. The types of questions policy economists have been interested in answering, 
therefore, did not correspond to those of academics. Second, historically central banking has 
been dominated by a culture of secrecy and exclusion. This meant not only that central banking 
rendered itself a self-contained domain of knowledge production closed to outsiders, but also that 
policy economists held a monopoly over the type of data necessary for studying systemic risk.39 
Finally, elite policymakers at the Fed refused to elevate systemic risk to the status of an official 
                                                
38 A search for the term “systemic risk” on two elite sociology journals, American Journal of Sociology and 
American Sociological Review, returns only two articles that make a reference to systemic risk. And only one of 
these (Tomaskovic-Devey & Lin 2011) actually suggests measuring systemic risk using network models. Donald 
MacKenzie and Yuval Millo, “Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial 
Derivatives Exchange,” American Journal of Sociology 109, no. 1 (July 1, 2003): 107–45; Donald Tomaskovic-
Devey and Ken-Hou Lin, “Income Dynamics, Economic Rents, and the Financialization of the U.S. Economy,” 
American Sociological Review 76, no. 4 (August 1, 2011): 538–59. 
39 Walker F. Todd and James B. Thomson, An Insider’s View of the Political Economy of the Too Big to Fail 
Doctrine, (Working Paper 9017, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, December 1990). 
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macroeconomic policy objective and thereby refrained from publically communicating the role 
systemic risk played in their overall emergency mitigation strategy.40 Consequently, the Fed’s 
efforts to mitigate financial emergencies in cases such as the failures of the Long-Term Capital 
Management in 1999 and Bear Sterns in 2008 were interpreted by the public to be the bailout of 
rich financiers as opposed to a necessary measure to protect the financial system. 
The literature on systemic risk can be analyzed under two groups, realist and constructionist 
studies. The realist studies undertaken by experts were conducted with the purpose of 
understanding of what systemic risk was as a phenomenon and relied mainly on case studies. The 
case studies characterized systemic risk as the outcome of two types of contagion mechanisms, 
domino-effects and liquidity gridlocks. Studies that focused on domino-effects were the first 
studies that attempted to understand the systemic effects of bank failures on the financial system. 
In these studies, central bankers simulated the impact of such a failure on a network of 
interdependent lending and borrowing relationships among financial institutions in large-value 
payment and settlement systems, interbank lending markets, such as the Fed Funds market and 
other money markets, and over-the-counter derivative markets. These studies initially were based 
on “what-if” scenario analyses that simulated the failure of randomly selected large financial 
institution.41 In this respect, they conceived systemic risk as a “too-big-to-fail” problem. In the 
                                                
40 As late as 1995, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan pointed out that “It would be useful to central banks to be able to 
measure systemic risk accurately, but its very definition is still somewhat unsettled. […] Until we have a common 
theoretical paradigm for the causes of systemic stress, any consensus of how to measure systemic risk will be 
difficult to achieve.” George G Kaufman, “Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation,” Cato Journal 16, 
no. 1 (Spring 1996): 20 fn. 5 .  
 




mid-2000s, a new generation of experts in central banks approached the domino-effect 
phenomenon as a “too-interconnected-to-fail” problem. These experts, trained in formal 
modeling techniques, reframed systemic risk as a problem of systemic interdependency between 
“systemically important nodes” within a given financial network. From this perspective, 
systemic risk occurred not because of the size of the failing firm, but whether it was a critical 
node that could destabilize the network.42 The second contagion mechanism, liquidity gridlocks, 
began drawing the attention of experts in the early 2000s. According to a senior vice president at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, experts began to study gridlocks as they realized that in 
market dominated financial systems market liquidity and asset prices became an independent 
contagion mechanism. From this perspective, liquidity in a market dries up as economic agents 
                                                                                                                                                       
a group of Fed economists in the mid-1980s. This experiment was repeated by a group of central bankers in the mid-
1990s. David B. Humphrey, “Payments Finality and the Risk of Settlement Failure,” in Technology and the 
Regulation of Financial Markets: Securities, Futures, and Banking (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986., 
1986); James J McAndrews and George Wasilyew, Simulations of Failure in a Payment System (Working Paper 95-
19, Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1995); P Angelini, G Maresca and D 
Russo, “Systemic Risk in the Netting System,” Journal of Banking & Finance 20, no. 5 (June 1996): 853–853; Harri 
Kuussaari, “Systemic Risk in the Finnish Payment System: An Empirical Investigation,” (Discussion Paper 3/96, 
Finland: Bank of Finland, Helsinki, 1996), http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/bofrdp/1996_003.html; Carol Ann Northcott, 
Estimating Settlement Risk and the Potential for Contagion in Canada’s Automated Clearing Settlement System, 
(Working Paper 2002-41. Ontario: Bank of Canada, 2002); Peter Docherty and Gehong Wang, A Revided Exposition 
of the Methodology for Testing Payments Systems Risk, (Working Paper, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business 
School, University of Technology, Sydney, June 1, 2009); Peter Docherty and Gehong Wang, “Using Synthetic 
Data to Evaluate the Impact of RTGS on Systemic Risk in the Australian Payments System,” Journal of Financial 
Stability 6, no. 2 (June 2010): 103–17.  
42 Michael Boss et al., “Network Topology of the Interbank Market,” Quantitative Finance 4, no. 6 (2004): 677–84; 
Kimmo Soramäki et al., “New Approaches for Payment System Simulation Research,” Simulation Studies of 
Liquidity Needs, Risks and Efficiency in Payment Networks: Proceedings from the Bank of Finland Payment and 
Settlement System Seminars, 2005-2006, (Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 2007); Kimmo Soramäki, “Network Theory 
and Systemic Importance” (presented at the IMF Conference on Operationalizing Systemic Risk Measurement, 
Washington, D.C., 2010); Anne Wetherilt, Peter Zimmerman, and Kimmo Soramäki, “The Sterling Unsecured Loan 
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Networks (Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 2009), 279–313. 
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decide not to lend or trade with each other.43 The new generation central bankers mentioned 
above studied such situations with agent-based modeling techniques and tried to find ways to 
encourage market participants to start lending and settling with each other in interbank markets 
and settlement systems.44 As reviews of these case studies by central bankers repeatedly 
underlined, these studies attempted to provide neither a general definition nor a generalizable 
theory of systemic risk.45 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, academic economists began to pay more attention to 
systemic risk. While it is beyond the scope of this introduction to cover the bourgeoning 
literature, it should suffice to note that economists have been trying to assimilate the 
phenomenon of systemic risk into agent-based models of economic action.46 The work of the 
                                                
43 Darryll Hendricks, John Kambhu, and Patricia Mosser, “Appendix B (Background Paper): Systemic Risk and the 
Financial System,” Economic Policy Review, no. Nov (2007): 65–80; John Kambhu, Til Schuermann, and Kevin J 
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Policy Review 13, no. 3 (December 2007): 1–18; Hyun Song Shin, “Risk and Liquidity in a System Context,” 
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44 Morten Bech and Kimmo Soramäki, “Liquidity, Gridlocks and Bank Failures in Large Value Payment Systems,” 
E-Money and Payment Systems Review, 2002, 111–26; Morten L Bech and Kimmo Soramäki, Gridlock Resolution 
in Interbank Payment Systems (Helsinki: Suomen Pankki, 2001); Craig H. Furfine, “Interbank Exposures: 
Quantifying the Risk of Contagion,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35, no. 1 (February 2003): 111–28; 
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45 A recent survey undertaken by the Office of Financial Research identifies 31 distinct quantitative measures of 
systemic risk in economics and finance! Olivier De Bandt and Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey, European 
Central Bank Working Paper Series (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: European Central Bank, November 2000); 
Hendricks, Kambhu and Mosser, “Appendix B”; Dimitrios Bisias et al., “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics,” US 
Department of Treasury, Office of Financial Research, no. 0001 (2012); Lars Peter Hansen, “Challenges in 
Identifying and Measuring Systemic Risk,” February 14, 2013. 
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Volatility Institute at New York University is a prime example of this attempt to assimilate 
policy-centered focus of policy economists to the theoretical concerns of economics. In this 
research institute, a group of economists with a background in finance and close ties to the New 
York Fed have been reframing systemic risk as a negative externality. As part of the project, they 
have been measuring the “costs” financial institutions accrue on financial stability and have been 
advocating to institute a “systemic risk tax” to neutralize such undesirable costs.47 These studies, 
however, do not answer the critical question of whether one could still have systemic risk in a 
financial system that is “cleansed” of such externalities. From the structural vulnerability 
perspective put forward by the policy economists, the answer would very likely to be in the 
affirmative.  
In sociology, there are two lines of research that can be associated with the study of systemic risk 
from a realist perspective. The first of these is a research program that is put forward by Miguel 
Centeno of Princeton University, which directly addresses systemic risk as an economic 
pathology.48 Under his initiative an interdisciplinary group of scholars from financial 
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engineering, economics and philosophy propose to model the global financial system as a 
dynamic complex system and to study the causes and consequences of systemic risk by utilizing 
analytical tools such as network analysis and mathematical modeling.49 The second line of 
research is undertaken by the scholars of new political economy, and it implicitly tackles aspects 
of systemic risk as part of an endeavor to explain the underlying causes of the crisis. In the new 
political economy, the work of Greta Krippner and Jakob Vestergaard provide complementary 
accounts of why the policymakers failed to ensure the resilience of the financial system. 
Krippner locates the crisis as the endpoint of a process of financialization of the US economy 
and the consequent speculative exuberance that has been driving the economy since the 1980s. In 
contrast to other accounts of financialization that focus on the political influence of financiers 
and the ideology of deregulation, Krippner constructs an original and intriguing explanation. She 
shows that deregulation and consequent financialization were the unintended consequence of a 
series of policy decisions that were made by policymakers at the Fed in response to specific 
problems they began facing in their effort to govern the economy in the 1970s.50 Vestergaard 
also focuses on policymaking as an explanation for the crisis. Instead of monetary policy 
decisions and their consequences, he highlights how efforts in the last two decades at 
strengthening the international financial infrastructure through market discipline, stress testing, 
and market sensitive risk management and accounting techniques failed to enhance the resilience 
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of the system. Similar to the proponents of systemic risk regulation, he advocates a regulatory 
regime that takes its object of intervention to be the critical interdependencies within the 
financial system. From the perspective of the new political economy literature, the crisis, 
therefore was the result of two complementary factors. The uncontrolled accumulation of 
excessive financial risk in the financial system produced an asset-price bubble that left millions 
of Americans in debt after it burst. The financial system, in turn, could not withstand the shock 
of the bursting of this bubble-economy because it was not regulated properly.51 In this sense, 
both lines of research share concerns that are complimentary to those of policy economists and 
seek to contribute to the endeavor to govern systemic risk. 
As an alternative to these realist approaches, a group of critical social scientists with Foucaultian 
inclinations offer a promising constructionist framework to study systemic risk. This framework 
was articulated as a response to Ulrich Beck’s “insurability thesis.” According to Beck, we live 
in what he calls the “second modernity” ridden with incalculable and thus uninsurable 
catastrophe risks. These risks are uninsurable for two reasons: first, they are so infrequent that 
they defy statistical forms of knowledge production; second, their financial hazards exceed the 
limits of insurance as a security mechanism.52  
There have been three lines of response to Beck. The first response attempted to debunk the 
insurability thesis by showing that many catastrophe risks, such as terrorism and mega-natural 
                                                
51 Jakob Vestergaard, “‘More Heat Than Light’: On the Regulation of International Finance,” Economic Sociology: 
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disasters, have indeed been brought into the fold of insurance in the last decade.53 The second 
response was formulated by Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley and Mariana Valverde, the leading 
scholars of the governmentality school. Building on Foucault’s collaborators’ work on the 
genealogy of insurance as a governmental technology,54 Rose et al. objected to Beck’s epochal 
and realist characterization of catastrophe risk. They underscored that insurance is only one form 
of risk technology that renders collective life governable, and emphasized the importance of 
analyzing diverse forms such technologies take empirically. Along these lines O’Malley put 
forward a research program to study the alternative strategies and forms of calculation through 
which catastrophes are constituted as governable objects. O’Malley points out that one such 
strategy in the realm of financial catastrophes has been new technologies of self-government that 
hold corporate executives responsible for avoiding ‘excessive risk’ taking.55 As this example 
illustrates, for governmentality scholars, the folding of problems of collective life into the 
discourse of risk is part of the broader neoliberal process of delegating governmental tasks to the 
private sector and the market and therefore is constitutive of the project to govern the economy 
from a distance.  
The third line of response has been provided by Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff in their 
                                                
53 Philip D. Bougen, “Catastrophe Risk,” Economy and Society 32, no. 2 (January 2003): 253–74; Richard Ericson 
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collaborative project on the genealogy of vital system security. Collier and Lakoff concur with 
Beck’s diagnosis that a new form of risk comes into being as a consequence of the modernization 
process and this form is ontologically distinct. In contrast to Beck, however, they study the 
government of these catastrophe risks from a constructionist and non-epochal point of view. 
According to Collier and Lakoff, one should make a distinction between regularly occurring 
events that are normally distributed and therefore predictable with standard statistical tools on 
the one hand, and rare and irregular events that escape statistics but are nevertheless potentially 
catastrophic on the other. In turn, they make a distinction between the two modes of security that 
correspond to these risks. While normal risks, which have been the subject of the 
governmentality studies, are governed under the mode of population security, the latter are 
governed under the mode of vital system security. They show that vital system security addresses 
catastrophe risks through a governmental strategy that they call vulnerability reduction. Drawing 
on Foucault’s 1978 lectures on security, Collier argues that vulnerability reduction rests on an 
enactment-based knowledge form that allows experts to assess the vulnerability of a given socio-
technical system to low probability but high impact catastrophe risks. Vulnerability reduction is 
deployed in situations where either the risk is uninsurable within a given risk distribution, or 
where mitigating financial hazards is simply not sufficient, such as in a nuclear holocaust. In 
contrast to insurance, the objective of vulnerability reduction, therefore, is to reduce the 
probability of the disruption as well as the magnitude of its impact.56 
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I combine the Foucaultian research program on catastrophe risk with the new political 
economy’s concern for financial system resilience within a constructionist framework. By 
tracing the genealogy of systemic risk as a governmental problem, I show that financial 
deregulation was conceived much earlier than Krippner argues as part of the nominalist project 
to balance the flow of income in the economy (geographically) and thereby to enhance the 
growth potential of the economy. Furthermore, I argue that deregulation was actually only one 
aspect of an effort to institute an aggregationist regulatory regime that would protect the financial 
system from liquidity crises while allowing the financial sector to facilitate economic growth in 
under-funded rural areas. In this respect, I demonstrate that the strategy to govern the 
international financial infrastructure discussed by Vestergaard was indeed the extension of the 
regulatory strategy that was conceived by the nominalists and their decedents in the Fed to the 
international financial system. Unlike Vestergaard, however, I do not make the claim that the 
aggregationist strategy was inherently flawed. I argue rather that policymakers came to the 
conclusion that systemic risk could not be governed under the aggregationist regime only after 
the crisis demonstrated that the functional limits of the regime’s ability to govern such risks were 
surpassed. The rise of systemic risk regulation, thus, does not necessarily signal the 
disassembling of the so-called neoliberal aggregationist regulatory regime. It signifies that 
policymakers believe that to render systemic risk governable, vulnerability of the system has to 
be reduced first.  
In addition, I advance the Foucaultian research program on governing catastrophe risks and 
demonstrate that policymakers have been problematizing such risks in the domain of 
macroeconomic governance since the late 1920s. My genealogy of systemic risk also establishes 
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that vulnerability reduction as an alternative technique of governing catastrophe risk has been a 
foundational aspect of economic governance since the rise of fiscal nominalism. In a similar 
vein, I show that governmental concepts that orient security such as resilience and vulnerability 
play an important role in guiding the efforts of macroeconomic policymakers to govern not only 
the financial system but also the economy and protect these objects against systemic risk.57 
Finally, I illustrate that systemic risk and its historical iterations point to a form of catastrophe 
risk that has been overlooked as the literature fails to make a distinction between systemic and 
non-systemic catastrophe risks. I argue that systemic catastrophe risks are the types of risk that 
are neither insurable nor are meaningful to insure against. This is why such risks cannot be 
governed from a distance regardless of whether the mechanism is insurance or an alternative 
technology. From this perspective, the rise of systemic risk regulation poses a conceptual 
challenge to the governmentality scholars, who equate neoliberalism with the art of governing 
from a distance. Just consider the recent mandatory stress tests the Fed conducted on the balance 
sheets of the nation’s systemically important financial institutions. The results of the tests already 
barred Citigroup from paying dividends to its shareholders and put the plans of Bank of America, 
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs at the mercy of the Fed.58 Given this intrusive form of 
intervention in the name of systemic risk in the financial system at the scale of the firm, does this 
mean that we no longer live in the age of advanced liberalism? Or is it the case that we 
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misconceived what it means to govern the economy in the neo-liberal era? My findings hint that 
our way of governing in the present might be in greater continuity with the golden age of 
economic governance that preceded neoliberalism than we might presume.   
Policymaking.in.the.Wild.
In addition to these two substantive points, I would like to make a set of interrelated 
methodological points that differentiate this work from others. As already noted, my work 
centers on policy entrepreneurs and powerbrokers. I postulate that these types of actors are 
motivated by a calling for solving governmental problems that they believe affect the security 
and wellbeing of collective life in significant ways. I also assume that these actions spring from 
justifications and judgments that rest on distinct styles of reasoning and problem-making. Finally 
and most critically, these actors assemble networks of expertise and construct governmental 
apparatuses to address such problems and institute regulatory regimes to ensure the effectiveness 
of these apparatuses.59 In sum, I construe the history of economic governance as a history of 
successive problematizations formulated by policymakers and the establishment of governmental 
apparatuses to solve governmental problems.  
My focus on policy entrepreneurs and powerbrokers allows me to shift the locus of the analysis 
from academic economists and their theories to practical governmental problems and gray areas 
of economics expertise that are often excluded from academic economics and their theories.60 
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Most sociological and historical studies of economic governance are accounts of academic 
economists and their struggle over the control of the economic profession. The underlying 
assumption in these studies is that economists ultimately determine how the economy is 
governed.61 There is clearly some truth to this observation. However, I argue that academic 
economics is only part of the story. There is a vast hybrid field of policymaking in which 
academic economists participate, and the norms governing this field are considerably different 
from those of academia. In many respects, these norms and conditions are more similar to the 
economists that Michel Callon calls “economists in the wild.”62 As Timothy Mitchell also 
underlines, what makes economics such a pervasive way of thinking about the problems of 
collective life is the dissemination of grayer, non-pure forms of economic arguments, calculative 
devices and information in institutional spaces such as the firm, think tanks, business schools and 
non-governmental organizations.63 Following Callon and Mitchell, my methodological 
framework invites scholars of economic governance to revisit the institutional spaces within and 
in the orbit of the state to analyze such grayer forms of economics.  
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Another aspect of policy entrepreneurship that my dissertation elucidates is problem-making. I 
build on Gil Eyal’s attempt to connect the Foucaultian approach to the study of 
problematizations with historical sociology via Jeffery Haydu’s “reiterative problem solving” 
approach.64 By conceptualizing policymaking as a process of recursive problem-solving, I bring 
into light the ways in which policymakers constitute phenomena such as systemic risk, inflation 
and unemployment as governmental problems. Regardless of whether such problems do actually 
exist in the world a priori, what is critical is that policymakers formulate and frame problems in 
thought and reflect on them to find practical solutions. The advantage of this methodological 
move is that it shifts the analytical focus of my research from the economic theories and 
theoretical rivalries that have been the object of study in many studies of academic economics. In 
these studies, the economic profession and policymaking are most often characterized as 
consisting of struggles between two diametrically opposed theoretical positions with opposing 
ideological and political leanings, e.g. Keynesians versus monetarists. Or we are told that 
economic theories such as rational expectations or neoclassical economics establish a hegemony 
over economic governance. While such oppositions and struggles for hegemony may exist, an 
overemphasis on ideological aspects of policymaking overshadows fundamental ways in which 
policymakers reflect on the nature of policymaking and constitute the economy as an object of 
intervention.  
To avoid this pitfall, I tilt the angle from which economic government is analyzed. I approach 
government not from the assumption that policymakers are programmed to behave in a certain 
                                                
64 Haydu, “Making Use of the Past”; Eyal, “For a Sociology of Expertise.” 
 
 45 
way, but from a perspective that assumes policymakers respond to the problems confronting 
them. This approach shares many similarities with the perspective of Peter Hall, the preeminent 
historian of policymaking, on policymaking as social learning.65 Throughout the work, I focus on 
what Hall calls second and third order shifts in policymaking. While second order shifts refer to 
a major change in the tactics and strategies within a given policy paradigm, third order shifts 
occur when one paradigm replaces another altogether. Whereas Hall conceives such shifts from a 
Kuhnian perspective as tectonic epochal moves, my perspective emphasizes the mutational 
transformations between different layers of governance. Furthermore, unlike Hall, I show how 
different layers of governance can coexist and complement each other in unexpected ways.  
Finally, my analysis of policymakers’ reflection on problems rest on what Ian Hacking called 
styles of reasoning.66 This perspective holds that the way in which one reasons and reflects on 
problems depends on the techno-political norms and rationalities that one subscribes to. This is 
why I prefer to avoid terms such as Keynesianism and monetarism in my work. Instead, I utilize 
terms that point to the ways in which actors reflect on problems. Terms such as monetary 
nominalist, as opposed to monetarist, allows me to underline that a given actor such as Arthur 
Burns, who served as Eisenhower’s chief economic advisor and the Fed chairman under Nixon, 
conceives the economy from a monetary perspective, but he does not subscribe to the specific 
policy prescriptions that make up the monetarism of actors such as Milton Friedman. In this 
sense, my actors are not preprogrammed automatons, but subjects who have the capacity for 
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critical thought and reflection on the world. Nevertheless, they operate within the structural 
limits the governmental logics that underlie the policymaking field. When reflecting on problems 
and crafting policy, they hold structural positions that I signify by the permutations of the three 
oppositions I identify in this dissertation, substantivist-nominalist, fiscal-monetary, and 
aggregationist-systemic. The combinations of these elements brings into being distinct styles of 
thinking and reflection that actors deploy.  
A.Note.on.Method.&.Data.
This dissertation draws on a three-staged historical discourse analysis conducted on primary and 
secondary sources. Mitchel Foucault’s discourse analysis has become a commonly accepted 
method in critical social sciences in the last two decades and produced many rich accounts of 
politics and expertise.67 In this dissertation, I adopt a slightly modified version of discourse 
analysis. Instead of tracing the dissemination of discourse within the social space, I focus on 
moments of discourse formation. As Foucault and his interlocutor Paul Rabinow pointed out, in 
such moments actors reflect on emergent issues and recast them into well-bounded and 
articulated problems. Problem-making, therefore, is a reflective activity that problematizes a 
given unsettled situation in which actors are aware of the existence of a problem but cannot 
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clearly pinpoint and articulate its nature and source.68 Metaphors, I argue, play a critical role in 
the process of problematizations and often end up forming the groundwork of conceptualization 
of problems into well-defined and succinct concepts. This is why much of the dissertation dwells 
on metaphors and concepts such as resilience, vulnerability, shocks and shock absorbers, and 
systemic risk.69 Seen from this perspective, discourse is a product as well as an artifact of 
problematizations that successfully weld problem-making with concept-formation. 
The first stage of my method consisted of a thorough reading of the secondary literature on the 
history of economic governance. This literature was excellent for the period between the 1920s 
and the mid-1970s. This stage of my research helped identify the relevant institutions, actors, 
reports as well as the concepts and metaphors that play a key role in my work. There were two 
striking deficiencies that were common to nearly all works in this literature. First, the substantive 
content of the reports were left unanalyzed in an overwhelming majority of these works. Second, 
the conceptual and metaphorical language the scholars quoted in their work were under-
conceptualized. This led scholars to only note the conclusions of the reports, which were often 
not implemented within the period analyzed by the given work. As already noted in the opening 
of this introduction, this resulted in a historiography that represents the history of economic 
governance as a series of successive failures.  
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The second stage of my research involved archival research in four archives. The first three 
archives I consulted contained the records of two successive defense mobilization agencies, the 
Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) (1949 – 1960) and the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness (OEP) (1960 – 1973). These agencies were responsible for economic mobilization 
planning in the context of the Cold War. Under a national resilience objective, the primary 
function of ODM was initially to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to an enemy nuclear attack 
with the help of substantivist planning techniques. As it became clear to national security 
planners that a nuclear attack would result in a nuclear holocaust, nuclear war preparedness was 
demoted to a secondary position. As a result, in the early 1960s, the primary function of the 
mobilization planning apparatus, now under the control of OEP, was reformulated as enhancing 
the resilience of the economy against price demand and supply shocks caused by sudden 
disruptions such as an escalation in mobilization level, labor strikes, and price hikes in key 
commodities, i.e. steel, aluminum and copper.  
I visited the OEP archive in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland in June 2007 as 
part of a collaborative research effort with Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff. In this archive, I 
analyzed two types of materials. The first type was analytical models that were used for 
measuring the vulnerability of the economy against low probability high impact catastrophic 
shocks. These models were developed for nuclear war preparedness purposes for the National 
Damage Assessment Center (NDAC) of ODM in the late 1950s. The information infrastructure 
OEP relied on for its analytical calculations was called PARM, an acronym for Program 
Analysis for Resource Management. PARM integrated four distinct sets of models: (a) attack 
simulation models, (b-c) damage and vulnerability assessment models, and (d) horizontally 
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disaggregated material flows analysis techniques, input-output (I-O) and network analysis 
models.70 PARM was used for analyzing the vulnerability of the economy and its infrastructures 
to an enemy attack. I-O and network analyses were particularly important in this endeavor as 
they allowed experts to determine the critical flows and nodes whose destruction would result in 
a catastrophic paralysis of the flow of resources in the economy. The second type of materials I 
analyzed were reports and memorandums written between 1963 and 1973. These materials were 
on the emergence of inflation as a mobilization problem and the adaptation of OEP’s analytical 
capabilities to address it from an economic vulnerability standpoint. I traced the activities of 
OEP’s Economic Vulnerability Surveillance group, which was tasked by Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara to monitor mounting inflationary pressures within the economic structure. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, under McNamara’s direction, this group undertook a series of 
targeted interventions in the economy against inflationary price hikes in critical raw materials. 
The instrument used in this intervention was the Critical Materials Stockpile, which was under 
OEP’s purview. Tracing the paper trail produced by this group to the early 1970s, I discovered 
OEP’s preparations for a governmental apparatus to protect the economy from material price 
shocks, an effort that was never fully realized with the dismantling of the agency in 1973. 
The second and third archival trips were undertaken in the summer of 2010 and the fall of 2011. 
In the second trip, I visited the ODM archives in the National Archives at College Park. The 
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main purpose of my visit was to review the NDAC records as this administrative unit was the 
point of origin of OEP’s analytical models. NDAC records, along with the rest of the ODM 
archive for years beyond 1953 were classified and I was denied access. I was, however, granted 
access to materials between 1950 and 1953, which mainly consisted of memos and reports on 
ODM’s industrial dispersal program to reduce the vulnerability of the industrial mobilization 
base to a conventional enemy attack from the air. In the fall of 2011, I designed a third archival 
trip to Princeton University’s Mudd Manuscript Library to circumvent the national security 
firewall. The library’s archival collection contained the papers of one of the members of ODM’s 
Mobilization Program Advisory Committee (MPAC), Douglas Brown. The collection consisted 
of the minutes of MPAC meetings and policy papers discussed in the meetings. The discussion 
and the papers presented a clear picture as to how ODM came to undertake the ambitious task of 
reducing economic vulnerability. 
The final archive that I consulted was the World Bank archive in Washington, D.C.. In this 
archive, I focused on the origins and development of the Bank’s structural adjustment lending 
(SAL) program between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. The SAL program was launched to 
provide liquidity to developing countries affected by the oil and commodity shocks in the 1970s. 
By the early 1980s, it was transformed into a governmental apparatus to reduce the national 
economy’s vulnerability to shocks and was used as a primary policy instrument to prevent the 
repetition of an international debt crisis similar to the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. 
The Bank’s archives was an obvious place to conduct research on economic resilience and 
vulnerability, because the Latin American debt crisis was a significant turning point in the 
trajectory of the concept of systemic risk and vulnerability reduction was at the core of SAL.  In 
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this archive, I analyzed correspondences between the Bank’s top level policymakers, President 
Robert McNamara, Vice Presidents Ernest Stern, Munir Benjenk, Attila Karaosmanoglu, Chief 
Economists Hollis Chenery and Anne Krueger as well as a senior development economist Bella 
Balassa. My analysis of these correspondences pointed me to a series of policy papers that were 
written by Balassa in the early 1980s. These papers contained the blueprints of structural 
adjustment as a governmental technology to reduce economic vulnerability to shocks. 
The data from these archival trips do not feature in this dissertation, but they were valuable for 
two reasons. First and foremost, it played a formative role in the formulation of my overall 
perspective on my project. Analyzing OEP-ODM and the Bank’s efforts to reduce the economy’s 
vulnerability to shocks and their conception of resilience helped me discern that vulnerability, 
resilience and systemic risk are generic categories of economic governance that are fundamental 
to the endeavor to govern the economy in the second half of the 20th century. In this sense, these 
two cases helped me conceive my research within the framework of a broader project on the 
genealogy of economic vulnerability and the governmental technologies to reduce distinct 
vulnerability forms. Thus, I am hoping that the data I collected in these research trips will prove 
to be instrumental in advancing the scope of my project in the future. 
The final stage of my research consisted of locating the primary sources on which the secondary 
literature rested and reconstructing the historical significance of these reports and the conceptual 
artifacts they contained. This entailed reconstructing the intellectual profiles as well as the 
politico-institutional trajectories of the key actors who commissioned and authored the reports. 
As a result, I expanded my research to academic and non-academic papers, speeches, and other 
reports. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of these wide-ranging primary sources, I traced 
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the evolution of metaphors, concepts and problem-makings into problematizations and 
eventually into a stable discourse. Overall, this approach allowed me to provide a sociological 
account of the intellectual world of policymakers and the process through which they reflect on 
problems of collective life.  
Scope.and.Limitations.
There are three major limitations of my approach, and the first two of these stem from the 
challenge of studying a moving target. The first of these two limitations is endemic to the 
historical method. While this method is powerful in locating the objects of analysis within larger 
structures that have been created in longue durée such as governmental layers and apparatuses, 
its analytical capacity is weakened as one approaches the present. This problem is further 
compounded when the object is an emergent form or phenomenon. In the present, the potentially 
significant genealogical threads and sites exponentially increase, and it becomes harder to 
discern which thread and site is significant. The distinction between analysis and prognosis 
becomes murkier and the analyst finds himself in an unavoidable position to deploy the 
“sociological imagination” to draw conclusions on what the future might beget.  
The second limitation of my approach is that the explanation of the emergence of systemic risk is 
restricted to the national scale. This is partially due to the difficulties I experienced in expanding 
my research in the World Bank archive and inability to access the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) archive due to construction work in the archive. More importantly, it is because the 
international aspect of systemic risk has been largely overlooked in the reform efforts since the 
crisis. While IMF has been an important site for thinking on systemic financial crises and 
development of governmental techniques used in systemic risk regulation since the 1980s, it has 
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been sidelined as a regulatory institution. Unsurprisingly, regulators at the Office of Financial 
Research are already facing jurisdictional and technical challenges trying to map out a financial 
system that is tightly embedded within the international financial system. In this respect, it would 
not be a surprise to see the resurrection of IMF as a global systemic risk regulator in the future. 
However, until then, analysts will have to study what there is as opposed to what may happen. 
The final limitation of my approach rests on my focus on “macro” structures such as 
governmental layers and apparatuses as well as regulatory regimes. This approach privileges 
governmental technologies over micro-scale techniques that make up these technologies. An 
approach that centers on techniques would trace the genealogy of analytical modeling techniques 
such as network analysis or statistical analysis techniques such as power laws distributions. As 
the systemic risk regulation regime becomes robust and stable, the importance of undertaking 
such a task will no doubt increase. However, given that the social sciences are largely unfamiliar 
with systemic risk and the object of analysis is not yet stabilized, it was necessary to conduct the 
analysis at the level of governmental technologies first.  
Organization.of.the.Chapters 
The first chapter traces the emergence of a representation of the economy as an object of nominal 
imbalance between the late 1920s and the late 1940s. In this chapter, I argue that the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) System was constructed as a statistical information 
infrastructure. The NIPA System functioned as an interface between policymakers in the state 
and the economic environment surrounding the state, concurrently constituting the economy as 
an object of government intervention. In this respect, the chapter puts forth the argument that the 
economy was invented as an effect of the endeavor on the part of the policymakers to represent 
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the economic environment as the milieu within which the economy exists as an interdependent 
balance of flows and stocks.  
The chapter starts with showing how the business cycles research program of Wesley Mitchell 
and his collaborators at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) was transformed 
into a sectoral substantivist vision of economic governance in the course of the 1920s. This 
transformation was the result of a collaboration between NBER and the Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover to stabilize the business cycle. Both parties were convinced that the cyclical 
fluctuations in economic activity, which produced regular depressions, were the product of the 
accumulation of imbalances in the form of inventories within the firm. Sectoral substantivists, 
therefore, initially sought to address this problem at the level of the firm. While the Department 
of Commerce built an information infrastructure under the auspicious of the Survey of Current 
Business to provide more economic information to companies, NBER proposed to educate 
managers in business management and punish uncalculated excesses of managerial decisions, 
especially in the area of contract cancellations. In the late 1920s, this firm-level vision was 
augmented into a sectoral one. Under Hoover’s initiative, Mitchell and his collaborators were 
brought together in a Committee on Recent Economic Changes to survey the transformation of 
the US economy in the last decade. In the course of this survey, they formulated a substantive 
conceptualization of the economy as a complex and dynamic organism and called for the 
creation of a vantage point from which the substantive imbalances of the economy could be 
monitored. This organism consisted of “vital components” that were represented in their 
substance such as national income, transportation, business, and consumers. This substantive 
approach corresponded to an ambition to represent the economy in its full-empirical detail in the 
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form of flow of substances through the components of the economy and their accumulation in 
these components in the form of stocks. From this perspective, the economy was vulnerable and 
thus prone to depressions because over-accumulation of inventories within the firm as well as 
overinvestment in certain sectors resulted in sectoral imbalances that periodically burst and led to 
disruptive spirals resulting in depressions. 
The rest of the chapter shows how this substantive representation was abstracted into a nominal 
one in the aftermath of the Great Depression. This abstraction was made by Simon Kuznets of 
NBER and Robert Nathan and his colleagues at the National Income Division of the Commerce 
Department. In the hands of Kuznets and Nathan, the first national income tables of the US 
economy were constructed as a vertically aggregated representation of the substantive flows and 
stocks of the economy. In this vertically aggregated form, each vital component of the economy 
was represented in nominal money terms in the form of double-entry bookkeeping, which had 
been utilized in the firm to represent the firm’s nominal balances of profit and loss. What was 
novel about this way of representing the economy was the ability of this new statistical tool to 
unconceal the nominal imbalances between vital components of the economy. As a result, it 
allowed policymakers to determine whether the depression and subsequent stagnation was the 
result of underconsumption or overproduction. In this new way of thinking about economic 
imbalances, the vulnerability of the economy was reframed as an imbalance between the 
consumption and production components of the economy. The creation of the NIPA System in 
the 1940s materialized this conceptualization in the form of a statistical interface through which 
policymakers could now monitor and intervene in the nominal imbalances of the economy on an 
ongoing basis and prevent them before they unfolded into depressions.  
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The second chapter analyzes the establishment of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) as 
the vantage point to govern the substantive imbalances of the economy in the late 1930s. The 
chapter first demonstrates the connection between the Committee of Recent Economic Changes 
and the project to transform the executive branch into a governmental space in the form of EOP. 
In this process, the problem of imbalance was rearticulated as a problem that is not simply 
economic, but also political. Reunited once again in a Committee on Social Trends in the early 
1930s, Mitchell and his collaborators’ undertook a survey of the changes the American society 
underwent since the turn of the century and argued that in the absence of administrative reforms 
the economy would remain ungovernable. Under the Roosevelt administration, this warning led 
to two developments that would prove to be critical. First, an internal debate on how to govern 
was launched and eventually resulted in the institution of EOP. From this perspective, EOP was 
seen as a governmental space that would host administrative machineries that would allow the 
executive to govern the economy through governmental apparatuses. In this sense, the creation 
of EOP signified the constitution of a new political ontology. This ontology built on a 
governmental vision that rested on governing the economy with the help of objects such as 
machineries, devices and apparatuses.  
The second outcome of the findings of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes was the 
creation of the National Resources Committee (NRC), which was inserted into the EOP under 
the auspicious of the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) in 1939. Staffed with Mitchell 
et al., NRC was supposed to realize the dream of monitoring the economy’s hidden sectoral 
imbalances. Mitchell’s sectoral substantivist vision, however, was transformed into macro-
substantivism in the hands of Gardiner Means in NRC. While Means also subscribed to the 
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organic conceptualization of the economy and shared the ambition to represent the economy in 
its full-substantive detail, he located the vulnerability of the economy in the price system. 
According to Means, the economy, in its ideal form, was a resilient entity that was supposed to 
be able to recover from depressions in economic activity on its own. He believed, however, that 
with the rise of modern corporations this object had lost its resilience. The underlying reason for 
this was the inflexibility of prices of certain commodities that played a critical role within the 
economic system. For Means, economic vulnerability, therefore, was an imbalance within the 
business cycle that was caused by critical price inflexibilities that posited systemic importance. 
Finally, I show that having been equipped with this new form of vulnerability analysis, NRC was 
inserted into the EOP as the administrative machinery of an economic emergency early warning 
and mitigation apparatus. The chapter ends with the defunding of NRPB and the transfer of its 
emergency mitigation functions to the Bureau of the Budget, whose Planning Branch would 
eventually become the administrative machinery of the fiscal apparatus in the postwar period.  
The third chapter demonstrates the rise of fiscal nominalism at the expense of macro and sectoral 
forms of substantivism. In this chapter, I argue that fiscal nominalism combined the emergency 
mitigation approach of substantivism with a structural vulnerability reduction strategy. I focus on 
the intellectual trajectory of Gerhard Colm, the chief economist of the Council of Economic 
Advisors, in the post-Great Depression period. I argue that Colm was not only one of the chief 
technicians of fiscal nominalism, but also a highly skilled policy entrepreneur. Coming out of 
German structuralism, he was a pioneer in theorizing about deploying the government budget as 
a fiscal policy instrument to resolve the structural maladjustments in the economy. As a key actor 
in the Planning Branch of the Budget Bureau, he played a key role in the institution of the fiscal 
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apparatus as the primary policy instrument to balance the economy nominally.  
The final part of this chapter undertakes a detailed analysis of the annual reports of CEA between 
1947 and 1954. I show that in these reports, which were prepared under the direction of Colm, 
one can discern the existence of a subdomain of macroeconomic governance that takes its 
objective and object of intervention as economic resilience and vulnerability. In these reports, the 
problem of imbalance was reframed explicitly under the concept of vulnerability to shocks. Of 
particular importance in this reproblematization was the analysis of how shocks propagate 
through the structure of the economy in the form of a chain reaction that result in deflationary 
spirals. For fiscal nominalists, while these chain reactions were triggered by the bursting of 
sectoral imbalances, the underlying cause for depressions were “cumulative forces” that 
reinforced the depressive effects of a given shock on the economy. To counter such forces, fiscal 
nominalists outlined an emergency preparedness and prevention strategy that rested on what they 
called “arresting forces.” First, the New Deal reforms were reinterpreted as an effort to build into 
the economy “shock absorbers” and “institutional dampers” that were supposed to enhance the 
economy’s resilience. While measures such as automatic fiscal stabilizers absorbed shocks, 
institutional precautionary reforms such as Glass-Steagall’s firewalls and risk suppressors 
lowered the probability of depressions. Finally, discretionary fiscal policy would be used both as 
a vulnerability reduction instrument in advance of depressions and as an emergency mitigation 
instrument to neutralize cumulative forces. This vision of economic vulnerability, which can 
only be rivaled by the imaginative power of magical realism, conceived the economy to be such 
a vulnerable object that the crash of a price boom in a single commodity such as wheat could 
trigger a deflationary chain reaction, resulting in a depression. In contrast to this firm belief of 
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the fiscal nominalists in the vulnerability of the economy, however, members of congress, who 
held the ultimate power in the deployment of discretionary fiscal policies in emergencies, did not 
share this governmental vision. As a result, the fiscal apparatus was born with a serious design 
deficiency, the inability to deploy it as a vulnerability reduction instrument in normal times.  
The final chapter traces the emergence of the monetary apparatus as a response to this critical 
deficiency in the administration of the fiscal apparatus. In this chapter, I show that systemic risk 
was invented as a homologous governmental problem to fiscal nominalism’s deflationary chain-
reactions. For monetary nominalists such as Arthur Burns, the vulnerability of the economy 
resided in the financial system as opposed to an imbalance between consumption and production 
components of the economy. From this perspective, the Great Depression specifically and 
depressions generally were the result of the inability (and unwillingness) of the Fed to mitigate 
general liquidity crises in the banking sector. I demonstrate that in the mid-1960s, policymakers 
in the Fed invented a new type of liquidity crisis. Despite being limited in its scope, unless it was 
contained and mitigated they believed its consequences would be crippling for the financial 
system. At the heart of limited liquidity crises were the short-term liquidity markets such as 
money markets that financial institutions were becoming increasingly dependent upon to finance 
their lending activities. Liquidity crunches in these markets were potentially dangerous because 
in these markets and the payment and settlement systems they depended on, previously unrelated 
banks became interconnected. The inability of one firm to settle its liabilities with its 
counterparties would unleash a chain reaction that would bring the entire financial system and 
the economy down with it.  
The response of the Fed to this new problem was the institution of an emergency lending 
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program in 1970. This program rested on the assumption that systemic risk could be managed 
through a crisis management strategy. The chapter shows a series of reforms that were 
undertaken to make this strategy more effective between the 1980s and the late 1990s. I argue 
that because policymakers conceived systemic risk as a problem that stemmed from idiosyncratic 
failures on the part of firms to manage their risks effectively, they refused to take into 
consideration the possibility of reducing the vulnerability of the financial system to shocks. Only 
when the financial emergency mitigation strategy failed in the course of the financial crisis of 
2008, they were convinced that to govern systemic risk one would first have to reduce the 





“Discipline works in an empty, artificial space that is to be completely 
constructed. Security will rely on a number of material givens. It will […] 
work on site with the flow of water, islands, air, and so forth. Thus it works 
on a given. This given will not be reconstructed to arrive at a point of 
perfection, as in a disciplinary town. It is simply a matter of maximizing the 
positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and 
of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and diseases, while 
knowing that they will never be completely suppressed. One will therefore 
work not only on natural givens, but also on quantities that can be 
relatively, but never wholly reduced.” 
- Michel Foucault, 197871 
 
Introduction.
The emergence of liberal biopolitical government in the United States coincided with two 
remarkable developments that took place in the beginning of the 1920s. First, one of the most 
severe depressions in the history of the US occurred in 1920. This depression is scarcely 
remembered today as it was overshadowed by the Great Depression of the 1930s. Despite its 
faint impact on the US collective memory, it resulted in the sharpest deflation in prices in the US 
history and left 1.6 million people unemployed in the midst of a severe winter.72 Second, the 
decennial Federal Population Census, conducted the same year, revealed that for the first time 
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72 According to National Climatic Data Center, the average temperature in January and February 1920 were as low 
as 10.5 and 17.5° F.  See http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/time-series/us/30/00/tmp/p12/02/1920-
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the urban population in the US accounted for more than half of the population.73  
Under the initiative of the new Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover and economist Wesley 
Mitchell, a coalition of reformers responded to these developments with the launch of a liberal 
reform program to prevent depressions. This effort was rooted in the following assumption: 
Market mechanism was a very effective political technology that had not only put an end to the 
twin problems of chronic shortages and scarcity in commodities, but also generated wealth and 
prosperity at a great scale. These actors nevertheless recognized that the susceptibility of the free 
enterprise system to severe periodic booms and busts in the form of cyclical fluctuations in 
economic activity. In industrialized urban society, depressions posed a biopolitical problem that 
threatened not only prosperity, but also the wellbeing of the population. In the 20th century, 
population-wide famines, caused by food shortages and scarcity, ceased to be a critical problem 
as it had been in the earlier phases of capitalism. This catastrophe risk, instead, was replaced by 
the risk of massive unemployment in the event of a depression. In the absence of income 
generating employment opportunities, a substantial portion of the population would lose its 
access to food and shelter and face the threat of starvation in the midst of plenty. The central 
problem of liberal government, therefore, was no longer how to create prosperity, but how to 
maintain it and protect the population from depressions.74  
This chapter first traces the assemblage of the sectoral substantivist layer of government in 
response to the biopolitical problem of depressions in the 1920s. It then illustrates the emergence 
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of nominalism as a new governmental layer in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Within the 
substantivist layer, the economy was conceived as a complex, dynamic and yet unstable 
organism, composed of vital components such as production, consumption, and transportation. 
Each component was characterized as a domain that consisted of substantive resources and was 
represented in its full qualitative and quantitative detail. Economic activities in these components 
brought into being a two-level flow pattern and resulted in the accumulation of these flows in the 
form of stocks in different parts of the economy. At one level, material goods and services 
flowed all the way from raw materials producers to end consumers. The second level consisted 
of nominal income and prices and moved in the opposite direction. Nominalism abstracted the 
nominal elements of the substantivist conceptualization of the economy and represented it as an 
interlocking nominal income flows and stocks that were vertically aggregated in money terms. 
Each sector of the economy was described only numerically in terms of the total aggregate 
income it produced and consumed in the course of functionally defined economic activities such 
as production, consumption and investment.  
I make three arguments in this chapter. The first argument is that sectoral substantivists invented 
economic vulnerability in the late 1920s as an ontologically distinct form of economic pathology, 
orthogonal to the cyclical fluctuations of the business cycle. Within this problematization, the 
underlying cause of depressions was identified as inter- and intra-sectoral imbalances that were 
hidden beneath the surface of prosperity. According to sectoral substantivists, these imbalances 
were the result of over-accumulation of inventories within the firm and overinvestment of capital 
in certain sectors. Depressions, in turn, were problematized as the consequence of a deflationary 
spiral that was unleashed by a sudden liquidation of these excesses. Under the ensuing panic, the 
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spiral would propagate from one sector to another and force perfectly sound companies into fire 
sales and even bankruptcy, yielding a sharp decline in prices, output and employment. Since 
sectoral imbalances were not visible to the managers in the firm, in the late 1920s substantivists 
came to the conclusion that the catastrophe risk of a depression could not be prevented solely by 
performing the behavior of managers, and hence reprogramming the market, as they advocated 
earlier in the decade.75 As an alternative, they called for a vantage point from which the state 
would monitor and obviate emergent imbalances through a “technique of balance” before they 
triggered a deflationary spiral.76  
The second and third arguments are that nominalists reproblematized economic vulnerability as 
an imbalance between production and consumption and remolded the sectoral imbalance 
problematization into a nominal form. On the basis of this folding, they constructed the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) System as an information infrastructure that represented 
the economy as a balance of nominal flows and stocks. As an interface between the state and the 
economy, the NIPA System rendered these entities visible and allowed policymakers to monitor 
                                                
75 I borrow the term “programming” from Foucault. In the 1978 lectures, Foucault characterized the introduction of 
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describes phenomenon of calculation at the level of the individuals and techniques of calculation, the latter refers to 
the economy as a whole. Programming, however, operates at the level of governmental apparatuses, political 
technologies, and mechanisms of security. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 41; Michel Callon, “The 
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the emergent vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis and intervene in a timely fashion. The NIPA 
System, therefore, was assembled as an essential element of the fiscal apparatus that was 
designed by nominalists to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to shocks.  
The significance of this chapter for the broader genealogy of economic vulnerability and 
systemic risk lies in the two alternative governmental strategies that substantivists deployed to 
prevent depressions in the early and the late 1920s. As articulated in the 1923 report of the 
Business Cycles Committee and the 1929 report of the Committee on Recent Economic 
Changes, these strategies proposed to format the economy in orthogonal ways that were in 
tension with each other. The 1923 report called for reprogramming the market mechanism by 
performing economic actors in the firm in two ways: by providing more information to managers 
and encouraging them to adopt business planning techniques, or by recalibrating their interests 
by punishing them with monetary penalties in the case of failing to honor their contracts. In the 
1929 report, however, we find an attempt to provide a supplementary alternative strategy, i.e. 
counteracting economic imbalances by the means of a technique of balance in the hands of the 
government. Rather than modifying the market mechanism, this was a proposal to undertake 
strategic and targeted interventions in parts of the economy that posed the risk of a catastrophe 
risk to collective life. Effectively, this latter strategy sought to address excesses that the market 
mechanism could not prevent and intervene directly in the resulting imbalances. 
In the case of systemic risk there is a similar tension between strategies that would reprogram 
financial markets and those that would reduce the vulnerability of the financial system. On the 
one hand, two groups of actors propose to reduce systemic risk by reprogramming the market at 
the level of the firm. Gerard Corrigan of the Goldman Sachs’ Counterparty Risk Group and their 
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financial engineer alias, most notably Robert Merton, hold systemic risk tantamount to 
counterparty risk. They argue that systemic risk can be minimized by providing information to 
economic actors on the risks their counterparties pose to them. NYU Stern Volatility Lab group 
takes a second approach to reprogramming the market. They reduce systemic risk to a negative 
externality that is caused by reckless risk taking on the part of economic actors. If they can be 
penalized for their deviations from sound and prudent risk management schemes, they argue 
systemic risk would diminish to insignificant levels. In order to do this they propose a systemic 
risk tax for firms that pose excessive risk to the system and propose to calculate this risk based 
on a systemic risk index for individual firms. Both of these strategies, therefore, resemble the 
Business Cycle’s Committee’s 1923 report’s answers to the risks that either ignorant or 
overambitious economic actors posed to society. Moments of both the early 1920s and the 2000s 
see information and monetary penalties as solutions to an economic malaise that can be 
minimized by a reprogrammed market mechanism. In contrast, the 1929 report and the structural 
vulnerability problematization of systemic risk offer a supplementary programming mechanism 
that is centered on reducing the weaknesses within the milieu they propose to stabilize. In this 
sense, Hoover’s two commissions can be seen as a vantage point from which one can trace the 
tension between two mechanisms of security that complement each other at moments when 
adjustment by the means of the market mechanism alone cannot resolve economic 
maladjustment. 
The first part of the chapter analyzes sectoral substantivist strategy to reduce economic 
vulnerability. It first focuses on the 1923 report of the Business Cycles Committee and delineates 
Hoover and Mitchell’s efforts to stabilize the business cycle. The chapter then turns to the 1929 
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report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes and details a mutation that led to a 
fundamental modification in the substantivist strategy. It analyzes the emergence of a new 
problematization of economic instability in the form of substantive imbalances within the 
economy as opposed to cyclical fluctuations. This new framing necessitated a new security 
mechanism that required a detailed understanding of the sectoral structure of the economy, the 
flows and stocks that constitute it, and the imbalances within and between sectors. While this 
mechanism would not replace the market mechanism and information-based planning targeting 
the firm, it envisioned the creation of a vantage point within the state to monitor the totality of 
flows and stocks within the economy. The governmental rationality upon which this vantage 
point would be established was articulated around the discourse of (im)balance and would 
become the foundational logic of economic government, i.e. vulnerability, in the next two 
decades. By reducing the cycle to the total balance of a multitude of forces, the Committee was 
giving the first signals of the emergence of a new way of governing in the form of reducing 
vulnerability-inducing imbalances as opposed to stabilizing the business cycle.  
The rest of the chapter traces the abstraction of the economy as a balance of nominal flows. It 
starts with a series of Senate hearings that were held in 1931 regarding the creation of a National 
Economic Council in response to the Great Depression. These hearings were a critical juncture in 
the genealogy of economic vulnerability. One of the significant outcomes of the hearings was a 
report by Simon Kuznets that contained the first national income tables for the US economy 
using reliable data for the first time.77 These tables measured the impact of the depression on 
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national income. The National Income Division of the Commerce Department developed these 
tables into an information infrastructure that represented the macroeconomic structure underlying 
the economy as described by Keynes and other macroeconomists of the 1930s. This 
infrastructure provided policymakers and economists inside and outside government with a 
complex statistical representation of the economy and its structure of nominal balance. This new 
vantage point made visible the weaknesses in the consumption and production components of the 
economy and thereby enabled policymakers to conceive of the vulnerability of the economy as a 
nominal imbalance between these components. This was a radical break from the substantivist 
conceptualization of economic vulnerability. The implication was that the locus of intervention 
would move from the managerial and production processes taking place within the firm to the 
flow and accumulation of income at the scale of the national economy. 
The.Birth.of.the.Economy.as.a.Balance.of.Flows.
The presidency of Herbert Hoover is often associated with laissez faire capitalism. A wave of 
historical scholarship since the mid-1980s, however, demonstrated this legacy to be a 
misrepresentation of Hoover’s term both as Secretary of Commerce in the 1920s and as President 
later in the decade. Hoover, an engineer himself, was indeed an ardent proponent of planning and 
economic expertise in government. The relationship between his and Roosevelt’s terms, 
therefore, can better be described as one of relative continuity, rather than a rupture and 
opposition, with respect to economic governance.78 What made this continuity possible was the 
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sectoral substantivist experts conglomerated around Wesley Mitchell, the pioneer of business 
cycles research, at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).79 Substantivists 
conceived the economy as a totality of substances that take the form of material and nominal 
flows and the accumulation of these flows in the form of stocks in the economy, most notably the 
firm. Building on this conceptualization of the economy, they problematized economic 
vulnerability as an imbalance within and between sectors, caused by the overproduction and 
hence accumulation of stock of goods in the firm as well as the overinvestment in certain sectors.  
Sectoral substantivism was formulated and implemented in two contemporaneous and partnering 
institutional settings, NBER and Department of Commerce (DOC), in the 1920s. NBER was the 
product of an emerging consensus within the economics profession on the need for a private 
research institute to garner and distribute economic statistics. The idea of establishing such an 
institution was initially proposed in late 1918 by Irving Fisher, the President of the American 
Economics Association, who was already publishing weekly price indexes at his Index Number 
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Institute.80 The creation of NBER, however, was undertaken by Mitchell and Edwin Gay, the 
first Dean of the Harvard Business School, in 1920. Having directed the federal government’s 
Central Statistics Bureau in the course of the war mobilization during World War I, Mitchell and 
Gay considered statistics a governmental technology to render the booms and busts of the 
business cycle visible and hence a way to make this economic pathology a governable 
phenomenon.81 
Hoover’s crusade to turn the state into a body responsible for governing economic activity 
echoed the ambitions of Mitchell and Gay. When Hoover became Commerce Secretary in 1921, 
the US was still in the midst of the depression of 1920. During his time in office, he reorganized 
the department and turned it into a governmental machinery that produced vast amounts of 
information on business conditions. Like Mitchell, he also wanted the state to play the role of an 
impartial supplier of economic information to business. If government could mediate between 
firms by collecting and distributing information, then the business cycle could be stabilized.82 
The assumption behind this strategy was that periodic booms of overproduction and busts of 
underconsumption were the result of sub-rational decisions made on the part of the managers in 
the firm. If they had access to adequate information on the business conditions surrounding them, 
they would make better decisions and instability would be curtailed. More information would 
realign the outcomes produced by the individual decisions of economic actors toward a desirable 
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aggregate outcome for the collectivity. This view presupposed that instability resulted from a 
deficiency in actors’ calculative capabilities and consequently that instability was not the norm, 
but a pathological state of affairs. By providing information, government could reprogram the 
market mechanism so that the gap between how it was supposed to work and how it did work 
could be closed. What Hoover and Mitchell wanted to do was essentially to wrap the market with 
a governmental apparatus and, thereby, as Eyal and Levy argue, perform the decision-making 
processes of managers and businessmen in the firm.83 
Hoover took two major steps in this direction. First, he established the Survey of Current 
Business as the monthly publication of the department. The first issue of the Survey, published in 
July 1921, made it clear that it was not just an ordinary publication. It was an information 
infrastructure that facilitated the distribution of information in the realm of business. The first 
issue, a total of 55 pages, contained only a single page of text; the rest consisted of tables with 
quantitative data referred to as “index numbers,” similar to Fisher’s. The introduction to the 
document described the underlying rationale for publishing such “a large volume of information” 
as to “assist in the enlargement of business judgment.” The authors hoped that “[t]hese index 
numbers [would] enable the reader to see at a glance the general upward or downward tendency 
of a movement, which can not so easily be grasped from actual figures.”84 According to Hoover, 
it would “aid the individual business firms in basing their policies upon fact, and to stabilize 
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business in general through proper coordination of production, prices, stocks, etc..”85 
The second initiative was the establishment of the Committee on Unemployment and the 
Business Cycles in early 1922. The Business Cycles Committee was the outcome of a conference 
on unemployment that Hoover organized in October in response to worsening economic 
conditions earlier that year. As Guy Alchon, the first historian to discern the significance of 
Hoover’s efforts, noted, the Unemployment Conference and the Committees that were formed 
following it constituted the second and more proactive instrument through which Hoover 
attempted to perform the market. The establishment of the Committee signified the assemblage 
of a skeletal substantivist network of expertise that brought together business leaders, 
progressive reformers, Taylorite efficiency engineers, and business cycle experts. This network 
included Owen D. Young, Chairman of General Electric; Joseph H. Defrees, former President of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Clarence M. Woolley, President of the American Radiator 
Company; Mary Van Kleeck, Director of the Industrial Studies Division at the Russell Sage 
Foundation; and Mathew Woll, Vice President of the American Federation of Labor. Its 
secretary was Edward E. Hunt, a Taylorite who was one of Hoover’s closest assistants. The task 
of technical investigation was assigned to Mitchell and Gay. This network, in principle, would 
allow the substantivist apparatus to reprogram the firm on the basis of statistical information 
collected on economic conditions. This would enhance efficiency and thereby increase the 
productive capacity of the business enterprise, minimizing the waste of economic resources, 
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including that of human labor in the form of unemployment.86 
The recommendations of the Committee were announced in April 1923. At the heart of the 
Committee’s report was the need for “more informed action by individual businessmen in 
periods of rising markets in order that excessive expansion may be prevented and the extent of 
the decline reduced.”87 The report demonstrated its point through a hypothetical scenario based 
on two shoe manufacturers at the peak of a boom. The first manufacturer, the report said, “knew 
the industry was over-expanded but he lacked any basis for judging how to handle his business at 
[such a] time.” In the name of conservative business practice, he put in orders for raw materials 
in a state of panic, willing to pay any price. The other, in contrast, “convinced himself through a 
study of conditions that his orders were inflated and that it would be unwise to cover with raw 
materials.” Instead of ordering more, he cut his already placed orders further down. The result, 
according to the scenario, was the following: While the former had to liquidate his inventory at 
an enormous loss, the latter was able to make the purchase for his requirements at much lower 
prices after the bust. The report underlined the distinction between informed, rational economic 
action and unplanned, reactive action based on speculative instincts and emotions:  
It was not because one of these managers was conservative that he was more successful in coping 
with the problem of cyclical losses. […] [T]he manager who knew and acted with reference to the 
fundamental facts of the relationship of his particular business to his industry who had a sound 
knowledge of general business conditions from study of statistical data of trade generally was 
able, to a large extent, through policies planned in 1919 and 1920, to avoid the difficulties of 1921, 
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while the manager who ran his business without reference to such factors was gambling in his 
most important decisions.88 
In the Committee’s view, the problem in the case of business cycles was not simply the loss of 
profits or bankruptcy of an individual firm as a consequence of its failure to plan for future 
contingencies. The Committee claimed that “the widespread uncertainty caused by cancellation 
of orders” played a critical role in the formation of the cycle. While from a collective standpoint 
contract cancellations were unacceptable, from the firm’s perspective, it was inevitable as “many 
businessmen faced the alternative of cancellation or bankruptcy.” There were two main courses 
of action to prevent such a situation. The first was to provide more information to firms and to 
educate economic actors so that they acted rationally in their business plans, which was also the 
intended purpose of the Survey!. The second was the introduction of “definite and substantial 
penalties for cancelation” in order to realign managers’ incentives so that they would be 
compelled to plan in advance. In both instances, the report was proposing to reprogram the 
market by performing the decision-making structure of economic actors at the scale of the firm.89  
While reprogramming of the market was the central mechanism proposed by the Committee for 
the “prevention of widespread unemployment through the control of extreme fluctuations of the 
business cycle,” the Committee also suggested other means that could generally be called 
counter-cyclical intervention mechanisms, namely the control of credit expansion, of inflation 
and of public and private construction, an unemployment insurance scheme, and public works 
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construction during depressions.90 The significance of these alternative schemes was the fact that 
mechanisms that were external to the market, but nevertheless that would work along it were 
being proposed as mechanisms of security for governing the flow of things within the socio-
political space called the nation. The purpose of these mechanisms, however, was to moderate 
periodic cyclical fluctuations and mitigate the depressions these fluctuations resulted in. They 
were not designed to prevent the accumulation of imbalances and thereby reduce the 
vulnerability of the economy in an anticipatory mode in advance of a depression. In this sense, 
they were insurance mechanisms designed to counteract the failure of economic actors to act 
rationally or to ameliorate a given situation of depression ex post facto. Countercyclical 
measures, thus, were secondary mechanisms that supplemented the primary mechanism of 
performing the market to mitigate the excesses of a money economy whose stability primarily 
rested on the ability of economic actors in the firm to manage their own affairs rationally. Only 
in the late 1920s, Mitchell and his collaborators began to envision a security mechanism that 
addressed imbalances as an orthogonal form of pathology to that of cyclical fluctuations. 
The pinnacle of Hoover’s planning initiatives was the Committee on Recent Economic Changes, 
which was also organized by the Conference on Unemployment. In the 1929 report of the 
Committee, one finds not only what is most likely to be one of the first explicit 
conceptualizations of the economy as an object that is a hybrid of growth and vulnerability, but 
also a call for a “technique of balance” to govern the economy.  The Committee was organized in 
1927 with the purpose of conducting an investigation into “the foundations of [the uninterrupted 
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period of] prosperity” that the US had been enjoying since 1921.91 This investigation was not 
going to be a celebratory one however. On the contrary, Hoover was concerned that such an 
unusual period of prosperity could be covering over hidden threats to stability. The implication 
of the acknowledgement of the existence of hidden pockets of imbalances was that the firm-
centered approach of substantivism had to be modified into a sectoral-focused form. Since it was 
not possible for economic actors in the firm to discern such imbalances from the positions they 
held within the market, sectoral substantivism proposed the creation of a vantage point from 
which government would monitor intra- and inter-sectoral imbalances. This vulnerability 
surveillance approach would allow the early detection of emergent imbalances before they burst 
and the government to take precautionary measures to obviate them, prolonging periods of 
prosperity.  
The most significant accomplishment of the Business Cycles Committee had been to initiate a 
colossal project within the federal government to collect statistical information on economic 
conditions. In contrast, the new organization was not just supposed to produce knowledge. It was 
also intended to be the first step toward the development of what the Committee would call in its 
1929 report a “technique of balance.” As Alchon points out, the Committee pointed to the 
possibility of a shift in the strategy of economic governance that was developed under Hoover in 
the 1920s.92 According to Hunt, it was a perfect opportunity to transform this machinery of 
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indicative planning into a “genuine scientific national planning” apparatus. In Hunt’s mind, the 
apparatus could be put under the control of a “National Planning Board.” The Board would be 
led by disinterested senior private citizens and policymakers interested in public affairs and 
would have a staff composed of economic and engineering experts.93 
The organizational structure of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes was exactly the 
same as its predecessor.94 The backbone of the technical staff, headed by Mitchell and Gay, was 
composed of NBER affiliated academic economists. A noteworthy addition was Julius Klein, the 
director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce at the Department of Commerce, as 
well as policy economists from the Fed. Apart from these, Edwin Nourse and Morris Copeland 
were now on the NBER roster.95 Nourse became the first-ever Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors under the Truman administration, and Copeland became a valuable member 
of Simon Kuznets’s Wealth and Income Studies Group at NBER in the mid-1930s and developed 
flow of funds accounts in the late 1940s as a supplementary information infrastructure that has 
been used by the Fed to this day. The absence of Van Kleeck was indicative of the shape the 
substantivist project was taking in the late 1920s. Van Kleeck’s departure signified the insistence 
of substantivists to construe unemployment a secondary problem that was the residual effect of 
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market inefficiencies. More importantly, it signaled that within the sectoral substantivist project, 
the primary economic problem would be framed as the depressions triggered by the collapse of 
economic imbalances and not unemployment as a fundamental problem in and of itself.  
The Committee’s final report was completed in May 1929, only six months before the Great 
Crash of 1929. It consisted of two main parts, mirroring the organizational structure of the 
Committee. The first part was the Presidential Report, authored by Hunt. It consisted of three 
sections, one characterizing the period between 1922 and 1929, another on prices, wages and the 
cost of living, and finally a section on “economic balance.” The second part was the technical 
report and contained twelve substantive chapters, an introduction by Gay and a review essay by 
Mitchell. Each chapter was on what Gay called the “chief component elements” of a “shifting, 
dynamic complex.” The component elements of this “living organism” were national income, 
consumption, industry, construction, agriculture, transportation, management and labor, prices, 
money and credit, marketing, and foreign markets. Thus, national income within the substantivist 
layer was only one element within many. 
Two interrelated themes in Gay’s introduction were noteworthy. The first one was the idea of the 
economy as a “living organism.” According to Gay, as the Industrial Revolution had 
demonstrated, the development of this organism was not based on “sudden burst[s] of 
[economic] activity,” but rather on “organic growth.” While “the strength and stability of [the] 
financial structure [of the U.S.], both governmental and commercial, [was] of modern growth,” 
this growth, nevertheless, was not limitless. To the contrary, there were concrete physical and 
non-physical limits to the expansion of the organism. In Gay’s words,  
[t]he resources of the country, still enormous, are no longer regarded as limitless; the labor of the 
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world is no longer invited freely to exploit them. The capital flow has turned outward; private and 
public interests and responsibilities have a new world-wide scope. These changes must have far-
reaching consequences and entail further and more perplexing adjustments. 
As this quote makes it clear, the Committee had not yet conceptualized the economy as an 
abstract and purely nominal object that can grow infinitely as Keynes and others would in the 
coming years.96 The genealogical significance of this hybrid conceptualization, therefore, was 
not the nature of growth in itself, but the maladjustments this growth under limits resulted in. 
The second theme concerned the growth-maladjustment tension. Expansion had often brought 
with it serious maladjustments that resulted in “swings of prosperity and business depression.” 
What caused maladjustment was the phenomenon of “unbalance.” “[T]he rapidity and vigor of 
growth of some elements [was] so great as seriously to unbalance the whole organism.” The cries 
for “stability,” in Gay’s opinion, were actually a symptom of this anomaly. The task ahead, 
therefore, was to address the social concerns such imbalances created.97 In addition to this, he 
made two warnings. First, because of the need to break this organic whole into its elements, the 
survey might obscure “the reality of [the] interlocking relationships of all the parts.” Second, due 
to the status of NBER as “a purely fact-finding organization,” the report was not a study of the 
business cycle, but a representation of “the recent economic experiences of the United States.”98 
As we will see below, the work of Kuznets and his colleagues would radically diverge from this 
organicism and would represent not the “economic experiences,” but the structure of nominal 
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flows of the economy in an abstract manner. Moreover, this abstraction would reify the economy 
and its functional components and render a vast portion of the statistical information garnered by 
substantivists obsolete for purposes of governing the economy.  
A similar discourse about economic balance was also taken up in the Presidential report. Indeed, 
the section on “economic balance” constituted the heart of the two reports as a whole and 
provided the logic for the seemingly random choice of chapter topics in the technical report. 
Before moving on to a discursive analysis, I should note that the report referred to the idea of an 
economic balance in reference to the object that the Presidential report eventually ended up 
calling “the economy” at the very end—this particular enunciation might very well be the first 
time the notion was put into writing in the English language.99 The idea of economic balance was 
an older notion that was used in reference to the balance between new thriving industries and 
dying ones in the American context.100 What made this enunciation distinct was the 
generalization of the problem of balance from an intra-sectoral problem within the industrial 
system to the relationships between the “component elements” of the economic organism.  
The idea of economic balance in the form of the “material balances of the national economy” 
was also used in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and was institutionalized as a governmental 
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apparatus in the form of total economic planning around the same time the report was written. 
Administered by the Soviet central planning agency, Gosplan, total planning was a substantivist 
way of governing. Rather than minimizing sectoral imbalances that posed a catastrophe risk, it 
focused on maximizing the material balances of the economy to enhance its productive 
capacity.101 The novelty of the American idea of balance, therefore, was that it was a dynamic 
understanding of the behavior of an autonomous system with a propensity for growth as well as a 
pattern of volatile booms and busts. Within Soviet substantivism, material balancing was an 
essential step in maximizing physical output of the industrial system. Within its American 
counterpart, however, the conceptualization of the economy as a balance of flows underscored 
the causal link between the catastrophe risk of a depression and the inter- and intra-sectoral 
imbalances accumulating in the economy. Thus, the objective of balancing within a liberal 
political ontology was to ensure the stability of flows by reducing their vulnerability.  
According to the report, the survey of American economic life illuminated “the outstanding fact 
[…] that [the US could] not maintain [its] economic advantage […] unless [it] consciously 
accept[ed] the principle of equilibrium and appl[ied] it in every economic relation.” The report 
warned that “the forces that [bore] upon our economic relationships [had] been always 
sensitive.” Furthermore, “[a]ll parts of our economic structure from the prime processes of 
making and of marketing to the facilitating functions of finance, were and [had] been 
interdependent and easily affected.” The danger the US was facing was the risk that “through 
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ignorance of economic principles, or through selfish greed, or inadequate leadership, the steady 
balance [would] be disturbed.” Particular problems that could cause such disturbance were 
wasteful uses of natural resources, financial speculation, a disregard for collective interests on 
the part of both labor and management, and the manipulation of commodity prices to a degree 
that could lead to imbalances between different commodities.102 While these specific themes 
were also present in the Business Cycles Committee’s 1923 report, now these elements are seen 
here as instances of a sui generis pathology of the market economy, i.e. economic imbalance.  
While the Committee was hopeful in light of the scientific and technological advances of the last 
decade, especially in the area of the balance of consumption and production, it identified the 
primary problem that the leadership needed to address as “maintain[ing] this balance and […] 
extend[ing] it into fields which [were] not [yet] in balance with the more prosperous elements of 
the nation.” This could be done by developing what the report called “a technique of balance.” 
Such a technique could be used for “the maintenance of equilibrium.” Such a task, however, 
required “a general knowledge of the relations of the parts to each other. Only through incessant 
observation and adjustment of our economy,” asserted the Committee, “can we learn to maintain 
the economic balance.” 103 (Emphasis added.) It noted that this could be accomplished by the 
very experts who had prepared the technical report.  
From the new macroeconomic perspective of the post-1930s, the conceptualization of the 
economy one finds in the Report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes would appear 
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to be a hodgepodge of economic trends and activities without any theoretical basis. The report 
represented the economy as a geographical space containing two intrinsic continuous flows, one 
material and the other nominal. While the former started from nature in the form of raw materials 
and reached all the way to consumers whose “appetite for goods and services [was seemingly] 
insatiable,” the latter, actually a cycle, flowed from consumers to producers and vice versa in the 
form of wages. This substantivist representation of the economy was just too messy for the 
macroeconomists of nominal balance. Under the macroeconomic conceptualization of the 
economy, economists were able to abstract nominal flows from material ones and represent the 
structure of the economy in the form of a set of equations consisting of aggregate 
macroeconomic variables each of which was a proxy for one of the components of the economy. 
Once the economy was conceived in this way, economists would be no longer concerned with 
matters pertinent to the internal affairs of the firm and focus on economic problems from a 
formal point of view. This vision not only saw things in aggregated magnitudes and statistical 
averages, but also filtered out substantive qualities of economic entities governed. As a 
consequence, the substantivist conceptualization came to be construed as a “measurement 
without theory” and became obsolete as a governmental strategy by the 1940s.104 
As demonstrated above, the Committee, however, clearly had a distinct conceptualization of the 
economy as a dynamic entity whose stability rested on a balance of material and nominal flows 
and accumulation of stocks and capital in sectors of the economy. As long as productivity 
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increased, the activities that constituted this object would continue to “create an accelerated cycle 
of productivity-consumption,” and “the economy” would continue to grow at an increasingly 
accelerated speed.105 The primary threats to the expansion of the economy were not the physical 
and non-economic limits of organic growth, but the structural imbalances.106 Substantivists, 
therefore, problematized economic vulnerability as a substantive imbalance within and between 
sectors and not as a nominal one between demand and production components of the economy. 
This is why intervention had to take place at the level of productive and managerial processes at 
the scale of the firm as well as capital allocation processes at the scale of sectors. 
To summarize, the “Economy” was born as an object that not only could grow, but was also 
potentially imbalanced, maladjusted and, hence, vulnerable. As Daniel Breslau pointed out, 
Mitchell had already discerned the existence of the economy as an ontological entity and an 
autonomous domain with its own logic and regularities in the 1910s. What was novel about the 
Committee on Recent Economic Changes’ conceptualization of the economy was the 
problematization of economic instability as an imbalance orthogonal to cyclical fluctuations. 
This problematization reframed depressions as the product of sectoral imbalances hiding 
underneath general economic conditions. Economic prosperity, therefore, was not just a matter 
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of sustaining economic growth and counteracting cyclical fluctuations, but depended also on the 
ability to detect imbalances in an anticipatory mode before they reached a critical point and to 
reduce them before they triggered in a deflationary spiral, resulting in a depression.  
In 1930, NBER was given the task of preparing a second study on the problem of balance. The 
study was to begin on Jan 1, 1931 and was supposed to be conducted by the same economists 
who participated in the initial study.107 According to Mitchell and Gay, the study should have 
aimed to explain how “[t]he shifting and precarious balance of economic and social forces, so 
long, and so amazingly maintained in a fairly successful working relationship, had been suddenly 
and progressively dislocated.” The “automatic functioning of the elements [of] the economic 
organism,” continued Mitchell and Gay, were still operational, but “no longer smooth.” This 
apologetic and defensive attitude was not surprising given that their initial report, published only 
6 months before the Great Crash of October, now looked unrealistically optimistic. This was a 
peculiarly ironic situation, since the central emphasis of both the presidential and technical 
reports, as demonstrated above, was the problem of imbalances that could precipitate 
depressions. Mitchell and Gay were nevertheless hopeful. They believed that “[a]n examination 
of the whole organism and of the interaction of its vital parts, now under pressure and strain, on 
the basis of the existing facts critically retested, might… yield new insights, and would certainly 
tend to greater coherence in the form of presentation.”108 (Emphasis added) The question was 
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which vital component was responsible for the depression.  
While this project was never taken up in the form of a Presidential Commission, recursive 
attempts to answer this question led to the establishment of three governmental layers, fiscal and 
monetary nominalism and macro-substantivism, in the next four decades. Under the Roosevelt 
administration, sectoral substantivists established the National Resources Committee in 1933 as a 
vantage point from which they could balance the economy. As demonstrated in the next chapter, 
within this space sectoral substantivism was transformed into macro-substantivism under 
Gardiner Means’s initiative. Concurrently, Mitchell’s assistant Simon Kuznets and his colleagues 
in the Wealth and Income Studies group developed national income accounting as the central 
calculative technique upon which the National Income and Product Accounts System was built. 
As demonstrated in the rest of this chapter and chapter 3, Kuznets and other nominalists located 
the vulnerability of the economy in an imbalance between the consumption and production 
components of the economy. In contrast to this vision, Mitchell’s two students and his protégés, 
Arthur Burns and Milton Friedman, undertook a research program in NBER in collaboration 
with Copeland to explain the monetary aspects of the business cycle and invent monetary 
nominalism. They would locate the source of the vulnerability of the economy in the financial 
system and reframe the Great Depression as a monetary phenomenon caused by a misconduct in 
monetary policy on the part of the Federal Reserve as detailed in chapter 4.  
In.Search.of.a.Statistical.Representation.of.Balance.
This section traces the mutation of the substantivist problematization of economic vulnerability 
into a nominal form. The first step in this process was the unsettling of the substantivist 
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discourse of sectoral imbalance and the subsequent reframing of vulnerability as an imbalance 
between the production and consumption components of the economy. The section demonstrates 
this process by focusing on a series of Senate hearings that took place toward the end of 1931. It 
analyzes a controversy that took place between two groups of actors with substantivist leanings 
in the course of these hearings. While these actors also subscribed to the framework of 
imbalance, they abandoned substantivism’s emphasis on sectoral imbalances. Instead, they 
reframed the problem as an imbalance in the economy caused by either overproduction or 
underconsumption. As a result, the controversy between these groups centered on the question of 
which one of these factors was the source of the imbalance that was responsible for the 
depression. The section then turns to the second step in the process, i.e. the abstraction of the 
nominal elements of the substantivist layer of governance. A critical phase in this process was 
the folding of substantivist statistics into a nominal mold. To resolve the overproduction-
underconsumption conundrum, the organizers of the hearings commissioned the substantivists at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research for a statistical study on the impact of the depression 
on national income. This study resulted in the invention of national income accounting as a 
technique of balance that made a comprehensive statistical representation of the economy 
possible. The creation of this alternative governmental technique rendered the economy’s 
underlying balance of flows and stock visible to policymakers and allowed them to disregard its 
substantive elements when intervening in this new object. 
Reframing.the.Problem.of.Imbalance.
The hearings were organized by Senator Robert LaFollette, Chairman of the Manufacturers 
Subcommittee, in order to discuss a bill to create a National Economic Council. Contrary to the 
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expectations of the collectivists, the Council, as described in the bill, was an advisory body with 
no binding authority. Although the hearings were presented in direct opposition to Hoover’s 
seemingly laissez faire response to the depression, LaFollette’s agenda was ironically not only 
much less ambitious than Hoover’s substantivist project to perform the firm. It was also in much 
greater continuity with it than one would expect as it shared the ambition of the Committee on 
Recent Economic Changes to create a vantage point to monitor emergent imbalances. The 
Council would be responsible for analyzing “economic trends, identifying weaknesses and 
problem sectors, and formulating stabilization measures” in an anticipatory mode. While 
contrary to Mitchell, LaFollette held that depressions could not be prevented, he nevertheless  
shared Mitchell’s commitment to create a depression watchtower within the state. In this vein, 
the Council would be responsible for anticipating the advent of a depressions and “put up the 
storm signals” “when a depression [was] obviously approaching.”109  
The idea of creating such a council emerged in a meeting to strategize a possible way to gain 
public support for an investigation into the underlying causes of the depression as well as 
possible ways to recover from it. The meeting brought together LaFollette and his assistant 
Isodor Lubin, a statistician on loan from the Brookings Institution, with leading proponents of 
national economic planning, namely Columbia economist John M. Clark, Taylor Society’s 
President Harlow Person, and George Soule, an economist who was a director at NBER and the 
editor of The New Republic. LaFollette was a progressive Republican who had identified 
unemployment as a major governmental problem before the depression. He had sponsored a 
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resolution for the Senate to hold hearings on addressing unemployment in 1928, and it was in the 
course of these hearings that Lubin and LaFollette’s paths had crossed for the first time. In 
December 1929, Lubin had just returned from a nearly six month trip to Europe. Toward the end 
of this trip, he examined the Soviet Union’s experience with national planning—the Soviets had 
just initiated their first 5 year plan in 1928—during his visit to Moscow. The outcome of the 
meeting was the decision to pursue a series of legislations in the Senate to promote the idea of 
national planning as a solution to the nation’s economic problems.110 In this respect, the function 
of the hearings was not a purely disinterested investigation, but rather a political spectacle to 
shift the framing of the discourse of balance from an emphasis on production to consumption.  
The schedule of the hearings was designed in such a way that it would discredit those who 
construed the depression as a condition inherent to the business cycle and therefore as 
unavoidable. In a total of 14 days, 44 individuals from a wide range of backgrounds and 
industries testified on the measures necessary for a full recovery as well as the prevention of 
future depressions. These contrived hearings would first feature leading government economists 
and statisticians who would give a fact-based account of the damage the depression had done to 
the nation. Following these testimonies, business leaders from the industrial and financial sector 
would testify on their proposals for addressing the depression. Proponents of national planning 
would then ridicule the business position by juxtaposing it with the bleak picture drawn by the 
experts. After exposing the vulnerability of business plans, they would advance their agenda for 
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a positive program of government action.111 The intended significance of the hearings, therefore, 
did not solely lie in creating an economic planning body as much as dealing a blow to the 
overproduction hypothesis. In the hearings, the responsibility of the government for the 
economic well-being of the nation was going to be scrutinized on a public forum for the first 
time since the Great Crash of 1929. The intended effect of the hearings on the public, thus, was 
to highlight the vitality of consumption as a governmental problem. 
In the course of the hearings, as it was planned, two themes dominated the discussion, the root 
cause of the depression and the adequacy of government statistics. The discussion on the 
depression centered on the imbalances in the economy. Whereas the issue of imbalance applied 
to the entire economy in the 1929 report, now the problem was reduced to the question of 
whether there was an overproduction or underconsumption problem. The diagnosis would 
determine the mode and target of intervention, which obviously had political implications.  
As LaFollette and Lubin expected, business leaders such as the President of General Motors, 
Alfred Sloan identified the problem in the natural course of the business cycle and opposed 
government involvement, insisting the cycle had to run its full course for recovery to take hold. 
What they did not expect, however, was a positive program to prevent depressions under the 
leadership of Gerard Swope, the President of General Electric. Swope had just announced what 
would come to be known as the Swope plan in September. This plan envisioned a cartelized 
economy managed by trade associations.112 From this perspective, the imbalance was caused by 
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overproduction, and the solution lied in restricting production. This view was also supported by 
the majority of business leaders who testified, including Clarence Woolley, Chairman of the 
American Radiator Company who was a member of both Hoover Committees.113 
The second point of view located the problem in underconsumption. Its strongest proponent was 
Mary Van Kleeck, Director of Industrial Studies at the Russell Sage Foundation and a former 
member of Hoover’s Business Cycles Committee. Van Kleeck was a pioneer in problematizing 
unemployment as a governmental problem in the 1920s. As the Chairwoman of the Committee 
on Governmental Labor Statistics of the American Statistical Association, she had been a 
pioneering force in the development of government unemployment statistics and had 
championed unemployment insurance in the 1920s. After defecting from the substantivist project 
of obviating the hidden imbalances under the blanket of prosperity, she directed her attention to 
the visible “problem of stabilizing employment.”114 In search for allies, she became associated 
with a group of economists and policymakers who held high positions in Soviet planning 
agencies, including the central planning agency, Gosplan, while serving as the Chair of the 
Program Committee of the World Social Economic Congress in the Hague in the late 1920s. Van 
Kleeck’s interaction with Soviet planners resulted in her transformation from a sectoral 
substantivist into a staunch advocate of total planning.115  
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Van Kleeck believed that the depression was caused “not by lack of economic resources or 
productive capacity, but by lack of purchasing power.” Therefore, if one wanted to assess “the 
stability and balance of industry,” statistics of employment, earnings and standards of living had 
to be used together as an “indicator of whether production and consumption [were] in harmony.” 
According to Van Kleeck, this, however, would not guarantee prosperity by itself, since one 
could simply balance production with consumption by limiting the former. Plans to restrict 
production, such as Swope’s, would eventually result in the impoverishment of the nation. Van 
Kleeck explained this by presenting the Committee a memorandum she prepared based on 
reports from her Russian colleagues. She argued that the effect of cartels in European countries 
such as Germany, France, and Great Britain had been to increase prices and thereby cost of 
living, which in turn had resulted in a fall in purchasing power. In effect, attempts to restrict 
production had contributed to the problem of imbalance, instead of solving it. If the objective of 
planning was “the much more difficult task of raising standards of living in proportion to […] 
productive capacity,” the economy had to be balanced within a comprehensive economic plan. 
And the only country that had undertaken such an endeavor was the Soviet Union. Regardless of 
whether one took the Soviet planning as a model or not, what was certain was the fact that there 
would be a need for more statistical data to solve the economic problems the US was facing.116  
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The final perspective was provided by Clark and Soule, who were founding members of the 
Subcommittee on Planning for Stabilizing Industry. The Subcommittee was established in the 
summer of 1931 by the National Progressive Conference, a bi-partisan organization of which 
LaFollette was a founding member. While presenting the Subcommittee’s final report, Long-
Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry in the hearings, they agreed with Van Kleeck 
on the need for national planning beyond just restricting production. Yet, Clark disagreed with 
Van Kleeck on the effectiveness of means such as unemployment insurance against depressions. 
For Clark, the problem was essentially the fact that the US had found itself within a “vicious 
cycle in which production [was] limited by purchasing power, and purchasing power [was] 
limited by production.” Long-range indicative economic planning was the only way to break this 
cycle. The objective of such a planning apparatus would be “[d]iscovering and bringing about a 
desirable balance between productive equipment and demand, with adequate anticipation of 
growth” in total production. Finally, just like Van Kleeck, he emphasized the need for more data 
to be able to undertake such an ambitious endeavor.117  
Among the three perspectives formulated in the course of the hearings, Clark and Soule’s 
problematization proved to be the most significant for the trajectory of substantivism. Van 
Kleeck’s call for total planning never gained any currency in policymaking circles in 
Washington. While the Swope plan formed the intellectual basis of the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA), NRA was terminated in 1935 only two years after its foundation. Clark’s 
framing of the depression as a vicious cycle of underconsumption and overproduction served as a 
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foundational element in the mutation of sectoral substantivism into its macro counterpart in the 
mid-1930s. As analyzed in detail in the next chapter, macro-substantivism would recast the 
sectoral imbalance problematization of vulnerability in the form of an imbalance in the business 
cycle. Clark would contribute to this process by inventing a type of “multiplier analysis” similar 
to the one conceived by Herman Kahn and Keynes while working as a consultant for the 
National Resources Committee created by the sectoral substantivists in 1933.118 This analysis 
technique was a critical innovation for sectoral substantivists. It would render the countercyclical 
effects of public works investments calculable and thereby enhance the precision and capacity of 
countercyclical public works as a depression mitigation instrument.  
The second issue that was discussed during the hearings was the adequacy of the statistical 
information that was collected by the federal government. If the National Economic Council was 
going to function as an early warning agency against looming depressions as LaFollette 
envisioned, then the availability of adequate “statistical data […] to make a complete picture” of 
“the alarming trends of speculation and overexpansion that occurred prior to the depression” was 
critical.119 With the exception of business representatives who opposed government involvement 
in economic affairs altogether, there was a near-unanimous consensus on the need for more 
adequate and exhaustive data in the hearings.120  
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On the first and second days, Federal Reserve’s Research and Statistics Director Emanuel A. 
Goldenweiser and New York State Industrial Commissioner Frances Perkins testified on the 
status of industrial production and unemployment statistics. In the former area, statistics seemed 
to be relatively robust. The Fed had just released a new “index of industrial production,” 
accounting for nearly 80 percent of the total industrial production.121 On the unemployment 
front, statistical knowledge was less complete. After pointing out that New York had relatively 
reliable data on employment statistics, Perkins underlined that this was not the case throughout 
the nation. Upon LaFollette’s question regarding whether New York statistics could be 
generalized for the nation, Perkins responded with caution. Because “so little [was known] about 
the economic composition of [the] population” such an exercise would be extremely difficult. 
This said, Perkins stated that three different estimates of national unemployment had been 
constructed within the last year. The first was performed by the Department of Labor statisticians 
and Perkins in consultation with the statisticians from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and 
Standard Statistics Corporation. According to this estimation, which Perkins underlined was “a 
very rough conclusion,” the figure for unemployment was about 7 million. Two other estimates, 
constructed by the Standard Statistics and the National Industrial Conference Board, were 6.3 
and 7.5 million.122 The problem was not simply the variation in these figures. According to 
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Perkins, neither New York State statistics, nor those of any other industrialized state were based 
on “statistical sampling” rather than “positive enumeration.” While Perkins’s denunciation of the 
probabilistic approach to counting things may come as a surprise to a contemporary observer, at 
this moment, statisticians of public service were still skeptical of probabilistic thinking and were 
dreaming of a world of complete and universal enumeration.  
Hearings on December 2 presented a less hopeful picture. One of the witnesses who testified that 
day was Frederic Dewhurst, chief of the Economic Research Division of the Bureau of Foreign 
and Domestic Commerce (BFDC) at the Department of Commerce. If Commerce was the center 
of data collection and dissemination within the substantivist layer, Dewhurst was the czar of 
substantivist economic information. After a series of questions from LaFollette, it became clear 
that the department’s statistics were also inadequate, in the words of one Senator, “to give a 
coordinated picture of the economic condition of the Nation as a whole.”123  
According to Dewhurst, even in raw materials, the area the department was most competent in, 
the situation was “far from ideal in trying to get a real picture of the flow of goods and services 
from primary production through to consumption and the reverse flow of payments back through 
the channels of trade.” Statistics on “consumer purchases” were even worse. The only statistical 
category for which the Bureau had a good estimate of business conditions was department store 
sales. Yet, this particular data series was a misleading predictor of general consumer behavior. 
At the height of the depression, the statistics for department store sales had shown no change in 
consumer purchases. This was absurd, because, as Dewhurst admitted, “when [one] walk[ed] 
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down the streets of any large industrial city which [had] been hard hit by depression, [one would] 
see the specialty shops, every other one for rent, closed out.” Because those stores were closed, 
department stores had become the only option for consumers to shop for essential goods. The 
Bureau’s official statistics for consumption were simply not representative. As a result, it was 
impossible for the Bureau to answer the question of “how much retail buying [had] fallen off 
since 1929.” The situation with savings and investments was not any better, as there was no data 
on the “total volume of savings in savings banks throughout the country at any one time.”124  
One account of the Senate’s involvement in the development of national income accounting 
suggested the Senate Committee’s interest in national income estimates was to prove President 
Hoover wrong. Reports from federal employees tasked with surveying economic conditions 
throughout the country had reportedly convinced Hoover that recovery was imminent.125 As the 
Senators must have realized, the problem was not the selection bias of these observers and the 
asymmetry between their subjective opinions and the lack of systematic data. The problem was 
precisely the reverse, namely, the unreliability and selection bias of the data collected by the 
federal government since the early 1920s. In a piece publicizing the outcome of the hearings, 
Lubin succinctly summarized the situation by writing that Dewhurst’s testimony “might well 
[have] been entitled ‘What We Do Not Know About Our Economic Life’.”126 
For the construction of the economy as a balance of flows to be complete probabilistic statistics 
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and sampling had to take hold as a technique of truth within government. The challenge of 
compiling accurate national income and product estimates, as Simon Kuznets would soon show 
was not having all the empirical data on all material and nominal flows of the economy. 
Dewhurst’s response to the following question by LaFollette would reveal why so little progress 
had been made in this area at the Commerce Department. The question was whether “the 
difficulty [of] keeping track of production the further away [one got] from the raw material 
[toward the end-product]” was a matter of the availability of resources to obtain such information 
or “a difficulty inherent in the situation.” For sectoral substantivists like Dewhurst, the 
fundamental challenge was one of adequate resources.127  
The difficulties encountered by BFDC in collecting data foreshadowed the daunting challenges 
the early New Deal programs would face in the mid-1930s. A primary obstacle the Bureau and 
other agencies had to overcome was a twofold blockage. First, they had to perfect a type of 
probabilistic sampling technique as a pragmatic solution to the resource problem. Then they 
arrived at the counterintuitive conclusion that this approach was superior to the “complete 
enumeration” technique they held in the greatest esteem as far as data production was concerned. 
This approach to data compilation rested on the idea that one should gather information on all 
sources of economic activity. On the surface, the weakness of this approach was its resource 
intensive nature as Dewhurst thought. However, as Ian Hacking has pointed out, the challenge 
the practice of counting and measuring things poses to the counter has been the endemic problem 
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of accuracy. While the error in counting was initially assumed to be the result of exogenous 
factors such as insufficient resources or deficiencies in how one counted, with the rise of 
probabilistic thinking, a new wave of statisticians would demonstrate that error was an 
endogenous aspect of the practice of counting. The question was not whether one could count 
accurately, i.e. without any error, or not. It was whether sampling could yield a lower degree of 
error than enumeration. As a new generation of statisticians and their allies in government would 
demonstrate in the late 1930s and the early 1940s, while enumeration could produce very 
accurate results in finite populations, as the magnitude of things counted increased its accuracy 
would diminish to a point lower than probabilistic sampling.128  
The proliferation of probabilistic sampling within government agencies was the result of the 
reconstitution of the American state with the emergence of New Deal programs under the 
Roosevelt administration. Circa 1933, while a few agencies were relying on intuitive and 
structured sampling, the only agency utilizing probabilistic sampling was the Internal Revenue 
Service.129 The creation of substantivist governmental bodies, namely the National Recovery 
Administration, Agricultural Adjustment Administration and Civil Works Administration, that 
year was a critical factor in the adoption of probabilistic sampling by government departments. 
In the absence of a fully developed statistical apparatus, administrators faced problems in both 
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identifying their objects of intervention and evaluating the effects of their programs on these 
objects. Confronted with financial and time constraints, they adopted this technique as a 
pragmatic and less costly solution to their data problems. Although sampling would become 
widely accepted within a broad range of government agencies by the end of the 1930s, 
enumeration was nevertheless still considered to be a far superior in terms of its accuracy. 
The establishment of probabilistic sampling as the primary data collection technique within the 
state, in turn, was contingent upon the rise of a cohort of government statisticians trained in 
probabilistic statistics. Ironically, the initiation of these actors to the state bureaucracy was made 
possible as part of the substantivists’ efforts to rationalize the government’s statistical system. 
With the support of Lubin, now the Commissioner of Statistics of the Labor Department, 
Perkins, now the Secretary of Labor, initiated the creation of a Committee on Government 
Statistics and Information (COGSIS) to reform government statistics in the summer of 1933. 
COGSIS brought together a group of actors that included substantivists such as Copeland and 
Dewhurst; the nation’s leading economist-statisticians, Stuart Rice and Frederic Mills, both 
Presidents of the American Statistical Association, Edmund Day, Director of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and Meredith Givens, the Secretary for Industry and Trade at the Social Science 
Research Council.130 In line with the substantivist utopia of representing the totality of the 
economy as a balance of flows, COGSIS underscored the importance of a rationalized and 
efficient statistical system through which “a wide range of statistical materials from many 
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sources [could be] woven together into composite picture.”131 To accomplish this objective, it 
launched a comprehensive review of the statistical data collection programs of government 
agencies. In collaboration with the Central Statistical Board (CSB), which was created by the 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, COGSIS undertook a colossal effort to eliminate 
duplications and identify gaps in government statistics. When it was terminated in the end of 
1934, CSB would continue this task under the direction of Copeland and Rice and act as a 
“watch-tower” over the federal statistical system.132 The absorption of CSB by the newly 
augmented Bureau of the Budget in 1939 was a clear indication that the substantivist statistical 
apparatus was being folded into the newly emerging nominalist layer of government. 
A critical aspect of the reform initiative undertaken by COGSIS was the insertion of a group of 
economists with training in the emerging probabilistic statistics in the Bureau of the Census in 
the Commerce Department. Before becoming the Chairman of CSB in 1936, Rice, a believer in 
sampling, was appointed as the Assistant Director of the Bureau. Rice, in turn, brought in three 
economists, Calvert Dedrick, Morris Hansen, and William Hurwitz, between 1935 and 1937. 
Dedrick was recruited from CSB where he had organized the Civil Works Administration’s 
Sampling Study in 1933. The study, reviewed by Lubin, established the most robust target of 
sampling to be the scale of the household, establishing this entity as the primary target of Federal 
government’s data collection activities. Hurwitz was a student of mathematical economist and 
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statistician Harold Hotelling, who introduced Ronald Fisher’s revolutionary probabilistic 
statistics methods to economics. Finally, Hansen, originally an economist and accountant, was 
trained by Edwards Deming in the Department of Agriculture Graduate School. Deming was 
instrumental in teaching policymakers like Hansen how to design optimal sampling techniques 
that minimized sampling error. This method was developed by Jerzy Neyman, a UC  Berkeley 
mathematician and statistician who invented confidence intervals, circa 1934.133  
By 1942, three critical developments cemented probabilistic sampling as the foundational data 
collection technique within government. On the one hand, Deming organized a seminar featuring 
Neyman to introduce sampling design techniques. This conference, attended by over 70 
policymakers, economists and statisticians, including Milton Friedman, facilitated the 
popularization of probabilistic sampling within government beyond a small group of experts. On 
the other hand, Dedrick and Hansen organized a project called Enumeration Check Census of 
Unemployment for the Civil Works Administration. The results of this project demonstrated that 
there were more unemployed than registered (11 versus 7.8 million). This was a critical victory 
for samplers over enumerators as it demonstrated that sampling could deliver a more “realistic” 
picture of the world than a mechanism of counting resting on enumeration logic. By 1942, to 
these developments, a series of theoretical breakthroughs by figures like Neyman was added. 
These new studies provided the proof that in theory probabilistic sampling provided more robust 
results than enumeration as it contained a lower sampling error than counting error.134 The 
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cumulative result of these developments was the acceptance of probabilistic sampling as the 
foundational and primary data collection technique by federal agencies. Data collected with 
sampling, in turn, became the source data upon which the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) system rested when this information infrastructure system was built in the 
1940s. In this respect, the rationalization of government statistics and introduction of 
probabilistic sampling in the 1930s laid the foundations of NIPA and allowed the immense 
complexity of reality to be represented as a composite statistical picture called the economy. 
Estimating.National.Income.
The final step in the construction of the economy as a balance of flows was the folding of 
substantivists statistics into a nominal mold. This was accomplished by the invention of national 
income accounting in the 1930s. This calculative technique translated the statistical objects 
collected by the modernized substantivist statistical apparatus into a nominal form measured in 
money terms. The reconstitution of these objects made it possible for the economy to be 
assembled as a composite object composed of many disparate elements. Seen from the 
perspective of nominalism, these objects, as they appeared in the substantivist layer, existed in 
such a great degree of heterogeneity that they were incommensurable as long as they were 
represented as things with substances. Once they were rendered nominal, however, they could 
take a commensurable form and could be welded together as elements of a coherent and holistic 
object. In addition to making this object measurable, national income accounting would allow 
policymakers to assess its imbalances both between consumption and production components 
and within the flow of income through all components of the economy. 
If LaFollette and Lubin had any remaining doubts that the cause of imbalance lay in the 
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weakness of the consumption component of the economy, these gave way to absolute certainty 
by the end of the hearings in December 1931. Lubin made this new position, which was still 
considered heretical at the time, clear in a piece he authored on the hearings in March 1932. He 
said that the bill introduced by LaFollette was “break[ing] away from the stereotyped idea of 
restricting production in the direction of enhanced consumption.” In organizing the hearings, 
according to Lubin, LaFollette was searching for answers to the following questions: “Could the 
consumptive power of our citizens be raised to the point where it would equal our productive 
capacity? And, if so, how could we make a beginning?”135 While the hearings answered the first 
question in the affirmative, it could not give a definitive answer to how national income and 
purchasing power was affected by the depression. In order to answer this question, LaFollette 
and Lubin approached the Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFDC) 
for a survey on “purchasing power” in February. As a result, the Senate Subcommittee asked the 
Department of Commerce for a study on national income and purchasing power for the period of 
1929-1931 in June. Secretary of Commerce Robert Lamont turned to Wesley Mitchell for help. 
Mitchell, in turn, assigned the project to his assistant Simon Kuznets, who had joined NBER in 
1929 after finishing his doctoral studies in 1926 under Mitchell at Columbia.136  
Neither of these choices on the part of LaFollette and Mitchell were coincidental. First of all, as 
noted above, NBER was the organization that had prepared the technical report for the 
Committee on Recent Economic Changes and was given the task of undertaking a second study 
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concerning the impact of the depression on the economy and its “vital parts.” Second, the initial 
report contained a chapter written by Morris Copeland of Cornell University on the national 
income accounting. Copeland opened the chapter with a blunt critique of the existing state of 
national income estimates calculated by another NBER economist, Willford King, who was the 
leading expert on national income estimation until the early 1930s. He stated that not only was 
the definition of national income imprecise in terms of its meaning, but national income 
estimates were also inaccurate in their statistical reliability. “The present estimate of the income 
of the people of the United States,” he declared, “may be in error by as much as 5 per cent; in 
some years the error may be slightly more than that.” Furthermore, “the constituent streams that 
combine to make the national income,” he pointed out, “[were] known less accurately than the 
total.”137 Copeland’s criticisms did not fall on deaf ears, and in February 1931, the Board of 
Directors of NBER assigned Simon Kuznets, who had been serving as an assistant under 
Mitchell since 1929, “the task of making a preliminary survey looking toward the re-
establishment of the estimates of national income.” The Board also noted that three studies 
related to national income should be initiated. These were intended to be on the reformulation of 
the estimates of national incomes, the development of “adequate methods” for investigating “the 
amount, source and direction of the flow of national savings,” “the efficiency of the working of 
competition,” and “the physical volume of production in the United States and the flow of goods 
from producer to consumers.”138 As this research agenda indicates, despite all the attacks on 
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Hoover and the destruction of the reputation of his Committee on Recent Economic Changes, 
NBER was on full course to developing a governmental technique to represent the economy as 
an hybrid object of balance of flows. The irony was that the methodological blueprints of the 
statistical tool to represent the economy as a nominal balance of flows were drawn by Kuznets as 
part of the broader substantivist project by the time LaFollette and Lubin needed such a tool.  
In January 1933, Kuznets began collaborating with the Economic Research Division of BDFC. 
Prior to Kuznets’s arrival, experts at the Economic Research Division had already started 
working on the project, albeit with no success. The Bureau created a new National Income 
Section within the Economic Research Division specifically for Kuznets. There, Robert Nathan, 
one of his former students from the University of Pennsylvania, joined him in June and 
eventually took over the Section after the completion of the project in 1934. By November, 
Kuznets and Nathan had already prepared the estimates for industries in the form of individual 
balance sheets for each industry.139 They spent the next few months aggregating these balance 
sheets into tables. The results were submitted to the Senate in the form of a 268 page report, 
National Income, 1929-32, in January 1934.140  
The results of the study and the graphs that represented these quantitative estimates were exactly 
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what LaFollette and Lubin had in mind when commissioning the project. Kuznets found that 
“[t]he volume of net income paid out to individuals shrank by 40 percent during [the] 3 year 
period” since 1929. The same statistic for the 1920 depression was calculated by King as 14.4 
percent. The first chart of the report was the visual representation of the quantitative effects of 
the depression on different types of income. The intended effect of this graph as an object of 
truth was to intensify the drastic impact of the depression on the consumption component of the 
economy as it was represented in numerical form in the income table. While these tables were 
powerful calculative tools, they nevertheless were not legible to laypersons. The power of the 
graph to represent visually complex numerical results in a simple and legible form, in turn, 
allowed policymakers to bridge this gap with non-experts, especially such as the legislators in 
Congress. Convincing these actors that the underlying imbalance in the economy was located in 
the consumption component was an essential task as they were the ones who would ultimately 
make laws to correct the imbalance based on a given diagnosis. In this respect, Kuznets’s 
accomplishment was a colossal step in framing the imbalance as one of underconsumption. Now, 
the Fed’s industrial production data series that emphasized the problem of overproduction could 
balanced against national income data in determining the underlying causal nature of the 
imbalance.  
As Timothy Mitchell pointed out, one of the major shifts in the field of national income 
estimation had actually taken place much earlier. In the aftermath of World War I, the idea of 
estimating “national income” emerged as a response to the problem of determining Germany’s 
“capacity to pay” economic reparations. Thus, “[t]he goal,” as underlined by Mitchell, “was no 
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longer to count the nation’s wealth or dividend, but rather its aggregate ‘national income.’”141 If 
this shift established the national income as an intelligible object, Kuznets’s new approach made 
it measurable. Thus what Kuznets accomplished was much more than systematizing the 
measurement of national income. As we have seen above both Kuznets’s predecessor at NBER, 
King, and experts at BDFC were faced with technical and conceptual blockages in making this 
object calculable. While King’s method was plagued with the problem of the same things being 
counted more than once, leading to significant inconsistencies, BDFC’s approach of attempting 
to map the entire flow structure of the economy was simply not financially feasible.142 
In National Income, Kuznets’s approach, in contrast, was simple and efficient. In constructing 
the national income estimates, Kuznets relied on the principle of the double book entry method 
and adapted this accounting technique that had been used at the scale of the firm for centuries to 
the national scale. The nation, just like a firm, both consumed and produced goods and services. 
The income and expenditure resulting from these two distinct types of activities had to balance 
each other once the deficit, i.e. debt, or the surplus, i.e. savings, were added to the respective 
sides. On the one hand, households engaged in “a vast volume of work toward the satisfaction of 
their wants.” Kuznets called the aggregate product the households produced “national income 
produced,” i.e. the net total national product that the economy produced in money terms. As a 
reward for their activities, individuals, just like businesses, were compensated for their work. 
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The aggregate of this value was “national income paid out,” i.e. the national income.  
Kuznets’s second step to resolve the blockage that both King and BDFC faced was to apply this 
double book entry principle to a two by two table, i.e. a balance sheet. On one axis of the table, 
there was a classification structure that divided income based on its type, i.e. labor incomes 
(wages, salaries etc.), property incomes (interest and dividend), and entrepreneurial incomes 
(business dividends and savings). On the other axis, one had a classification structure based on 
the sectoral structure of the economy, e.g. agriculture, raw materials, construction etc..143 The 
balance sheet demanded that the accountant compute income produced and income paid out by 
each sector for each category of income one by one. While the former axis was based on the 
logic of vertical juridico-political status of economic activity, the latter indicated the horizontal 
location of a particular economic activity within the economic structure. The idea of applying the 
double book entry technique was originally conceived by Irving Fisher well before NBER’s 
substantivists.144 However, it was King who first attempted to apply this technique, which he 
called “a business concept,” in the field of national income estimation in his 1930 study National 
Income and its Purchasing Power.145 Yet, without a balance sheet approach that cross-referenced 
the structure of the economy against the status of income generating activity, King could not 
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overcome the problem of double counting.  
The significance of Kuznets’s accomplishment was not merely a technical solution to a technical 
problem. By resolving the problem of double counting, Kuznets allowed the economy to be 
represented as a composite object of nominal flows. This effectively constituted an anchor point 
from which one could represent the balance of the economy in vertically aggregated form, 
without any reference to the material flows. As put into practice in the new macroeconomics of 
the 1930s, one could intervene in the imbalances between different components of the economy. 
The advantage of this new “technique of balance” over its substantivists counterparts was its 
ability to represent the national economy with no reference to the material flows within which 
the sustentative elements of the economy moved within an economic space. From the vantage 
point of income accounting, even the productive capacity of the economy was measured in 
nominal terms, which in turn allowed the bracketing of the question of what the exact qualities 
produced by the economy were. In the absence of specific political demands, the primary 
governmental question was framed as the potential imbalances between nominal values specific 
constituent elements of the economy took as opposed to the number of specific material objects 
the economy could produce as in the case Soviet total planning.  
Finally, this was also true for employment and the unemployed. In principle, income accounting 
was blind to these entities. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in chapter 3, under normative political 
concerns nominalists deployed income accounting toward the goal of maximizing employment. 
Even in this instance, however, they used gross national product, i.e. “national income 
produced,” as a proxy indicator that they believed was correlated with employment. Based on 
this new statistical representation, one could determine the changes in the distribution of income 
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sources in different parts of the economy over time. One could also start comparing the 
productivity and income generating capacity of different industries within the economy in 
relative terms. All these new possibilities of vision could be translated into economic policies in 
the form of channeling productivity, income and consumption toward desired locations within 
the economy. For policymakers to gain this capacity, however, first they had to build a fiscal 
apparatus that could intervene in the nominal flows of the economy. 
Intervening.in.Nominal.Flows:.Objects.of.Balance.
The first major shift in national income estimation was the development of national income 
accounting by Kuznets. This by itself, however, was not enough to give rise to an information 
infrastructure to represent the economy as a balance of flows in the form of the National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) System. For that, three developments had to take place to fulfill 
the conditions of possibility that were necessary for NIPA to take the shape it took by the end of 
the 1940s. First, the substance and form of national income estimates were modified. As Kuznets 
warned, the estimates of national income were not precise. They needed further disaggregation 
and more data. More importantly, reports covering random periods and published sporadically 
were not suitable for policymaking. The publication of national income tables on a regular basis 
was not sufficient either. The frequency of their publication also had to be synched with the 
needs of policymakers. Second, certain institutional changes to the Bureau of Domestic and 
Foreign Commerce were required. The Bureau had to disassociate itself from its substantivist 
roots and be equipped with the right kind of expertise, i.e. fiscal nominalism. Finally, a distinct 
economic indicator called “national product” had to be developed. While this indicator 
resembled Kuznets’s “national income produced,” what made it significant was its ability to 
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account for the economic activity produced by the government. And for this to happen, the 
policy problem guiding national income estimation work in the Bureau had to shift from the 
problem of underconsumption and weaknesses in the income component of the economy to a 
problem that could not have been foreseen in the wake of the Great Depression, i.e. 
overconsumption and inflation. This new problem raised the question of what the limits of the 
economy’s productive capacity potentially was.146 This final rupture gave national income 
estimation the final form it would take in the NIPA System in the late 1940s.  
Targeting.Income.&.Consumption.
The recession of 1937-1938 was a puzzling and a critical event that made possible the 
emergence of fiscal nominalism. Contrary to the conventional wisdom it unfolded at a time of 
relatively low capacity utilization and high unemployment. A group of policymakers took 
advantage of the space of uncertainty this event opened up regarding the expected behavior of 
the economy and delivered a final blow to the proponents of overproduction hypothesis. This 
group was composed of substantivists such as Lubin and Leon Henderson, director of the Works 
Progress Administration, and prospective fiscal nominalists, namely Harry Hopkins, who would 
soon become Commerce Secretary, Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles and his assistant Lauchlin 
Currie.147 Among these actors, Currie was the most significant as he had spent the last three 
years at the Fed’s Research Department inventing fiscal nominalism, while Keynes was still 
working on his General Theory. Utilizing Kuznets’s income estimates, Currie developed public 
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compensatory spending as a policy instrument to balance the economy nominally. Within this 
framework, while countercyclical public works of substantivism were reconstituted as a strategic 
tool for intervening in the household budget, government programs were construed as a critical 
element in the nominal balance of the economy. In a series of memoranda to Eccles, Currie 
demonstrated that the recession was indeed the proof that in the absence of a permanent 
corrective government intervention in the income component of the economy, the vulnerability 
of the economy to depressions could not be prevented.148 This nominalist framing of economic 
vulnerability served as the underlying logic of a new permanent spending program initiated by 
Roosevelt in April 1938. Now, the remaining question was at which points interventions should 
have been made. In order to answer this question, there was a need for a better statistical 
representation of the economy as a balance of nominal flows.  
In parallel to these developments, a series of technical advancements that allowed fiscal policy to 
make targeted interventions in the consumption component were undertaken by policy 
economists in the Commerce Department. The first step in this direction was taken by Robert 
Nathan. In 1934, Nathan took over the National Income Section of the Bureau of Domestic and 
Foreign Commerce and by 1936 started publishing estimates of national income on an annual 
basis in the Survey of Current Business. Annual estimates, however, were not useful for 
policymakers. To direct nominal income flows toward desired parts of the economy, they needed 
data with less temporal lag between the moment in which the data was collected and when it was 
used for policymaking. The result was the development of monthly income estimates for the first 
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time in 1937. A second obstacle was the lack of geographic disaggregation that rendered 
depressed areas visible. This problem was resolved by the development of income estimates for 
each state in 1939. With these two advancements, policymakers could make timely interventions 
at the right points of weakness within the economy. Monthly national estimates allowed the 
temporal distance between policymakers and their object of intervention to be closed. This 
improved both the timing and the accuracy of fiscal intervention. Where one needed to intervene 
was not simply a matter of the location of the intervention. What was more important was 
whether by the time the intervention took place, there was still a need for it. After all, the point of 
vulnerability might have simply moved to a different location.  
The most important improvement was made in the conceptual architecture of national income as 
an indicator. As late as 1938, Nathan was still relying on Kuznets’s design from 1933 for 
estimating income. This design was developed at a time when the federal government was not 
yet a source of supplemental income for households in economic hardship. With the passage of 
the Social Security Act of 1935, however, types of income such as unemployment and retirement 
benefits became a significant source of income for the population. Without the integration of this 
new type of income, policymakers could not develop precise programs to intervene in the 
consumption component. To address this problem, a monthly measure of income called “income 
payments to individuals” was introduced by the National Income Section. In 1939, the May issue 
of the Survey of Current Business published national income estimates in the form of “total 
income,” “income per capita,” and their distribution by state. This final step marked the 
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stabilization of the categories of income estimation upon which the NIPA System was built.149 
The impetus for uprooting the Bureau from its substantivist roots was Roosevelt’s appointment 
of Harry Hopkins as the Commerce Secretary in December 1938. Hopkins’s arrival signaled a 
rise in the importance of the National Income Section within the government. The new secretary 
wanted to enhance the department’s expertise in the area of national income accounting. 
According to William Barber, Hopkins’s goal was to transform the department from an 
institution whose mission was to provide a plethora of economic information to business to a hub 
for the production, analysis and dissemination of macroeconomic knowledge. The question was 
for whom this knowledge would be produced. Whereas within the substantivist layer Commerce 
produced economic knowledge primarily for business, now under nominalism it administered 
what would come to be called the NIPA System. This information infrastructure produced 
statistical knowledge first and foremost for policymakers within the state and then for business. 
For business to utilize this new knowledge form, however, it first had to be equipped with 
macroeconomic theory. This was a critical task because only through a macroeconomic lens the 
key macroeconomic variables published in the Survey such as “aggregate consumer 
expenditures,” “capital spending” and “inventory accumulation” could become discernable to 
laypersons.150 In contrast to business barometers of substantivism, these magnitudes were framed 
as lead indicators signaling the likelihood of a depression. While substantivism deployed 
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economic information as an instrument to stabilize the business cycle to prevent a depression, 
nominalism provided macroeconomic information to business so that it could protect itself from 
a looming and unpreventable depression. In this respect, the relationship between the state and 
business was no longer an instrumental but a paternal one. Information would help policymakers 
to correct nominal imbalances and facilitate the survival of business from depressions.  
Toward this end, Hopkins initiated a series of institutional reforms that resulted in the techno-
institutional structure upon which nominalism rested. First and foremost, Hopkins’s arrival 
ensured the fate of the National Income Section and in turn income accounting within the state. It 
also bolstered resources at the disposal of Nathan. Indeed, one of Hopkins’s first initiatives was 
to upgrade the status of the National Income Section to division level. He also created an 
Industrial Economics Division. While the National Income Division was tasked with gathering, 
compiling and processing data, the latter was designed as an analytical arm of the emerging 
fiscal nominalism. The Industrial Economics Division’s staff was filled with the new breed of 
economists who subscribed to the conceptualization of the economy as a structural and nominal 
totality made up of vertically aggregated components. Richard Gilbert, a Harvard economist who 
was an ardent advocate of deficit spending as a solution to stagnation, was chosen as its chief. 
Notable names on its staff included Gerhard Colm and Walter Salant, two fiscal nominalists who 
served on the staff of the first Council of Economic Advisors under the Truman administration. 
As demonstrated in the next two chapters, Colm also played a critical role in the construction of 
the fiscal apparatus during World War II and become the chief economist of the Council.151  
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The primary reason for reorganization was a change in the institution’s relationship to economic 
information. As late as the end of the 1930s, the Bureau remained loyal to the Hooverian 
tradition of information-based substantivist planning. The testimony of Frederic Dewhurst in the 
1931 hearings shows the lack of business interest in such efforts. According to Dewhurst, the 
Survey sold only around nine thousand copies, while he admitted the circulation should have 
been closer to one hundred thousand under conservative assumptions.152 Thus, substantivist 
planning was a failure within its own parameters by the time it was declared an ineffective 
laissez faire approach in the 1930s. For Hopkins, the problem with the Survey was not limited to 
its dismal circulation figures. From the perspective of nominalism, the problem had to do with 
the underlying philosophy of information facilitation on which the Survey was based. The 
economic indices of the publication, including the income estimates, were displayed as an 
endless plethora of barometers of business conditions.153 Contrary to the instincts of 
substantivists such as Dewhurst, the problem was not the incomplete coverage of information on 
all the flows that affected such conditions. The fundamental problem with this style of displaying 
information was its piecemeal, unsystematic and haphazard nature. The publication should have 
focused on the type of data that were considered to be the determinants of macroeconomic 
activity. Such a task required resources to be allocated for garnering information on key 
components of the economy. An internal memo, written in April 1939, stated that the department 
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was engaged in “the publication and wholesale distribution of a multitude of items whose place 
is really in a reference handbook.” What was needed instead was “the interpretation of 
information […] and its prompt dissemination” by economists with an expertise in 
macroeconomics.154 In this regard, the primary function of the Commerce Department under 
Hopkins was to render the economy’s nominal imbalances visible to policymakers as opposed to 
stabilizing the business cycle by performing managers in the firm. The transformation of the 
department into a vantage point from which one could monitor the hidden imbalances underlying 
the economy, therefore, marked ironically the emergence of fiscal nominalism at the expense of 
sectoral substantivism. 
Inventing.Gross.National.Product.
Kuznets introduced the term “gross national product” for the first time in 1937 in his National 
Income and Capital Formation, 1919-1935, as the most important concept of his work on 
national income accounting.155 There were, however, two problems, one concerning the 
conceptual architecture of the concept and the other its timing. First, it failed to account for the 
role of government in the production of the national product. As a consequence, it was heavily 
criticized by leading nominalists such as Gerhard Colm and Lauchlin Currie. As delineated in 
Chapter 3, while from a theoretical perspective, as Kuznets argued, government should not have 
been included in the calculations for accuracy sake, from the standpoint of policymaking it was 
critical for including government programs in the national product if this indicator was going to 
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be used for governing the economy. For the construction of such an indicator of national product, 
one had to wait the start of the war in Europe in September 1939. Only after this development 
the National Income Division reallocated its resources toward constructing a new 
macroeconomic indicator that would come to be called Gross National Product (GNP).156 
Initially, the experts at the National Income and Industrial Economics Divisions posed the 
question of what volume of armament the US could produce and export to Europe. The first 
example of such work was an October 1939 analysis on the effects of the war on the economy. 
This work was the first sign of an approaching shift in the analysis of the nominal balance of the 
economic structure. As illustrated in the previous sections, economic balance had always been 
problematized in terms of weaknesses that made the economy susceptible to instability and 
depressions. While what drove experts in this early analysis was still a defensive posture 
resulting from their conviction about the fragility of the economy, this was the first time that the 
locus of the question they asked shifted from the problem of deflation to that of inflation. The 
purpose of their analysis was to assess no longer weaknesses in the consumption component, but 
the impact of the added demand pressure on the production component on the economy. Despite 
this change in the focus of analysis, both divisions were still relying on the national income 
estimation for determining the effects of the European munitions demand.  
The construction of GNP, however, was the result of a second shift in the work of the National 
Income Division. This shift involved a change not only in the problem, but also in the method of 
analysis. After the near complete invasion of Western Europe by Nazi Germany, Roosevelt 
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agreed to a major increase in the US munitions supply to England and created the National 
Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) in May 1940 as a first step of mobilization 
preparedness in advance of a possible US entry to war.157 By the time Roosevelt declared the US 
as the “arsenal of democracy” in December, it became clear to the members of NDAC, which 
included Nathan, that the economy had begun to experience shortage and scarcity problems in 
the face of an unexpected boom in civilian consumption.158 The situation was only worsened 
with the signing of the Lend-Lease Program with England in March 1941 and then the US entry 
to war in December. Under these new conditions, the new problem that confronted policy 
economists in the National Income Division was to estimate what the maximum share of the total 
national income that could be spared for defense production was. This was a critical problem that 
needed a solution because not only the wellbeing of the population but also the fate of the war 
depended on it. If too much of the national income was spent on mobilization, the population 
could be harmed, and if the reverse were to happen, then the US might have lost the war. In this 
respect, this techno-political problem foreshadowed the feasibility dispute discussed below.  
At the annual meeting of the American Statistical Association in December 1941, the new 
director of the National Income Division, Milton Gilbert, fiercely rejected the conventional way 
of calculating the potential size of the national income available for civilian consumption once 
defense spending was factored out. He argued that war expenditures could not be discounted 
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from civilian consumption by simply subtracting the former from national income.159 He openly 
criticized those “who had turned to national income as a practical tool in connection with 
responsibilities imposed by war.” Such “a direct comparison between these two aggregates,” he 
noted, could be done as a practical measure of the magnitude of the war effort. Yet, if one was 
trying to “draw inferences from the national income and war expenditures aggregates regarding 
changes in the level of civilian goods output,” then one would face real methodological 
difficulties. These two figures were incompatible aggregates. Defense expenditure was a gross 
sum of all transactions, “includ[ing] payments other than those for goods currently produced,” 
and it was measured in market prices paid for goods and services. As designed by Kuznets, 
national income (produced), on the other hand, was a net value of current output, measured in 
factor costs, i.e. the total cost of production as opposed to the sale prices for the final user. For 
these two reasons, Gilbert concluded that national income was not the appropriate concept.160  
According to Gilbert, the concept appropriate for such a calculation was total product. While 
national income was also a measure of total product, Gilbert underscored the fact that it was “too 
net for [the] present purpose.” So, what one needed was a concept that was defined as the gross 
total product that the nation as a whole produced at current market prices. This new magnitude 
had to include “the intermediate products of government” which were discounted from the net 
national income in the form of business taxes. This new aggregate concept was what Gilbert 
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called “gross national product at market prices.” This concept, noted Gilbert, was distinct from 
the “gross national product” concept developed by Kuznets in the sense that it was “certainly a 
grosser ‘gross national product’ than that which [had] become familiar through [Kuznets’s] 
work.”161 With a few strokes of Gilbert’s pen, the nation’s productive capacity was expanded.  
The first gross national product series was published by Gilbert in the May 1942 issue of the 
Survey for the period between 1929 and 1941. In this article, he formalized the distinction 
between his method for calculating the gross national product and that of Kuznets. This was not 
the result of a petty academic effort to create an alternative indicator just for the sake of gaining 
recognition and fame. First and foremost, Gilbert’s concept stemmed from a need for an 
indicator that included the economic value produced by government activities as Kuznets 
excluded this magnitude due to theoretical concerns for purity. Second, Gilbert highlighted the 
need for a way of calculating national income that yielded a “more useful breakdowns than […] 
the method of distributive shares” that Kuznets used. According to Gilbert, Kuznets’s method of 
“national income by distributive shares and industrial origin” measured national income as “the 
net value of goods and services produced during a given period.” This was done “by adding 
together all the incomes paid or accruing to factors of production during that period.” To 
complement this approach, Gilbert developed what he called “final products approach.” This 
method calculated national income by adding up “the values of all finished commodities and 
services produced during a given period.” The advantage of the latter was its ability to yield 
measures of both gross and net national product. This method rendered the changes in the use of 
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national product over a given period as well as the commodity composition of the national 
product visible. As a consequence, it provided a new way of disaggregating national income.162 
Now, policymakers could also monitor the production component of the economy and intervene 
in inflationary imbalances due to overproduction. Given this enhancement in their analytical 
capacity, they could finally analyze the behavior of the production and consumption components 
of the economy in relationship to each other.163 
Balancing.the.Economy.for.War:.Feasibility.Dispute.
By the time Milton Gilbert publicized his estimates of gross national product in May 1942, 
Simon Kuznets and Robert Nathan were about to conduct one of the most significant 
experiments of nominalism. In the Planning Committee of the newly created War Production 
Board (WPB), Nathan and Kuznets tested the feasibility of the defense program as outlined by 
Roosevelt and military. This unique exercise, which was the first of its kind, was an attempt to 
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answer the question of whether the production goals as stated in the defense program could be 
produced under the given factors of production the nation had at its disposal. Using income 
accounting, they first calculated the productive capacity of the economy for 1942 under ideal 
conditions and then projected it into the future years. Finally, they discounted limiting 
substantive factors that posed bottlenecks to the productive capacity. This analysis unconcealed 
the infeasibility of the defense program and stirred a controversy between civilian mobilizers of 
WPB and the military establishment on feasible production goals in the fall of 1942.164  
The genealogical significance of the feasibility analysis was twofold. First, it made possible one 
of the most significant tenet of nominalism, namely that the economy was an object with a 
production capacity that could be increased to a level of what Kuznets called “feasible 
maximum.” In other words, at any given combination of productive factors the economy could 
be propped up to a potential magnitude of GNP that is larger than its actual size. As shown in 
Chapter 3, fiscal nominalists in the Council of Economic Advisors redeployed feasibility 
analysis as the central policy instrument of the fiscal apparatus in the postwar period. In the 
hands of fiscal nominalists, this technique was used for balancing the economy nominally at full 
employment. Second, it was used for determining the civilian-military relation in the form of 
budgetary allocation of defense spending in the government budget starting with the late 1940s. 
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Feasibility analysis, thus, became both a passive and proactive security mechanism that ensured 
the nominal balance of the economy at an economically as well as politically desirable point.  
For feasibility analysis to be undertaken, first the size of the defense program had to be 
calculated as the exact size of the defense program was unknown as late as spring of 1941.165 
The size of the program was calculated by Stacy May, chief statistician of the Office of 
Production Management, and Nathan, who was now assisting May in the Bureau of Research 
and Statistics.166 What allowed them to calculate the size of the program was a resource planning 
technique called “balance sheet.” This technique was introduced to May by Jean Monnet, an 
influential French expert on the British Supply Council in Washington.167 As in the case of 
Kuznets, Monnet’s balance sheet was also inspired by that of the firm.168 Unlike the former, 
however, this accounting device represented the balance of material surpluses and deficits in a 
given nation’s production requirements.169 In the balance sheet, each column represented the 
physical resource availabilities in the economy and the requirements of government and private 
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consumers. The rows delineated these needs and availabilities on an itemized basis in terms of 
raw materials and munitions. In its inception, balance sheet was designed by Monnet as a 
technique of truth that would facilitate cooperation between Allied countries.170 It would reveal 
specific resource deficits and surpluses of each nation and balance these shortages and excesses 
to maximize munitions production. May and Nathan assigned dollar values to each item on the 
balance sheet and aggregated the total monetary value of the defense requirements. In May and 
Nathan’s hands, balance sheet, thus, was transformed into a tool of nominal balance. 
May and Nathan estimated the size of the program three times between March and December 
1941. Each attempt revealed that it had grown significantly, surpassing the appropriations 
approved by congress.171 Issued just a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the final 
results indicated that only three-fourths of the production goals could be reached by September 
1943 in the best case scenario. What was further disconcerting was the fact that this could be 
done only if non-military consumption was severely restricted. There was a considerable gap 
between existing production requirements and schedules and the nation’s productive potential. 
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Unless planners approached the problem in a reflexive manner, in May’s words, “a definite and 
violent collision of the various contenders for limited amount” of available resources was 
inevitable.172 Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, at the request of Roosevelt, May and Nathan 
prepared a list of production objectives based on their analysis of what would come to be called 
the Victory Program. When the program was announced in January 1942, it became clear that 
Nathan and May failed to persuade Roosevelt as his objectives were considerably higher than the 
ones calculated by them.173 Despite all their techno-political efforts, at the end Roosevelt sided 
with his military strategists over economic experts.  
It is tempting to construe Roosevelt’s defiance of May and Nathan’s expertise as a “natural” 
outcome of the difference in the hierarchical authority that exists between the political leader of a 
nation and the experts within his bureaucracy. Or one can point to the leader’s conviction that 
economists, accountants and bureaucrats are always overly cautious and economizing. An 
alternative explanation for the difference would focus on the different modes of substantive 
rationality in which these two types of actors are embedded. As shown in Chapter 3, nominalists 
were worried about the inclination of Roosevelt to rely on rhetoric and persuasion instead of 
establishing a policy machinery that would produce the desired effects in the world. One can, 
therefore, argue that the relationship between the politician and the policymaker is similar to the 
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tension between the prophet and the priest in Weber’s analysis of competition over religious 
authority.174 Just like the prophet, the political leader has to rely on charismatic authority to 
reproduce the support of the public. In the days of radio, the production of such charismatic 
authority relied on the discursive effects of one’s speech acts. I postulate that this was why 
Roosevelt drifted away from technically feasible to politically effective production targets.  
A political leader relying on charismatic authority, however, faces a similar risk to one faced by 
the prophet. Since a politician’s authority depends exclusively on charisma, every time he needs 
to reproduce it with a miraculous act, he faces the risk of failure. In order to reduce such risk, just 
like the prophet who has to rely on priests, the politician has to rely on policymakers. After all, 
both clergy and policymakers rely on the power of routine practices that are based on scripture 
and code to produce the effects of their expertise on the world. Relatively speaking, they produce 
the demand for their services, as well as control their supply, and as a result they control the 
environment in which they practice expertise. There is, however, one nuanced difference 
between the relationship between the prophet and clergy on the one hand and politician and 
policymakers on the other. The prophet eventually dies, allowing the clergy to gain indefinite 
autonomy and monopoly over his legacy. Whereas the structural position held by the politician is 
permanent within a political order that ultimately prioritizes the politician over technocrats in 
decision-making processes. Thus, politician-policymaker couplet is an inseparable one, and the 
asymmetry between these two structural relationships is preserved as long as the politician relies 
on his policymakers to “get it right” or such a political order is preserved. 
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The situation Roosevelt found himself in in the coming months was similar. While as the 
political leader, he could simply defy the advice of his experts, what he could not afford was for 
his charisma to be tested by a reality that turned out to be radically different from the image of 
the world projected in his discourse. The reality that tested Roosevelt’s charisma was the 
practical failure of the war mobilization machinery. According to two statisticians who played 
critical roles in solving mobilization problems in the War Production Board (WPB), after the 
announcement of the Victory Program in January 1942, the production problems facing the 
industrial system became so overwhelming that production nearly came to a halt.175 This was a 
critical turning point that demonstrated to the politician the indispensability of the expertise of 
the expert. If the politician wanted to ensure the effectiveness of his discursive power to 
construct the world as an image painted in words, he had to stabilize the correspondence between 
his discourse and the actual. This was a critical task because as long as the actual continued to 
beget events that disrupted the framings of the real produced by the politician, politician’s 
discursive powers would be rendered ineffective and unreliable. Thus, it was essential to 
integrate the expert, his expertise, the politician, and his discursive speech acts within a network 
of expertise. Only once this was accomplished, the discursive goal setting power of the politician 
could be deployed as a governmental technique to govern the economy. 
The formation of this network was finalized in November 1942 when WPB Chairman Donald 
Nelson convinced Roosevelt that the production objectives had to be reduced if the economy 
were to operate at its maximum production capacity. What made this possible was the statistical 
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work of the Planning Committee of WPB between March and August. The Committee was 
created in mid-February, and Nathan was chosen as its Chairman. Nelson and the members of 
the Committee close to him wanted to explore ways to increase the productive capacity without 
questioning the Victory Program’s production targets. In contrast, Nathan insisted the priority 
should be to determine the feasibility of objectives and whether they could be reached on time. 
Within a few weeks, a consensus emerged in the Committee that favored Nathan’s position. This 
consensus rested on the conviction that unattainable production goals would actually result in a 
smaller total output than more modest, achievable ones.176  
While unreasonably high goals might have had a positive function within a charismatic mode of 
political action, Nathan and Kuznets argued that they also interfered with the techno-political 
rationality of mobilization planning. From the very beginning of the European war Roosevelt had 
refused to establish a centralized administrative system for allocating economic resources in the 
form of a powerful mobilization agency with the jurisdiction to channel the flow of resources 
within the economy. The result was a free market economy that was shell-shocked by a massive 
defense demand that reached as high as 50 percent of GNP. Series of mobilization agencies that 
were created one after the other since May 1940, including WPB, tried to exert influence over 
markets for raw materials and semi-finished goods by instituting a voluntary priorities system in 
which producers were asked to give priority to the orders of defense manufacturers. This system, 
however, was paralyzed as early as August 1941 as the Office of Production Management was 
overflown by priority requests, eventually resulting in the creation of WPB in January. The top 
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cadre of the new agency, composed of corporate managers, advocated shifting from Roosevelt’s 
indicative planning to mandatory directive planning and imposing total controls over the 
industrial system. While Kuznets and Nathan agreed that this may be an unavoidable measure as 
capacity utilization reached full capacity, they insisted that the underlying cause of the 
misallocation of resources was infeasible production goals of the Victory Program. The key to 
stabilizing production, therefore, was to formulate a feasible defense program.  
Kuznets and Nathan came to this conclusion based on a reflexive form of reasoning that traced 
the impact of government policy on the decisions of economic agents. They argued that such 
goals were signaling to manufacturers that there would be scarcity and shortage of the materials 
that were essential for fulfilling their contracts. The result of such signaling, in turn, was 
hoarding and the creation of serious imbalances in the economy. Based on this reflexive 
argument, they persuaded the Committee that the key to engaging in total war overseas while 
maintaining a relatively liberal economic order at home, therefore, depended on the ability to 
calculate and set feasible goals that minimized the distortive effects of mobilization on the 
economy. According to this logic, the feasibility of goals must have been the primary goal of the 
mobilization program. The program’s objectives had to be recalculated and then its effects on the 
entire economy had to be analyzed.177 
A Program Analysis and Research Section was created specifically for this purpose within the 
Committee, and Kuznets, who was working under May in the Statistics Division, was brought in 
to lead it. In mid-March, Kuznets completed a preliminary feasibility analysis based on estimated 
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data. Kuznets’s results indicated that the value of GNP used for defense in 1941 was $30 billion 
and this figure could be no more than $50 billion in 1942. The program was also infeasible in 
terms of the availability of raw materials. There were already serious shortages in 1942, and the 
requirements for 1943 were out of line with what would be available for every single 
commodity. A similar situation was also the case for the production capacity of key industries 
such as machine tools as well as the labor force. The munitions goals for 1942 required a labor 
force that was 10 million greater than what the US had. The Victory Program was infeasible 
according to every single major criterion of feasibility that Kuznets’s analysis emphasized. 178  
In the absence of feasible production requirements, Kuznets concluded that, as May had warned, 
a scramble for materials by manufacturers and the consequent shortage in raw materials was 
impeding both economic and military mobilization. For this, Kuznets blamed the Victory 
Program for not taking into account the civilian needs that were essential for the fulfillment of 
direct military needs. The relationship between steel and railroads was the most striking example 
of the problem. Railroads were essential for the movement of troops, raw materials, and finished 
military goods. Yet, because of the steel shortage caused by mobilization, the railroads could not 
be repaired on a timely basis. As a result, railroads became bottlenecks instead of facilitators of 
production.179 Railroads were only one example as shortages and misallocation of resources were 
clogging production and thereby suppressing the productive capacity below its potential. At the 
very least, a feasible production program, balanced nominally against the productive capacity of 
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the economy measured in GNP terms, would alleviate these pressures and increase output.  
In August, Kuznets completed the final feasibility study, now based on GNP data provided by 
Gilbert’s National Income Division. The final report was 140 pages long and consisted of four 
studies. Each covered the feasibility of a particular aspect of the program—its dollar magnitude, 
the raw materials situation, the supply of industrial equipment, and labor requirements. The 
report had two conclusions. The first conclusion reaffirmed the main finding of the preliminary 
study, namely that without feasible goals, economic resources could not be mobilized 
effectively. Second, even if the goals were technically feasible, the more ambitious they became, 
the more there would be a need for a centralized command and resource allocation mechanism. 
Under such conditions, even the slightest errors in decisions in the allocation of resources within 
the firm would lead to serious maladjustments with intolerable consequences. To reach full 
productive capacity, such a centralized planning agency would have to rely on horizontally 
disaggregated balancing techniques in order to manage material flows more effectively. In order 
to reach a maximum feasible level of economic production, bottlenecks would have to be 
identified as they emerged and had to be rapidly broken. For this task, Kuznets proposed the 
creation of a “supreme war production council” that would be responsible for maintaining the 
overall balance between different dimensions of the mobilization effort. He described the extra-
economic balance needed to establish a sustainable correlation between military strategy and 
political and economic considerations in the following way:  
The strategic [considerations] relate to the general balance among broad categories of weapons 
and complementary items; the economic to the productive resources available in the country and 
the extent to which they can be shifted to military production on a given time schedule; and the 
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political (in the sense of broadly social) condition the others in the sense of indicating how far we 
can go in changing the existing institutional set-ups under which the economy operates.180 
By October, after months of intense debate, General Somervell, who was in charge of the 
Services of Supply, finally came to accept Kuznets’s perspective regarding the balance and 
harmony between overall production and military strategy. In November, the mobilization goals 
for 1943 were reduced to $80 billion from $93 billion, reaching a level that Kuznets and Nathan 
thought was within the realm of possibility.181 While Kuznets’s idea of a central planning agency 
was not realized in the course of the war, a series of peacetime mobilization agencies resembling 
the one Kuznets had in mind were created in the postwar period, i.e. National Security Resources 
Board (1947-53) and its successors, the Office of Defense Mobilization (1950-1960) and the 
Office of Emergency Preparedness (1960-1973).  
Kuznets’s conclusions were significant for two interrelated reasons. First, the technical details of 
Kuznets’s analysis were the first time that the maximum feasible productive capacity of the 
economy was calculated. Kuznets’s approach involved two steps. The first step determined the 
ideal capacity in vertically aggregated form, and the second step determined the capacity gap 
caused by limiting factors in horizontally disaggregated form. The first step was to determine 
what a feasible maximum military production estimate could be. This could be determined by 
deducting “the irreducible minimum of production required for civilian sustenance” from the 
total production capacity of the national economy. As shown above, Milton Gilbert was already 
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working on a similar problem at the National Income Division and was in dialogue with Kuznets 
on the technical details of how to resolve a very similar question. Gilbert and Kuznets’ analyses 
were, nevertheless, substantively different. For Gilbert, the question was one of ex post facto 
analysis of a given situation, i.e. how much of the gross national product (GNP) was left for 
civilian consumption after a given level of defense program. The significance of Gilbert’s work 
was to demonstrate that the share of GNP consumed by non-defense sectors was actually greater 
than what was assumed. Kuznets’s investigation was ex ante in nature and forward-looking.  
Even more importantly, Kuznets took Gilbert’s analysis to its logical limits. In order to calculate 
the maximum feasible production goals, one first had to know the bare minimum requirements 
necessary for the survival of the population and maintenance of its productive capacity. Once 
this bio-political limit was established, then Kuznets could use this as a concrete condition for 
maximizing the share of GNP that could be allocated for defense production. Since the defense 
program was a multi-year program, this analysis would have to be repeated for all the years the 
program covered. This required projecting the GNP into the future. In order to forecast 
accurately, however, one needed to disaggregate GNP into its constituent components and 
project each component individually. What was remarkable about this analysis was that Kuznets 
was tacitly calculating not only the maximum productive capacity of the economy at a given 
time, but also the potential of this capacity to grow in the future. Kuznets called this capacity the 
“maximum feasible” and defined it as the maximum output an economy could produce when all 
resources were perfectly balanced in nominal terms within the economic structure.182  
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The second step in the analysis was to contrast this idealized vision with potentially limiting 
exogenous factors that could impede the economy from reaching its maximum output. These 
factors were production bottlenecks such as limited raw material supplies, the capacity of 
industrial facilities, and the size and utilization of the labor force. In order to translate the 
aggregated economic balance calculated in the form of GNP into a spatial and temporal balance 
for the economy, these limiting factors had to be eliminated. This meant optimizing scheduling 
and eliminating bottlenecks between interdependent sectors. This, however, required a 
horizontally disaggregated representation of the substantive structure of the economy, a form of 
representation which national income accounting was incapable of producing.  
Contrary to Kuznets’s conviction that balancing the economy horizontally and temporally would 
require a central planning apparatus and mandatory total planning, an unexpected turn of events 
in the WPB resulted in the implementation of a balancing mechanism that functioned based on 
the principle of budgeting and allocated resources within the economy as if the nation was a 
firm. As noted above, WPB’s top cadre was initially convinced that total directive planning was 
the only way to balance the economy. Toward this end, the Requirements Committee of WPB, 
vested with the responsibility for the supply and allocation of materials, conducted two industry-
wide surveys in February and March.183 The results of these surveys were tabulated in the form 
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of an input-output table that represented the entire inter-industry structure of the industrial 
system in statistical form. Not only was this the first input-output table constructed on current 
data on industrial structure, but it also became the interface through which the Requirements 
Committee monitored the developing imbalances in the flow and accumulation of materials 
within the industrial system. This interface displayed a demoralizing situation that resembled the 
sectoral imbalance problem of substantivism: The misallocation of critical raw materials had 
resulted in excessive inventories and the certified demand for metals with highest priority ratings 
was well above available supply. There was no doubt that the priorities system had failed to 
balance the flow of resources and that there was a need for an efficient control system with a 
precise grip on materials flows.184 The question was, given the new interface of input-output 
tables, what form the new mechanism of intervention should have taken.  
Contrary to what one might have expected, the eventual response of WPB to this substantivists 
problem was the establishment of Controlled Materials Plan that resembled the monetary 
government of the economy as discussed in Chapter 4. This plan was conceived by Ferdinand 
Eberstadt while he was the Chairman of the Munitions Board (CMP), the mobilization planning 
agency of the military, and was implemented when he became the Chairman of the Requirements 
Committee in the fall of 1942.185 Eberstadt designed CMP as a vertical allocation mechanism 
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similar to the General Motors’ managerial technique of vertical budgeting. Just like Alfred 
Sloan, Jr. used budgeting to manage the company and to resolve production bottlenecks from a 
distance, Eberstadt envisioned balancing material flows by the means of a warrant system that 
would function as material budgeting mechanism for the industrial system.186  
Eberstadt’s control concept appealed to Nathan as it would help bring military demand under 
control.187 The system would function as a material credit and accounting system for the entire 
industrial economy. WPB would grant metal credits to claimant agencies, i.e. military agencies 
responsible for procurement. This would effectively put military under a hard budget as they 
would receive warrants based on their statements of demand, delineating procurement 
requirements. Then, these agencies would distribute these credits to end product producers in the 
form of warrants, and these producers would pass warrants down the supply chain to its 
suppliers, its suppliers to the sub-suppliers, and so on. The primary producers then would cash in 
these warrants to the WPB for receiving the metals as if they were doing a “bank withdrawal.” 
This would prevent inventory accumulation and coordinate production schedules of producers.188 
The decision to implement CMP over directive planning was made based on an evaluation of a 
committee headed by Nathan under the auspicious of the Committee on Control of the Flow of 
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Materials in the summer of 1942.189 According to the analysis conducted by the Committee’s 
staff, the vertical warrant system was superior to horizontal total planning. Controlling the entire 
flow of materials was simply unrealistic and infeasible. In contrast, one could govern the entire 
material flows by controlling only a few highly critical metals, such as steel, copper, and 
aluminum. Once these key metals were taken under control, the rest would be allocated 
automatically. Moreover, directive planning could also be perceived as an anti-business scheme 
by business as it would intervene in the internal affairs of the firm. Directive planning, thus, 
failed the most crucial test of the Committee: to “enlist not only the patriotic support but also the 
personal self-interest of businessmen.”190 What was needed was a governmental tool that could 
balance the balance of the flows of the economy from a distance with much greater efficiency.  
CMP promised such a way of governing. By the means of establishing a materials credit and 
accounting system, CMP envisioned governing the conduct of producers from a distance. Like 
the feasibility analysis of Kuznets and Nathan, it took the incentives of the governed into account 
instead of implicitly assuming the consent of the governed. In this respect, along with the 
feasibility analysis, it was one of the primary ways in which the management of the wartime 
economy was governmentalized. The underlying assumption of the system was the conception 
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that under a situation of extreme scarcity, critical metals, especially steel, copper, and aluminum, 
were equivalent to the function of money in peacetime economy of abundance. In this respect, 
the relationship between WPB and the Munitions Board under the CMP scheme can be likened 
to the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. Like the Treasury, which 
enjoys monopoly over printing money, the Munitions Board controlled the National Defense 
Stockpiles, which was the instrument for monopolizing the supply of critical metals.191 Yet, just 
like the Fed, WPB was the sole controller of the supply of metal warrants as the WPB’s 
Requirements Committee was positioned at the top of the control system. In this respect, CMP 
complemented the nominalist feasibility analysis in governing the economy in a time of war. In a 
time of peace, however, the extent of CMP was curtailed to a great extent, and it was replaced by 
a monetary way of governing the flow of things in the economy as demonstrated in the final 
chapter. In the wartime economy, ultimately the critical flow in the economy was critical raw 
materials such as steel, aluminum and copper and thus the quantity of metals circulating in the 
economy was used for controlling the behavior of firms. In the peacetime economy of the 
postwar period, however, money would replace metals as the critical flow thanks to monetary 
nominalists as discussed in Chapter 4, and the quantity of money circulating in the economy was 
used for controlling the behavior of households and firms under the monetary nominalist layer. 
Therefore, CMP was what Michel Foucault called a governmental technique of conduct of 
conduct from a distance and was homologous to that of monetarism of monetary nominalists 
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such as Milton Friedman.192  
Now that WPB was actually in a position to limit the supply of materials to military, Kuznets’s 
feasibility analysis was able to produce an institutional problem as highlighted by the feasibility 
dispute between WPB and the military. Until the eruption of the controversy, the military 
determined its own objectives and then communicated them to the civilian administration with 
the expectation that they would be accepted. Equipped with the statistical facts produced by 
Kuznets and CMP, WPB Chairman Donald Nelson was able to problematize the indefinite 
autonomy of the military and took the first step toward what would become an organizational 
innovation shaping the basis of the post-war civilian-military relationship in terms of budgeting. 
Thanks to Nelson’s efforts, feasibility analysis was turned into an institutional mechanism that 
mediated the substantive needs and requests of the military with the formal budgetary and 
economic limits of such requests. Kuznets’s technique assumed that the military would be given 
a share of the GNP as an absolute limit of what it could spend on defense, and then the military 
planners would make allocation decisions within this limit. This was a critical principle because 
if this limit were exceeded, the military would be shooting itself in the foot, as it would actually 
lower productive output. While a series of controversies erupted over what this limit should have 
been in the postwar period, none questioned the logic of feasibility to this day.193  
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The implications of feasibility analysis, however, were not simply technical. It required a 
rethinking of how the US prepared for an emergency such as war and how to govern the 
transition phase from a situation of normalcy to one of emergency. Managing this process 
required not only rearrangement of the bureaucracy and already established procedures, but also 
a substantive rationality to govern the entire transition process. As a government report on the 
feasibility dispute from 1950 pointed out, the controversy between the military and WPB was not 
personal, but institutional. Roosevelt’s discursive strategy of setting ambitious goals at the outset 
of the war could not be seen only as the deployment of charismatic authority in a vacuum. Such 
objectives were also adopted by military as politically feasible goals and the entire bureaucratic 
machinery in the military was set up to achieve these goals. This all-out effort, according to 
Nelson, had reached such a scale that it exceeded the productive capacity of the nation. The 
decisions the Joint Chiefs were making were affecting every single corner of the society as well 
as the economy. The problem was that the Services of Supply of the War Department, which 
made these decisions, had not taken any potential limits to the availability of raw materials and 
industrial capacity into account.194 The creation of the Department of Defense, the National 
Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the postwar period was a response to this 
problem. Headed by a Secretary of Defense, a vast civilian bureaucracy was established in the 
Pentagon to calculate feasible production programs and determine production requirements in 
detail.195 The embedding of the feasibility analysis in the state, therefore, was a critical 
development toward the reconstitution of a state that could engage in war in time of peace with 
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only minimal disruption on the civilian market economy.  
Finally, CMP played an instrumental role in the domain of mobilization planning in the postwar 
period. After being disassembled with demobilization in the wake of the war, it was redeployed 
in the midst of the Korean War in the early 1950s. This event made clear that one could not 
launch a limited war without a governmental technique like CMP operating in the background. 
As a result, CMP was reinstituted in a simplified form in 1953 by William Truppner, who had 
administered CMP in WPB, under the banner of Defense Materials System (DMS) and Defense 
Priorities System (DPS). Under the Defense Production Act of 1950, DMS was administered by 
the Business and Defense Services Administration of the Commerce Department, which was 
created as an offshoot of the Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce when the latter was 
recreated as the Office of Business Economics in the late 1940s. 196 In the mid-1970s, after the 
OPEC oil crisis, the purview of DMS and DPR were extended to cover energy, and in 1984 they 
were reconstituted as the Defense Priorities and Allocations System.197 This system has remained 
operational until this day, operating under the jurisdiction of the Defense Production Act and 
allowing the US to launch limited mobilization as an instrument of foreign policy without 
disrupting the civilian market economy.198 In this regard, CMP’s successors played critical roles 
                                                
196 Robert. Cuff, “From the Controlled Materials Plan to the Defense Materials System, 1942-1953,” Military Affairs 
51, no. 1 (January 1987): 1–6. 
197 United States, Defense Materials System and Defense Priorities System, (Washington. D.C.: Dept. of Commerce, 
Domestic and International Business Administration, 1977). 
198 Only in 1998, the controlled materials rules DPAS inherited from DMS were terminated. A Richard Meyers, who 
was in charge of DPAS in the of the Commerce Department, notes that “[f]rom the Korean War, through the 
Vietnam Conflict and the Cold War, to the 1991 Persian Gulf Operation Desert Storm, and to the more recent 
deployment of U.S troops to Bosnia, the DOC priorities and allocations authority has played a key role in ensuring 
industrial support for our national defense. As our nation faces a future of declining defense budgets, a shrinking 




in the “peacetime” economy of the last half century as the problem of mobilization was not 
simply to balance the flow of materials, but to ensure a swift mobilization without disrupting the 
normal flows guided by the price system. To this day, this system protects the economy and its 
price system from mobilization demand shocks, rendering the mobilization and demobilization 
as a cause of depression a non-problem. 
The.NIPA.System.as.an.Information.Infrastructure:.A.Matrix.of.Balance.
The significance of Gilbert’s work on national product accounting during the war goes beyond 
the disentanglement of gross national product from national income. Neither should it be reduced 
to the emergence of GNP as a new macroeconomic variable. Its greater significance is that it laid 
the groundwork for the construction of an information infrastructure that would function as a 
database for policymakers and economists. As Michel Callon points out, information never 
simply circulates, but is produced and reproduced, and reproduction of information is a resource 
intensive process that is facilitated within an integrated ensemble of networks of expertise.199 
Making the economy a composite object that can be represented, analyzed, measured and 
intervened in requires knowledge to be produced, disentangled from its context and codified into 
numbers. This is what the NIPA System accomplished. In this respect, it not only facilitated the 
study of the economy and its behavior in the postwar period. It also functioned as one of the key 
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components of the fiscal apparatus that was assembled by nominalist actors in the Bureau of the 
Budget and the Council of Economic Advisors in the 1940s, acting as an interface between the 
economy and the state. 
The NIPA System was first introduced by Gilbert in 1947 in a supplement to the Survey of 
Current Business. The supplement contained the first complete set of interrelated national 
income and product data. The system, which was initially a manual database, was the outcome of 
a project whose origins dated back to 1942. The supplement stated that the primary goal of the 
project was “to complete the setting up of the whole body of national income statistics as an 
interrelated and consistent system of national economic accounting.”200 The Survey introduced it 
as a “factual” representation of “the myriad of economic forces whose workings [were] 
measured by the statistics.” It was presented as a set of “new tools of analysis” which 
“provide[d] answers to economic questions of wide business importance and public interest.”201 
It was composed of six accounts, one for the national economy as a whole and the other five for 
the major sectors of the economy, i.e. business, government, the consuming public, and the 
foreign and capital sectors.202 These accounts contained over 50 tables covering the period 
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between 1929 and 1946. These tables contained “[statistical] data on the fluctuations since 1929 
of more than a thousand key elements of the country’s economic life.”203 The system, however, 
“show[ed] not only the consolidated transactions of each sector of the economy, but the relations 
of the transactions among the accounts” as well.204 While the framework was altered various 
times after 1947, the relationships which it depicted among households, businesses, government, 
and the rest of the world, noted a 2007 Survey article, have remained essentially the same. In 
2006, the number of tables by which the NIPA System represented the economy increased to the 
stunning figure of 299.205 As the former director of the French Central Statistical Office, André 
Vanoli points out, national accounts does not simply measure “the economic nature of the flows 
and stocks” that exist within an economy a priori.  It reconstitutes the economy as the flow of 
income and accumulation stocks in a nominal form by rendering otherwise invisible flows and 
stocks statistically visible.206 In the 1960s, the system was expanded to include the national input 
and output accounts, similar to the ones used by WPB, and the flow of funds accounts developed 
by Morris Copeland at the Fed in the late 1940s. With the addition of these, policymakers could 
also analyze nominal interdependencies within the industrial and financial system in conjunction 
                                                                                                                                                       
Department of Commerce, National Income and Product Statistics of the United States, 1929-1946, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. G.O.P, 1947), 2–6, fn. 10. 
203 “Major Revisions in National Income and Product Data.” 
204  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Income and Product Statistics of the United States, 1929-1946, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.O.P, 1947), 6. 
205 Marcuss and Kane, “U.S. National Income and Product Statistics,” 42; United States, “A Guide to the National 
Income and Product Accounts of the United States,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2006), 4, www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipaguid.pdf . 
206 André Vanoli, A History of National Accounting (Washington, D.C.: IOS Press, 2005), xvi. 
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with the flow of income.  
The remaining question is why government started accounting for the flows and stocks and why 
it continued to do so despite the intensive resources such an ambitious task required? Part of the 
answer to these questions is that the NIPA System was and still is an interface for governing the 
economy, as argued above. The rest of the answer lies in the genealogical origins of income 
accounting that I have traced in this chapter. From this perspective, the NIPA was a political 
technology that allowed policymakers to interface with the economy represented as a balance of 
flows. On the one hand, as Gil Eyal and Moran Levi argue, the NIPA System allows 
policymakers to steer the economy toward politically determined economic goals.207 On the 
other hand, however, it serves as a surveillance mechanism to detect imbalances in the flow and 
accumulation of income within the economy. As recent debates on healthcare demonstrated, 
fiscal nominalists such as Larry Summers can identify a sector such as healthcare to cause a 
nominal imbalance in the economy as it takes up nearly 18 percent of economic resources. Or in 
a similar vein, as the Office of Financial Research of the new systemic risk regulation apparatus 
did, one can point to sovereign debt of the American state, measured also as a share of GDP, and 
identify it as a source of systemic risk for the financial system. Overall, the NIPA System 
functions as part of a security mechanism, the fiscal apparatus, that allows obviating nominal 
imbalances in the economy.  
The substantivist dream of a “technique of balance” to govern the cyclical behavior of the 
economy came full circle with the creation of the NIPA System. If one recalls, the first issue of 
                                                
207 Eyal and Levy, “Economic Indicators as Public Interventions.” 
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the Survey of Current Business consisted of 50 tables of “index numbers” and only one page of 
text. The supplement in which NIPA was presented also contained over 50 tables of data and just 
enough text to embed the data within a robust methodology of statistical arithmetic and a theory 
of the economy. Studies of the history of national income accounting emphasize the importance 
of this theory, which is often called “Keynesian macroeconomics,” as the major rupture in this 
history. From a genealogical point of view, however, the rise of so-called Keynesian 
macroeconomics was only one of the genealogical shifts that shaped the structure of the 
accounts. As this genealogy has shown, the definitive rupture was the pealing off of the 
substantivist and the subsequent emergence of nominalism. Within this new layer, Keynesianism 
would have had no way of working on the economy, of becoming more than a mere theory, 
without the NIPA System. In this regard, the NIPA System and Keynesianism found each other 
in the course of the war, and were gradually adjusted one to the other. To conclude, the NIPA 
System allowed a statistical representation of the national economy as a nominal balance of 
flows and stocks in the form of a multitude of interrelated tables of economic activity. Now that 
the balance could be represented in statistical terms, what was left to be done was to construct 
the tools of analysis and intervention for correcting the imbalances that became observable 
thanks to this new information infrastructure. 
Concluding.Remarks.
In this chapter, I traced the delayering of the sectoral substantivist layer of economic governance 
and the subsequent emergence of nominalism. Within the substantivist layer, the economy was 
conceived as a hybrid object of growth and imbalance, composed of material and nominal flows 
and stocks. In the late 1920s, substantivists came to believe that while the economy could grow 
 
 149 
by itself without the support of government, for the consequent prosperity to be rendered 
sustainable the vulnerability of the economy had to be reduced in advance of a depression. They 
conceptualized vulnerability to be a generic pathology that took the form of inter- and intra-
sectoral imbalances. These imbalances stemmed from the over-accumulation of inventories 
within the firm and overinvestment in certain sectors. The accumulation of these excesses, then, 
was the root cause of periodic depressions by triggering deflationary price spirals. This way of 
thinking about vulnerability presented a problematization of economic instability that was 
orthogonal to the cyclical fluctuations caused by the business cycle. In order to monitor the 
formation of such imbalances, substantivists advocated forming a vantage point equipped with a 
“technique of balance” within the state. This depression watchtower would allow them to 
anticipate depressions and mitigate deflationary spirals.  
This vantage point, however, was constituted in the form of an interface between the state and 
the economy with the emergence of the nominalist layer of governance. This interface was the 
effect of an information infrastructure called the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
System. Within this layer, the substantive statistical artifacts collected by the state were folded 
into a nominal mold measured in money terms and the vulnerability of the economy was 
reframed as a nominal imbalance between the consumption and production components of the 
economy. This folding was first accomplished by Simon Kuznets who constructed the first 
reliable and current national income tables for the US Senate in the wake of the Great 
Depression. These tables, however, were only temporary windows onto the milieu called the 
economy. The National Income Division of the Commerce Department first turned these tables 
into an instrument with features necessary for policymaking and then institutionalized it in the 
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form of an information infrastructure system called the NIPA System. This system rendered the 
flow and accumulation of income within the economy visible and thereby allowed nominalist 
policymakers to monitor and detect emergent imbalances of the economy in advance. The shift 
from the governmental layer of substantivism to that of nominalism, therefore, resulted also in a 
mutation in the governmental strategy against depressions. Instead of trying to anticipate and 
then mitigate depressions, nominalists attempted to reduce the vulnerability of the economy in 
the mode of preparedness.  
The NIPA System was built around databases in which data series covering national income 
accounts were accumulated. It was finally published in 1947 in the form of a statistical 
supplement to the Survey of Current Business. With the rise of computers, it would first become 
an automated system and eventually its materiality would take the form of digitized information. 
Today, one can interface with the milieu of the economy simply by logging onto the website of 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the successor of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce. As the NIPA System became a more and more complex matrix, integrating a 
multitude of matrices of nominal balance over the years, to interface with this information 
infrastructure in a more productive manner would require a complementary statistical tool called 
regression analysis. In this respect, the popularization and proliferation of GNP as the ultimate 
economic indicator was only the surface effect of a much deeper domain of expertise that was 
designed to represent the balance of the economy in the form of its nominal flows and stocks.  
There are two reasons that the material described in this chapter is significant for the broader 
genealogy of economic vulnerability. First, because the discourse of economic balance that was 
produced by the Committee on Recent Economic Changes was later reframed and redeployed by 
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Truman’s Council of Economic Advisors in the immediate post-war period in the form of a 
discourse of vulnerability and resilience of the economy. Such a problematization was 
institutionalized by the Truman Council in the form of a domain of economic security whose 
main purpose is to ensure economic stability as opposed to growth. Second, the NIPA System 
made the measurement of vulnerability possible and was integrated into a broader apparatus of 
security that the Council called economic adjustment. The NIPA System allowed the Council not 
only to monitor imbalances, but also to make calculations and projections in determining the 
impact of government policies, especially in the area of fiscal policy, on these imbalances.  
This brings me to the role of information in economic governance. In Hoover’s earlier initiatives, 
information was a central policy tool in intervening in the business cycle. Its goal was to stabilize 
the cycle by reprogramming the market mechanism. From the perspective of the firm, the state 
was just another source of economic intelligence, to use the terminology of the period. One could 
even claim that it was a public competitor of the firms that sold economic intelligence to 
companies, such as the Standard Statistics Corporation. The state could simply be ignored, which 
seems to have been the case at the time. With the rise of the NIPA System, however, the state’s 
relationship to information was radically altered. Government was no longer something firms 
could simply avoid, as it was no longer just another source of (free) economic intelligence. As 
already pointed out above, the NIPA System was part of an apparatus of security that could 
potentially alter the medium in which firms operated. Correcting imbalance involved 
interventions in prices, income, wages, costs, taxes and many other factors that could potentially 
affect firms. In this respect, the NIPA System symbolized the rise of information as a material 
infrastructure for governmental intervention as opposed to a primary tool of intervention in itself. 
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In the Hooverian model, one collected, compiled and distributed information in the name of and 
for the firm. In the new model, information was collected for the state and its machinery of 
policymaking. The effect of this restructuring was what Timothy Mitchell has called the state 
effect. In constituting the economy as a governmental milieu, policymakers also simultaneously 
constituted the state. If state and economy were two distinct domains, the NIPA System was the 
interface that not only separated, but also linked these two domains. It constructed the economy 
as something outside the state, as something that the state was nested within, and as something 
that was only visible and actionable from the state’s point of view. The institution of this 
interface was a moment of reflexive rationalization for the economy as an object of government. 
This made it possible for policymakers to calculate the impacts of their interventions on the 
economy. Above all else, this corresponded to a newly cautious role for the state that conceived 
of itself as a “bull in the china shop” of the economy. From this point of view, the problem was 
the threat that the state’s budget posed to the economy as much as the vulnerability of the 






The Executive Branch of the Government of the United States has 
[…] grown up without plan or design like the barns, shacks, silos, 
tool sheds, and garages of an old farm. 
The Committee on Administrative Management, 1937 
 
If the President does not have the means to carry out his executive 
functions, he becomes a chief of state something like the Dalai 
Lama, a venerated ruler in whose name all ministerial actions are 
taken but who is carefully shielded from reality. 
Harold Smith, Budget Director, 1941 
 
Introduction.
Chapter 1 traced the assemblage of the nominalist layer of governance within which the 
economy was constructed as a composite object of balance of nominal flows and stocks. Within 
this layer, the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) System was built as an 
information infrastructure that folded substantivist statistics collected by the sectoral 
substantivists into a nominal and vertically aggregated form. By serving as an interface between 
policymakers and the economy, the NIPA System allowed policymakers to monitor the flow of 
income and the accumulation of nominal stocks in the economy. Thereby, it made possible the 
early detection of emergent imbalances within these nominal entities as well as between the 
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functionally defined and vertically aggregated components of the economy. By the late 1940s, 
policymakers were equipped with a statistical surveillance system that allowed them to assess the 
catastrophe risk in the economy stemming from structural maladjustments and their effects in the 
form of nominal imbalances. 
This chapter traces the emergence of the Executive Office of the President as a governmental 
space. The ontological fabric of this space consisted of co-existing administrative machineries 
that connected the NIPA System to the governmental apparatuses with which the governor 
intervened in the economy. This space, therefore, provided policymakers a partly physical, partly 
administrative and partly conceptual space that allowed the programming and administration of 
these apparatuses. Since governing the economy necessitated first and foremost governing the 
behavior of the state in the first place, this space was also designed as a vertical budgetary 
control mechanism that equipped the governor with administrative control tools. These tools 
were used for managing the behavior of the state agencies and their nominal impact on the 
economic environment within which the state was embedded. In this respect, the Executive 
Office, which was created in 1939 and has continued to exist to this very day, was created as a 
techno-political vantage point from which the policymakers could govern not only the economy 
but also the vast and rapidly growing fiscal-institutional space termed the federal state.  
The first argument of this chapter is that to understand the emergence of fiscal nominalist layer 
and the creation of the fiscal apparatus within this governmental layer, it is necessary to analyze 
the conceptual design of this space and the administrative machineries inserted into this space in 
the moment of its foundation. This genealogical analysis shows that the normative structure as 
well as the techniques of intervention of fiscal nominalism were originally developed in one of 
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the central machineries of the Executive Office, the National Resources Planning Bureau 
(NRPB). NRPB’s predecessor, the National Resources Committee (NRC), was created by the 
sectoral substantivist actors discussed in the previous chapter in 1933. By the late 1930s, these 
actors and their allies from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the Department of 
Agriculture, who were equipped with advanced mathematical as well as statistical modeling 
techniques, transformed sectoral substantivism into a macro form that sought to map out the 
economy as a substantive system in its entirety. This new knowledge form was systemic in its 
style of reasoning and, thus, orthogonal to the aggregationist representation of the economy by 
the nominalists. Building on the sectoral conceptualization of the economy as an hybrid object of 
substantive and nominal flows and stocks, macro-substantivists framed the vulnerability of the 
economy to be an imbalance in the business cycle. This imbalance was the effect of the critical 
price inflexibilities in certain material flows. In the words of the exemplary figure of macro-
substantivism, Gardiner Means, as the inflexibility of prices increased, “the economy [became] 
more susceptible to violent fluctuations in activity,” and “an initial small fluctuation of industrial 
activity [turned] into a cataclysmic depression.”208 The macro-substantivist framing of economic 
vulnerability resulted in the conceptualization of the economy as a (potentially) resilient object. 
By the time NRC was inserted into the Executive Office in the form of NRPB, macro-
substantivists had already transformed countercyclical public works investment technique of 
sectoral substantivists into a macroeconomic emergency mitigation instrument to act as a 
technique of balance against depressions.  
                                                
208 Quoted in Rosenof, Economics in the Long Run, 35. 
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The second argument is that the birth of fiscal nominalism was the result of a mutation in the 
second administrative machinery of the Executive Office, the Bureau of the Budget and its Fiscal 
Division. I argue that the Bureau was originally designed as a self-introspective mechanism that 
was intended to allow the president to manage the state bureaucracy with the vertical budgeting 
technique. Within this primary function, the Bureau’s secondary objective was defined in the 
negative in the sense that it was tasked with ensuring that government programs and activities 
would not have a destabilizing impact on the nominal balance of the economy. This function was 
given to the Fiscal Division, which housed budding fiscal nominalists such as Gerhald Colm and 
former macro-substantivists who had been ousted from NRPB, Gardiner Means and his 
colleague Louis Bean. In the hands of these actors, the Fiscal Division’s negative logic of 
preventing the state from destabilizing the economy was transformed into a proactive 
governmental technology to balance the economy nominally at a high employment equilibrium. 
In this sense, the Executive Office of the President acted as an incubator that gave nominalist and 
substantivist actors to experiment and combine governmental techniques and innovate new ways 
of intervening in the economy. The end result of this innovative entrepreneurship, ironically, was 
the emergence of the fiscal nominalist layer of government at the expense of macro-
substantivism. 
The final argument is that the creation of the Executive Office marked the governmentalization 
of economic emergencies and, thus, was a critical point in the genealogy of economic 
governance. In the first New Deal, Roosevelt and his advisors lacked the governmental 
instruments and legal framework to govern the catastrophe and its secondary effects realized in 
the form of stagnation. The only framework that was available to them was the emergency 
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powers that were developed and used during the World War I. The creation of countless boards, 
bureaus and passage of key New Deal legislation were undertaken in accordance with a 
sovereign conception of state of emergency. As these new bodies and laws were repealed one 
after the other by the Constitutional Court, Roosevelt and his substantivist advisors found 
themselves in a situation where they had to maneuver countless juridical blockages that restricted 
their ability to intervene in the economy. This was the conditions for possibility for the 
emergence of macro-substantivism as a strategy of mitigating and preparing for emergencies. 
Macro-substantivists responded to these blockages by inventing emergency mitigation and 
economic preparedness as two foundational strategies to govern the catastrophe risk of the 
economy within a liberal political ontology that forced policymakers to govern the object from a 
distance. These two normative structures were inscribed into the Executive Office as a 
governmental space and were inherited by fiscal nominalism.  
The significance of the material covered in this chapter for the genealogy of systemic risk 
regulation is threefold. First, in the macro-substantivism layer one witnesses the invention of 
resilience governmentality upon which systemic risk regulation rests. While fiscal nominalists 
inherited this governmental strategy in the postwar period and used it as a guiding principle in 
deploying the fiscal apparatus, macro-substantivists such as Means conceived resilience 
originally in systemic terms. Under both macro-substantivism and systemic risk regulation, 
resilience is deployed as a strategy to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to the maximum 
degree by impeding on the material flows humanely as minimal as possible.  
This brings me to the second point of significance. The concern for the systemic resiliency of the 
economy allowed actors like Means to develop a form of vulnerability analysis that greatly 
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resembles the one deployed by the systemic risk regulation apparatus. This analysis modeled the 
economy as an interdependent system composed of substantive flows and stocks and tested the 
vulnerability of this system under stress conditions such as the Great Depression. As already 
noted above, Means’s analysis focused on the destabilizing effect of certain critical points within 
the system under stress and sought to measure the degree of importance of these nodes for the 
stability of the entire system. Contrary to the conceptualization of the resilience of critical nodes 
in terms of robustness, Means, however, was concerned with the flexibility of these nodes, which 
implied that the more flexible prices were, the more resilient the system would be. Nevertheless, 
both macro-substantivists and proponents of systemic risk regulation share the conviction that 
the catastrophe risk in a capitalist economy that operates within a liberal political ontology can 
only be reduced if one intervenes in the critical nodes that are seen as source of vulnerability for 
the system. Because of the juridical limitations macro-substantivists faced in the aftermath of the 
Schechter Constitutional Court case that terminated the substantivist National Resources 
Administration, macro-substantivists designed a strategy that intervened in critical points by the 
means of critical materials stockpiles at the scale of the market as opposed to the firm. Systemic 
riskers, however, do not face such juridical limits as the juridical basis of their expertise as 
outlined in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 are still legitimate. This is why under systemic 
risk regulation the object of intervention becomes the capital stockpiles held by banks as shock-
absorbing reserves whereas stockpiles were used as instruments of vulnerability reduction under 
macro-substantivism.  
Finally, the legacy of macro-substantivism was the development of substantivist and systemic 
analytical techniques under the defense mobilization agencies, which were the successors of the 
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National Resources Planning Board in the postwar period, namely National Security Resources 
Board (1947-1953), the Office of Defense Mobilization (1950-1960), and the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness (1960-1970). While this development is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, it is critical to recognize that they built on Means’s systemic substantivist project and 
developed a technical capacity to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to physical and commodity 
price shocks. In doing this they perfected the systemic analytical techniques such as input-output 
analysis, simulation analysis and network analysis that were used in their rudimentary forms by 
Means. They combined these techniques with the Critical and Strategic Materials Stockpiles to 
intervene in firms holding the position of critical nodes within the substantive flow structure of 
the economy. The emergence of the systemic risk regulation apparatus, therefore, signifies the 
remapping of these techniques onto a new ontology of substantive financial flows and their 
combination in new and innovative ways.  
The chapter consists of two parts. The first part traces the evolution of the idea of a governmental 
space within the executive branch of the government. It shows that the idea was a direct response 
to the 1929 report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes, which argued that the 
problem of imbalance was a major governmental concern and that it had to be addressed by a 
technique of balance based on a careful study of the economy. The President’s Research 
Committee on Recent Social Trends, which was created after its economic counterpart, 
reproblematized the problem of balance and interpreted it as one of the symptoms of the 
transformation of American society. The first concrete outcome of this new problematization 
was the creation of the National Planning Board, which eventually became the National 
Resources Planning Board in 1939. The second outcome was the establishment of the President's 
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Committee on Administrative Management, whose 1937 report precipitated the creation of the 
Executive Office. Overall, this part establishes the genealogical connection between the call for a 
vantage point from which the economy could be balanced in 1929 and the creation of the 
Executive Office in 1939. 
The second part traces the genealogy of the machineries that were inserted into the Executive 
Office. I argue that the managerial techniques of the firm and municipalities, particularly 
budgeting, were inserted into the Executive Office in order to turn this space into a governmental 
space. The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) was initially supposed to be the management and 
control mechanism of the federal government in the hands of the president, and the National 
Resources Planning Board was intended to serve as the administrative machinery in charge of a 
supplementary security mechanism that would adjust the economy along the side of the price 
mechanism. Yet, the Fiscal Division of BOB, which was responsible for evaluating the impact of 
programs and policies on the economic balance, turned itself into the sole financial planning 
apparatus responsible for economic governance. This meant the Planning Board was stripped of 
its macroeconomic duties for all intents and purposes. The seeds of the Council of Economic 
Advisors as an institution responsible for fiscal adjustment, therefore, were planted as early as 
1942. 
Charles.Merriam:.From.Economic.Balance.to.Governmental.Adjustment.
When the President’s Research Committee on Social Trends was launched in 1929, no one 
would have imagined the findings of a research project on social change to result in the overhaul 
of the institution of the presidency a decade later. Yet, the uncertainty that the Great Depression 
caused with regard to faith in the liberal capitalist order opened up a space for many reform 
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entrepreneurs to advance their agendas with unprecedented rapidity and success. One of these 
reformers was Charles Merriam, one of the most influential social scientists of his time. Starting 
with the Social Trends Committee, Merriam elevated Wesley Mitchell and Edwin Gay’s 
discourse of economic balance to a broader critique of the institution of government that resulted 
in a fundamental transformation of the American presidency and rearrangement of the executive 
branch. Merriam accomplished this by disassociating the technical aspect of planning for 
economic balance from its politico-institutional and administrative dimensions. By delegating 
the former to proponents of economic planning in the National Resources Committee’s technical 
committees, he was able to concentrate his efforts on convincing Roosevelt of the necessity of 
recasting the presidency in accordance with the new social patterns. The beauty of this strategy 
was its formalism. One did not need to go into the substance of governmental techniques to 
convince the president. All that was necessary was to deploy the formal language of bureaucratic 
rationalization. Once the space was created, then one could determine which institution would 
serve what purpose.  
Merriam’s career as a policy entrepreneur started in Chicago in the first decade of the twentieth 
century.  After receiving his Ph.D. from Columbia University, Merriam joined the political 
science faculty at the University of Chicago. In Chicago, he pursued an active role in the city’s 
progressive urban reform circles and took part in important city commissions, including the 
advisory committee of the Chicago City Planning Commission, between 1906 and 1917. In 
addition to meeting Frederic Delano, future New Dealer and his future colleague on the National 
Resources Committee, at the Planning Commission, Merriam developed an approach to urban 
planning that later informed his take on the problem of government in the executive branch in the 
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mid-1930s. This approach was based on the principles of budgeting, personnel, and 
administration. A good city government required the centralization and processing of 
information regarding fiscal matters, an informed and qualified personnel, and a rational and 
efficient administrative structure. As the founding president of the Social Science Research 
Council (1923), Merriam directed the institution’s research efforts toward formalizing his efforts 
in the Chicago city planning commission into a conceptualization of national planning. By 1925, 
he was both the chairman of the Chicago political science department, and president of the 
American Political Science Association. In the 1930s, according to historian Patrick Reagan, 
Merriam became the principal theorist and organizer of New Deal planning.209 
The.Committee.on.Social.Trends.
In 1928, Merriam conceived of the idea of surveying the transformation of the social pattern 
since the turn of the century. Merriam’s idea was brought to Hoover’s attention in late 1929, and 
funding for the Committee was arranged by the end of the year. Its chairman and vice-chairman 
were Mitchell and Merriam, respectively, and Edward Hunt served as executive secretary. 
Initially, in Merriam’s mind such a research project would have helped to advance social science 
as a form of expertise for remedying society’s ills.210 Yet, the impact of the study’s findings far 
exceeded his initial expectations. With Roosevelt’s rise to power, the Committee’s 1933 report 
not just resulted in the institution of substantivist planning in the form of a planning bureau in the 
federal government. It also inspired a much broader reform of the presidency as a political 
                                                
209 Reagan, Designing a New America, 53, 61–4, 74. 




This account, which was presented in the form of a mammoth report, over fifteen hundred pages 
in length, provided a comprehensive picture of various aspects of the American socio-political 
structure. The elements that constituted the social were characterized in a substantive form, as 
opposed to a nominal one. The substances that made up the nation were of three distinct types, 
each corresponding to a set of problems. First, there were physical things that the report called 
“natural or physical heritage” and “problems of physical heritage.” These were “natural wealth” 
in the form of “mineral and power resources” and “agricultural and forest land.” While the 
former were susceptible to exhaustion, the latter were depleted by use, eroded by the forces of 
nature, and cut by humans. Then there were biological things and “problems of biological 
heritage,” namely the “the population of the nation.” The first set of problems in this area was 
related to the quantity of the population, namely “the declining rate of growth,” “the problem of 
an optimum population,” and the “distribution and density of population.” According to the 
report, changes in the population pattern in these three areas had caused both economic and 
institutional problems at the scale of the city. The second set of problems was related to the 
“quality of population.” The report spoke of “processes for improving the inherited qualities of 
the population” through what it called “conscious selection,” of “ethnic groups and immigration 
policies” as means to affect the quality as well as the quantity of the population, and of 
“environmental influences on the quality of peoples,” particularly cultural and family 
environments. Finally, there were substantive institutional structures and “problems of social 
heritage.” These problems stemmed from economic organization and inventions, social 
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organizations and habits, and governmental organization.211  
“The problem of economic balance,” which had already been raised in the 1929 report of the 
Committee on Recent Economic Changes, was again emphasized as the central problem related 
to the domain of economic activity. “[T]he severity of the current depression,” the report noted, 
“has been due in large measure to non-cyclical factors.” The basic question at the heart of this 
problem was  
the task of maintaining a tolerable balance between the supply of and the demand for the innumerable 
varieties of goods we make, between the disbursing and spending of money incomes, between 
investments in different industries and the need of industrial equipment, between the prices of 
securities and the incomes they will yield, between the credit needed by business and the volume 
supplied by the banks […]. 
The Committee criticized those like Alfred Sloan of General Motors and Gerard Swope of 
General Electric who saw the solution to the depression as stabilizing total industrial production 
at a lower level of output at the expense of massive unemployment. As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, these actors agreed on this goal for public policy, but disagreed on how to accomplish 
this goal. While Sloan wanted to rely on the market to provide an automatic adjustment 
mechanism, Swope advocated voluntary and associational national planning as a supplementary 
mechanism to the market. Both of these balancing strategies rested on the assumption that the 
demand for goods and services was limited on the part of the consumers. The Committee, 
however, adopted a contrarian view that was articulated in the 1929 report of its predecessor and 
                                                
211 President’s Research Committee on Social Trends, Recent Social Trends in the United States: (New York, N.Y.: 
McGraw-Hill, 1933), xvi–liv. 
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reiterated the point regarding the insatiable nature of consumer demand. “The reason why we do 
not produce a larger real income for ourselves,” the Committee proclaimed, “is not that we are 
satisfied with what we have, for in the best of years millions of families are limited to a meager 
living.” In this respect, it seemed like the Committee was siding with the demand-siders of the 
LaFollette hearings, i.e. Mary Van Kleeck, Gerard Soule, and John M. Clark. Indeed, the 
Committee agreed that “[t]he effective limit upon production is the limit of what the markets will 
absorb at profitable prices, and this limit is set by the purchasing power at the disposal of would-
be consumers.”  
Despite this move, the Committee nevertheless quickly differentiated its position from that of the 
latter group of actors. The argument was that it was not clear how these “families […] limited to 
a meager living” were to become consumers with higher purchasing power. As long as the 
programming of economic flows relied on the market mechanism, the question of “how larger 
sums [could] be paid out in wages and dividends” remained a valid one. To increase purchasing 
power, one needed higher wages and dividends, which in turn depended on private enterprise’s 
ability to produce at increasing levels of efficiency and remain profitable. In this respect, the 
Committee still held the view articulated by its predecessor that prosperity was an effect of 
increasing efficiency in resource utilization. Yet, the paradox of the process of wealth creation 
was its intrinsic susceptibility to “the danger of glutting markets.” According to the Committee, 
what was even worse was that such a risk “seem[ed] to grow greater as [the] power to produce 
expand[ed] and as the areas over which [the nation] distribute[d …] products [grew] wider.” The 
Committee admitted that Hoover’s attempt to perform the market mechanism had failed to bring 
such a balance to production and consumption: “Despite improvements in communication, 
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increased accuracy in business reporting, the strenuous efforts of the Department of Commerce 
and the rising profession of business statisticians,” the balance between what Mitchell and Gay 
had called different “vital component parts of the economy” had proved to be harder and harder 
to maintain. Thus, “[t]o maintain the balance of our economic mechanism [was] a challenge to 
all the imagination, the scientific insight and the constructive ability which we and our children 
can muster.” The report concluded that “deal[ing] with the central problem of balance, or with 
any of its ramifications, economic planning [was] called for.” While the Committee admitted that 
“[t]he best which any group of economic planners [could] do with the data now at hand, bulky 
but inadequate, [was] to lay plans for making plans,” the nation had demonstrated its ability to 
“recast its basic institutions at need” with “rapidity and […] success.”212 
Despite alluding to the experience of mobilization planning, the Committee did not specify the 
details of what it meant by economic planning. Instead, it highlighted the plasticity of “economic 
institutions” and their changing nature over the course of history. If one were to pay attention to 
“the actualities of current life” and “look behind cherished phrases,” it would become clear “not 
only that economic institutions [could] be changed, but also that they [had] been changing during 
the period covered by this survey of social trends.” The question, therefore, was how to reform 
political institutions. The Committee warned that unless necessary institutional changes were 
made, the change would come in a haphazard way. “[I]t seems inevitable,” the Committee 
cautioned, “that the varied economic interests of the country will find themselves invoking more 
and more the help of government to meet emergencies, to safeguard them against threatened 
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dangers, to establish standards and to aid them in extending or defending markets.” With the 
right kind of institutional arrangements, “changes of this type [… could have been] made more 
conducive to the general welfare if they [were] guided by understanding and good will than if 
they [were] the outcome of a confused struggle between shifting power groups.” The question 
confronting both the Committee and the nation was “[w]hether [the American people could] win 
the knowledge which [was] needed to guide [its] behavior wisely and apply this knowledge 
effectively to [its] common concerns.”213 
The Committee’s conclusions regarding the need for new economic institutions was generalized 
by Merriam to the scale of the federal government as a political institution in his conclusion to 
the report. Merriam’s essay, entitled “Government and Society,”  was a treatment of the 
tremendous transformation the American society had undergone since 1900 and the impact of 
this transformation on government. More than half of the population was now living in cities, 
which lacked adequate governmental capacity. While local governments’ ability to govern was 
seriously lacking, the federal government’s functions had expanded and its share of the national 
income had increased by a third from 1915 to 1929. Yet no legislative and judicial adjustments 
had been made in the face of these developments. In the absence of these adjustments, “[t]he 
distribution of the functions of government under the new social and economic conditions,” 
stated Merriam, “proved a serious problem, and little progress was made toward its solution.” 
Merriam pointed out that new developments in industrial organization on a large scale and 
revolutions in intercommunication and transportation “made many of the older [political] units 
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obsolete.” In short, for Merriam, the US was on the verge of a structural crisis in the field of 
social and economic governance if the new social patterns were to continue along the trajectory 
they had been following for the last three decades. “If present trends continue,” Merriam warned, 
“America will struggle in the next period of growth with a series of grave problems of 
government, which it will not be possible [any] longer to defer or evade.”214 
Point.of.Inflection:."A.Plan.for.Planning".at.the.National.Planning.Board.
The national planning board that both Hoover Committees called for was established in 
November 1933. As the Social Trends Committee noted, the task of the National Planning Board 
was not actually to plan, but to determine what national planning should be in the first place. In 
August 1934, Delano, Mitchell, and Merriam submitted their Final Report, 1933-1934 to 
Roosevelt.215 Unlike Hoover’s mammoth encyclopedic reports, the length of the Board’s report 
was only about 120 pages, and the core of the report was a 20-page paper written by Merriam, 
entitled, “A Plan for Planning.” Merriam placed the concept of national planning within a long 
and established tradition of city and state planning and compared it with business planning. He 
pointed to relatively recent calls for planning such as the LaFollette’s bill of 1931 for the creation 
of a national economic council, and the Social Trends Committee. As Merriam saw it, planning 
was not a politico-economic institution that was foreign to the American tradition, but one “that 
[was] as old as the Constitution and as widespread as business enterprise.” As he noted in his 
“Government and Society,” it was an institution that needed to be adapted to the new social 
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pattern taking hold in the US.216  
Therefore, at one level, national planning was the long-range, indicative economic planning that 
Soule and Clark had presented in the LaFollette hearings. It would intervene in the substantive 
objects identified in the Recent Social Trends report. At a more abstract level, it was a technique 
of balance that would coordinate the seemingly irreconcilable interests of the rival social groups 
described by the Social Trends Committee. “The weakness of our American planning in the 
past,” Merriam pointed out, 
has been the failure to bring the various plans and planners, public and private, into some form of 
concert with one another, to develop public interest planning in concert with planning in the 
private interest. The plans of business, the plans of labor, the plans of agriculture, the plans of 
science and technology, the plans of social welfare, the plans of government, have not heretofore 
been aligned in such manner as to promote the general welfare in the highest degree attainable. 
Much of the unbalance, insecurity, and suffering which our country has experienced in the past 
might be avoided in future by a more perfect coordination of the knowledge which we already 
possess.217 
In this respect, national planning was conceived by Merriam as a technology of the future that 
promised to balance rivaling interests by means of government programs.  
For such a technology to work within the American tradition, however, there was a need for 
administrative reform. The federal government had to be integrated not only vertically with 
states, cities, and rural areas, but also horizontally. While various federal government planning 
units were connected to the President and the Cabinet, “in actual operation the mechanism of 
planning [was] not geared together as closely as desirable. […] President, Cabinet members, and 
Congressmen [were] overworked and overburdened with a bewildering variety of political and 
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administrative duties, and [were] confronted by an overwhelming mass of decisions which 
[could not] be postponed.” Merriam continued by warning that “from time to time, indeed half of 
the time, no one party [was] in complete possession of the agencies of power essential to law 
making. Under such circumstances, it [was] inevitable that national policies [were] not always 
clearly related and at times offer startling contrasts with dangerous implications.”218 From this 
perspective, the type of planning Merriam had in mind was not restricted to creating the desired 
effects on the milieu in which the government acted. It was also a process of rationalization of 
the bureaucracy. Merriam wanted to create an administrative machinery that would allow for the 
ongoing coordination of the activities of different policymaking units which did not have much 
knowledge of each other’s activities. 
Merriam’s paper on planning triggered the first step toward the creation of the Executive Office 
in the summer of 1935. After a series of meetings, Roosevelt requested that Merriam prepare a 
memorandum on the relationship between the broader concept of planning and the institution of 
the presidency. In the resulting memorandum, he argued that there was a need for a greater 
presidential capability in areas of management and administrative supervision in order to plan 
the nation’s natural and human resources at the national scale.219 Furthermore, executive 
leadership was identified as the defining characteristic of American administrative institutions 
and was defined as the ability to make plans that guide and execute policy in an effective and 
efficient manner. Like the principles of budgeting and personnel, planning was a crucial aspect 
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of public administration.220 In this respect, planning was defined formally as a rationalized 
administrative process of policymaking as opposed to a specific mode of governmental 
intervention. In some sense, Merriam was no longer speaking of long-term national planning per 
se, but an instrument of intervention that would allow the executive to plan the planning process 
itself.  
In the fall of 1935, Merriam’s memorandum had the intended effect on Roosevelt. Taking 
advantage of the president’s interest in Merriam’s ideas, Delano and Merriam proposed a study 
of the presidency, which was approved on the condition that it would also include an analysis of 
the possibilities for reorganizing the bureaucracy.  As historian Barry Karl underscores, 
reorganization studies were a well-established tradition in the federal government. Merriam and 
Delano’s proposal was the first time that a comprehensive and systematic study of the top 
management of the institution of the Presidency would be undertaken.221 As a political scientist, 
Merriam was proposing to reconstitute the concept of the state as a political institution.  
This was a critical step in the genealogy of governing economic catastrophes because up to this 
point the New Deal operated under an understanding of emergency management that was drawn 
form the World War I experience. This understanding rested on the emergency powers of the 
president as the commander in chief of the nation and therefore conceptualized the management 
of emergency as an affair resting on sovereign’s right to declare state of exception. As historian 
Matthew Dickinson points out, in the early New Deal Roosevelt had pursued a twofold strategy 
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to recover from the depression. On the one hand, he used the emergency powers to create a series 
of substantivist governmental agencies that were given vast powers to intervene in the internal 
affairs of industrial firms and farmers, the National Recovery and Agricultural Adjustment 
Administrations. On the other hand, he adopted a juridico-political strategy that sought to 
legislate recovery measures such as restricting business hours. These measures, however, were 
struck down by the Constitutional Court. This meant that the ability of the state to directly 
intervene in the economic affairs of the actors was curtailed even if the reason for this was to 
recover from an economic catastrophe or to forestall such a risk in the first place. To make 
matters worse, the capacity of the president and his cabinet to manage the affairs of the state was 
seriously strained in the face of unprecedented expansion of the number and size of state 
agencies. In this respect, what Merriam was proposing was to rationalize the affairs of the state 
and ground its activities upon a new foundation that governmentalized the management of 
emergencies. This attempt at governmentalization meant that “economic debacles” that produced 
economic catastrophes would also be rendered governable with the help of administrative 
machineries of the state. As will be shown below, the outcome of this development was the 
creation of the National Resources Planning Board as an administrative unit in charge of the 
substantivist apparatus tasked with the preparation and mitigation for economic emergencies.222 
The.Brownlow.Committee:.Reconstituting.the.Presidency.as.a.Governmental.Space.
The second step toward the Executive Office was taken in March 1936 when Roosevelt ordered 
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the creation of the Committee on Administrative Management, i.e. the Brownlow Committee.223 
The same year that the National Income Division was beginning to turn national income 
accounting into an information infrastructure in the service of budding fiscal nominalists, 
Merriam’s ideas regarding administrative reform were crystallized in the Brownlow Committee’s 
1937 report. Apart from Merriam, the Committee consisted of two other political scientists, 
Louis Brownlow and Luther Gulick, both of whom shared his background in governmental 
reform.  
The Committee argued that the depression as well as the “growth of the nation” and the social 
problems precipitated by growth demonstrated the need for governmental readjustment, an idea 
that was at the core of Merriam’s “Government and Society.” Such a reorganization, however, 
did not require new principles, but the improvement of what the report called the “machinery of 
government” in order to “meet new conditions and to make [the nation] ready for the problems 
just ahead.” The main purpose of reorganization, therefore, was to make sure that democracy 
worked by turning the national government into “an up-to-date, efficient, and effective 
instrument for carrying out the will of the Nation.” Accomplishing this goal involved two sets of 
interrelated reforms: First, an administrative reorganization in the executive branch; and second, 
the modernization of the management tools at the disposal of the executive branch.224 
The Brownlow Committee’s report did not speak of an institutional unit such as the Executive 
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Office of the President. Yet, it clearly posed the question to which the Executive Office would 
soon be the answer. “The Executive Branch of the Government of the United States,” proclaimed 
the Committee, “has […] grown up without plan or design like the barns, shacks, silos, tool 
sheds, and garages of an old farm.” The underlying reason for this was the fact that neither the 
nature of executive power nor the administrative organization of government were issues that 
were dealt with in the constitution. Instead, executive power was constituted by statute law over 
time as a response to the various problems that the government faced. The most recent of these 
moments of reconstitution was when emergency actions were taken in the wake of the 
depression. The result was the creation of “a new and headless ‘fourth branch’ of the 
Government” that consisted of “a dozen of agencies which [were] totally independent” of the 
departments that traditionally formed the bureaucratic basis of the executive branch. Especially 
since the early New Deal, the Roosevelt administration had created scores of boards, bureaus and 
offices that charged with collecting statistical information and producing public policy. Not only 
was it not clear where one agency’s jurisdiction ended and other’s began, but also the functions 
and policies of these bodies brought with the risk of cancelling out the intended effects of policy 
implemented by each agency. As a result, this unruly development had impaired the president’s 
ability to supervise the executive branch. The situation was worsened by the fact that “normal 
managerial agencies designed to assist the Executive in thinking, planning, and managing, which 
one would expect to find in any large-scale organization, [were] either underdeveloped or 
lacking.” The “fourth branch” also posed the risk of undermining the foundations of the 
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American democracy. Without coordination and planning, it could interfere with the general 
policies that were put forward by the elected representatives of the American people.225 
While not spelling out a comprehensive solution to the problem of the “fourth branch,” the 
Committee proposed one of the key elements of the solution that would become the Executive 
Office. The solution was to enhance the effectiveness of government machinery by improving 
managerial functions in three areas: personnel, planning and fiscal management. The first area, 
personnel, meant the expansion of the “merit system” in all possible directions for all positions in 
the Executive Branch. “The effective conduct of the work of the Government,” stated the 
Committee, “depends upon the men and women who serve it.” Unless “human capacity” was 
developed, no plan to improve governmental organization would bear results. The second area of 
reform was planning management. The Committee recommended turning the temporary National 
Resource Board into a permanent resource planning agency. This agency would have two 
functions: First, it would act as “a clearing house of planning interests and concerns in the 
national effort to prevent waste and improve […] national living standards.” And second, it 
would have the function of collecting and analyzing data on the substantive objects that 
constituted the nation’s resources, both “human and physical.”226  
The third area of reform was fiscal management, which the report defined as “a prime requisite 
of good administration.” In order for the executive branch to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibility to faithfully execute the fiscal policies that were determined and approved by 
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Congress, the president “must [possess] undivided executive powers and adequate means with 
which to execute them.” The primary obstacle in this area was the Bureau of the Budget, which 
was inadequately staffed according to the Committee. While the Committee framed the problem 
as one of inadequate resources and organization, what it was really doing was reconstituting the 
function of the Bureau within the executive branch. The report not only reframed the Bureau and 
consequently the budget as an administrative tool for interdepartmental management within the 
executive branch, but also signaled their potential as governmental tools vis-à-vis the economy. 
The Committee tacitly redefined the purpose of the Bureau in its report in two major ways. As 
will be illustrated below, the Budget Bureau in its original form was not designed as a tool of 
management and control in the sense of modern theory of management. Nevertheless, the 
Committee called the Bureau “the right arm of the President for the central fiscal management of 
the vast administrative machine.” From this perspective, the purpose of the budget system was 
“to provide in financial terms for planning, information, and control.” The Committee argued 
“[t]he budget not only serves as the basis of information for the Congress and the public with 
regard to the past work and future plans of the Administration, but also as the means of control 
of the general policy of the Government by the Legislative Branch and of the details of 
administration by the Executive.”  
In addition to this management purpose, the budget and the Bureau were given the task of 
ensuring that government programs were “in harmony with long-range and general economic 
policies.” This was a radical departure from the tradition of formalistic analysis that was 
developed in the early days of the Bureau under its first director Charles Dawes, who had 
insisted that the Bureau was not an institution of policymaking. Within the logic of sovereign 
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solvency, the substance of policies was irrelevant; in principle what mattered was their costs and 
the resulting impact on the budget balance.227 What the Brownlow Committee was doing, 
therefore, was tacitly attaching a third function to the Bureau. The idea was that the Bureau 
would no longer simply serve as a watchdog, but would rather be a central locus in the 
machinery of policymaking, whose role was to manage and evaluate government programs. The 
goal of program evaluation was not simply to improve economy and efficiency as set forth in the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 that established the Bureau, but to determine the effects of 
proposed policies on the economy. This meant that the Bureau would be reconstituted as “a 
managerial agency of the President […] responsible for the execution, as well as the formulation, 
of the budget as a national fiscal plan.”228 
The.Executive.Office.of.the.President.
The Executive Office of the President was created to a large extent as a space of economic 
governance under the Reorganization Act of 1939 after a period of consultation between 
Roosevelt and the members of the Brownlow Committee. Conceptually speaking, this space was 
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divided into normalcy and emergency functions. The former area covered policy issues 
concerning the ordinary course of the economy as a pattern of a multitude of series. In its 
essence, it centered upon the governmental norm of prosperity. In this respect, it was tasked with 
the continuity and invigoration of the series of economic activities that made up the economy. In 
the postwar period, this norm was attached to the goal of economic growth. The latter was based 
on the norm of stability and was centered upon the goal of resilience. Emergency functions were 
concerned with potential and actual discontinuities in the series. The question was not simply to 
mitigate an emergency, but also to prevent its occurrence in the first place. As the work of 
Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff on the genealogy of vital system security and emergency 
preparedness indicate, emergency functions can be analyzed based on three analytic categories: 
emergency preparedness, readiness to an emergency, and emergency mitigation. Readiness takes 
its object of intervention as the capacity of policymakers to react to an emergency on a timely 
fashion in a rational and preplanned manner. Preparedness concerns itself with ensuring the 
resilience of the economy as well as the anticipatory capacity of policymakers to foresee the 
advent of a depression in advance and reduce its vulnerability to low probability but high impact 
adverse conditions and events. Finally, emergency mitigation consisted of mitigating the spread 
of inflationary or deflationary forces that could result in a full-blown depression.  
The emergency functions of the Executive Office were distributed to three administrative units, 
the Bureau of the Budget, the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), and the Office for 
Emergency Management. The Bureau and NRPB were the first line of defense against economic 
emergencies. The Bureau’s role was initially defined in a passive and negative way. It was 
designed as an instrument of introspection for ensuring that government decisions did not 
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contribute to imbalances in the economy. NRPB, in contrast, was given the positive task of 
emergency preparedness and mitigation. It was supposed to assemble an early warning system 
against depressions and use its public works program as an emergency mitigation tool in the 
event. While it was not officially tasked with enhancing the resilience of the economy, it was 
already well on its way to developing this sort of expertise even before its insertion into the 
Executive Office of the President.  
If all else failed, the Office for Emergency Management (OEM) was supposed to serve as the 
final line of defense against a depression. As its name suggests, OEM was responsible for 
managing emergencies, including “economic debacles.” In contrast to other machineries set up 
within the Executive Office, it was not so much an actual machinery, but a potential 
administrative space which the president could shape as needed in time of a national 
emergency.229  Traditionally, the declaration of a state of emergency occurred in times of war 
under the threat of a foreign enemy. In 1933, Roosevelt had radically expanded this strict 
interpretation of the constitutional right of the president, as Commander in Chief, to declare an 
emergency. In Roosevelt’s hands, the New Deal was not only a reform program. It also marked 
the declaration of a national emergency for the first time in the American history in response to 
an enemy that was not a foreign aggressor in the classical sense. The enemy against which the 
state of emergency was declared was the Great Depression. From a juridical perspective, 
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therefore, the New Deal was a “War on Depression.”230 What OEM did was to create the 
machinery for the execution of emergency actions once a depression set in. This space was 
where intrusive economic controls were kept ready to be used in an emergency. Interestingly 
enough, apart from the World War II mobilization, these tools were used only at the onset of the 
Korean War under Truman and during the wage-price controls from 1971 to 1973, following 
Nixon’s decision to withdraw from the Bretton Woods international monetary system.231  
In the domain of economic governance, there were two types of planning. The first type was a 
substantivist approach to planning, which intervened in the material flows and stocks of the 
economy as well as the techno-physical infrastructures that facilitated the flow and accumulation 
of such flows. This type of planning was supposed to take place in the NRPB. The second type 
of planning was nominalist financial planning and was embedded within the Budget Bureau. 
Initially, its primary function was to manage the machinery of public policymaking within the 
bureaucracy through the technique of budgeting. Its secondary function was to evaluate the 
impact of budgetary decisions on the economy. With the establishment of the Council of 
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Economic Advisors in 1946, this latter function was elevated to the primary position, at the 
expense of the managerial function, and was deployed for adjusting economic imbalances. 
Speaking at a symposium in 1940 which brought together the members of the Brownlow 
Committee with the members of the directing boards of the new divisions of the Executive 
Office, Brownlow explained why the need for such an institutional space had arisen historically. 
Traditionally, the model of government that the US political system rested on was one that gave 
weight to the legislature. Brownlow identified the first serious critique of this model in Woodrow 
Wilson, who criticized it as early as 1885 by calling “the federal government […] ‘a government 
by the standing committees of Congress’.” In this system, there was very little room for 
policymaking in the executive branch, as a plethora of congressional bills dominated the polity. 
From this perspective, there was no “will of the nation” executed by the government in a singular 
manner, but a multitude of vested interests and their bills that in effect weakened the will of the 
people. Brownlow argued that as the role of government in the affairs of the nation increased, 
“the legislature[, i.e. the Congress] lost its ability to take a coherent view of the state of the 
nation.” The result was that the president was left in an unprepared and under-capacitated state 
that inhibited his ability to govern in the absence of managerial tools for controlling the 
machinery of the state. The situation was especially acute given the form the state was taking in 
the face of sprawling labyrinth of departments, agencies, and offices.  
What was needed was an Executive Office that contained “the physical and organizational 
facilities that any chief executive must have under modern conditions if he is to discharge his 
responsibilities” to other institutional units within the government. The functions of this new 
space were the ones that could not be delegated if effective government was desired, i.e. if the 
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executive was to control his own organization.232 These managerial functions were budgeting, 
planning, and personnel. In order to operationalize these functions, one needed to insert the 
management tools that were already being developed by municipal governments, private 
business and private research foundations into this space. Thus, the Executive Office of the 
President was not simply a name that was given to an abstract idea. It was the partly physical, 
partly organizational and partly conceptual space in which the sovereign would govern the nation 
effectively with the help of modern instruments of management.233 
National.Resources.Planning.Board..
The National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) was the national planning board that the 
Hooverian Recent Economic Changes and Social Trends Committees had envisioned. NRPB 
embodied a conceptualization of the economy that was substantivist, similar to the one outlined 
in the 1929 report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes. From a substantivist 
perspective, planning involved intervening in the material flows and stocks of the economy. As 
Wesley Mitchell advocated, NRPB’s predecessor, the National Resources Committee, adopted 
public works infrastructure projects as a technique of balance, deployed in a countercyclical 
mode, in the situation of a business cycle downturn. Under normal conditions, the objective of 
substantivist planning was to enhance the efficiency of resource production and to plan the 
physical volume of the flow of resources. This meant that the objects of planning were raw 
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materials production facilities, public utilities, and infrastructure systems as well as stockpiles of 
excess raw materials. Under the direction of Gardiner Means, the NRPB expanded its expertise 
into the domain of nominal flows and stocks. This expertise, however, was not only interested in 
the normal state of economic affairs. It was also going to be primarily concerned with the 
resilience of the economy to depressions. 
The NRPB was created in 1939, but its institutional roots date back to 1933. Its earliest ancestor, 
the National Planning Board, was created in 1933 as part of the Emergency Administration for 
Public Works for evaluating public works projects. As noted above, its members were Frederick 
Delano, Charles Merriam, and Wesley Mitchell.234 While the purview of the Board was much 
more restricted than what Mitchell and Merriam had envisioned, they leveraged their 
institutional proximity to Roosevelt in order to convince him to elevate the Board to the status of 
a proper resource planning agency. In this respect, the Bureau’s Final Report, 1933-1934 led to 
the creation of both the Executive Office of the President and the National Resource Board 
(1934), an independent agency that answered directly to the president. The new board, which 
laid the institutional groundwork for NRPB, consisted of the members of its predecessor plus 
five cabinet members and the Federal Emergency Relief Administrator.235 The institutional 
organization of the Board replicated those of the Hooverian committees. It consisted of two 
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permanent chambers, and Executive and Advisory Committees.236 In addition, the Board 
established a series of research committees, each specializing in a given area of substantive 
planning.237 When the Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act, which 
was the statutory basis for the Board, in 1935, it was reestablished under a new name as the 
National Resources Committee. The preservation of the Board was a sign of Roosevelt’s faith in 
substantivist planning.238  
The final shift in the institutional trajectory of substantivist planning occurred with the 
Reorganization Act of 1939, which inserted the National Resources Committee into the new 
Executive Office of the President under the auspices of NRPB. Its Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
were Delano and Merriam. The most significant difference between the Committee and NRPB 
was the exclusion of cabinet members from the Executive Committee.239 The significance of this 
institutional change was the enhancement of the autonomy of substantivist planning expertise 
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Committee, Progress Report, 1939. U.S. National Resources Committee, Statement of the Advisory Committee. 
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within government. As in the case of the Bureau of the Budget, becoming part of the Executive 
Office did not simply mean an improvement in the ability of NRPB to have personal access to 
the president. It also meant that substantivist planning had been reconstituted as a governmental 
apparatus in the service of the president. 
As a governmental apparatus, the central function of NRPB was to serve as an economic security 
mechanism that not only resembled the early warning system LaFollette had proposed in 1931, 
but also went beyond it. NRPB was responsible for advising the president on “the trend of 
employment and business activity, and [on] the existence or approach of periods of business 
depression and unemployment in the United States or in any substantial portion thereof.”240 
Between 1933 and 1939, the National Resources Committee had already turned itself into a 
clearinghouse for research and data on the nation’s natural resources and their development. In 
doing this, it positioned itself at the center of a network of governmental and private research and 
planning agencies.241 This position allowed the Committee to occupy a vantage point upon the 
American economy that no other agency enjoyed. It collected and disseminated information, but 
also coordinated the planning efforts of other agencies in the decentralized planning network 
throughout the nation at all levels of government.  
Physical planning of natural resources was at the heart of the substantivist planning apparatus. 
The Executive Order that created the National Resources Board gave the Board the responsibility 
to prepare “a program and plan of procedure dealing with the physical, social, governmental, and 
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economic aspects of public policies for the development and use of land, water, and other 
national resources.”242 The Executive Order also requested a comprehensive report from the 
Board on land and water use. The Board’s report laid the foundations for the core of this 
apparatus. In its submission letter, the Board underscored the report’s significance by 
highlighting the fact that this was “the first attempt in [American] national history to make an 
inventory of national assets and of the problems related thereto.”243  
This national inventory, initially covering the nation’s land, water and mineral resources, would 
be the basis of “a comprehensive long-range national policy for the conservation and 
development of [the nation’s] fabulous natural resources.” The Board proposed to establish 
natural resource development as an autonomous domain of public policy. In doing this, it warned 
against a narrow perspective that would potentially see this area as a solution to the depression. 
Nevertheless, it also rejected cultivation of natural resources as an end in itself. “[H]uman 
resources and human values are more significant than the land, water, and minerals on which 
men are dependent,” noted the Board and continued “[t]he application of engineering and 
technological knowledge to reorganization of the natural resources of the Nation [… should] be 
conceived as a means of progressively decreasing the burdens imposed upon labor, raising the 
standard of living, and enhancing the well-being of the masses of the people.”244 By the end of 
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the decade, the National Resources Committee had undertaken extensive studies in the areas of 
land, water, science, and minerals, i.e. energy, as well as public works and industry.245  
From%Physical%Planning%of%Resources%to%Substantivist%Planning%of%the%Economy%
The Committee’s work in industry and public works foreshadowed the expansion of NRPB’s 
purview from a narrow focus on resource development to a broader approach to economic 
governance. These areas can be analyzed under two analytical categories, economic 
preparedness and emergency mitigation. The former policy area focused on minimizing the risk 
of depressions, and it was the product of Gardiner Means’s work at the Industrial Section of the 
Industrial Committee of the National Resources Committee between 1935 and 1939. Emergency 
mitigation expertise relied on the use of public works projects as countercyclical tools, and 
research on the effectiveness of such mitigation measures was conducted by Kenneth Galbraith 
in the Public Works Committee. 
Economic!Preparedness!&!Resilience!Analysis!
The origins of NRPB’s expertise in resilience analysis dates back to the activities of the 
Committee’s Industrial Committee. This Committee, created in 1934, established an industrial 
section in order to “give […] the industrial resources of the national consideration parallel to that 
was given to other national resources.” By 1936, the Industrial Committee had become a meeting 
ground for both the substantivists who favored structuralist economic planning and nominalists 
                                                




who advocated compensatory public spending.246 Initially, it included Leon Henderson, Director 
of the Research and Planning Division of the National Recovery Administration, and Isador 
Lubin, the Commissioner of Statistics at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. By 1939, the following 
would join: Lauchlin Currie, Harry Dexter White, and Mordecai Ezekiel.247 The Industrial 
Section, which contained the technical staff of the Committee, was headed by Gardiner Means, 
whose services were initially loaned from the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture for a study 
on industrial capacity in 1934.248 
At the time, like Ezekiel, Means was an economic advisor to Secretary of Agriculture Henry 
Wallace. He was recruited in 1933 by Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Rexford Tugwell, a 
member of Roosevelt’s first brain trust who enlisted an entire cohort of young and talented 
economists in the Roosevelt administration. Means’s enlistment in the New Deal coincided with 
the rise of his reputation following the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, which he coauthored with Adolf Berle. As Theodore Rosenof notes, The Modern 
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Corporation’s focus on the juridico-institutional transformation of corporate control led to the 
identification of Means as an institutionalist. However, Means was not interested in the modern 
corporation as an end in itself. He had written his dissertation at Harvard on the rise of the 
modern corporation and its implications for economic theory in the early 1930s. In a series of 
articles he authored before joining public service, Means argued that in a modern economy 
dominated by large corporations, the price mechanism and competition had lost their 
effectiveness in the allocation and distribution of resources. The rise of administered prices and 
concentrated control had undermined the market mechanism as a mechanism of adjustment, 
resulting in the Great Depression.249 In this respect, Means’s interest in corporate control was 
ironically orthogonal to his future patrons. While Means identified the modern corporation as the 
source of the nation’s economic ills, figures like Merriam considered the very managerial 
techniques that had made the modern corporation possible in the first place, such as budgeting 
and a skilled personnel, to be the tools that would save society.  
Means’s trajectory in government, first as an advisor to the Secretary of Agriculture and then as 
the Director of the Industrial Section of the National Resources Committee, might come as a 
surprise, but it should not. When Means joined the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, the 
Department was on the cusp of becoming one of the strongholds of the proponents of planning. 
The Department’s leading economists, such as Ezekiel, Tugwell, and Louis Bean, who joined 
Means in the Bureau of the Budget in 1940, were all ardent supporters of the idea of centralized 
national planning. As counterintuitive as it might seem, the Department provided planners one of 
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the most conducive environments for developing the technical capacity of substantivist planning 
within the federal government. First of all, agricultural economics, in the words of Michael 
Bernstein, was “one of the most […] technical of fields within the [economics] discipline,” and 
the Department was receptive to the statistical techniques of agricultural economists.250 In the 
1920s, with the exception of the Federal Reserve Board, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
(BAE), was the only government organization that possessed statistical as well as economic 
expertise. By 1933, not only did BAE develop the expertise to conduct surveys using the 
structured sampling method, but it was also one of the few agencies that had the capability to 
conduct statistical analysis. Ezekiel and Bean were the leaders of the agency in this area.251 Circa 
1930, BAE, with a budget of $6 million, was on its way to becoming one of the leading research 
agencies in the nation.252 
The Agriculture Department planners occupied a homologous position to that of Merriam and 
Mitchell. As illustrated in this chapter and the previous one, Merriam and Mitchell proposed 
national planning as a supplementary mechanism to the market for balancing the economy. In a 
similar manner, Ezekiel and company were responding to the failure of the market mechanism to 
provide adjustment in the agricultural sector. BAE, which was created in 1922, had spent most of 
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the 1920s trying to address the problem of maladjustment between price of supply and volume of 
demand. Like the Hooverian Business Cycles Committee, the goal of BAE economists was to 
perform the behaviors of farmers by teaching them how to forecast future demand conditions 
more accurately.253 By the early 1930s, it had become clear to these actors that such 
performation was not bearing results.  
Disillusioned with the market mechanism, BAE economists rallied around the new Secretary, 
Henry Wallace, in 1933 and legislated the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) the same year as 
a counterpart to the National Industrial Recovery Act.254 While both of these acts were 
determined to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935, under the leadership of Ezekiel 
the former was eventually re-legislated under the same name in 1938. What set the AAA of 1938 
from its 1933 version was the adoption of indirect intervention mechanisms such as subsidies 
and the technique known as the “ever-normal granary,” essentially the stockpile of excess 
products to counteract imbalances in agricultural commodity markets. 
Seen from this perspective, the choice of Means as Director of the National Resources 
Committee’s new Industrial Section in the same year that the National Industrial Recovery Act 
was struck down was a tactical move within Ezekiel’s larger strategy. As early as 1934, Ezekiel 
and other actors in the Department of Agriculture were dissatisfied with the piecemeal planning 
of the New Deal. Ezekiel had already finalized blueprints for a central planning apparatus based 
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on the planning techniques they had developed to address the problem of maladjustment in 
agriculture. Between 1934 and 1937, Ezekiel, Wallace, Bean, and Means had reached an 
agreement that a central planning apparatus would be based on three institutional units, an ever-
normal warehouse for non-agricultural products, a bureau of industrial economics, and a central 
planning board.255 These plans would be put into action, albeit in an unexpected way, starting 
with the late 1940s under a series of legislations that brought into being national security as a 
new governmental domain. First, the Critical and Strategic Materials Stockpiling Act of 1946 
created a stockpile that contained critical and raw materials raw materials based on the 
difficulties experienced by the War Production Board mobilizing economic resources during the 
war. The next year, the National Security Act of 1947 recreated NRPB under the auspicious of 
first National Security Resources Board (NSRB) and tasked it with overseeing the stockpile. 
Finally, in December 1950 Truman created the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) as the 
central planning agency for defense mobilization. ODM and its predecessor Office of Emergency 
Preparedness (1960-1973) administered the Critical and Strategic Materials Stockpile as a 
critical component of a substantivist mobilization resource planning apparatus and deployed it 
for enhancing the resilience of the economy against mobilization demand shocks and ordinary 
supply shocks due to price hikes or labor strikes affecting critical material flows.256  
When Means took over the Industrial Section in 1935 on a permanent basis, he turned the 
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division into the industrial studies division that Ezekiel had proposed. Contrary to what one 
would expect, however, Means was not only interested in expanding the economy. In line with 
the trajectory of both his former Hooverian patrons and the BAE economists, he was also 
interested in solving the problem of economic balance in order to prevent the recurrence of 
another Great Depression. During his tenure at the National Resources Committee between 1935 
and 1940, Means attacked this problem from his distinct perspective on administered, inflexible 
prices. Before going into Means’s approach to the analysis of economic resilience, it should be 
noted that for Means the problem was not a crude case of monopolistic control of the economy. 
The problem was the vulnerability of the economy due to the phenomenon of administered 
prices. According to Means, as the inflexibility of prices increased, “the economy [became] more 
susceptible to violent fluctuations in activity,” and “an initial small fluctuation of industrial 
activity [turned] into a cataclysmic depression.” Large parts of the price mechanism “had 
become so inflexible that the economy lacked resiliency.”257 (Emphasis mine in both instances.) 
Therefore, for Means the problem of balance and maladjustment was essentially one of 
“susceptibility” and “resiliency” circa 1935. Contrary to what one might argue, what Means 
developed at the National Resources Committee was not a theory, but rather an empirical 
analysis and analytics of resilience and vulnerability. 
Under Means’s direction, the Industrial Section attacked the problem of economic balance head 
on. In order to address this problem, two sets of research projects, one on the production 
capability of industry and the other on the consumption habits of consumers, were initiated in 
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1934. The first study “examine[d] the industrial process from the point of view of the producer—
looking down the stream of goods as they flow toward the consumer.” The second study 
complemented this approach by “examin[ing] the industrial process from the point of view of the 
consumer—looking up the stream of goods as they flow down from the producer.” The goal of 
these two closely coordinated projects was to obtain “a well rounded picture of the industry” and 
eventually to produce a body of knowledge regarding the substantive structure of the American 
economy. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, sectoral substantivists had already come to 
conceive the economy as a composite entity that was made up of components that served vital 
functions in the flow of material resources and nominal income. By the mid-1930s, this 
perspective was folded into formal econometric models by aggregationist nominalists such as Jan 
Tinbergen.258 Yet, these studies were neither based on historical economic data, nor did they 
demonstrate the existence of such a structure based on empirical research. The Committee’s 
projects, which culminated in Means’s The Structure of the American Economy, were the first 
attempts along these two lines. 
The Committee hoped that such a body of knowledge would both help reprogram the market 
mechanism, and as a supplementary security mechanism, program the economic conditions in 
which the market operated. With such data, the industry could plan its business and investment 
activities more accurately, and labor and consumer groups could protect their interests more 
effectively. More accurate data in these areas would function as “warnings to prevent 
overbuilding of industrial plants or overproduction of certain types of goods,” reducing the risk 
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of the “[g]reat economic losses [that had] fallen on individual producers and on the community 
because of mistaken ideas as to consumer demand or the productive capacity of competitors.”259 
According to the Committee, the most important application for such knowledge was the 
determination of “production-consumption patterns for the American economy.” If patterns of 
consumption and production could be revealed, then “the condition of production and 
consumption which would constitute economic balance with the optimum use of human and 
material resources” could be determined. This would “throw a clear light on what would 
constitute the optimum possible American standard of living and should suggest ways in which it 
could be brought about.”260 The Committee was not only expanding the sectoral substantivist 
approach to balancing the economy, but it was also reformulating it within a macro form that 
perceived the economy as a whole and not a conglomeration of sectors.  
Such a study first required the collection of data on consumption and production. Compiling data 
on consumption was relatively easy, and the project was completed by the end of 1934. Under 
the direction of Lubin, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as well as the Bureau of Home Economics, 
had already collected some data on household consumption and expenditure.261 However, the 
Committee found the data collection techniques employed by these agencies to be inadequate for 
its purposes. As noted in the previous chapter, in 1934, the random sampling method had not yet 
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become a routine practice in the federal government. The Committee undertook a data collection 
project based on random sampling with a sample size of 336,000 randomly selected families. 
The Committee’s role was to plan the study based on a sound methodology that would represent 
the pattern of consumption and expenditure habits of the population in a truthful manner.262  
The second project proved to be more challenging. In contrast to the consumption study, data 
and data collection methods were not the obstacle. The Committee noted that there was indeed 
“much more information available about industry than about consumption.” Various government 
agencies, including the Census, Labor Statistics and Foreign and Domestic Commerce Bureaus, 
had already collected valuable information on economic activities. The main obstacle in this area 
remained in “organizing the data to show industrial capacities.” To organize data in a meaningful 
way required a conceptualization of “industrial capacity.” Because “little fundamental work 
directly related to industrial capacity [had] been done,” the state of statistical knowledge on 
industrial capacity was in a perplexing state. The Committee noted “while more data were 
available in the fields of industrial capacity, techniques for handling the data were in a less 
advanced stage than was the case in the field of consumption.” This meant that the data had to be 
redeveloped.263 
The problem in the area of industrial capacity statistics was mainly due to the lack of a coherent 
definition of industrial capacity. Capacity was most commonly measured in terms of the capacity 
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to produce. Yet, in certain industries, the standard definition of capacity was based on the 
capacity to consume. The problem, however, was not simply a matter of standardizing the 
definition of capacity. According to Means, both definitions were unsatisfactory from a 
conceptual point of view, as the Committee was “concerned [with] neither the capacity to 
produce items of output nor to consume items of input.” A perspective that was concerned with 
the structure of the economy as a whole, in contrast to a sectoral-focused perspective, needed to 
know “the capacity to convert items of input into items of output. […] The problem of industrial 
capacity thus becomes one of conversion capacity.” Such a substantive form of statistical 
knowledge, it was hoped, would guide government in developing policies with respect to areas 
such as tariffs and transportation.264 What Means was doing was effectively analyzing what 
Wassily Leontief called the economic structure’s input and output relationships. Having been 
trained at Harvard in the early 1930s, Means must have been familiar with Leontief’s project at 
Harvard on the inter-industry economics that sought to illuminate the systemic interdependencies 
that underlay the substantive structure of the economy. In this respect, Means’s effort marked the 
first attempt within the government to develop a substantivist form of knowledge that would 
allow policymakers to intervene in the structural interdependencies of the economy to ensure its 
resilience.  
The significance of the results of these two studies, published in the form of a 1938 report, 
Patterns of Resource Use, went beyond compiling a comprehensive set of data on the 
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consumption and production components of the economy. The report, written by Means, 
attempted both to establish the existence of an underlying structure in the economy, and also to 
project the behavior of the economy based on that structure into the future. Despite this technical 
concern, which lay at the heart of the report, the primary question Means was interested in 
answering was a techno-political one: “what is the level of economic activity which would 
absorb practically all of the great army of unemployed?” Means argued that one would have to 
“lay a foundation for answering [this] question […] through the discovery of continuing 
relationships between such factors as employment, production, and consumer income.” If one 
could discover the laws that rendered these constitutive functional factors continuous within a 
conceptual temporal space, then one could intervene in these regularities and influence their 
behavior toward desired political and social ends. In other words, this way one could begin 
governing the economy as a composite object of interrelated and interdependent statistical 
regularities as opposed to perform the behaviors of decision makers in the firm as sectoral 
substantivists attempted. This would not only expand the scope of economic government and 
allow policymakers to balance the economy as a whole, but it would also bypass the problem of 
compliance on the part of businessmen in governing economic activity. It should be noted that 
Wesley Mitchell had already conceived the idea of conceptualizing the economy as endogenous 
forces and regularities that constituted the business cycle as an effect.265 In this sense, Means was 
advancing Mitchell’s conception both empirically and conceptually. As illustrated below, Means 
gave Mitchell’s sectoral focus a systemic character conceived at the scale of the economy. 
                                                




It was true that the economy was always in “a constant state of flux,” resulting in “tremendous 
changes in production and in prices […] in very short spans of time.” According to Means, there 
must have been “economic relationships of a continuing character” beneath “this constantly 
changing activity.” Admittedly, the economy rested on the “highly complex structure of modern 
industry.” Nevertheless, there must be a “system of interrelationships,” such that “changes of 
activity in the different parts [were] necessarily interrelated to a greater or less extent.” Means 
proclaimed that, such a structure “constitute[d] the basic economic framework which conditions 
and limits specific economic activity.” However, Means went beyond the presentation of 
evidence: He also claimed that construction of such patterns could be “used as a basis for 
developing coherent patterns of resource use” that would resolve the socio-political problem of 
unemployment.266 
Establishing economic structure in the form of continuities required “breaking down [economic] 
activity into its separate components.” In the words of Kuznets, what one needed to do was to 
analyze the structure of the economy from a “horizontally disaggregated” perspective. Means 
divided the American economy into 81 industry groups, which he called segments, and analyzed 
the behavior of each segment’s use of physical resources in terms of production and consumption 
of resources as well as manpower use. Means presented his results in the form of indexes that 
traced resource use in these three factors. “At a first glance,” pointed out Means, “examination of 
the available data on economic activity does not disclose any considerable degree of such 
continuity.” Despite annual fluctuations in the form of irregular ups and downs in the indexes for 
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almost all industries, Means argued that in order to discern patterns, one would have to look 
beneath the “surface data.” A careful analysis would show that the relationship between the 
volume of employment, production, consumer purchases, and other major factors specific to 
industry or the economy as a whole would “bear a fairly constant and determinable relationship.” 
Means argued that this relationship between exogenous and endogenous factors of economic 
activity could be modeled in the form of “a formula representing an arithmetical combination of 
straight lines, simple exponential curves or other simple curves as a parabola” as long as “[t]he 
condition for a simple and continuous function [was] met.”267 Along with the work of 
aggregationist nominalist econometricians such as Jan Tinbergen at the Business Cycles 
Research Project at the League of Nations, Means’s effort to model the economy in a 
mathematical model was one of its first kind. What made it even more noteworthy was its 
systemic approach. Contrary to aggregationists, the structure of the economy was modeled as in 
a horizontally disaggregated form that elucidated the systemic interdependencies within the 
economy. In vertically aggregated form of modeling which modeled the economy’s components 
as functionally defined, vertically represented nominal magnitudes, such interdependencies were 
concealed. In this sense, Means’s attempt to model the economy was an exemplary effort that 
carried with it the potential to unconceal such systemic interdependencies that would become a 
critical issue in reducing vulnerability of the financial system under systemic risk regulation. 
A more interesting question for policy was whether one could use these formulas for “projecting 
the relationship of the past into the future.” One way to determine the reliability of such an 
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exercise would be to compare actual historical data with synthetically produced data. This was 
done for all 81 segments of the economy, which involved 140 separate analyses—most segments 
required one employment and one consumption analysis. Means chose six cases and presented 
his findings in the form of graphs. Just like Kuznets, he was deploying a visual representation of 
statistical truth rather than relying on tables that made patterns indiscernible.268 Means reinforced 
this truth tactic by proposing three other ways of “testing” the reliability of his formulas.  
The first of these was to deploy a set of statistical methods. In an appendix on the statistical basis 
of segment analysis, Means associated his method with Royland A. Fisher’s probabilistic 
standard error of estimates method, which he said would qualify a formula as “reliable if each of 
the residuals for the [extrapolated] years [… was] less than twice the standard error of estimate.” 
Using a graph again, Means demonstrated the extent to which his results were in line with 
Fisher’s rule and reiterated the fit between historical and synthetic data.269 Reference to Fisher 
was no coincidence. As Alain Desrosières points out, in the 20th century, Fisher, along with Karl 
Pearson, had turned statistics into a tool for establishing the truthfulness of hypothetical 
conceptual relationships between seemingly unrelated factors.270 In this respect, Means was 
breaking new ground in the use of probabilistic analysis within the federal government. This 
breakthrough legitimized Means’s projection analysis, which was essentially a virtual 
experiment that simulated the future state of things in the absence of policy changes.  
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The other two ways of testing reliability were the test of reasonableness, and the actual future, 
the latter of which Means said was the most rigorous. He pointed out that the former test had to 
precede any statistical test, because “the relationship [had to be] justified on rational grounds 
before it was established statistically instead of being rationalized after it had been discovered 
through trying out various possibilities.” While Means did not explain what he meant by 
rationalization, he was clearly speaking of a theory of economic behavior. The examples he gave 
to demonstrate the “common sense” nature of the application of rationalization in the 
construction of formulas demonstrated this presupposition.271 Finally, the future (course of 
events) was not only the most rigorous, but also the most productive test for formulating 
continuities in mathematical form. While the future might reveal the inadequacy of a formula, it 
also presented the opportunity to improve reliability.272 Therefore, the future was the perfect data 
generator with which one could construct more reliable and robust statistical representations of 
the economy as a milieu of government intervention. 
Once the formulas for all segments of the economy were constructed and their truthfulness was 
established, Means could answer the question he posed in the beginning of the report. Based on 
two different models, one made up of 11 segments and the other 81, Means’s answer was that 
full employment would be reached when consumer income corresponded to a value somewhere 
between 90 and 100 billion dollars. He argued “[s]uch a level of economic activity and consumer 
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income represents a most desirable objective towards which to orient national policy.”273 This 
was a remarkable accomplishment, because Means was calculating what Kuznets would call the 
feasible maximum productive capacity of the national economy. Moreover, Means was in effect 
establishing a trend projection technique as a tool of policy analysis. Means took this instrument 
with him to the Fiscal Division of the Bureau of the Budget and established it as an essential type 
of analysis in the evaluation of the impact of government programs on the economy. As 
demonstrated in the next chapter, this technique was turned into a form of forecasting technique 
called impact analysis by Gerhard Colm, Means’s future colleague in the Fiscal Division. This 
technique was the first exemplary of a simulation analysis that allowed policymakers to test the 
resilience of the economy to potential future adverse macroeconomic conditions. In this instance 
the object that was stress tested was the whole economic system. With the emergence of the 
monetary layer of the economy, it first became the balance sheets and investment portfolios of 
financial institutions and then eventually the financial system, conceived as a vast network, 
under systemic risk regulation.  
Means combined the National Resources Committee’s physical planning approach with his 
horizontal disaggregationist statistical modeling of the economy in The Structure of the 
American Economy.274 This report was the crowning achievement of the National Resource 
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Committee. Finally, the Committee was beginning to measure up to the expectations of its 
creators. Submitted to Roosevelt just a few months before the Committee was inserted into the 
Executive Office in 1939, it was the clearest statement of substantivist planning’s potential as a 
governmental strategy for addressing the nation’s economic problems, especially in resolving the 
dilemma of massive unemployment in a liberal-democratic order. From a genealogical 
perspective, Means’s conceptualization of the economy was the culmination of Committee on 
Recent Economic Changes’ vision. Not only did it propose a way to study the economic 
organism and its shifting parts, but it also laid the foundations for possible ways to bring balance 
based on its analysis of the economy. In doing this, Means also managed to represent the 
economy as a statistical totality, as Senator LaFollette and Frederic Dewhurst, the Director of the 
Economic Research Division at the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, sought to do in 
the early 1930s.  
The single major difference between Means’s and the Recent Economic Changes Committee’s 
conceptualizations of the economy was the fact that for Means the economy could be reduced to 
an economic structure, a point already made in the previous report. This was a critical 
development in the creation of a vantage point from which the economy could be balanced as the 
Committee had called for in its 1929 report. In the absence of the ability to represent the 
economy as an economic structure in the form of a model, it was not possible to intervene in the 
object with the knowledge of secondary and tertiary effects of one’s intervention. Now that the 
economy could be represented as a model, one could conduct policy simulations to design the 
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most desirable and strategic ways of intervening in the economy. Such simulations would also 
allow policymakers to calibrate their policy instruments and increase the precision and 
effectiveness of interventions. Therefore, it would not be wrong to state that insertion of 
economic modeling and representation of economic structure were two critical developments 
that constituted the state as a governmental vantage point from which one could govern in an 
omnipresent and omniscient fashion. As demonstrated in chapter 4, this ability was instrumental 
in the institution of a vulnerability reduction regime, since without such a form of knowledge one 
could not map out the structure of financial flows and determine their points of vulnerability. 
Just as for the Recent Economic Changes Committee, for Means, the economic process was 
made up of two sets of flows, material and nominal, flowing in parallel to each other. At the two 
poles of this process were resources and human wants, and “the function of [the] whole process 
[was] to use the resources in satisfying wants.” One of the basic structures of the economy was 
the wants of consumers, as reflected in their expenditures. One could, indeed, speak of what 
Means called a “structure of wants.” Such a structure depended on factors such as geographical 
location and income level, and was classified into different types of expenditures. Means claimed 
that his analysis had demonstrated the non-satiable condition of the American consumer, who 
would absorb the excess production capacity of US industry given sufficient purchasing 
power.275  
Concrete resources, both natural and man-made, were the other pole of the economic process. 
The former were of primary importance in the long-run as they were exhaustible. The latter, such 
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as “houses and factories, dams and powerhouses, machinery and equipment, farm improvements 
and irrigated areas,” were of secondary importance in the long-term, but were just as important 
within the frame of a short time period. There was also a less concrete, but even more important 
resource, the nation’s manpower. Finally, some resources shaped the process of production, but 
were not consumed: the physical environment of production, i.e. climate and topography, 
production techniques, and social institutions that allowed production to take place.276 
The two poles of resources and wants were mediated by production. Production facilitated 
material flows in the economy all the way from nature up to the consumers by transforming 
natural resources into raw materials, raw materials into unfinished products, and unfinished 
products into end products. In doing this, it also constituted another set of nominal flows all the 
way down from the consumer to the producers operating at the boundary between nature and 
society. Means analyzed this process in three ways. First, he addressed the geographical structure 
of production, which depended on the location of resources as well as consumers and the 
historical trajectory of economic activity, which limited the mobility of capital and consumers. 
The combination of these three factors resulted in a spatial flow structure of goods from 
resources to consumers. The direction of the flows was determined by the geographic 
concentration of industries that connected resources to consumers.  
The second factor that determined production was the function of different forms of production 
and the relationships between them. Means analyzed the functional structure of production in 
four dimensions. First, he classified production based on types of activities that produced 
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different products. Second, he constructed the historical trend of these activities. Third, he 
measured the sensitivity of each type of activity to depression, and finally focused on the relation 
of actual and potential production. The final aspect of production was what he called the 
“financial overlay” of money flows. These were the financial transactions that accompanied the 
physical activity of production. Means analyzed the structure of money flows based on research 
conducted by Wassily Leontief, who applied his input-output analysis approach to the flow of 
money. In Means’s hands, this became an analysis of the distribution of money balances in the 
hands of different economic groups.277  This was also a critical development for the genealogy of 
economic governance in general and that of systemic risk regulation in particular. As discussed 
in the chapter 4, in the mid-1940s, Means joined the emerging group of monetary nominalists 
and enlisted former substantivist Morris Copeland to map out the flow of funds that constituted 
the financial overlays of the economy. At a time when most nominalists and substantivists 
assumed money to be a neutral factor of influence over economic activity, Means was a 
visionary who pushed Copeland to explore the potential of monetary control instruments of the 
Fed as governmental tools. A second and more specific outcome of this effort was the adoption 
of network analysis by the proponents of systemic risk regulation to map the structure of 
financial flows in the financial system. This attempt was made by another systemic substantivist 
tool that also relied on linear matrix algebra that formed the basis of input-output modeling, 
namely network analysis. Only with such systemic substantivist techniques, one could determine 
critical points within a system that made it vulnerable.  
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The final layer of Means’s analysis was the structure of organizational influences that welded the 
productive activities of individuals into a national economy. There were four major influences: a) 
the market mechanism, b) administrative coordination, c) canalizing rules, such as laws, rules, 
and regulations, and d) widely accepted common goals. While Means accepted the ability of the 
market and prices to regulate economic activity, he found its effectiveness to be insufficient to 
organize the use of resources. Only if it was supplemented with the canalizing rules and 
administrative organization of the modern corporation, could the market mechanism yield the 
expected results. Based on an incredibly detailed analysis at the scale of the national economy, 
Means concluded that neither of the organizing influences was dominant over the others.278 One 
interesting conclusion that Means’s analysis yielded was the recognition that goal setting was an 
understudied instrument of influence. Pointing to its effectiveness during times of war, Means 
emphasized the need for studies that focused on the role of goals in influencing productive 
activity during times of peace.279  
Finally, Means compared the price mechanism in theory with its actual operation. Contrary to 
what one might expect, he was a proponent of the role of the price mechanism as an 
organizational influence. He concluded that the analysis had shown that there was price 
flexibility in many prices and wages that “appeared sufficient to allow the gradual readjustment 
of price relationships to reflect the gradual changes in wants, in resources, and in techniques of 
production.” However, he also found that “large groups of prices, and to a some extent labor 
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rates” had not displayed flexibility in accordance with the decline in purchasing power during the 
depression. “This differential sensitivity of prices to depression influences,” he concluded, “tends 
to introduce serious distortions in the price structure and appears to reflect a disorganizing rather 
than an organizing role that the market can play.” The problem, therefore, could not simply have 
been solved by government intervention in monopoly profits or by government ownership. 
Means argued that the most important characteristic of the price mechanism in its current form 
was its destabilizing role.280 
In the 1939 report, Means could not spell out a specific remedy for fixing the price mechanism; 
indeed, he pointed out that the report was just a first small step in that direction. Yet, he was able 
to identify the degree of flexibility of different sets of prices. In determining this, he used the 
depression as a test of the flexibility of prices. A precursory analysis of data on the surface made 
it seem like the sensitivity of a product’s price diminished as it approached the consumer. Yet, 
Means warned against this approach. He pointed out that flexibility was not an inherent quality 
of a given material. It was an attribute of the industry that produced the product. Among many 
factors that affected flexibility, the most relevant was “the relatively small number of concerns 
dominating particular markets.” First, the structure of the economy created the tendency for the 
number of suppliers to narrow as one moved closer to the consumer. Second, the need for large 
scale enterprise in certain industries for efficiency meant that there were a fewer firms in certain 
industries. Finally, there was the problem of collusion and concentration of control across firms 
or even industries. For instance, while scrap steel was one of the most sensitive products in the 
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economy, aluminum was not, because its production was dominated by a few companies.281  
By identifying the points of inflexibility within the economic structure, Means was getting one 
step closer to an analysis of the vulnerability of the economy to demand and supply shocks. As 
early as in his 1936 book, Modern Economy in Action, he had conceived the idea of governing 
the economy’s adjustment process by intervening in “certain key points at which decisions made 
[…] largely condition the rest of the industry.”282 In the post-war period, the key points that 
Means spoke of became the “key industries” that produced “key commodities” that made the 
economy vulnerable to price shocks. It is true that idea of a key industry was not new—it indeed 
seems to be introduced into the American context in the 1910s from England and popularized by 
Torstein Veblen in the 1920s.283 Yet, which industries were key for the entire economy, and not 
just other sectors, were discovered in the War Production Board during World War II. In the 
post-war period, this problematization was combined with Means’s critique to form a 
substantivist inflation management apparatus in the hands of the mobilization planning agencies 
that were the descendants of the NRPB.   
Beyond these historical points of significance, Means’s systemic analysis of the economic 
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structure should be seen as an exemplary of a form of vulnerability analysis that was eventually 
deployed to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system to shocks under the auspicious of 
systemic risk regulation in our present. While Means did not use forecasting to test the resilience 
of the economic system in an imaginary future of adverse macroeconomic conditions, he 
nevertheless used the Great Depression as an historical form of stress testing simulation. He first 
modeled the economy as an interdependent system of material and nominal flows, stocks and 
prices and then he simulated the behavior of these flows under stress conditions produced by the 
depression. This allowed him to measure the ability of these individual flows to weather the 
shock of the depression. For Means, the flexibility, i.e. adaptability, of these nodes was an 
indicator of the resilience of a given node. By cross-referencing the results of the stress test with 
the interdependency model of the economy, Means was able to identify critical nodes within the 
economy that made it vulnerable. Means’s solution to this problem was to deploy stockpiling as 
a secondary adjustment mechanism that would reduce the economy’s vulnerability to shocks. In 
the spirit of resilience governmentality, however, this mechanism would only intervene in critical 
nodes while sparing other flows from this intrusive form of intervention.  
This schema of governmental intervention is homologous to that of systemic risk regulation. 
There is, however, one critical difference. In Means’s analysis, resilience was a function of 
flexibility. This idea was later adopted by Milton Friedman and was further advocated by Alan 
Greenspan in support of complete deregulation of the financial system. Under systemic risk 
regulation, however, resilience is considered to be correlated with flexibility in a non-linear 
fashion. While flexibility may serve as a source of resilience to a certain optimal point, beyond 
this point it begins to form a source of vulnerability for the system. This is why systemic risk 
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regulation seeks to intervene in critical nodes in the financial system by enhancing their 
robustness as opposed to flexibility. The implication of this shift is that the governor inserts 
shock-absorbing stockpiles into the firms holding critical nodes within the financial system 
rather than trying to exert force on them with stockpiles to enhance flexibility in market prices. 
In this respect, systemic risk regulation pursues a form of intervention that may actually be much 
more intrusive than the one envisioned by Means. It does not just try to force the hands of 
managers; it directly reaches into the firm and directs the managers to behave in a certain way 
and comply with systemic risk regulation measures on a discretionary basis.  
Economic!Emergency!Mitigation!&!Public!Works!
NRPB’s public works program was the primary policy instrument in the agency’s emergency 
mitigation strategy against economic catastrophes. The practice of using public construction 
projects as a tool of emergency relief in times of depressions was already in common use in local 
government. The first proposal to apply this idea on a national scale was made by the President’s 
Conference on Unemployment of 1921.284 As noted in the previous chapter, the Business Cycles 
Committee of the President’s Conference proposed the use of public construction projects as one 
of the ways to stabilize the business cycle in its 1923 report. The adoption of the idea by the 
Committee pointed to a subtle shift in the purpose for which public works were deployed in 
times of economic emergency. From the perspective of business cycle specialists such as 
Mitchell, the primary goal of such an intervention was the stabilization of the cycle. In this 
respect, relief was an indirect effect produced to the extent that the counter-cyclical intervention 
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upon the business cycle was successful. 
The calls for such a mode of intervention came to fruition in the midst of the Great Depression 
with the creation of a Federal Employment Stabilization Board under the Federal Employment 
Stabilization Act of 1931. The Stabilization Board was given two sets of responsibilities. First, 
its Economic Unit was tasked with assessing the risk and determining the existence of a 
depression based on statistical information it collected on business and construction activity. 
Second, its Federal Planning Unit was responsible for coordinating the governmental 
construction agencies’ emergency public works plans. The Stabilization Act had mandated that 
each agency prepare and maintain a six-year projection of its plans for construction projects. The 
Planning Unit was responsible for adjusting these six-year shelves of advance plans based on 
changing economic trends as reported by the Economic Unit. Under Roosevelt administration, 
the Board was abolished in 1934 and its functions were transferred to the new Federal 
Employment Stabilization Office in the Commerce Department. When Congress blocked 
funding for the Stabilization Office for fiscal year 1936, its functions were assigned to the 
National Resources Committee on an informal basis until this de facto situation was formalized 
with the creation of NRPB in 1939.285 Such readiness plans, called “shelf plans,” continued to 
exist well into the postwar period within the Council of Economic Advisors.286 
Despite this new emergency preparedness capacity, the new Emergency Administration of Public 
Works lacked a calculus for evaluating the effectiveness of public works projects as emergency 
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mitigation measures. Without such a calculative matrix, Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the 
Interior and also the head of the Public Works Administration, found himself in a situation where 
he could neither determine the costs and benefits of each project nor prioritize the execution of 
projects based on their net utility. The National Planning Board was tasked with formulating a 
calculative system to address these two sets of problems. The Board was supposed to devise 
criteria for selecting economically feasible projects that would produce effects as quickly as 
possible. In addition to these two criteria, selected projects would also have to deviate from the 
long-range public works investment program in the least disruptive way.287 Thus, the Board was 
tasked with advance evaluation and planning of public works projects, a function which NRPB 
eventually inherited. 
Before the creation of NRPB, the Public Works Committee of the National Resources 
Committee had already started a project to reflect on the Public Works Administration’s 
experience using public works construction as a countercyclical tool. The research and analysis 
was done by Kenneth Galbraith, who would become the quintessential Keynesian of the postwar 
period. The significance of the project lay in the fact that it was the first systematic and 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the emergency public works program and its impact on the 
economy.288 
In their final report submitted to Roosevelt in 1940, Delano and Merriam underlined the 
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significance of public works as both normal and emergency programs.289 One of Galbraith’s 
most striking findings was the relative ineffectiveness of the New Deal public works 
construction projects for facilitating economic recovery. Public works expenditure had bottomed 
out in 1932 and only reached its pre-depression levels again in 1936. There were two primary 
reasons for this. First and foremost, state and local government spending programs, which 
accounted for anywhere from six to ten times federal spending under normal conditions, were 
seriously curtailed in the face of the depression. Second, the federal government was unable to 
expand its spending program, let alone fill the gap. The government was simply not ready to 
boost public works spending. The initial push for public works had started under Hoover in 
1932, but the public works budget, a total of 1.8 billion dollars, could not be disbursed because 
of the criteria of “self-liquidation.”290 Despite the fact that the Public Works Administration 
(PWA), which was founded in 1933, did not have to abide by this principle, it still could not 
spend its 3.3 billion dollar budget as rapidly as it should have. There were simply not enough 
prepackaged, “shelf-ready” projects.291  
The problem, however, was not simply a matter of putting prepackaged plans on the shelves. 
First and foremost, the relationship between federal, state and local governments had to be 
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rethought. Without better coordination, the increase in spending by the federal government 
would merely compensate for the decline in state and local expenditures. Another major factor 
that diminished the effectiveness of public works was the delay in their effect on the economy. 
There was a considerable delay “between the authorization of a large program of public 
construction, or even the appropriation therefore, and the actual employment of great numbers of 
men on construction operations.” Before a project started, it had to go through many stages such 
as “preliminary surveys, studies, and investigations, […] detailed plans and specifications to 
arrange […] financing, [… the acquisition of] land, [advertisement and collection of] bids and 
award[ing] of contracts.” Even after the construction project was ready to start, it usually took 
time to fill the jobs with unemployed workers with the proper skills.292  
Finally, project size was an impediment to the rapidity with which the projects produced effects. 
The larger a public works program was, the more rigid it became on the whole. Smaller projects, 
such as streets, roads, water distribution systems, and sewers, were much more flexible 
compared to large ones such as bridges and dams. A large project would take considerably 
longer to finish, which meant by the time it reached its peak in terms of its stimulative effects, it 
might not be any longer needed. In contrast, smaller works could be stopped as needed without 
leaving behind a large unfinished project—an outcome that would be neither economically nor 
politically sensible. Therefore, NRPB concluded that “[a] well-balanced program might well 
consist of a limited number of projects of considerable magnitude to provide weight and solidity, 
to which would be added a much greater number of rather small undertakings to provide 
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 In light of these difficulties, NRPB concluded that “in a major depression it is impossible to rely 
solely upon the employment created through an expansion of public construction to make up for 
all of the unemployment created by the decline in business activity.” In order for “the effects of 
depression […] to be mitigated,” other strategies had to be developed. NRPB noted that these 
ranged from carefully planned fiscal policies to social insurance and security programs to 
antimonopoly measures.294 While NRPB was acting as a responsible governmental agency by 
spelling out how its emergency mitigation function could be supplemented by other means, it 
was simultaneously undermining its position vis-à-vis its competitor, the Bureau of the Budget, 
as the primary advisory agency to the president on economic policy.  The rise of Budget Bureau 
to significance within the emerging domain of macroeconomic governance, however, was not 
just a significant development in terms of the rise of fiscal nominalism at the expense of macro-
substantivism. It also begot the implementation of Means’s vulnerability reduction approach 
within a fiscal nominalist framework. In this respect, the Fiscal Division of the Bureau of the 
Budget and its successor the Council of Economic Advisors appropriated not only the emergency 
mitigation techniques of macro-substantivism. They also transformed vulnerability analysis into 
a vulnerability reduction technology.   
The.Bureau.of.the.Budget.
The Budget Bureau was transferred to the Executive Office of the President from the Treasury 
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Department in 1939 to serve as a de facto general staff agency for the president to manage the 
executive branch. Yet, the Bureau’s new director, Harold Smith, had much larger plans for the 
new Bureau. Apart from its management function, the Reorganization Act of 1939 also assigned 
the Bureau a new function called program evaluation. This was defined in a passive and negative 
way as assessing the impact of budgetary decisions on economic balance. Smith’s vision for the 
Bureau was to build a third function on this one that would be concerned with a positive program 
of economic governance. In this respect, he saw his Bureau as a competitor both to the NRPB 
and the president’s economic advisor, Lauchlin Currie.   
Smith had garnered extensive experience in the use of the budgeting technique as a management 
tool during his tenure as Budget Director of the State of Michigan (1937-1939) and as the 
Director of both the Michigan Municipal League (1928-1937) and the Bureau of Government at 
the University of Michigan (1934-1937). In this respect, Smith represented the reform process in 
which management techniques developed in local and state government were redeployed in the 
federal government. He transformed the Bureau, which was created as a small line agency in the 
Treasury in 1921 into a key presidential managerial staff, and the position of Budget Director 
into a key presidential advisory role. When Smith took over, the Bureau had a staff of only 45 
individuals, one adding machine, one calculation machine, and one bookkeeping manual, all of 
which had been purchased in 1921. By 1944, the size of the staff would increase to over 600, 
reflecting about a 13 fold increase, and new equipment was purchased.  
The old Bureau consisted of only two divisions, the Estimates and Research Divisions. Smith 
expanded the former considerably and created a Fiscal Division, which was the most significant 
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one after the Estimates Division.295 These two units were responsible for the three main 
functions of the Bureau. Finally, the Central Statistical Board was transferred into the Bureau 
with its entire staff under a new name, the Division of Statistical Standards. The Central 
Statistical Board, created by Roosevelt in 1933, had been responsible for coordinating the 
government’s statistical data collection program, and had played a critical role in the 
construction of the economy as a composite object of nominal flows in the 1930s as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter.296 With this new unit, the Bureau had become the locus of 
statistical knowledge within government.  
The Bureau had been established under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as a check on 
executive power. While the Bureau was technically connected to the president, it was part of a 
broader control mechanism for enforcing the normative rationality of sovereign solvency, i.e. the 
principle of austere and sound state finances. But the Bureau was not just any agency, it was the 
agency responsible for preparing the budget for the President.297 The budget, which was also 
created for the first time in 1921, was an information tool that produced the effect of 
transparency in the area of government expenditures and financing. The Bureau was supposed to 
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help the president to represent the fiscal conditions of the state to Congress in a truthful manner. 
Thus, in the hands of the old Bureau, the budget was constituted as a technology of transparency. 
Second, the Bureau was given the task of sustaining a state of greater economy and efficiency in 
the administrative structure of the executive branch. In this respect, the Bureau’s relationship to 
the president can be seen as analogous to the relationship between the chief executive of a 
corporation and an impartial and independent auditor. While the auditor and management’s 
interests may be aligned, the former’s loyalties are to the shareholders, i.e. Congress and the 
taxpayers. To put it simply, the Bureau was a disciplinary watchdog monitoring the executive in 
the name of the legislature.298 
The reconstitution of the Bureau resulted in the demotion of the Bureau’s transparency function 
to a tertiary status and the absorption of its secondary function within its new primary function, 
to serve as an instrument of management in the service of the president. According to Harvard 
political scientist Arthur Macmahon, who was an influential staff member on the Brownlow 
Committee, the new Bureau of the Budget was not only the “the substance of the Executive 
Office of the President,” but also “the embodiment of the presidency in administration.”299 
Director of the Budget Harold Smith corroborates Macmahon. Speaking at the Executive Office 
Symposium, Smith stated that the Bureau was the management arm of the President. “If the 
President does not have the means to carry out his executive functions,” Smith proclaimed, “he 
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becomes a chief of state something like the Dalai Lama, a venerated ruler in whose name all 
ministerial actions are taken but who is carefully shielded from reality.” Echoing the Brownlow 
Committee’s 1937 report, Smith claimed that as late as the late 19th century, “[t]he President was 
often ignored [by the Congress]; he was chief executive in name only.” From this perspective, he 
likened the Bureau and other divisions of the Executive Office to a centralized nervous system in 
an organism. These institutions were supposed to “provide a system by which information 
[could] be collected, classified, compared, and transmitted for decision by the Chief 
Executive.”300 In this respect, as a staff member of the Bureau put it, the insertion of the Bureau 
of the Budget into the Executive Office “gave the Bureau much more than a new location.” The 
new Bureau was considerably more accessible to the president and its institutional capabilities 
and financial resources were enhanced accordingly. As a result of these two factors, its standing 
within the bureaucracy and thereby its influence were greatly enhanced.301 
The shift in the primary function of the budget, and therefore of the Bureau, from being a 
technology of transparency to one of management, affected the Estimates Division the most. 
Estimates, the largest division, was responsible for the supervision, review, consolidation, and 
execution of the budget. Before the emergence of the management function, its task had been 
merely the preparation of the budget as a fiscal document that estimated future expenditures for 
individual agencies. For the budget to become a management tool for financial planning and 
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administrative control, it also needed to acquire supplementary functions, and most importantly 
oversight of budget execution.302 The adoption of this administrative function led to two 
significant changes: First, the division grew in size to a considerable degree, which accounted for 
most of the increase in size of the Bureau as a whole; Second, a process that would change the 
form of the budget as a governmental document was triggered. If the budget was going to 
become a managerial tool, it had to be transformed from a fiscal document into an administrative 
one that spoke to administrators rather than accountants. For this to happen, the budget had to be 
reorganized around a central focus on government programs and projects.303  
The secondary function of the Bureau was to evaluate the effects of budgetary decisions on the 
economy. This new task was given to the Fiscal Division, which was responsible for “program 
analysis and evaluation.” According to Macmahon, the Fiscal Division was “the nucleus of a 
planning staff” in the Bureau.304 While the staff was very small, it was composed of some of the 
most prominent economists of the time, most notably Gerhard Colm, Gardiner Means, and Louis 
Bean, and was headed by Weldon Jones, who was serving as the Financial Advisor to the High 
Commissioner to the Philippines before joining the Bureau. The main task of the division was 
translating the piecemeal budgetary estimates produced by staff for individual agencies into 
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holistic government programs. Once programs were constructed, they were analyzed and 
evaluated in terms of their economic implications. In the words of Smith, program evaluation 
entailed “compiling overall financial and budgetary information and studying the consequences 
of various aspects of the budgetary program upon the country’s economic structure.” To collect 
such information, the Bureau had to work with staff groups in other agencies such as the 
Treasury and the Fed and distill relevant information that would allow the Division to assess the 
impact of changes in government programs on the economy. This sort of analysis, by definition, 
had to be forward looking and determine the present and future effects of budget estimates upon 
the economy in both micro and macro terms. This meant that the fiscal staff adopted a scale of 
analysis based on broader government programs as a whole, and not the piecemeal budgets of 
individual agencies, as the estimates staff did. In the words of a member of the Bureau, 
“[w]ithout this kind of focus, a budget agency might not [have] see[n] the forest for the trees.”305 
In order to see the forest, the Fiscal Division had to analyze the impact of government programs 
on the economy in the future as well as the present. As a result, the Division started conducting 
long-term financial projections.306 
According to Arthur Holcombe, another Harvard political scientist who was also on the staff of 
the Brownlow Committee, what set the new Bureau apart from its predecessor was “the change 
in its conception of its task.” The task of balance was no longer the negative task of ensuring 
sovereign solvency, but to merge “[t]he problem of balancing the budget […] into the larger 
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problem of maintaining the balance of the national economy as a whole.” Holcombe warned that 
while “[t]here may [have been] sound political reasons for synchronizing the making of 
appropriations with the periodical rotation of the earth around the sun,” “[t]he cycle of the 
seasons [… was] far too short a period for balancing the books of a government controlling an 
economy in which public administrative enterprise [was] rapidly coming to the aid of the 
traditional system of private enterprise.” The decision to balance the budget, and even more 
specific decisions regarding individual items of appropriation in the budget had serious 
consequences for the economy. “Such decisions,” remarked Holcombe, “cause reverberations 
throughout the whole national economy.” When making a budget, the president would have to 
ask himself the following questions: 
What effect will the financial plans of the government have on the plans of farmers and 
businessmen, on the aspirations of salaried workers and laborers, on the flow of private funds 
through the channel of investment, on the general process of capital creation, on the fluctuations of 
the business cycle, and at last on the size and distribution of the national income? What effect will 
the financial plans of the government have also on the fortunes of political parties and of the 
candidates for public office whose interests the parties are designed primarily to promote? 
In order to give satisfactory answers to these crucial questions, the Bureau had to take the role of 
an “organ of thought,” as opposed to an “organ of will and action,” whose primary purpose was 
“organizing official thought in the field of financial policy.”307 Smith shared this vision, but he 
also had much more ambitious plans for the Bureau’s Fiscal Division. Smith’s goal was to turn 
the fiscal staff into a permanent economic staff for substantive policy analysis and advice.  
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With the establishment of the Council of Economic Advisors in 1946, however, his hopes was 
dashed. In 1952, the Fiscal Division was discontinued, and the Bureau eventually became a line 
agency that functioned as a calculative apparatus for the Council by the early 1960s.308 While 
this can be interpreted as a defeat from a historical or biographical point of view focused on 
Smith and his vision, from a sociological perspective it was an ironical success. As explained 
below, the creation of the Council, at the expense of Smith’s vision, should be construed as the 
institutionalization of the Bureau’s secondary function, i.e. the evaluation of the economic 
impact of government programs, as part of a broader governmental logic that would be embodied 
in the Council. This logic was based on nothing other than the nominal balances of the national 
economy. In this respect, Holcombe and Smith’s objective of balancing the national economy 
was realized in the Council under the leadership of its architect, Gerhard Colm. 
Concluding.Remarks.
This chapter has demonstrated that the Executive Office of the President was created as a space 
of economic governance in the late 1930s. Genealogically speaking, the creation of this space 
was a response to the problem of economic imbalance first articulated in the 1929 report of the 
Committee on Recent Economic Changes. Charles Merriam reconstituted the problem of balance 
as a generalized problem of adjusting the political institution of the presidency against the pattern 
into which American society had crystallized by the 1930s. Governing a modern society as well 
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as an economy required the sovereign to rule with machineries of government based on the 
science of public policy. In the area of economic governance, these machineries were supplied to 
the president in the form of the Bureau of the Budget and the National Resources Planning Board 
(NRPB).  
While the former was supposed to have managerial and reflexive introspective functions, its 
director, Harold Smith, took the initiative to expand the purview of the Bureau into a broader and 
positive program of economic policymaking. However, Smith’s expansion was only partially 
successful. As early as 1940, he had added Gardiner Means from NRPB to the Bureau’s Fiscal 
Division, which was at the heart of Smith’s plans for the Bureau. By 1942, he managed to get 
Roosevelt to issue an Executive Order banning NRPB from engaging in financial planning, an 
area of expertise crucial for creating any governmental apparatus.309 What he did not foresee, 
however, was a preemptive strike against his efforts by the Bureau’s own Gerhard Colm, who 
had already become the leader of fiscal nominalists in Washington. As we will see in the next 
chapter, Colm transformed the Fiscal Division into the Council of Economic Advisors, absorbing 
the presidential advisor position, which was reserved for an economist and held by Currie, as 
well as the emergency mitigation and preparedness functions of NRPB. 
Before moving into the next chapter, a note on the historiography of economic planning in 
general and that of NRPB in particular is in order. The historiography of US economic 
governance has mainly overlooked the significance of NRPB as a governmental space.310 The 
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studies that pay attention to its work emphasize its demise, underlining the unrealized potential 
of centralized economic planning in the United States.311 This narrative, however, is misleading. 
The first reason for this is empirical. While it is true that NRPB was defunded by Congress in 
1942, the organization would reemerge under the auspices of the National Security Resources 
Board in 1947 thanks to the National Security Act of 1947. NRPB reemerged within the newly 
established domain of national security in the Executive Office of the President because of the 
need to disguise such an institution from Congress and justify its existence through the ideology 
of national security.  
A second reason for the inadequacy of the literature’s conclusions is conceptual. Thinking of 
NRPB’s legacy solely in institutional terms or within a framework of group conflict would 
inadvertently lead to a misrecognition according to which NRPB and its substantivist planning 
expertise looks like a genealogical dead end. Yet, if one thinks of NRPB’s functions, expertise, 
and techniques, independent of its institutional form and the institutional or ideological struggles 
its actors took part in, then one can see that NRPB is part of a genealogical thread that remains 
alive and active in the present.312 Apart from obvious threads such as the genealogy of economic 
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development both within and outside the US, there are two threads that have been important for 
the genealogy of economic vulnerability. First, the NRPB’s work on the inventory of natural and 
industrial resources of the American economy became an essential knowledge base in the hands 
of its post-war descendants. Second, the type of multi-sector industrial analysis that was 
developed by Means contains techniques that came to be called input-output and sensitivity 
analyses, as well as a generalized approach to the study of substantive problems in the national 
economy. Such investigations were formalized under various Departments in the postwar period. 
The most significant would be the study of energy vulnerability in the 1970s, first in the Energy 
Office, and later in the Department of Energy. From this point of view, systemic risk regulation 
can be seen as the apex of macro-substantivism’s systemic approach to the twin problems of 
resilience and vulnerability. The analytical techniques developed under Means’s tenure took 
more sophisticated forms in the postwar period under defense mobilization agencies and were 
eventually remapped onto the ontology of financial flows to reduce the financial system’s 
vulnerability to shocks. For this to happen, however, first fiscal nominalism and then its 
monetary counterpart would have to face a crisis of their own in managing the catastrophe risk in 
the economy. Only then one could witness the return of the repressed, i.e. systemic analysis 
techniques of macro-substantivism, in our present. 
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In the previous two chapters, I have traced the assemblage of nominalist and macro-substantivist 
layers of economic governance in response to the Great Depression. Building on the sectoral 
substantivist conceptualization of the economy as a hybrid object of material and nominal flows, 
macro-substantivists reproblematized economic vulnerability as an imbalance in the business 
cycle due critical price inflexibilities. In contrast to their substantivist forbearers, this framing 
was based on a systemic analysis of vulnerability and resilience, which marked a critical rupture 
in the genealogy of systemic risk as a generalized catastrophe risk in the economy. While these 
actors were confronted with a series of political and juridical obstacles implementing their vision 
of government, nominalists spent the 1930s constructing National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA) System as an information infrastructure. The NIPA System folded the substantivist 
statistics into an aggregationist nominal mold and constructed the economy as a composite object 
of nominal flows and stocks. Building on their substantivist counterparts, these actors framed the 
vulnerability of the economy as a nominal imbalance between the consumption and production 
components of the economy and deployed the NIPA System to render these imbalances visible. 
In this chapter, I show the emergence of fiscal nominalism as a form of aggregationist 
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nominalism with systemic tendencies that were borrowed from macro-substantivism. Fiscal 
nominalism rested on the nominalist conceptualization of the economy and represented the 
economy and its constituent components in the form of vertically aggregated functional 
magnitudes. Following the nominalists of the 1930s, they also targeted the household budget to 
balance the economy nominally. These actors, however, drew on both sectoral and macro forms 
of substantivism and accepted that imbalances in the economy could have also resulted from 
structural maladjustments caused by substantive causal factors such as technological change and 
abnormalities in the behavior of prices and wages. Based on this dual problematization of 
vulnerability, they constructed the fiscal apparatus in the 1940s not just as a nominal balancing 
instrument, but also as one that was intended to correct substantive maladjustments in ordinary 
times. Fiscal nominalists problematized these two distinct framings of economic imbalance into 
a generic problem of economic vulnerability and conceived the economy as a potentially resilient 
object in a similar vein to the macro-substantivists. In light of this new framing, they invented 
vulnerability reduction as a governmental technology to render the economy shock-resistant and 
thereby enhance its resilience. Finally, they appropriated the substantivist emergency mitigation 
strategy of shelf-ready countercyclical public works deployment into the fold of fiscal 
nominalism and integrated it into the fiscal apparatus as an emergency mitigation security 
mechanism to counteract deflationary spirals.  
To demonstrate this recombinatorial process, I focus on the creation of the Council of Economic 
Advisors in the 1940s and its attempts to govern the economy through the fiscal apparatus under 
the Truman administration between 1946 and 1953. The Council was created as the locus of the 
new domain of macroeconomic governance in 1946 and enjoyed this status until it lost this status 
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to the Fed in the 1970s. Despite what its name suggests, the Council was not only an institutional 
space for advice to the president. Nominalists designed it as an administrative machinery and 
inserted it into the Executive Office of the President to constitute the economy as a governmental 
object. It combined one of the Executive Office’s six presidential assistant positions reserved for 
economic advice with the administrative machineries that were originally set up in the Bureau of 
the Budget and the National Resources Planning Board. Having inherited the governmental 
techniques of these agencies, it was tasked with programming and administering the fiscal 
apparatus. 
The normative governmental structure upon which the Council constituted macroeconomic 
governance can be analyzed around two sets of oppositions, temporalities of normalcy-
emergency and macroeconomic objectives of prosperity-stability. The prosperity objective under 
normalcy established economic growth as a macroeconomic goal, and the object of intervention 
in this domain eventually, under the Kennedy Council, came to be identified as productivity.313 
The stability objective consisted of emergency and normalcy functions. Stability was based on 
the goal of resilience. The more resilient an economy was, the more stable it would be in the 
long-term. It was not only more likely to avoid depressions, but it would also weather them with 
greater ease. Resilience, however, was a goal as well as an effect and not an object of 
intervention. Enhancing resilience, therefore, depended on reducing the economy’s vulnerability 
to shocks. In other words, the object of intervention in this subdomain was economic 
vulnerability.  
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While the preoccupation with economic growth in the 1960s caused resilience to disappear from 
view as a governmental objective, both resilience and vulnerability were reintroduced as twin 
governmental problems in the 1970s, first with the oil and raw commodity price shocks, and later 
with a series of bank failures. Thus, the problem of speculative price booms in markets and bank 
failures that trigger a destructive chain reaction in the financial system came to be called 
“systemic risk.” From the 1970s to the present, the vulnerability of energy and financial systems 
became two critical factors affecting the economy’s resilience to shocks. (See the Graph 1 above 




My analysis of the fiscal nominalist layer demonstrates that this layer contains three critical 
elements of systemic risk and systemic risk regulation. The first element is resilience 
governmentality, which underwrites systemic risk regulation’s attempt to reduce the 
vulnerability of the financial system while refraining from intervening in the flow of credit as 
humanely as possible. While this governmental logic was inherited by fiscal nominalists from 
macro-substantivists, it was nevertheless perfected and implemented for the first time under the 
former group. Similar to macro-substantivists, these actors also indexed the resilience of the 
economy to “strategic points” in the economic structure. While fiscal nominalists did not 
consider reducing the vulnerability of these points sufficient to preventing depressions, they 
nevertheless characterized these points in a similar vein to the “critical nodes” of systemic risk 
and associated the vulnerability of the economy with these points. In this respect, fiscal 
nominalists sought to enhance the resilience of the economy to the maximum degree by 
intervening in the substantive structure of the economy as little as possible.  
This brings me to the second element, namely vulnerability reduction. As already noted, fiscal 
nominalists invented vulnerability reduction as a governmental technology to enhance the 
resilience of the economy. Analyzing vulnerability of the economy to shocks in an anticipatory 
mode required fiscal nominalists to rely on virtual experiments called forecasting exercises. 
While forecasting would normally be used as a scenario planning tool that combines projection 
analysis with scenario analysis, fiscal nominalists deployed this tool in a mode that was geared to 
analyze the impact of future adverse macroeconomic conditions on the components of the 
economy. This meant that forecasting was effectively utilized as a stress testing exercise that 
allowed policymakers to enhance resilience of the economy in anticipation of adverse conditions 
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in the future.  
The third genealogical element that connected fiscal nominalism with systemic risk regulation 
was the catastrophe risk of deflationary spirals and the characterization of this phenomenon both 
as a “systemic event” as well as a “contagion mechanism.” While fiscal nominalists considered 
the underlying cause of depressions to be ultimately economic vulnerability, they framed 
accumulation of imbalances within sectors and markets to pose a systemic threat to the economy. 
Unless the income and production components were well balanced, a burst in over-accumulated 
imbalance in a given market could have triggered a deflationary chain reaction that would spread 
from one market to another and eventually bring down the economy with it. A perfect example 
of such an event was a speculative boom in a commodity market such as wheat. A short euphoria 
and consequent price boom in such a market would result with a crash and the impact of the bust 
would exert itself on the economy as an asymmetric shock. Unless this shock was contained on 
time, it would trigger cumulative forces in the economy and cause a depression. As illustrated in 
chapter 4, the fiscal nominalist metaphor of deflationary spirals as chain reactions was remapped 
onto the financial ontology of the financial system by monetary nominalists in the form of 
“limited liquidity crises” between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s and was deployed to 
characterize the catastrophe risk that was eventually called systemic risk.  
The chapter is organized in three parts. First, I briefly introduce the Truman Council as a 
governmental space. The second part of the chapter traces the creation of the Council from the 
perspective of its Chief Economist, Gerhard Colm. In this section, I point to Colm as a critical 
actor who formulated the resilience problematization. The final section does a detailed analysis 
of the two sets of reports that the Council authored between 1946 and 1953, the Council’s Report 
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to the President and the President’s Report to the Congress. In these reports, I analyze the 
Council’s fiscal nominalist approach to the adjustment of economic imbalances and show how 
the Council rearticulated the problem of imbalance around the norm of resilience.  
The.First.Council.of.Economic.Advisors. .
The Council of Economic Advisors was first created as a small office under the Employment Act 
of 1946. The organizational structure of the Council reflected the dual layered bureau model. The 
top layer was the main body, consisting of three advisors. The Council’s Chairman and Vice-
Chairman were Edwin Nourse and Leon Keyserling.314 Nourse was an agricultural economist 
with a Ph.D.—he was one of the authors of the Recent Economic Changes report of 1929. Before 
joining the Council, he acted as the President of the Social Science Research Council and Vice 
President of the Brookings Institution. Keyserling, in contrast, was a lawyer with extensive 
experience in drafting legislation. Keyserling was a prototypical New Dealer. He had been 
brought into the Roosevelt administration in 1933 by his mentor Rexford Tugwell, a macro-
substantivist economist with an expertise in structural economics.315 After working under 
Tugwell, who was then the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Keyserling became a legislative 
assistant to Senator Robert Wagner (1933-1937), and drafted key pieces of New Deal 
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legislation.316 Before joining the Council, he had been serving as the General Council for 
agencies responsible for federal public housing programs. While Nourse was officially the 
Chairman, Keyserling was de facto director, as he was the one who directed the Council’s daily 
activities, including producing its annual reports to the President and Congress.317  
The bottom organizational layer of the Council was the policy staff, consisting of nine policy 
economists. The most significant members were Bertram Gross, Gerhard Colm, and Walter 
Salant; the latter two were responsible for the most important policy areas, namely fiscal and 
monetary analysis, respectively.318 While Gross was the Chief of Staff, according to a staff 
member, Colm was “the strongest and most influential man on the staff.” Salant also affirms this 
assessment by saying Colm “had an undefined leadership role among the staff.” His influence, 
while based on his accomplished academic and policymaking careers, was greatly enhanced by 
Keyserling's highest regard for him among all economists in the staff. As a consequence, after 
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Secretary, he was the Council’s administrative assistant. Before joining the Council, he had played a major role in 
the efforts to pass the Employment Act legislation in Congress. With such experience, according to Flash, his role in 
the Council was far more important than what his title might suggest. Ibid., 30–1.  
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Nourse's departure in 1949, Colm was promoted to fill the position of Chief Economist.319 These 
three factors explain why it the Council’s annual reports were covered with Colm’s fingerprints. 
Much of the historiography on the first Council concentrates on two aspects of the Council. The 
first is the tension between Nourse and Keyserling over the Council’s formal rules and 
institutional functions. At the heart of this disagreement was the mode in which the Council was 
supposed to provide advice. For Nourse, the Council should have been “a truly professional and 
nonpolitical” scientific agency, providing scientific advise to the President in a passive mode. 
Keyserling envisioned the Council as a policymaking group that advocated policies proactively. 
With the replacement of Nourse by Keyserling in 1949, this issue was resolved in favor of the 
latter.320 The second is the issue of economic growth. One set of accounts focuses on the conflict 
between Nourse and Keyserling over the relative ability of the economy to bear government 
expenditures without causing an inflationary spiral. This difference became particularly 
accentuated in 1948, at the onset of the Cold War, when Truman was faced with the dilemma 
that has come to be known as “guns or butter.” While Nourse reaffirmed the validity of such a 
dilemma in economic terms, Keyserling denounced the dilemma based on a dynamic growth 
                                                
319 Ibid., 20, 29; Oral History Interview with Walter S. Salant, interview by Jerry Hess, March 30, 1970, Harry S. 
Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/salantws.htm. 
320 Specific issues related to this broader disagreement were whether the Council should have been a Cabinet level 
body and whether it should testify in congress. Flash, Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership; the Council of 
Economic Advisers, 23–7; Bernstein, A Perilous Progress, 109–11. Regarding their differences on the use of 
economic theory in general and economic growth specifically, see Collins, More, 24–26, 28, 30–31, 35; Lester H. 
Brune, “Guns and Butter: The Pre-Korean War Dispute Over Budget Allocations: Nourse’s Conservative 
Keynesianism Loses Favor Against Keyserling’s Economic Expansion Plan,” American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 48, no. 3 (1989): 357–71. Also see Oral History Interview with Leon H. Keyserling; Oral History 




model of the US economy.321 A second set of accounts focuses on the emergence of the concept 
of economic growth as a novel governmental objective. These accounts argue that under the 
Council, there was a shift from a cyclical model of the economy to a secular and dynamic growth 
model.322  
This chapter, while accepting the latter argument, argues that the Council had two 
macroeconomic objectives, growth and resilience. Growth, however, was not simply a goal in 
itself, but also a means toward the end of resilience. First of all, to have prosperity, one also 
needed to have long-term stability, which was defined as the absence of depressions. As 
illustrated at the end of this chapter, the Council conceptualized resilience as the ability of the 
economy to avoid depressions as well as its propensity to recover from them. Within this 
conceptualization, growth was seen as a way to lower the catastrophe risk of a depression. In the 
words of the Council’s Chief Economist, Gerhard Colm, economic growth would “increase the 
shock resistance of the economy.”323 In this respect, as the economy expanded, measured in the 
aggregate magnitude of Gross National Product (GNP), the proportion of the aggregate impact of 
the shock to GNP would diminish, enhancing the economy’s shock absorption capacity.324 The 
                                                
321 Brune, “Guns and Butter.” 
322 Walter S. Salant, “Some Intellectual Contributions of the Truman Council of Economic Advisers to Policy-
Making,” History of Political Economy 5, no. 1 (March 20, 1973): 36–49; Collins, More. 
323 Quoted in Collins, More, 21. 
324 This point was first made by Jan Tinbergen as part of his work on the statistical testing of the business cycles. 
Tinbergen argued that the ability of the economy to withstand a macroeconomic shock was a function of two factors, 
its gross nominal magnitude and the structural relationships between its components. As will be illustrated in this 
chapter, Colm first envisioned pursuing the second path and designed the fiscal apparatus as a vulnerability 
reduction mechanism that operated under the latter logic. Only after failed attempts, he turned to the former 
alternative. Morgan, The History of Econometric Ideas, On Tinbergen’s work, see; Ragnar Frisch, Autonomy of 
Economic Relations, 1948. 
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rise of fiscal nominalism at the expense of systemic substantivism in the rubric of the Council, 
thus, meant that systemic resilience conceptualization was now recast in an aggregationist form. 
Gerhard.Colm:.The.Technician.of.Nominal.Balance.
It was not a coincidence that the Chief Fiscal Analyst of the Bureau of the Budget, Colm, 
eventually became the Council’s Chief Economist. After all, he was the architect of the 
administrative machinery for the fiscal apparatus that the nominalists built in the post-Schechter 
period.325 The importance of Colm in the history of economic governance, however, has been 
overlooked in the historiography.326 This is because he spent most of his career as a policy 
economist setting up and administering governmental machineries in the Executive Office of the 
President. There, Colm’s task was not to advocate for policy positions, but to formulate them in 
concrete terms. Yet, there is a subtler reason why he has remained unnoticed, and that has to do 
with his position in the field of economic thought, as a particular type of intellectual which 
Michel Foucault calls the “specific intellectual.”327 Because historiography has been preoccupied 
with economic ideas and their diffusion, Colm was either overlooked as a policymaker or denied 
the prestigious title of a “macroeconomist.”328 He was neither a theorist like Keynes, nor was he 
                                                
325 Schechter was the name of the poultry company that singlehandedly caused the collapse of the first New Deal. 
The Supreme Court’s decision against the government in the Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States case in May 
1934 shook the very foundations of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. This meant that the New Deal’s 
central economic planning agency, National Industrial Recovery Administration, was no longer constitutional. 
Brinkley, The End of Reform, 18. 
326 Cite 
327 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in The Foucault Reader (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1984), 51–75. 
328 A perfect example in this regard is Malcolm Rutherford, the leading historian of institutionalist economic 
tradition. In his 350 page long definitive study on the institutionalist movement in American economics in the period 




a publically celebrated academic like Alvin Hansen. If Leon Keyserling was the master of policy 
advocacy and of crafting legislation in Congress and the White House, Colm was one of the key 
policy technicians who drew up the blueprints for policies and built the techno-political 
machinery through which they produced their effects on the world.  
According to Kenneth Galbraith, the quintessential Keynesian of the post-war period, Colm, an 
émigré from Germany, “transition[ed] from a position of influence in Germany to one of 
influence in the United States in a matter of some five years.” Galbraith points to him as one of 
the leaders of the budding so-called “Keynesian movement” in Washington in the 1940s.329 The 
fact that he was part of the leading fiscal nominalists in Washington who met Keynes in 1941 
corroborates Galbraith’s claim—the group included Lauchlin Currie and Leon Henderson as well 
as Colm’s former colleagues from the Industrial Studies Division, Walter Salant and Richard 
Gilbert. Furthermore, Galbraith states that Colm “played a major role in reducing the Keynesian 
proposals to workable estimates of costs and quantities.”330 One of the prominent institutionalist 
economists of the post-war period, Allen Gruchy also corroborates Galbraith’s assessment of 
Colm. Gruchy describes Colm’s importance in the following way:  
                                                                                                                                                       
Allen Gruchy’s reference to Colm as one of the few members of the neo-institutionalist school of the post-war 
period. Rutherford classifies Colm as an economist “associated with National Planning Association and worked 
broadly in the areas of public finance and fiscal policy.” Ignoring the macroeconomic nature of Colm’s work in the 
US government and NPA, Rutherford concludes that “there were [no] identifiable [institutionalist] research 
programs dealing with macroeconomic issues in the same sense that they existed in the 1930s.” Rutherford, The 
Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918-1947, 2011, 308, fn. 24. 
329 Barber, Designs within Disorder, 135. 
330 By then, Henderson was the Director of the Office of Price Administration, and Currie was holding one of the six 
presidential assistant positions that was created within the Executive Office under the Reorganization Act of 1939. 
This made Currie the first economist to become an advisor to the President of the United States. Kenneth Galbraith, 




Since 1945, economists of the first Council of Economic Advisors, the Conference on Economic 
Progress, the National Planning Association, and the Joint Economic Committee have accepted 
Gerhard Colm's proposition that ‘there is an economic relationship between total production, 
investment, and consumption which is essential for a steadily expanding economy,’ and which can 
be stated in quantitative terms.331  
In this respect, the role Colm played in the creation of the fiscal apparatus in the US state was as 
important as that of fiscal nominalists such as Currie, Kuznets, and even Keynes. Reminiscing 
about his days as the first personal economic advisor to Roosevelt in the White House, Currie 
mentioned that he and the New Dealers he recruited, including Colm, “did not sleep much, but 
when we did the General Theory kept working.” To turn what Currie said on its head, regardless 
of how much the General Theory worked while they slept, someone still had to formulate 
policies, establish specific associations between policy variables, and even design and build the 
entire machinery through which the policies that Keynes’s theory legitimized were deployed.332 
                                                
331 Allan G. Gruchy, “The Influence of Veblen on Mid-Century Institutionalism,” The American Economic Review 
48, no. 2 (May 1, 1958): 11–20. 
332 Seen from this perspective, the General Theory, the book, was an actant that was inserted within a broader 
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strained the network and led to a partial fracturing. While figures such as Henderson chose to remain within the 
network, others, most notably Gardiner Means, eventually broke ranks. Personal hostilities between actors, such as 
Means and Keynes and Hansen, should not distort the fact that the compensatory spending side of the network still 
believed structural intra-industry problems were still significant. This is why Keyserling and Colm would bring 
substantivist planning back under the disguise of the National Security and Defense Production Acts in the late 
1940s. Another example of the analytical poverty of the category of “Keynesianism” is the case of Isador Lubin, the 
Commissioner of Statistics at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since the 1931 LaFollette Hearings, Lubin was a 
proponent of substantivist planning. Yet, from Schechter moment onward, he became one of the leading proponents 
of compensatory spending. Despite this seeming change of heart, Lubin was the one who funded Wassily Leontief’s 




And that person was Colm. 
The roots of Colm’s fiscal nominalism went back to his career in Germany. Before fleeing 
Germany in 1933, Colm was already an accomplished policy economist. After receiving his 
doctorate in sociology from Freiburg University in 1921, he worked at Germany’s Federal 
Statistics Bureau until 1927. By 1925, he became its Research Director. There, he led a research 
team in the construction of the first German national income statistics. According to Adam 
Tooze, the results of this project were particularly important for the genealogy of the economy as 
an object of government. Colm and his team managed to “provide an absolute measurement of 
national income [as] the key macroeconomic variable.” Unlike their American counterparts at 
the Harvard Committee for Economic Research, who were running a project on business cycle 
barometers, Colm analyzed the business cycle as “the actual movement of the economy as a 
whole,” and not by reference to prices in randomly selected industries.333 In this respect, the 
economy as a milieu already existed for Colm when his American substantivist counterparts 
were still busy mapping out the pattern of economic activity in the form of what Gardiner Means 
called “surface statistics.” 
Colm developed his fiscal theory as a structuralist adjustment mechanism at the Institute of 
World Economics at the University of Kiel. When Colm joined in 1927, the Institute had already 
become a bastion of structuralism, which presented an alternative to both laissez faire capitalism 
                                                                                                                                                       
next chapter, Leontief’s modeling of the economy was very similar to that of Means and would play a critical role 
within the substantivist planning agencies that were the decedents of the National Resources Planning Board. In the 
pre-neoclassical synthesis policy, there was simply no hostility between aggregationists and disaggregationists. 
333 J. Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German State, 1900-1945 the Making of Modern Economic Knowledge 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 124–26. 
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and socialist total planning.334 The members of the Institute, also called as the Kiel school, were 
known for their structural theories of balanced economic growth and the business cycle. The 
Institute’s Research Director, Adolf Löwe was one of Germany’s leading structuralists. Colm 
replaced him as Director of Research in 1931. In addition to Colm, Löwe recruited a cadre of 
distinguished economists, most notably Wassily Leontief, Jacob Marschak, and Hans Neisser.335 
Colm’s unique position in the US therefore can be explained by his previous career trajectory in 
Germany. First and foremost, he was an expert on the business cycle, but his understanding of 
the cycle was structuralist in nature. Colm must also have been acquainted with the Kiel School’s 
horizontally disaggregated approach to multi-sectoral analysis, which was imported to the US by 
Leontief under the name of input-output analysis. Thus, Colm could play three different games: 
He could speak to the nominalists at NBER and the Commerce Department as well as the 
proponents of supplementary spending; he was also in agreement with macro-substantivism New 
Dealers such as Means and Keyserling; finally, he was an eager proponent of Leontief’s 
approach.   
With Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, Colm and other members of the Kiel school took refuge at 
the New School for Social Research in New York.336 By 1938, Colm became the Dean of the 
University in Exile, a new graduate division for social science of which he was a founder. At 
                                                
334 At Kiel, he was also affiliated with the new Department for Statistical Economics and Business Cycle Research.  
335 On Kiel School, see the History of Economic Thought website http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//!
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New School, Colm launched a graduate seminar on fiscal policy, a new area of economics at the 
time, and began publishing a series of articles on the role fiscal policy could play in 
macroeconomic management.337 These articles not only raised his intellectual profile in the US, 
but also made him visible in the field of New Deal policymaking by the end of the decade.338  
His invitation as a speaker to the first meeting of the Conference on Research in National Income 
and Wealth in 1935 by Wesley Mitchell was a clear sign that Colm had already become a notable 
figure within the field of economic policy in the US. The executive committee that organized the 
event was chaired by Simon Kuznets and consisted of other notable substantivists and 
nominalists such as Morris Copeland, Gardiner Means, and Robert Nathan. The conference was 
intended as a venue for academic economists interested in policy issues to interact with 
policymakers from leading government agencies in the area of economic policy.339 As will be 
discussed in detail below, Colm’s paper on the need to include public expenditure and revenue in 
national income estimates caused a minor controversy between him and Kuznets. It is a 
testament to Colm’s impact on conference participants that his criticism of Kuznets’s 
methodology for estimating national income was picked up and argued by Means, Currie and 
                                                
337 The seminar seems to be productive and some of the students published their papers in the New School’s journal 
Social Research. See CITE 
338 George Garvy, a Federal Reserve economist, points to the role of German émigrés in introducing countercyclical 
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Nathan the next year at the second Conference on Research in National Income and Wealth.340 
By the end of the decade, he became a close friend of Hansen and was acquainted with Currie, 
two associations that signaled his emergence as a central figure in the expanding network of 
fiscal nominalist policymakers. These connections put him in a unique position as a structuralist 
within the shifting plane of economic governance in the post-Schechter period. 
Colm’s career as a policymaker in the US government began in mid-1939 with a position as a 
fiscal and financial expert in the new Industrial Economics Division at the Commerce 
Department. He was invited to join the division by Commerce Secretary Harry Hopkins. As 
described in the first chapter, this division was a central part of Hopkins’s agenda to transform 
the department into a machinery for the production of macroeconomic knowledge. It was located 
within the Office of the Secretary and was envisioned as the analytical arm of the emerging fiscal 
apparatus. Under the leadership of Richard Gilbert, a cadre of economists who subscribed to the 
conceptualization of the economy as a structural totality made up of aggregate components 
analyzed the data provided by the National Income Division on nominal balance.341  
In the Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce for 1939, Hopkins identified the task of the 
department as the monitoring of “[d]eveloping maladjustments” and the formulation of “the 
measures necessary to correct them.” Therefore, interpreting national income estimates, an area 
Colm had already mastered in Germany, constituted only one of the division’s responsibilities. 
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Other areas of analysis included estimating the maximum capacity of the US economy to 
produce goods and services and monitoring inventory accumulation as a predictor of economic 
vulnerability.342 When Congress failed to renew funding for the division for fiscal year 1940, 
Currie, who was about to be named as the first economist to become Roosevelt’s advisor after 
serving Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles for five years as an assistant, arranged Colm’s transfer to 
the Bureau of the Budget’s new Fiscal Division as a fiscal analyst. By 1946, Colm was promoted 
to Assistant Director of the Division.343 As shown in the previous chapter, the Fiscal Division 
was at the heart of the new Bureau. There, Colm worked with Gardiner Means and took the 
initiative to turn the Division into an administrative machinery to control the fiscal apparatus that 
was simultaneously being constructed by other groups within the government. 
Colm’s.Theory.of.Fiscal.Adjustment.
Colm held a unique position in the field of New Deal economics. While he was a proponent of 
compensatory spending, he was also a structuralist. As a member of the so-called Kiel school, he 
saw the business cycle as an effect of structural imbalances in the economy. While other 
members of the school, such as Adolf Löwe and Emil Lederer, were busy devising structural 
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theories of balanced growth, Colm was the one building the tools of intervention that would 
target the structural imbalances. Colm’s preferred instrument was fiscal policy, which made him 
a structuralist particularly suitable to the post-Schechter context in which Keynes’s General 
Theory became a critical node within the broader network of fiscal nominalist policymakers and 
economists. While New Dealers often drew on the General Theory because it offered scientific, 
objective authority that legitimized their pre-Keynesian ideas regarding pump priming, Colm 
used it differently. For Colm, Keynes was a theorist who formalized the structural relationships 
between different components of the economy in a robust way.344  
We know very little about Colm’s pre-1933 economic thought. Therefore, we can take his close 
colleague Löwe as a proxy. Löwe held the view that business cycles were the result of essential 
factors of production, such as capital accumulation, the organizational structure of industry, i.e. 
monopolies and cartels, and technology, as well as natural factors, including population patterns 
and crop variation.345 On the onset of the Great Depression circa 1929, both Löwe and Colm 
argued that the state should not have intervened in the economy only in a countercyclical mode. 
In the face of the failure of the private sector to recover from the crisis, adjustment of the 
structure of the economy must have been the primary priority.346 This was also the year he 
published his Economic Theory of Government Intervention. According to Dieter Krohn, in this 
work, Colm outlined “a fundamentally new approach” that “not only departed from the 
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prevailing market theory but also interpreted the work of public finance in a completely different 
way.” On the one hand, Colm described the public sector as the third pillar of the economy after 
the private sector and households. On the other hand, he characterized the public economy as “an 
economic system in its own right.” In this respect, taxes were not simply a burden on the 
economy, but the basis of funding government programs that were instrumental in achieving 
economic goals. For Colm, the public economy should have been a structural policy instrument, 
playing an instrumental role directing the economy. Fiscal policy, therefore, was a corrective tool 
as well as a transformative one.347 
In the US, Colm put his fiscal structuralism into circulation in a series of articles published in the 
New School’s journal Social Research. In a 1934 essay on the ideal tax system for the present 
mature state of capitalism, he criticized those who were arguing for the use of the tax system by 
the state to manage the business cycle. He pointed out that “the confidence in the automatic 
character of capitalism” had been shaken in the wake of the depression and tax systems were 
“entrusted with the task of economic [stabilization].” According to Colm, a policy of tax 
reduction would have been ineffective, since taxpayers who benefited from the cut would have a 
greater propensity either to pay off debts or hoard the tax savings, to put it mildly, a problem that 
has not been fully resolved to this day. Colm argued that this was why “a policy of tax reduction 
[was] insufficient [and] it must be combined with a policy of increased public expenditures. […] 
In combating cyclical instability, the state must place foremost reliance upon instrumentalities 
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other than taxation which affect more vitally the economic process.” 348  
Two years later, Colm reformulated his counter-proposal on a theoretical basis in “Theory of 
Public Expenditures.” After arguing that classical economic theory had neglected the study of 
public expenditure by its single focus on the disturbing effects of taxes on the market, Colm 
claimed that “the fundamental problems of taxation and public credit [could not have been] 
solved without an underlying theory of expenditures.” According to Colm, “the modern 
economic system consisted of two realms which are interwoven with each other: the private and 
the public realm.” While the former relied on the market for the allocation of resources, the latter 
depended on “the budgeting method.” (Emphasis in the original.) Despite this seemingly closed 
relationship between the public domain and budgeting method on the one hand and the private 
domain and the market mechanism on the other, there were cross-relationships between these 
systems and principles. Public economics relied on the market principle for managing enterprises 
and public utilities while private institutions such as churches and associations also relied on the 
budgeting method. The key difference in this double dualism was the distinction between public 
and private expenditures. In contrast to private expenditure, public spending was not geared 
toward profit-making, but was a “means for the execution of social and economic policy.”349 
Colm was establishing the autonomy of tax-funded public expenditures for governmental 
purposes. 
This was precisely why economic and fiscal criteria such as “economic productivity” and “self-
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liquidating projects” were misguided.350 The appropriate primary norm that should have guided 
public expenditure was “filling the gaps in the marketing system,” meaning providing the 
financing for types of services that could not be organized around price and market mechanisms. 
The secondary norm was “correcting the market system” in instances where individuals became 
“victims of malfunctioning in the market system.” The social task of government, from this 
perspective, was “to counteract the failures of the marketing system in procuring a minimum 
economic security.”351 What had made this rather obscure topic of fiscal theory of the state 
important was the fact that public expenditures were no longer a small percentage of what Colm 
called the “social product,” a macroeconomic variable that is the sum of the national income and 
the value of services not included in the former. As the proportion of public expenditure to social 
product increased, “public spending [became] a decisive factor in economic activity.” Colm 
concluded, therefore, that “[p]ublic expenditures [could] no longer be considered from a merely 
fiscal point of view; they must be considered also from the point of view of the whole economic 
system.”352 While Galbraith was analyzing the problems encountered in the use of “emergency” 
public works in the National Resources Committee, Colm was busy grounding the use of both 
normalcy and emergency public works within a fiscal theory of the state. 
By 1940, the year he joined the Bureau of the Budget, Colm had adopted a fully structuralist 
perspective on economic stability and integrated his fiscal theory of expenditures into this theory 
as a mechanism of structural adjustment. In 1940, he again posed the same question regarding 
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tax policy that he had asked six years earlier. According to Colm, the US was a maturing 
economy, which corresponded to “a stage of economic development in which the interest and 
price mechanism fail[ed] to direct the productive forces of the nation into work urgently 
needed.” This was why “market automism” could not be relied on in a maturing economy; it 
must be “supplemented by economic and fiscal policies […] in order to bring about full and 
steady employment of the productive forces.”353  
The question, however, was what kind of economic and fiscal policies to use. For Colm, the 
answer lay in the causes of the Great Depression. Colm borrowed his answer from his friend 
Alvin Hansen, who was in the process of preparing a manuscript on the relationship between 
fiscal policy, the business cycle and the problem of chronic unemployment. According to Colm, 
the problem was not simply a shortfall in income, but a fundamental maladjustment between 
different components of the economic structure. This was why depression could not be “removed 
by an injection of purchasing power.” A sustainable high level of income and employment 
required “a fundamental adjustment of the economic structure.” On the basis of this diagnosis, 
Colm asserted that a more meaningful question was whether tax policy, as opposed to spending, 
could be used to achieve a permanent adjustment in the economy.354 Colm’s answer was a 
qualified one. Tax policy could aid adjustment, but it was not enough to adjust the economy 
fully. It could be used most effectively for “directing the purchasing power, and not so much in 
its punitive or incentive effect on the behavior of individuals.” Yet, the ability of tax policy to 
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direct purchasing power “require[d] the development of legislative and administrative techniques 
which need[ed] further exploration.”355 As this analysis of Colm’s thought on fiscal policy 
explicates, Colm, the specific intellectual, was already pondering the nuts and bolts of the 
techniques for reprogramming the economy in the late 1930s. 
Colm.and.The.Full.Employment.Bill.of.1945.
While Kuznets and others were developing critical techniques to manage mobilization during 
World War II, Colm was pondering the problem of transition to a peacetime economy as early as 
1941.356 Colm accepted that mobilization was a productive activity in terms of developing 
governmental techniques. “In the organization of the defense effort,” Colm put it, “experience 
[was] obtained and institutions [were] developed and tested which may enable us better to master 
future postdefense difficulties.”357 At a time when the economy was mobilized at full capacity, 
Colm was nevertheless cautious regarding the sustainability of full-capacity utilization after 
demobilization. He was well aware of the historical examples of post-war depressions. Colm had 
already warned of this danger the previous year. “Armament,” asserted Colm, “cannot solve but 
can only postpone the fundamental problems of our economy.”358 Not being able to foresee the 
advent of never-ending and long-lasting limited wars of the Cold War era, Colm argued in 1941 
that “gains of the defense ‘prosperity’” were temporary, and such gains would be destroyed by 
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“the ensuing postwar or postdefense depression.” Since “the fundamental problem of the post-
defense period would be the maintenance of the high level of income and the preservation of 
economic activity,” he suggested that policymakers start asking “why a high level of activity 
could not be maintained after war periods in the past” and what could be done to avoid the 
repetition of such a depression.359 
Colm was not alone in his worries about the transition from war to peace. In July 1944, Hansen, 
who had just become a consultant for the Federal Reserve Board after the National Resources 
Planning Board was abolished in 1943, relayed to Colm a conversation on the subject that he had 
had with the Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles. They agreed on the need for an American version of 
the British White Paper on Employment Policy.360 Tasking Colm with writing the American 
“White Paper on Employment Policy,” Hansen asked Colm to write a draft that highlighted the 
federal government’s responsibility to maintain full employment.361 In early August, a study 
group, which came to be called the “postwar employment study group,” was gathered around 
Colm’s draft. With the exception of Colm, all the members of the group were alumni of 
Hansen’s fiscal policy seminar at Harvard. The group included Assistant Budget Director 
Weldon Jones, Arthur Smithies (Budget), Richard Musgrave and Richard Gilbert (both from the 
Fed), Walter Salant (Office of Price Administration), and Emile Despres (formerly the Fed, then 
State). By mid-August, the group agreed to write two distinct documents. One was intended for 
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Roosevelt as the basis for a public speech, and the other was a technical policy paper.362  
Having witnessed Roosevelt’s propensity to rely on inflated goals and charismatic leadership, 
Colm had become worried regarding the fate of postwar employment policy as early as 
September. In a memorandum detailing his concerns, Colm reiterated the points he had made in 
his 1940 and 1941 essays about the illusory and temporary welfare effects of war armament and 
mobilization. With war expenditures running at an annual rate of $90 billion, he underlined the 
need for “develop[ing] peacetime production and […] demand to take the place of these 90-
billion-dollars; war expenditures.” If they wanted to prevent the return of large-scale 
unemployment, consumer purchasing power had to be developed and business had to be 
encouraged to invest.363 While anyone would agree with such statements and goals, “[his] 
concern [was] based on the fact that these statements, desirable as they [were], [had] not been 
sufficiently implemented by concrete proposals for accomplishing the objective.” Drawing upon 
his experience representing the German government in the international peace negations in Paris 
in 1928, he pointed out that “outlawing war as a means of national policy” in conflict resolution 
by itself had proved ineffective. “[H]igh-sounding declarations,” argued Colm, “[were] useless 
unless they [were] implemented by appropriate machinery for effectuating the objective and by 
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an unqualified determination to use the machinery when needed.”364 (Emphasis mine.) It would 
not be an exaggeration to say that Colm must have had the initial Victory program and the 
difficulties that Kuznets encountered in the War Production Board in mind when he referred to 
“high sounding declarations.” Setting goals in itself was not sufficient; such goals had to be 
supplemented with policy machineries. 
According to Colm, the same point was valid in the area of economic policy. While one could 
not “legislate employment opportunities,” one could prepare “a positive program for full-
employment opportunities” and “provide [… the] government machinery that [would] enable 
[policymakers] to do [their] part in a national program.”365 Such a program, however, was not 
necessary simply because of proactive reasons of enhancing employment opportunities. It was 
also needed in the negative sense as a measure against the potential for government to destabilize 
the economy. Because “government activities, [both] expenditures as well as revenues, play[ed] 
such an important role in the national economy as a whole,” the function of this machinery 
“should be [to] plan[… revenue and expenditure measures] in close relationship to each other 
and in close relationship to actual and prospective business developments.” Fiscal planning 
would make “certain that revenue as well as expenditure legislation does not impede economic 
development but rather contributes toward the goal of promoting a full-employment economy of 
free enterprise and ample opportunities.”366 In his 1968 work on the fiscal revolution in America, 
Herbert Stein pointed out that “[t]he budget became much too big a cannon to be allowed to run 
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loose on the deck of the economy; its economic effects had to be taken into account.”367 As 
illustrated in the previous chapter, this was the second function of the Budget Bureau, which was 
delegated to the Fiscal Division that Colm was a part of. Colm was proposing to take this passive 
function one step further, transforming it into a proactive policy instrument for nominal balance. 
According to Colm, such a machinery had to be embedded in a statistical as well as a juridico-
institutional frame. First, there was the need to obtain information such as the estimates of 
federal expenditures for future years as well as “the prospective national production, national 
income, employment and related data.” Second, there was a need for a single place in both the 
legislative and executive branches where such data could be considered when determining 
budgets and fiscal policy. In Congress, there should have been one joint committee.368 In the 
executive branch, there should have been a corresponding agency, in either the Bureau of the 
Budget or another agency. The latter should have been responsible for collecting all the 
necessary data for the formulation of an overall government program that will cover the fiscal 
policies as well as the activities of state enterprises. Colm finished his memo with a warning that 
neither “a declaration of good intentions” nor the creation of “an efficient government 
machinery” was enough. The solution of the problems that awaited policymakers in the postwar 
period would depend on the nation’s determination.369 Colm was alluding to the goal setting that 
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Means had highlighted as a potential “influencing factor” in his 1938 The Structure of the 
Economy report. In this respect, the machinery that Colm had in mind was an assemblage that 
consisted of the techniques developed by both Kuznets and Means before and during the war.  
Colm’s concerns were for the most part addressed in the ad hoc study group’s final report, 
“Postwar Employment.” The report gave government the responsibility for four goals, two of 
which alluded to the dual norms of economic stability and growth. These were the maintenance 
of “full and stable national production, income, and employment to the maximum possible extent 
through encouraging the expansion of private enterprise” and the promotion of “a steadily rising 
standard of living for the nation as a whole by developing our economic resources and improving 
the efficiency with which they are used.”370 Despite the emphasis on the encouragement of 
private enterprise, the ultimate tool chosen for economic stabilization was fiscal policy, on both 
revenue and expenditure sides. In addition, the report also suggested the use of regional and 
urban development programs such as the development of river valleys, agricultural fields, 
transportation and urban development projects. Finally, it pointed to the price stabilization 
technique of the “ever-normal granary for agriculture” that was introduced with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA).371 As noted in the previous chapter, the AAA was part of a 
broader and more ambitious project of structural balance. The reinvigoration of the national 
defense stockpiles for raw materials, which were created under the National Stockpiling Act of 
1946, with the Defense Production Act (DPA) in 1950 came as a major step toward realizing the 
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dreams of structuralists like Ezekiel. It was no wonder why Keyserling referred to DPA as the 
final piece of legislation that complemented the Employment Act of 1946.372 
The significance of the “Postwar Employment” report was twofold. The original Full 
Employment Act of 1945, which was introduced to the House in January 1945, was entirely 
based on the ad hoc study group’s report. The final bill written into law as the Employment Act 
of 1946 was very similar to the report. There were two major differences: first, the former 
proposed the establishment not only of juridico-institutional arrangements such as a Joint 
Committee on the National Budget, but also the machinery which Colm insisted upon. At the 
center of this machinery was “the National Production and Employment Budget,” which was a 
rule based automatic adjustment mechanism. The President was required to submit a detailed 
budget that estimated the potential level of gross national product (GNP) required for a full 
employment economy. This figure would then be compared to the estimates of expected 
aggregate factors such as the size of the labor force and the volume of investment and 
expenditure by the private sector, consumers, and the government. Next, policymakers would 
compare the two estimates and determine whether the expected investments and expenditures 
would allow the economy to reach a full employment level. In case of a deficiency, the president 
was obliged to prepare an economic program that would compel the private sector to fill the full 
employment gap. If this was not feasible, then the government was expected to initiate federal 
programs that would compensate for the deficiency.373  
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Such a compulsory budgeting mechanism was absent from the final version of the bill. The 1946 
Act only established the juridico-institutional framework and defined the task of the president 
narrowly as a responsibility to seek “maximum employment and production,” as opposed to the 
single goal of “full employment.” It required the president to transmit an “Economic Report” to 
the Congress each year. However, this report was only informative in nature and did not have 
any trigger power. The Act also created two new institutions, a Council of Economic Advisors in 
the Executive Office of the President, an idea that was put forward by Colm, and a Joint 
Committee on the Economic Report.374 As the name of the new presidential office indicated, the 
Council’s authority was limited to advising and making recommendations. Thus, it was not 
certain whether a machinery such as the one contemplated by Colm would become operational. 
To make things worse, the Council’s budget was limited to a mere $345,000, approximately $4.1 
million in today’s dollars.375 Finally, there was nothing on the data system that Colm had 
described. Luckily, however, the National Income and Product Accounts System was about to be 
completed. The challenge that awaited Colm and his future colleague Keyserling was to 
convince the new president to heed their advice.  
The second point of significance was the appearance of the idea of deploying stockpiling as a 
supplementary technique of macroeconomic governance within a broader program of 
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macroeconomic stabilization. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the ever-normal granary for 
agriculture was adopted as a shock absorber in the field of agriculture policy.376 While the “ever-
normal warehouse” was never fully realized, a stockpile for raw materials considered critical for 
economic mobilization was established the same year. In the postwar period, this stabilization 
device was combined with substantivist analytical techniques such as input-output modeling to 
protect the price system from demand and supply shocks such as mobilization by defense 
mobilization agencies.  
Techniques.of.Balance.
While the Full Employment Bill was still debated in the Congress in the course of 1945, Colm 
had already started formalizing the techno-political innovations and advancements that Robert 
Nathan, Simon Kuznets, and Milton Gilbert had undertaken at the National Income Division and 
the Planning Committee of the War Production Board in the early years of the war. That year, 
Colm published two articles on the subject and presented the outcome of his initial efforts at the 
annual conference of the Income and Wealth Group in November. These documents contained 
blueprints of the fiscal apparatus that Colm wanted to deploy as an adjustment mechanism to 
supplement that of the market. 
Confronted by attacks from both the proponents of “a laissez-faire economy” and those of “a 
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planned economy,” in December 1945, Colm asked what the technical requirements of a full 
employment policy would be. The question for Colm was whether “the government [was] 
equipped, or […] [could] be equipped, to do the job without paying the price of adopting a 
regimented economy.” Since the Great Depression, “confidence in the effectiveness of central 
bank policy as a steering mechanism for a free-enterprise economy” had deteriorated, and thus, 
such policies “could no longer be regarded as the strategic weapon” in governing the economy. 
(Emphasis in the original.) Fiscal policy, on the other hand, had just been added to what Colm 
called “economic arsenal of democracy.”377 The importance of fiscal policy as a governmental 
tool was in its ability to “affect the general level of economic transactions and job opportunities 
without interfering with the basic principles of free enterprise, freedom in the choice of a job, 
and freedom in the choice of consumption.” Moreover, it could be used to solve a variety of 
distinct problems such as deflating a boom or stimulating a slack market. While fiscal policy 
might have been thought to be “the long-sought lever of economic policy,” Colm argued that a 
coordinated government program was “[t]he most powerful weapon in the economic arsenal of 
democracy.” A challenging task such as “maintaining high-level production and employment 
[could not have been] accomplished by any single device.”378 This coordinated program was 
conceptualized within the notion of the “nation’s economic budget” (henceforth the national 
budget).  
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Colm described the national budget as “a system of social accounting.” The purpose of this 
system was to make the effects of the Federal government’s fiscal policy decisions visible and 
thereby to “add to the effectiveness of democratic discussion and democratic determination of 
economic policies.” In this respect, the economic budget was the techno-political device of 
accountability par excellence. Colm saw the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as a model for 
this system. The Act established “the government’s budget” for the first time as a financial 
accounting mechanism. It was intended to allow Congress to “consider the financial implications 
of [the fiscal] actions” of the President.379 The goal of the act was not to predetermine what 
specific decisions should be taken, but to constitute a mechanism that would, hopefully, enforce 
the normative rationality of austere and sound state finance. In a similar manner, the mechanism 
that was proposed in the Full Employment Act of 1945 would foster a democratic environment 
of accountability, which would force government to consider the impact of its fiscal actions on 
its environment, i.e. the population vis-à-vis the economy.  
In this respect, if the government’s budget was established in order to ensure the solvency of the 
state and to protect it from itself by making those who make fiscal decisions accountable to 
Congress, the nation’s budget was intended to ensure the health of the economy and prosperity of 
the nation. It was, therefore, introduced as a check over the logic of sovereign solvency that was 
materialized in the form of the government’s budget. If there was one lesson that the Great 
Depression taught experts like Colm, it was that government had to proactively correct the 
maladjustments accumulated between various vital components of the economy. In order to 
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ensure that government could take the right kind of corrective actions, the solvency logic of the 
state had to be supplemented by an alternative logic that was primarily concerned with governing 
the relationship between the state and its environment. As a German émigré, Colm knew very 
well, how the wrong kind of balance could lead to the destruction of liberal democratic 
institutions and the rise of anti-liberal regimes, as had happened with the Nazis. While “[h]igh-
level production and employment [would] certainly not be the only objective of government 
policy,” he declared that “[i]t would be very desirable” to analyze “each policy proposal […] in 
terms of its impact on the so-called national budget,” i.e. the economy. This way “all policies 
would [have been] considered in terms of both their intrinsic merits and their social costs.”380 
Putting this policy device into practice, however, required forecasting the economic budget, and 
such a forecasting exercise was nothing, if not a combination of Kuznets’s GNP-based feasibility 
analysis and Means’s industrial capacity projections.  
The first national budget was introduced in the Budget Bureau’s report for 1946, issued in 
January 1945. It contained national budget estimates for 1939 and 1944.381 It was fundamentally 
a material interface between the state and its budget on the one hand, and the economy and the 
population on the other. It described the government budget by means of a balance sheet that 
represented the economy as an interdependent and closed system of nominal  flows. The total 
volume of nominal flows contained within this closed system was the “Gross National Product” 
that Milton Gilbert had invented during the war. The rows were broken into categories for 
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“Economic groups” that either consumed or produced the gross national product. These were 
consumers, businesses, and federal, state and local governments. The columns were organized 
around calendar years, and each column for a particular year had three separate categories. Two 
of these were for the receipts and expenditures that each economic group received and spent, and 
the third was for the excess or deficit that each economic group accrued. The receipts represented 
the nominal value of the goods and services produced by each group whereas expenditures 
measured consumption for each group. The sum of either the receipts or the expenditures of all 
groups was equal to Kuznets’s net national income. Once the necessary adjustments such as 
government payments to individuals and businesses were made, the table accrued the total size 
of the economy, i.e. “gross national product.” While the receipts and expenditures revealed the 
distribution of how much each group contributed to the production and consumption of national 
income, the excess-deficit column allowed one to see how (im)balances were distributed across 
different groups. Looking at the table, one could easily discern whether the economy was in 
balance or not, and also how (im)balances changed over time. With the introduction of the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) information infrastructure in 1947, the 
possibilities for cross-referencing and analyzing of the balance of the economy exponentially 
increased.  
Colm, however, was not simply interested in representing and monitoring the nominal flow of 
national income and product. He wanted to understand and demonstrate “the effect that various 
government policies may have on economic transactions by consumers and business.” Such a 
task, i.e. preparing coordinated programs and deploying these programs via the budget, involved 
two distinct types of national income analysis, one historical and backward-looking and the other 
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forecasting-based and forward-looking. First, one had to map out the historical trend in national 
income estimates. While this analysis was not as useful for studying the impacts of policies as 
forecasting, it would have been a valuable tool for calibrating the economic models that 
forecasting would have to rely on. The second step of the analysis required a relatively more 
controversial forward-looking technique, that is forecasting national income. According to Colm, 
this was an essential part of policy analysis, because “[n]ational income estimates as tools for 
policy purposes [were] useful only if they permit[ted] the drawing of conclusions for the future.” 
Impact analysis, the name that was eventually given to the estimation technique that Colm was 
describing, required a two-step forecasting exercise. The first set of forecasts would be based on 
a scenario of how the economy would behave under expected conditions in the absence of any 
policy change in the future. In preparing such a scenario, one would ask “what developments 
[were] likely to occur if policies under consideration [were] not adopted.” These developments 
depended on two factors. The first of these was what Colm called “autonomous changes,” i.e. 
“changes that [were] likely to take place irrespective of economic conditions.” And then one 
would have to make assumptions regarding how these “autonomous changes” would interact 
with “dependent factors” such as consumers’ disposable income and spending as well as 
business investments in inventories.382 The results of the forecast were called “benchmarks,” and 
they were used for measuring the gap between policy objectives and the expected behavior of the 
economy and the state of the economic structure. 
The second set of forecasts conducted was a “quantitative appraisal of proposed policies.” There 
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were two major differences between these and the first set of projections. The first difference 
was the scenarios. The projections were conducted under scenarios that detailed the 
developments that should be expected if a given set of policies was adopted. The second 
difference, in Colm’s words, was the use of “a technical tool [called] the economic ‘model.’” 
The purpose of the model was to describe the effects of the corrective programs on the economy, 
and projections estimated the behavior of the model within the altered scenario.383 Since there 
was not a single way to realize policy goals, one could construct several models and compare 
their results in order to study alternative policy programs. While national budget projections 
would “help to determine the need for government action, alternative models [were supposed to] 
help in appraising proposed policies that would meet that need.” 
One of the criticisms against forecasting during the hearings on Full Employment Bill during 
1945 was based on the conviction that such forecasts were technically infeasible. The critics 
argued that “it [was] impossible for anyone to foresee the future.”384 The question, therefore, was 
whether such an approach to governing the economy was technically feasible in the first place. 
According to Colm, analyzing the impact of government programs on the economy involved two 
interrelated questions. First, there was the question of technical capability as well as feasibility, 
and then there was the issue of accuracy and reliability. Backward-looking national income 
estimates, once considered speculative, were no longer as controversial as they had been a 
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decade earlier. National income estimates related to the past had become “firmly established as 
one of the statistical tools of policy formulation” during World War II, and the Bureau of the 
Budget was already using them to formulate fiscal policies as well. Roosevelt’s utilization of the 
national budget in the President’s message to the Congress within the budget report must have 
given Colm hope and excitement about the prospects of this new tool.385  
The projection of national income and product and their models were a more complicated matter 
from a technical stand point. Projections, i.e. “hypothetical predictions based on the assumption 
that no new policies of full employment or economic stabilization [be] adopted by the Federal 
government,” could have been done relatively easily and with satisfactory accuracy. Both “the 
theory of economic dynamics,” i.e. the new field of econometrics, and “spectacular 
improvements in statistical methods and sources” had improved the capabilities of economic 
projections. One particular developments that contributed to these capabilities was “the growth 
of scientific sample surveys,” i.e. the probabilistic sampling mentioned in previous chapters. All 
these developments meant that macroeconomic forecasting was far ahead of the “business 
barometers” of the early 1930s, which had relied on “very shaky statistics and theories.” 
Forecasting based on an economic model, on the other hand, was a different matter. This was 
more difficult because it was a matter of projecting a hypothetical object under hypothetical 
conditions. Compared to projections, forecasting with models posed a problem of complexity in 
the second degree to the forecaster. One would have to compare a variety of alternative models 
based on different coordinated programs and analyze their feasibility, costs and hypothetical 
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effects on the economy.386  
Colm presented the Budget Bureau’s innovation of national budget forecasting to a group of 
distinguished economists at the Income and Wealth Study Group’s tenth annual conference in 
November. Participants in the conference included Kuznets, Gilbert, Morris Copeland, Solomon 
Fabricant, and Dwight Yntema. Colm summarized the state of economic forecasting as follows:  
It is possible, on the basis of current data on the Nation's Economic Budget, to make statements 
concerning prospective economic conditions that can serve as a basis for planning economic and 
fiscal policies. Numerical projections of the Nation's Budget are still subject to considerable 
'judgment' and, on the basis of available data, to substantial margins of error, and should, if made at 
all at this time, be re-examined and revised at least quarterly. The margin of error is especially large 
at a time when the economy is in the process of demobilization and when consumers and business, 
with large deferred demand and large accumulated savings, may behave quite differently than they 
have in the past. Statistical sources, particularly for consumers' expenditures and business 
investments, require further improvement. With improvement in statistical data, numerical 
projections of the Nation's Economic Budget will become feasible. They will greatly facilitate the 
formulation of a rational fiscal and economic policy. However, a national policy need not await 
such refinements. If only tentative statements concerning the direction of change in the level of 
business activity can be made at this time, it will be necessary to re-examine the programs of 
economic and fiscal policy and to revise them in the light of a changing economic outlook.387 
Colm had noted earlier that such projections were “a convenient method for presenting realistic 
economic analysis in quantitative terms.” While such projections may have been controversial, 
Colm pointed out that they were already being done by the President in his budget message 
verbally. Therefore, even if they were not “exact forecasts,” […] they [could be] extremely 
useful tools of policy formulation. That, and nothing else,” stated Colm, “[was] the purpose of 
projections of the nation’s budget.”388 From this perspective, forecasting was actually a tool of 
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goal setting whose degree of truthfulness was seen as higher than that of the uttered words of the 
leader. Welding this technique of calculation with the charismatic authority of the leader would 
not only calibrate the signaling and effects of goals on the governed, but also enhance the power 
of goal setting as an influencing factor on the allocation and adjustment of resource use.  
Before moving on to the substantive expertise of the Council of Economic Advisors vis-à-vis 
nominal (im)balances in the economy, it is appropriate to return to the subject with which this 
section started, namely economic policy as a form of democratic techno-politics. As illustrated 
above, Colm saw fiscal policy and government programs as a solution to the dilemma of 
depression and serfdom. The solution that Colm offered was not simply a full employment 
economy, but a balanced economy that could sustain prosperous full employment in the long-
run. The question of what normative value Colm’s techno-politics promoted remains to be 
answered. As Timothy Mitchell pointed out, Kuznets warned practitioners of economic expertise 
against reifying national income estimates as these statistical values represented only the value 
created in society through market transactions.389 As one of the principle actors responsible for 
elevating the status of national income accounting to the highest level of policymaking within 
government, to what degree can one hold Colm responsible for this misdeed?  
In order to answer this question, first one needs to ask what national income was supposed to 
represent and consequently what GNP was for Colm. As early as 1935, Colm had been in direct 
disagreement with Kuznets over what national income was. At the first Conference on Research 
in Income and Wealth, Colm presented a paper on the issue of whether public revenue and 
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expenditure should be part of national income estimates. While Colm’s interest in public 
expenditure reflected a practical policy issue, i.e. the growing size of government and its budget 
within the economy, his point of departure pointed to a deeper engagement with the potential 
role that national income estimates could play in economic policy. Colm defined national income 
as the measurable part of the social product.” While national income was the value produced 
from the “pure exchange economy,” i.e. the market, Colm underlined that “[t]he economic 
system in reality […] comprise[d] other types of organization […] the household, the non-profit 
institution and the governmental unit.” If one were to consider these domains as three sectors that 
constituted the social product, then one was faced with a serious problem in terms of the 
representational accuracy of national income estimates. At the time, Colm’s response to 
Kuznets’s attack on his idea of the “social product” was at best apologetic.390  
A decade later, Colm posed the same question once again. This time, however, Colm’s attack on 
Kuznets’s national income was much sharper. After reiterating his point about the status of 
national income within the larger category of social product, Colm associated the former with the 
value theory of classical economics. In classical political economy, income and social product 
were reduced to the process of exchange in the market. “Before a truly comprehensive definition 
of social product and national income could be formed,” he argued, “it was necessary to 
recognize that ours [was] a mixed economy in which values [were] established not only in the 
market place; productive functions [were] fulfilled also within the family unit, and by 
government.” 
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If national income was a misleading representation of economic progress and welfare, the 
question for policymakers was then which statistical construct to use in its place when 
formulating economic policy. In other words, what value should the policymaker try to balance 
with the new technique of fiscal policy and coordinated government programs? Ideally, Colm 
thought it should be a properly defined national income, i.e. one that did not exclude government 
expenditures. However, Milton Gilbert’s National Income Division had never corrected their 
definition. Instead, it replaced Kuznets’s net national income with gross national product (GNP), 
which did include government expenditures. Therefore, for Colm, GNP was the auxiliary 
concept that should be used in the absence of a properly defined national income estimate.391 
While the degree of difference between Colm and Kuznets’s views of what a national income 
estimate should include might seem rather small, Colm’s perspective differed from Kuznets in 
the following significant ways. First of all, by defining national income as the measurable 
portion of a larger magnitude, Colm was anticipating the struggles that would occur later over 
the definition of GNP as a macroeconomic indicator. One cannot really criticize Colm for 
assuming that non-market values are immeasurable. After all, he was not a neo-liberal who 
would propose to simulate a price for non-measurable externalities such as global warming or 
pollution. Nevertheless, Colm should be commended for recognizing the existence and 
significance of such non-market domains within collective life. This brings me to the second 
important difference between the two figures. For Colm, national income estimates were not a 
purely theoretical, academic matter. In contrast to Kuznets’s academic asceticism, Colm was a 
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policy entrepreneur. As a policymaker, he needed tools and statistical representations of the 
world, and he needed them as soon as they were available. In this respect, Colm was a 
pragmatist. The calculus upon which his work rested was not driven by a desire for purity and 
perfection. This was why he accepted Kuznets’s criticism when Kuznets criticized his definition 
of the social product as vague. The issue was not one of having perfect definitions, but whether 
such imperfect definitions could lead to lower margins of error than definitions like Kuznets’s. 
While such definitions might have been internally coherent, they risked imposing invisible 
externalities on the world when put into use for policymaking.392 This distinction is particularly 
significant if one considers the fact that Colm’s task as an expert was to prevent the reoccurrence 
of another Great Depression. Colm needed a statistical representation of the nominal flow 
structure of the economy that included the government, and GNP was the only concept that could 
satisfy this requirement. 
Adjusting.Nominal.Imbalances:.The.Resilience.Problematization.
Reframing.Economic.Imbalance.as.Vulnerability..
There has been very little interest in the Council’s substantive policy work. Most accounts study 
the Council from an institutional stand point and focus primarily on the conflict described in the 
first section. The few that pay attention to the substance of the Council’s expertise construe it as 
part of the lineage of “Keynesian economics” and put an overemphasis on the Council’s views 
on growth.393 This perspective, however, overlooks the structuralist tendencies in the Council’s 
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conceptualization of the economy, especially around the issue of economic stability. Such 
tendencies were reflected in the Council’s preoccupation with the problem of economic 
vulnerability and economic imbalances, and they remained dominant even when the Council 
adopted growth as an explicit policy objective in 1949.  
In this section, I will demonstrate how the discourse of economic imbalance was rearticulated in 
the Council’s two sets of reports, the Economic Report of the President to the Congress and the 
Annual Report to the President by the Council of Economic Advisors. (henceforth the President’s 
Report and the Council’s Report) It has been pointed out that the latter were philosophical in 
nature. Yet, the question of what the philosophy of the Council was with respect to governing the 
economy remains unanswered. Robert Collins has argued that one can trace the emergence of 
economic growth as a policy goal in and of itself in these reports.394 Collins points to the 
resignation of Nourse and the rise of Keyserling as the Council’s new Chairman as an 
explanation for the shift from stability to growth in the Council’s governmental philosophy. In 
contrast to this explanation, I argue that the most important shift in the Council’s normative 
outlook was not from stability to growth. It was from a static conceptualization of the economy 
to a dynamic one. As a result, this shift necessitated a rethinking of economic balance for a 
dynamic economy. This is why we also find a continued concern and preoccupation with the 
problem of imbalance in these reports even when growth eventually emerged as a policy goal. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the objectives of growth and resilience, conceptualized 
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within the norm of balance, was conceived as a mutually reinforcing symbiotic relationship.  
The%Problem%of%Imbalance%
By the time the Council was created, the issue of what policies it would adopt had already 
become controversial. The first Council’s Report, released in December 1946, was a response to 
this controversy. It announced the Council’s fundamental approach to economic governance as 
continuous and mutual economic adjustment. In the report, the Council identified the primary 
governmental problem as the threat of depressions. The question, however, was how to deal with 
such catastrophes.  
The report identified three alternate strategies. The first was “the Spartan doctrine of laissez 
faire.” While the Council refrained from giving names, this label was clearly a reference to 
conservatives such as Republican Senator Robert Taft, one of the Council’s staunchest 
opponents. According to the Council, this line of thinking characterized the business cycle as “a 
highly individualistic and essentially fatalistic” phenomenon. The causes producing the cycle 
were considered to be “deeply rooted in physical nature or in fundamental human behavior.” The 
cycle, therefore, consisted of “essentially mechanical relationships rather than human institutions 
that [could be] modified by intelligent action in a republic, and human behavior that [could] be 
changed by wise leadership.” The Council stated that the inevitable outcome of this perspective 
on the problem of fluctuations was one of conformity and not corrective action. In extreme 
interpretations of business cycle theory, some even argued that depressions were desirable, as 
they created opportunities for smart economic actors to invest. The Council objected that “little 
recessions often develop into big depressions,” which in turn punish both efficient and inefficient 
businesses and workers. While some might have profited from such periods, the Council warned 
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that “[b]esides the human misery and the waste of productive resources implied, we wonder how 
often our social fabric can stand ‘cures’ of [this] type.” Depressions were not an adjustment 
mechanism for the treatment of imbalances, but an economic catastrophe that needed to be 
prevented.395 
The Council referred to the second perspective as “the Roman doctrine of an external remedy.” 
In contrast to the Spartans, those who subscribed to this line of thought, the Council argued, were 
proposing to “master the cycle by a remedy equally external to the processes of private 
business—the power of government to spend and create a purchasing medium.” This conclusion 
was based on the conviction that depressions were a consequence of a “too restricted volume of 
purchasing power being turned into the system.” This was clearly a reference to what was then 
becoming a populist strand of American-bred Keynesianism. From this perspective, the 
government could stabilize the cycle by intervening in the economy with fiscal and monetary 
policies. As long as a level of full employment could be attained, one did not “need to worry 
about anything else in the economy.” Criticizing the temptation to see “fiscal policy as a 
panacea,” the Council stated that “this single-track doctrine of fiscal policy [… did] not face the 
complexity of our economic system.” Trying to “control the Nation’s economic life” by simply 
“pumping money up or down” was unacceptable. One could not govern “without regard to what 
[economic actors] were doing in the countless specific price and wage and profit relationships 
that [made] up the body of their business life.”396  
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The Council called the philosophical perspective it advocated the “doctrine of mutual 
adjustment.” This doctrine equated economic governance with the task of facilitating economic 
adjustment in order to offset any major maladjustments in the economy that could lead to 
depressions. From this perspective, governing involved performing two interrelated functions. 
First, government would be responsible for creating an “institutional atmosphere” in which 
“specific wage-profit-investment-disbursement relationships [were] soundly adjusted.” 
Therefore, government would function as a facilitator encouraging economic agents to adjust 
“the internal relationships of business” by themselves.  
The second function was an anticipatory one that involved watching over the balance of the 
economy and correcting emerging imbalances. The Council identified three ways of doing this. 
First, the Council would use a technique of communicative “consultation” with leaders of major 
groups regarding “the demands that successful operation of a total system make upon each of its 
component parts.” This was an attempt on the part of the Council to make itself representative of 
the economy. On the one hand, the members of economic groups that participated in the 
constitution of the flow of national income and product were simply unable to discern the 
mounting imbalances among different components of the economy. On the other hand, the 
economy as an actant could not speak for itself, and its imbalances were manifested only in the 
midst of depressions when it was already too late. Therefore, the Council could act as a translator 
which could interpret statistical signs as symptoms of the imbalances in the economy. With the 
correct perspective and information, economic groups could adjust their interests in such a way 
as to “promote the welfare of the country as a whole.” The Council hoped that “voluntary 
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bargaining” would result in “mutual adjustment of wage, price, cost, and profit relations.”397 
The second tactic was to examine the role that government played in creating imbalances itself. 
According to the Council, “the Government [was], in spite of itself, […] a contributing factor in 
the maladjustments of the present time.” Toward this end, the federal government should start a 
“total program” to examine the effects of its policies on the economy. One part of this should be 
a review of all government aids and subsidies. Even traditional governmental activities in areas 
such as education, health and conservation should be reexamined. Finally, it should consider 
“[t]he timing, volume, and distribution of its own expenditures […] in relation to those of private 
business and state and local governments.” In its current state, government programs were a 
“conflicting factor” as far as their effects on the general economic picture were concerned.398  
The third tactic was to create a vulnerability surveillance and reduction program against 
emergent imbalances in the economy. The Council underscored that the “public purse” should 
“put a brake at certain strategic points where boom forces develop dangerous trends.” (Emphasis 
mine.) When these points were “unduly depressed,” the Council argued government must 
“stimulate employment and production and support purchasing power.” In doing this, the 
government would “face the same dilemma that every doctor […] faced.” One would have to 
exercise “[c]alm judgment” to avoid intervening in “small and temporary disturbances that 
would right themselves sooner and better if left to themselves.” Yet, the government should not 
be “[kept] from detecting serious symptoms promptly and initiating corrective measures with 
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skill and decisiveness.”399  
The second and fourth issues of the Council’s report, submitted in December 1947 and 1949 
elaborated on the strategy of mutual adjustment. In the second issue, the Council strengthened its 
defense against the budding populist full employment Keynesian position. It argued that the goal 
of macroeconomic policy was not “maximum employment,” because such a goal “may be 
achieved in a rich economy or in a poor economy, in a static economy or in a dynamic and 
growing economy.” Prosperity could be attained only by means of “maximum production.” 
(Both emphasis in the original.)  Such circumstances were necessary for an economic system to 
“translate its resources and skills into the highest standards of living.”400 While “near-maximum 
production existed” in the US, it was due to “a whole group of rather abnormal circumstances” 
and under such circumstances, “a stable equilibrium of a high production economy” could not be 
sustained in the long-run.  
The question was not simply how to reach the goal of maximum production, but how to make 
such a state sustainable. Echoing the 1929 report of the Recent Economic Changes Committee, 
the Council warned that “accelerated production or enlarging the flow of current product [would] 
not alone solve the problem.” Therefore, if one goal of policy was to realize “a total quantity” of 
economic output, another equally important goal to ensure that “maximum production [be] 
properly balanced.” The Council argued that if there were not “much higher consumption in all 
the lower and middle ranks” of income distribution and if the “great productivity [of the 
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economy were] not reflected in [their] pattern of consumption, the system itself [would] become 
clogged and fail to maintain maximum productivity.”401 An adjustment in the distribution of 
income, however, was not enough by itself; other adjustments in prices, property values, and 
rates of profit were also necessary in relation to income. To propose growth as a solution, the 
Council concluded, would only delay “the time when [the US would] have to face the 
problem.”402 
In a seemingly diametrically opposed manner, the Council’s 1949 report, Business and 
Government, pronounced economic growth as an explicit economic objective and stated that 
growth was a solution to the problem of redistributing income. A series of commentators have 
argued that this signals a rupture in the Council’s perspective on how to govern the economy. 
Both Walter Salant, a former staff economist of the first Council, and Collins argue that the 
Council, now under the leadership of Keyserling, displaced the cyclical model of the economy 
with one of growth. According to Collins, Keyserling’s “increasingly focused, self-conscious, 
single-minded emphasis on growth as the overriding (but not sole) national economic goal” 
resulted in the rise of economic growthmanship as an end in and of itself for the Council after 
Nourse’s departure.403 While Salant and Collins are correct to point out the increased emphasis 
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on economic growth in the Council’s work, their perspectives do not account for the fact that 
economic stability and the problem of imbalance continued to be major objectives and concerns 
for economic policy. I argue that growth did not replace the norm of stability and the problem of 
imbalance. Instead, it supplemented stability not only as an end in itself, but also as a way of 
achieving economic resilience. Therefore, if there was a shift, it was not from a cyclical model of 
the economy to a growth model, but from a static model of the economy to a dynamic one based 
on structural balance and economic growth. A more nuanced framing of the first Council would 
be one that takes its focus as the idea of long-term sustainable economic growth and 
consequently would place equal emphasis on the twin policy goals of growth and balance. 
It is true that under Section II, entitled “Trends in Government’s Attitude Toward Business,” the 
Council listed two trends as concurrent shifts: a) one “from theory of stagnation to practice of 
growth” and b) another “from ‘more for some’ to progress for all.” According to the Council, the 
stagnation thesis of American Keynesians like Hansen was no longer valid. As a result, the 
economy could continue to grow by itself and business no longer needed “government [to] 
provide the dynamic force for renewed growth.” Growth would also eventually resolve the 
problem of imbalanced income distribution. Therefore, “efforts to promote expansion of the total 
production and income of the economy,” stated the Council, “[were] more significant than 
measures to ‘redistribute’ the current product.” Until “the lever of general growth” raised the 
share of income of the underprivileged, efforts to improve their conditions must continue, since 
“measures directed specifically toward improving the productivity and incomes of low-income 
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groups [would have a] favorable impact upon the whole economy.” Nevertheless, “general 
growth offer[ed] a more workable formula” for all groups, including the underprivileged. As the 
pie grew and living standards for all groups rose, “the conflict between social equity and 
economic incentives which hung over the progress of enterprise in a dynamic economy” would 
become more manageable.404 (Emphasis mine.) 
Collins is correct in the sense that with Nourse’s departure, economic growth became one of the 
primary goals of economic governance at the Council of Economic Advisors. However, this does 
not change the fact that the 1947 report, written under Nourse, also considered the US economy 
as a growing economy. Indeed, the report emphasized the need for “healthy growth” twice.405 
The difference between the two reports was two-fold. First, the mode of literary explanation in 
the 1947 report was based on a static model of the economy whereas the 1949 model adopted a 
dynamic model that added a temporal dimension to the former. The fact that the 1947 report 
pointed to “maximum production” does not mean that it did not accept growth as a desirable 
policy goal. The former was a reference to what Kuznets had called “feasible maximum output” 
during the war, and it was a cross-sectional analysis of the economy’s potential behavior for a 
single year. The 1949 report, in contrast, spoke of a dynamic economy and its potential temporal 
behavior in the future. Therefore, it was projecting the feasible maximum production capacity of 
the economy as Colm imagined in 1945. It was no coincidence that Colm had started conducting 
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long-term projections of GNP in late 1947.406  
The second difference between the two reports again is not really about growth per se. While 
both reports spoke of income distribution, they constituted the problem of an imbalanced 
distribution of income as two distinct yet interrelated problems. For the 1947 report, it was a 
matter of economic sustainability, whereas for the 1949 report, it was one of socio-political 
sustainability with economic roots. As we have seen, the Council had made its concern about the 
disruptive impact of economic developments on the social fabric and the liberal political 
ontology quite clear. Therefore, the Council was not moving away from the problem of balance 
and stability, but rather offering an economic cure for a social and political problem that was 
becoming accentuated in the international political environment of the emerging Cold War—
1948 was also the year that the new National Security Council had issued its first Basic National 
Security Policy paper identifying the Soviet Union as a national security threat to the United 
States.    
Another trend was the recognition of the importance of economic stability. Under the heading of 
“From Social Theory To Economic ‘Balance’,” the Council underlined the distinction regarding 
the separation of economic goals from socio-political problems. This trend, the Council noted, 
“[arose] from fuller realization that the flow of income to different parts of the economy should 
be viewed as an economic no less than a social problem.” Broader social concerns were valid, 
but economic analysis had the potential to isolate “the problems of income flow” from “the 
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problems of ways and means” and reduce these to “soluble terms.” From this point of view, the 
supplementary objective of economic balance should be reevaluated under “the central objective 
of a stable and expanding general economy.” While growth would alleviate “the problem of 
income flows,” this did not mean that this area of government intervention would be de-
constituted as an economic problem. Government programs, “which channel[ed] the flow of 
income from one spot in the economy to another,” still needed to be tested to see whether they 
“promote[d] general stability and expansion or [simply] rob[bed] Peter to pay Paul.” The reason 
for the Council’s concern with “the problem of economic ‘balance’ [was] to encourage sufficient 
funds and incentives for the growth of productive facilities which fully absorb our technology 
and manpower, while promoting sufficient flow of income to ultimate consumers to clear the 
markets of goods and thus to avoid periodic ‘overproduction.’”407  
This slightly altered perspective on economic balance was also reflected in the Council’s take on 
the balance of consumption and production. As outlined, in both the old reports and in Colm’s 
writings, the balance between these two vital components of the economy was seen in static 
terms. Therefore, balance was held to be achieved in a state of static equilibrium. However, in 
this dynamic conceptualization, the Council argued that “in the long run a ‘balanced’ economy 
would require the expansion of consumption opportunities at an even more rapid rate than the 
expansion of investment.” In order to accomplish such adjustment, the government had to go 
beyond its traditional negative role of policing through regulation. Because regulation could not 
facilitate the necessary adjustments required for addressing “central problems of economic 
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‘balance’,” government would have to adopt an “affirmative or facilitative approach.” Just as 
inadequate consumption could cause problems, inadequate investment supply could wreak 
“economic havoc” as well. In order to prevent such catastrophes, fiscal and monetary policies 
had to be deployed as facilitation tools. While these tools, supplemented by government 
programs such as agricultural subsidies, social security, and minimum wage legislation, should 
be used for “promoting economic ‘balance’,” the adjustment of prices, wages and profits should 
be left to the managers and workers, and controls should not be used.408 This meant that the task 
of balancing the economy in an anticipatory fashion was to correct the nominal flow structure of 
income. As pointed out earlier, this was nothing if not Colm’s nominalist approach to the 
problem of structural imbalance.  
The final, and in the Council’s opinion the most important trend concerned “‘compensatory’ 
public action.” For the first time, the Council was explicitly distinguishing its position from those 
it labeled the “popular version of the ‘Keynesian economics’.” It noted that in popular 
discussions “the purely ‘compensatory’ approach was referred to […] as ‘Keynesian 
economics.’” Yet, Keynes, in the Council’s view, “placed more emphasis upon structural 
problems than upon the cycle.” In a similar vein, the Council highlighted the primary importance 
of structural economic balance over countercyclical policy. It accepted that compensatory 
spending “could help to iron out minor fluctuations of the business cycle and must indeed be 
used if big ones develop[ed].” Yet, it could not induce a “complete recovery from a substantial 
downswing.” The Council pointed out that the post-depression period of the 1930s had 
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demonstrated that compensatory spending “was not alone sufficient to restore and maintain 
satisfactorily high levels of general economic activity.” The problem was not simply the size of 
spending. First of all, the Council claimed “the range of useful projects susceptible to 
undertaking by government [could not] be sufficiently voluminous to counteract fully a general 
depression.” Moreover, there were limits to stimulus. “[B]eyond certain levels or in certain 
fields,” the Council warned, compensatory spending may have been “offset by declines in 
private spending and investment,” leaving a net gain lower than the amount of public money 
spent.409 Thus, economic policy must concentrate on “encouraging stability and growth” in the 
first place, because “revival [became] progressively harder to accomplish as the economy 
move[d] downward” in a time of depression and “depend[ed] primarily upon the revival of 
private investment.”410 
The%Emergence%of%Resilience%&%Vulnerability%
If in the Council’s Report one finds a philosophical articulation of the Council’s nominal 
structuralism articulated within a discourse of economic balance, in the President’s Report, one 
comes across a technical problematization of the economy as a resilient and a vulnerable object. 
It was positioned in parallel to the discourse of economic balance and rested strictly on technical 
norms of economic resilience and vulnerability, neither of which were deployed within the 
discursive space constituted by the Council’s Reports. These norms supplemented the 
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substantive rationality of economic balance in a way that made it possible to describe and 
eventually determine the state of the economy in terms of the risks posed to the entire economic 
system. Such risks could be inflationary or deflationary in nature, resulting ultimately in 
depressions. 
The norm of “vulnerability” was first deployed in the second issue of the President’s Report for 
Midyear 1947. The notion was used in the main section on changes in the Nation’s Economic 
Budget between December 1946 and June 1947. This was not a coincidence, because 
vulnerability was a state of fragility in the structure of the nominal flows of the national 
economy. Since the “component parts” of the economy were interdependent, an imbalance 
between two components, or in the flow volume in and out of one particular component could 
make the economy vulnerable. As “a master balance sheet” that “indicate[d] broad changes in 
the economy and its component parts,” the National Budget was nothing but the representation 
of that structure. As the report pointed out, “[i]t reflect[ed] adjustments made and help[ed] to 
identify those needed to sustain maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.”411 
In order to detect potential maladjustments, the report utilized historical trend analysis for the 
years between 1939 and the first half of 1947. This analysis included historical changes in 
consumer income, expenditures, saving and credit as well as business income and domestic 
business investment.412 The first source of potential vulnerability was identified as the 
consumer’s purchasing power. The report noted that consumer expenditures accounted for about 
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70 percent of the National Budget and consumer income was at an even higher level. This was 
particularly important, because “[r]elatively small changes in the real incomes of consumers, or 
in the disposition of consumers to spend, [had] a marked influence upon economic activity.” 
While American consumers were, on average, much more prosperous than in 1939, the Council 
stated that its “concern [… was] not whether consumers [could] buy as much as they could 
before the war.” The real issue concerning economic stability was “whether they [could] buy 
enough to sustain [the] postwar economy at maximum production.” And that depended on the 
trend in consumers’ per capita real income. The trend since the second quarter of 1946 had been 
a declining one, corresponding to a drop from $1,037 to $956, about a 9 percent decrease within 
a period of one year. Fortunately, the decline in disposable income did not effect the high rate of 
consumer expenditures, as many household supplemented their income with savings. The 
remaining question was whether such a trend could continue.413 
The effect of such a pattern in the flow of national income through the consumption and savings 
components of the economy was reflected in the form of a declining rate of inventory 
accumulation in various sectors of the economy. This was a significant development because the 
Council identified inventory accumulation as a sign of potential economic vulnerability. As an 
indicator, experts in the Council constructed a ratio of inventories to sales for the manufacturing, 
wholesale, and retail sectors. Two additional ratios were developed for department stores: Orders 
to sales, and orders to stocks. These indicators were displayed in two separate tables. The table 
for the former sectors was based on data collected by the Office of Business Economics, 
                                                
413 U.S. Presidents, The Midyear Economic Report of the President, 1947, 14, 16–8. 
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formerly known as the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFDC). The table for 
department stores was based on data collected by the Federal Reserve from 296 department 
stores throughout the country. Both tables covered 1946 and the first half of 1947 on a monthly 
basis and went back to 1939 on the basis of an annual average.414 (See Graphs 2-4 below)  
These ratios were a statistical representation of the structure of the nominal flow of goods in the 
supply chain, and were used for detecting irregularities in the flow patterns formed around each 
node. One could determine whether a problem in the flow was caused by a supply push or a 
demand pull at any node within the supply chain. The first table covering the inventory-sale 
ratios for the manufacturing, wholesale and retail sectors allowed experts to monitor the chain of 
demand pull from the consumer all the way to the producer. If there was not enough demand on 
one sector from the next one in the supply chain, the ratio would rise, and vice versa. The second 
table was on department stores as a specific sub-industry within the retail sector. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, BFDC had already begun to compile data on department stores as early as 
1931. One potential explanation for the Council’s decision to use such data could simply be 
institutional continuity. Yet, this would overlook the strategic position department stores enjoyed 
within the structure of the economy. They were positioned at the interface of the consumption 
and production components, and therefore constituted a locale in which demand met supply. 
Inventory accumulation at such a location was a perfect choice to measure the imbalance 
between these two vital component parts. A second reason for the detailed representation of this 
node was likely to be the experts’ conviction that department stores enjoy relatively high 
                                                




Graph 2 - Ratio of Inventories to Sales, 1939-1946 
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Graph 4 - Flow Indicators for Department Stores, 1939-1946 
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economies of scale, and therefore were more resistant to depressions. In 1931, Frederic 
Dewhurst, the Chief of Economic Research at BFDC, had already testified to this conviction. 
Therefore, their resilience to depressions made them a particularly a good lead indicator of 
vulnerability. 
Based on these statistical indicators, the Council underlined the fact that the “speculative 
condition in inventories and orders [… had] created a point of vulnerability” in the past. Yet, the 
rate of increase in inventories in general slowed down by half between the last quarter of 1946 
and the first half of 1947, and “[t]he inventory situation at [the] time [was] not unbalanced, 
judged by the business standards of prewar years.” The ratios of stocks to sales for 
manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers were all lower than they had been before the war. Yet, 
since the sale volumes had gone up considerably, there might have been more room for the 
inventories to “increase […] with safety.” After all, “[i]t [was] not certain that it [was] prudent 
business practice to maintain the same ratio of inventory as volume of sales increased.” Another 
sign of strength was the decrease in the ratio of outstanding orders to sales. This ratio had fallen 
from a peak of 4.4 in July 1946 down to approximately 1 in May 1947.415 Besides reducing 
vulnerability, this also meant increased efficiency in merchandize management, freeing up 
capital as a result. The Council also noted that “[t]his strengthen[ed] the inventory situation, 
since wholesalers and retailers would not find it necessary to cancel large outstanding orders in 
case of a decline in market demand.”416 
                                                
415 This meant that while outstanding sales was equal to 4.4 months of sales in July, in May, the relationship 
between these two figures was only a factor of 1. 
416 U.S. Presidents, The Midyear Economic Report of the President, 1947, 21. 
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The downside of low inventories, however, was the risk that an inflationary spiral would lead to 
a depression in its own right. A business model built on slim stocks would bring with it a lean 
supply chain that could be crippled under mounting consumer demand, let alone a sharp increase 
in the form of a “demand shock.” Once inflationary expectations set in, businesses would reverse 
their inventory behavior and start accumulating inventories in the expectation of future price 
increases. The January 1948 President’s Report noted this behavior in its inventory indicators. 
While “overall ratios of inventories to sales [were] still below prewar ratios, liquidation of 
inventories in case of a decline in sales,” warned the Council, “raise[d] a greater potential threat 
to the maintenance of production and employment than [had] been the case at any time since the 
war began.”417 The Council recognized this threat by stating that “[t]he movements of prices and 
incomes during 1947 constituted a strong inflationary trend.” According to the Council, rising 
prices were a problem because “[t]hey produce[d] a price structure which [was] increasingly 
sensitive and precarious and vulnerable to changes in business and consumer expectations, 
spending, and investment.” In order to prevent an inflationary spiral from turning into a “severe 
depression,” the Council recommended an anti-inflation program, which Truman submitted to 
the Congress in July.418  
“The year just ended has tested the strength of our economy” was the opening line of the first 
section of Truman’s message to Congress in the January 1949 President’s Report. The resilience 
                                                
417 U.S. Presidents, The Economic Report of the President, January 1948 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.$: United 
States Economic Office, 1948), 23. 
418 Only three out of ten recommendations of Truman was passed by a Republican controlled. Congress. Ibid., 41, 
44; U.S. Presidents, The Midyear Economic Report of the President, July 1948 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.$: 
United States Economic Office, 1948), 7–9; Benjamin Caplan, “A Case Study: The 1948-1949 Recession,” in 
Policies to Combat Depression (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), 36. 
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problematization of the economy was articulated for the first time as a response to this test. In the 
section, entitled “Sources of Our Economic Strength,” the economy was problematized as a 
resilient object, and the discourse of economic balance was finally combined with the norms of 
resilience and vulnerability. While the underlying reasons for resilience were detailed in this 
section, the theory of economic vulnerability was described under the title, “Vulnerability of the 
Economy.”  
At the onset of 1948, Truman argued that the nation had confronted the risk of a wage-price 
spiral that resulted from the previous period of unchecked inflationary pressures. In response to 
rising prices, households, whose budgets were squeezed, sought higher wages with the hope of 
offsetting the damaging impact of the rising cost of living. While firms enjoyed higher profits, 
rising prices also affected firms in the form of a stress inducing period of uncertainty. In short, 
Truman stated that “[t]he rising spiral created more and more maladjustment among prices, 
wages, and other incomes.” One of the effects of this maladjustment was seen in grain prices. 
Following a short period of rapid and speculative price increases in wheat and corn, the market 
had collapsed and the price of wheat had fallen by a quarter from its highs a month earlier.  
The report compared the events of early 1948 to the deflationary period of 1920-1922, which had 
taken place following a boom period in the wake of World War I. The difference between the 
two was the outcome. Contrary to the historical experience of the early 1920s, the collapse in the 
grain market had not yielded ills of deflation like unemployment, production cutbacks, inventory 
liquidation, or cancellation of capital investment plans. In the latter case, “the collapse of grain 
prices” had led to the impoverishment of farmers and a considerable decline in their demand for 
industrial products, causing “a chain reaction of price breaks in other markets.” In 1948, none of 
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that happened. Truman pointed out that as “the price drop was localized,” consumers and 
businessmen’s spending and investment plans were not affected.  
According to Truman, the difference between 1920 and 1948 was not simply luck. “Our 
economy,” he stated, “showed strength sufficient to withstand shock of a kind which had ended 
earlier inflations with collapse.” (Emphasis mine.) The underlying reasons that “[made] the 
economy more shock-resistant” were a combination of “[a]ffirmative national policies and 
greater caution in the business community.” Farm support programs that were built around the 
concept of the ever-normal granary were one of the primary mechanisms that had mitigated the 
effects of the shock emanating from the collapse in grain markets on the rest of the economy. 
Other New Deal reforms formulated by actors such as Keyserling and Currie also contributed to 
this resilience.419 The “whole financial and banking structure was stronger and more resilient 
than in the early twenties.” Social security policies also played an important role. Despite all 
these measures, Truman pointed out that while the US might have managed to escape from the 
danger of a general recession in 1948, the risk was far from non-existent. In order to prevent the 
recurrence of such an episode, “many adjustments in price and income relations need[ed] to be 
made.”420  
The part of the report written by the Council, under the title of “The Annual Economic Review” 
gave more depth to this resilience problematization of the economy. The Council framed the 
affirmative programs cited by Truman as “built-in flexibilities” that “[had] a cushioning effect in 
                                                
419 Currie’s role in the reform of the banking sector. 100 percent reserve banking  
420 U.S. Presidents, The Economic Report of the President, January 1949 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.$: United 
States Economic Office, 1949), 1–3. 
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case of a downswing” triggered by a shock. Other factors that “[made] an economy more 
resistant to shock” were large government budgets and the progressive income tax that had 
increased flexibility in managing the budget. Despite all these factors, the fundamental question 
for the Council was whether the affirmative policies outlined in the Employment Act could 
balance income and production before the gap between the two became an unmanageable 
chasm.421 For the Council, the “vulnerability of the economy,” therefore, was a matter of 
“maladjustments [that were] concealed under cover of the inflationary boom.” Even an economy 
strengthened by such improvements was “vulnerable to sharp declines” as long as its growth was 
driven by an investment boom and an inflationary environment. A deferred attempt to stem 
inflation too late would cause serious price weaknesses in an economy that was already 
experiencing a shortfall in consumption. This, in turn, would signal businesses and consumers to 
postpone purchases and investments. Falling demand would accelerate the fall in production as 
the stickiness of prices prevented the market from clearing. The result would be a downward 
spiral that could not be stopped before it became a full-fledged depression. As the Council 
argued in the Council’s Report, market mechanisms were not enough to reduce such 
vulnerabilities by themselves before they gave way to a deflationary spiral.422 
While these “built-in stabilizers” were explained in more detail in the President’s Reports in the 
coming years, the final report issued by the Truman Council in 1953 provided the clearest 
statement of the structural resilience approach to economic governance. The issue was discussed 
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in a section called “The General Nature of the Adjustment Problem” in the chapter on policies 
for sustaining prosperity. In the previous section on the long-run prospects of the US economy, 
the Council had concluded on a positive note on the subject. Along the lines of this conclusion, 
the Council recognized the US economy’s resiliency in its “capacity [to] unleash[…] new 
demand forces needed to sustain a growing total demand when previous front-runners [had] 
fallen back” since World War II. And yet, the Council warned that its “component-by-
component analysis” might have been deceptive when measuring “[t]he size of the problem,” i.e. 
the risk of a depression. It noted that “it would be foolhardy to conclude that a cumulative 
economic decline in the United States is no longer possible.”423  
According to the Council, this cumulative decline was the net outcome of two sets of forces in 
the economy. The first set of these forces was the “cumulator forces” inherent to the structure of 
the economy, which had a tendency to exacerbate deflationary problems. If these were to emerge 
in one sector at a time when the economy was below its “full employment incomes,” they would 
cause an unacceptable increase in unemployment. Such a development, “if left alone, could 
degenerate into a far more serious deflationary spiral.” In the unfortunate case that such a decline 
should coincide with spending declines in other sectors, including the government, the result 
would not be additive, as “[o]ne area of weakness would aggravate another.” As a result, a small 
problem that started in one sector could spread over to the entire system with increasing intensity 
of destructive effects. A decline in investment would lead to a fall in employment, incomes, and 
consumption. The effect of this first chain of developments would be a decline in profits, which 
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in turn would trigger another phase of cuts in investment and wages. A deflationary spiral in 
prices would cause a panic among consumers and have an accelerating effect on the collapse. 
The final blow to the system would come from the financial sector. In the best case scenario, the 
supply of credit into the economy would contract, and in the worst possible scenario, financial 
institutions would collapse. The vulnerability of the American economy was identified as its 
propensity to “magnify the impact of what might otherwise be a moderate or even minor 
discrepancy in total demand.”424 
The policy question was how to offset such destructive forces. The answer lay in “another set of 
forces which […] tend[ed] to cushion the effects” of the cumulator ones. The Council called 
these “arresting forces” and pointed to the institutional structure that had been created over the 
last two decades as their source. This structure consisted of “institutional dampers” and “shock-
absorbers” that served the function of what the Council called “built-in stabilizers.” The Council 
agreed that there was a need for further discussion on whether the degree of resistance provided 
by these stabilizers was sufficient or whether their distortive effects on incentives and risk-taking 
were unsustainable. Nevertheless, it was certain that the institutional structure based on the 
principle of freedom was “more conducive to a fairly steady rate of economic growth than […] 
two or three decades ago.”425 
The remaining question was how much one could rely upon such institutional arrangements. 
According to the Council, the recession of 1948-1949 demonstrated the effectiveness of arresting 
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forces at neutralizing the cumulator forces. Yet, the Council warned that while they had “reduced 
the economy’s susceptibility to deflation, […] they [were] not essentially recession-preventing or 
recession-reserving forces.” In an economy with a large demand deficiency, “the stabilizers 
would prove to be feeble in proportion to the need, the breaks would wear thin, and [the] 
‘bottom’ might turn out to be almost as far down as it used to be.” The main function of the 
arresting forces was to slow a decline that would otherwise strike suddenly in the form of a 
recession and to retard its spread into different sectors of the economy. Such a function was 
essential in a downturn because this institutional apparatus would “provide [policymakers with] a 
reasonably adequate interval for diagnosis and decision” before cumulator forces could “begin to 
feed on a growing and then rampant deflationary psychology.” Thus, “whether the cumulators 
[would] succeed in magnifying, or the arrestors in minimizing, any developing weakness in total 
demand” depended largely on the effectiveness and timeliness of “positive anti-deflationary 
policy.”426 
While these two sets of emergency mitigation measures were essential, the Council stated that 
the primary strategy for taming cumulator forces should have been a preventative strategy of 
mutual adjustment. In contrast to its earlier policy positions, it pointed to “the primacy of private 
[economic] adjustment”  as this was preferable “on general grounds of dynamism, flexibility and 
free-wheeling.” The reasons for this shift in emphasis were both external and inherent to the 
expertise that the Council had been developing since its creation. The practical limits of the 
mutual adjustment doctrine were twofold. The first was deficits: The Council pointed out that 
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under the given Cold War defense program and tax structure, any substantial increase in deficits 
would be “a source of legitimate concern.”427 Judging this truth-claim is beyond the scope of this 
project. Nevertheless, one should note that while the “Keynesian revolution” promised to free 
federal budget from the chains of balanced budgets, under the Bretton Woods international 
monetary system, one was still expected to balance the budget over the business cycle. And this 
rule was expected to apply most strictly to the United States, as the US dollar was the anchor 
currency between the value of gold and rest of the world’s currencies. Structural deficits signaled 
future prospects of inflation, and this, in turn, meant opening a gap between the nominal value of 
the dollar and its real value adjusted for inflation. As this gap increased, not only would it be 
harder to convince other countries to stay within the Bretton Woods system, but the international 
monetary system would also become vulnerable to shocks and speculative attacks.428  
A second factor, which the Council refrained from pronouncing, was the difficulty that 
policymakers experienced in passing fiscal policy programs in the Congress. If one recalls, Colm 
had emphasized the need for flexibility in devising adjustment policies and pointed to fiscal 
policy as a “strategic” tool in balancing the economy. However, as Herbert Stein points out, the 
reality turned out to be quite different.429 As early as the late 1940s, economic policy became 
                                                
427 Deficit for 1953 was almost $6.5 billion, representing a 333 percent increase over the previous years deficit of 
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entangled in partisan politics and would eventually lose its effectiveness and purity as it was 
mixed with pork barrel spending. By the 1970s, economists came to see monetary policy, which 
Colm had thought to be ineffective, as the strategic policy tool for adjustment. While its effects 
on the economy were subtler and inscribed on the world with a greater lag-time, thanks to the 
institutional autonomy that the Federal Reserve enjoyed, monetary policy would become a much 
more flexible and reliable policy instrument.430  
The endogenous factor for the shift was the anticipatory aspect of adjustment. As the Council 
admitted, “it [was] easier to prevent or forestall a depression than to stop or reverse one.” 
Moreover, preventative adjustments were more desirable, because in contrast to counteracting 
adjustments, they “minimize[d] the total amount of adjustment necessary” by intervening in the 
economy in advance in anticipation of future downturns. The need for anticipatory adjustments 
was particularly pronounced, because the risk of relying on market mechanisms for a 
“constructive realignment” in prices and wages was grave. According to the Council, such a 
process could easily “be transformed, by the alchemy of deflation, into an element of 
disruption.” The problem, however, was that the anticipatory adjustment approach “[was] not 
equally applicable in all policy sectors.” Especially in the area of tax policy, it often placed “a 
heavier burden on our abilities to forecast general economic developments than the complexities 
and uncertainties of economic analysis justify.” The Council noted this had two implications. 
First, policymakers needed to have access “at all times [to] the most current and most sharply 
focused body of economic intelligence available.” This was why Colm was particularly 
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interested in Leontief’s input-output modeling, which was funded by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics under the direction of Lubin.431 In parallel to this forecasting capacity, they needed to 
“keep[… a] current set of alternative policy programs for meeting various eventualities.”  
Second, they would have to rely on private economic agents as proxies for “anticipat[ing] and 
minimiz[ing] […] deflationary dangers.” This meant that business had a responsibility for 
making the “right” adjustment decisions in lieu of government. The Council finished on a 
hopeful note, stating it “[was] optimistic that their [i.e. businesses’] response [would] measure 
up” to the task.432  
Concluding.Remarks.
This chapter showed the construction of the fiscal apparatus by fiscal nominalists around what I 
called the resilience governmentality. This governmental strategy strove to enhance the resilience 
of the economy against shocks by the means of inserting shock absorbers and institutional 
dampers at strategic locations within the economy. In their efforts to build an emergency 
mitigation mechanism as part of the fiscal apparatus, these actors weaved the fiscal policy 
instruments with the goal setting technique that was utilized during the war. They mounted these 
policy tools on top of the information infrastructure that was assembled by the National Income 
Division, the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) System.  
They reframed the problem of imbalance that was articulated in the 1920s and the 1930s as a 
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generic problem of economic vulnerability and devised three strategies to reduce such 
vulnerabilities. The first strategy was an inner-looking, self-introspective one that acted as a 
check on the state’s tendency to cause imbalances and distortions in the economy. The second 
strategy was that of “mutual adjustment.” Fiscal nominalists considered themselves the 
representatives of the economy and sought to translate its signals of maladjustment into a 
discursive form. By rendering these signs legible to the actors that make up the economy, they 
sought to realign the interests of labor, management and capital and prevent the accumulation of 
maladjustments in advance. Finally, they created a vulnerability surveillance and reduction 
component within the fiscal apparatus and deployed it under the rubric of discretionary fiscal 
policy. This strategy was designed to act as a failsafe that functioned as an early warning 
mechanism against the accumulating maladjustments and their consequent imbalances. In this 
sense, it was a secondary security mechanism that functioned along the side of market and 
mutual adjustment mechanisms. Its task was to neutralize the excesses produced by the 
maladjustments these mechanisms failed to resolve.  
The rise of the monetary government of the economy in the 1970s has been construed as a crisis 
of Keynesian growthmanship. However, this crisis was only the final point in the difficulties and 
complications the fiscal nominalists faced in administering the fiscal apparatus. By the 1970s, 
the mutual adjustment and vulnerability reduction strategies had already been rendered obsolete. 
As demonstrated in the next chapter, the blockage of discretionary policies in Congress resulted 
in the formation of an official alliance between fiscal and monetary nominalists in the late 1950s. 
These actors sought to liberate the fiscal apparatus from the stickiness of congressional pork 
barrel politics and proposed monetary policy as a more precise discretionary adjustment 
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instrument. Under this vision, discretionary fiscal policy would be only used in cases of 
emergencies whose likelihood of resulting in a depression was incontestable. The mutual 
adjustment mechanism was institutionalized under an official inflation management strategy 
under what is commonly known as Keynesian wage-price guidepost policy in 1960 under the 
Kennedy Council. This attempt, however, also failed in 1966.  
The failure to manage inflation proved to be critical. First and foremost, it facilitated the 
emergence of the monetary layer of government. As shown in the next chapter, the Fed took 
upon the responsibility to stem inflation, but this attempt resulted in the worst credit crunch of 
postwar period. This event was framed as a “limited liquidity crisis” by a Fed study group, 
making possible the remapping of the fiscal nominalists’ deflationary spirals onto the financial 
ontology of interbank short-term lending markets such as the money market. Invention of 
systemic risk as a governmental problem was the outcome of this remapping. Ironically, this 
failure on the part of the Fed provided the occasion for Milton Friedman to put forth his 
monetarist strategy to govern the economy as well as inflation with monetary aggregates and 
money supply. This vision was realized by his mentor Arthur Burns upon his appointment as the 
Fed Chairman in 1970. Finally, Burns’s failure to gradually tame inflation in the face of global 
commodity price shocks opened up the way for his successor Paul Volcker to shock the 
inflationary expectations of economic actors to render inflation a governable phenomenon at the 
end of the decade. The result of this monetarist experiment was a spike in interest rates which in 
turn triggered the first global debt crisis of the postwar period, namely the Latin American debt 
crisis of the 1980s. The debt crisis, however, was no ordinary crisis as such a crisis for the first 
time was threatening the entire global financial system as well as the US banking system. 
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Thereby this event marked the emergence of systemic risk as an economic pathology as 
demonstrated in the next chapter.  
To sum up, the failure of the fiscal apparatus to provide a satisfactory adjustment mechanism in 
the postwar period gave way to a muddling through-like process in which different groups of 
actors tried to supplement the fiscal apparatus’s adjustment functions with alternative 
mechanisms. Today, this process is misconstrued as the transition from Keynesianism to neo-
liberalism. However, neither were the fiscal nominalists “Keynesians” in the strict sense of the 
term, nor was this process one of binary and epochal transition from one era to the next. In our 
present, we witnessed three critical developments that shed light on the survival of the fiscal 
apparatus to this very day. First, as the healthcare reform under the Obama administration has 
demonstrated government bodies such as the Council of Economic Advisors and the National 
Economic Council (NEC) still host fiscal nominalists who worry about nominal imbalances and 
structural maladjustments in the economy. One of these actors was Obama’s NEC Chairman, 
Larry Summers, who saw healthcare reform as a way to balance to economy nominally as this 
sector had been consuming an “unhealthy” share of the Gross Domestic Product. Second, as the 
response to the financial crisis of 2008, again under Summers’s direction, has demonstrated, the 
emergency mitigation module of the fiscal apparatus still exists and is maintained by the state. In 
a matter of months, the federal government was able to deploy nearly $1 trillion worth shelf-
ready public works projects to forestall the cumulative forces of the depression in accordance 
with the lessons that were drawn by fiscal nominalists and macro-substantivists from the 
deployment of public works in the wake of the Great Depression. Finally, the debate on the 
sovereign debt accumulated by the federal government demonstrates that the state is still very 
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much concerned about its potentially destabilizing role in the economy. While too much debt 
may lead to an imbalance of its own sort in the economy, trying to eradicate this debt too rapidly 
may also damage the economy and even cause a depression. Overall, fiscal nominalism is still 










The previous chapters focused on three sets of reiterative problem-solving initiatives to reduce 
the catastrophe risk of a depression in the US economy. Between the 1920s and the 1950s, 
sectoral and macro-substantivists and fiscal nominalists framed this risk as an economic 
imbalance accumulating in a different component of the economy and assembled governmental 
apparatuses to reduce it without restricting economic activity and growth. Each attempt, 
however, produced its own pathology in the form of a negative feedback loop, obstructing the 
effective operation of a given apparatus. Each failure, in turn, became an occasion for a new 
group to assemble a new apparatus to govern the catastrophe risk more effectively.  
This chapter details the final stages of this process: the rebirth of systemic risk as a governmental 
problem with the establishment of the monetary government of the economy in the 1970s and the 
institution of a systemic risk regulation regime under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to govern this 
new feedback loop that transformed disruptions in short-term lending markets into depressions. 
The emergence of systemic risk was the outcome of a strategic decision made by a coalition of 
fiscal and monetary nominalist policy entrepreneurs in the late 1950s. Having witnessed the 
failure of the fiscal apparatus to be deployed as a discretionary policy instrument in times of 
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economic emergencies, these experts concluded that the primary locus of macroeconomic 
government should have been moved to the Federal Reserve. To govern the economy with 
monetary apparatus, monetary nominalists reconstituted the financial system as a monetary 
policy transition mechanism, transforming the system into a leveraged credit infrastructure 
financing economic activity. The ability of the system to fulfill this new function depended on 
two factors, the free flow of capital and the undisrupted supply of operational liquidity to the 
system by short-term lending markets. While disassembling the risk suppression apparatus of 
Glass-Steagall would enhance firms’ risk appetite, these markets would encourage firms to adopt 
a leveraged business model. Despite being fully aware that such a transformation would result in 
the rebirth of the catastrophe risk in the form of a financial imbalance, monetary nominalists 
considered this as a necessary evil for the economy to reach its full growth potential. 
This process, however, should be characterized not as “financial deregulation,” but as 
reregulation. Drawing lessons from the Great Depression, monetary nominalists instituted an 
aggregationist financial risk regulation regime to manage the catastrophe risk. This regime 
assumed the financial risk in the system to be the aggregate of all the risks contained in the 
balance sheets of firms. To govern this risk, it deployed two governmental strategies, distributed 
financial emergency preparedness and financial emergency mitigation. The former was designed 
as a distributed risk management apparatus that operated at the scale of the firm, ensuring that 
the norm of efficient allocation of capital within the firm was balanced against the risk of a 
catastrophic failure. The latter, in turn, was conceived as a systemic security mechanism to 
mitigate liquidity crises that the firms could not manage on their own.  
“The only analogy that I can think of for the failure of a major international institution of great 
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size,” noted a Fed Governor in his congressional testimony in defense of the Fed’s emergency 
lending strategy, “is a meltdown of a nuclear [power] [sic] plant like Chernobyl.”433 This analogy 
implied that the sector most closely associated with capitalism had to be governed contrary to the 
most fundamental principle of the free enterprise system, private risk-reward. What forced the 
Fed to take such a paradoxical position was the conviction that money and credit were the most 
vital economic flows and that the economy’s primary vulnerability lied in the financial system. 
The circuits of money and credit, thus, had to be protected at any cost.  
The first critical moment in the assemblage of systemic risk was the invention of “limited 
liquidity crisis” as the source of the catastrophe risk in the financial system. Monetary 
nominalists, however, initially, problematized liquidity crises in the form of “general liquidity 
crisis,” which signified a situation of emergency threatening the money circuit. Because an 
overwhelming portion of the nation’s money was accumulated in banks, the collapse of the 
system would destroy the aggregate money stock and cause a depression. The Fed intervened in 
these crises with open market operations that flooded the system by buying financial assets to 
lower interest rates.  
In the mid-1960s, monetary nominalists framed “limited liquidity crises” as a new type of 
emergency riddled with absolute indeterminacy. Occurring in short-term lending markets, these 
crises carried the incalculable catastrophe risk that the failure of one firm participating in these 
markets would trigger a series of cascading failures and bring down the entire system. To protect 
                                                
433 The speaker was John LaWare, who was explaining to the members of congress why they should not curtail the 
Fed’s emergency powers to rescue failing banks that posed “systemic risks” to the financial system. Quoted in 
George G. Kaufman, “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Financial Services 
Research 8, no. 2 (April 1994): 129–24. 
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the credit circuit, the Fed relied on a financial emergency lending program that lent directly to 
financial firms through its discount window. In the early 1980s, monetary nominalists coined the 
term systemic risk  to justify the Fed’s emergency mitigation activities, thereby constructing 
systemic risk as an epistemic category of financial emergency.  
The final argument of the chapter is that the decisive transition in the history of economic 
government in the US took place with the rise of systemic risk regulation. Recognizing that the 
aggregationist regime reached its limits, a newly emerging systemic faction within monetary 
nominalism leveraged the crisis as a systemic event and built a consensus within the state that 
systemic risk was a threat to the future of economic governance. If policymakers were to 
continue governing the economy from the Fed, they had to render systemic risk manageable. 
And the only way to accomplish this was to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system.  
The assemblage of systemic risk was finalized with the establishment of vulnerability reduction 
as a governmental strategy under systemic risk regulation. This strategy reconstitutes systemic 
risk as an ontological category of economic pathology, redefining it as an inherent and structural 
feature of the financial system. This new framing conceives systemic risk as the following: (1) 
structural vulnerability of the banking system and (2) chain-reaction-like knock-on effects, 
liquidity gridlocks and too-interconnected-to-fail problem in large-value payment and settlement 
systems and interbank short-term lending markets. Instead of mitigating liquidity crises ex post 
facto, vulnerability reduction strategy seeks to proactively reduce vulnerability ex ante. Within 
this strategy, vulnerability is seen as a product of systemic interdependencies between different 
parts of the system. Utilizing systemic analysis tools such as network analysis and stress testing, 
it maps out the system as a financial network, composed of a complex web of interdependent 
 
 310 
financial flows and nodes, and seeks to identify the nodes critical for the stability of the system. 
The financial firms, markets and infrastructures that occupy these nodes are designated as 
“systemically important” and are declared zones of exception. Policymakers, in turn, are given 
extraordinary powers to enhance the resilience of these nodes. The irony of this strategy is that 
all these interventions are made to avoid a return to the intrusive, heavy-handed regulations of 
the Glass Steagall risk suppression regime. The vulnerability reduction strategy, therefore, 
operates on a governmental logic that is too intrusive to be neoliberal and yet too cautious and 
restricted to be fully interventionist. 
Like the previous episodes, the rise of the vulnerability reduction regime was also the result of a 
recombinatorial process. This regime combined elements from the Glass-Steagall and 
aggregationist financial regulation regimes with the substantivist elements. From Glass-Steagall, 
it inherited monetary credit control instruments, prohibitionist juridical powers and technique of 
transparency. From the aggregationist regime, it coopted capital adequacy requirements and 
stress testing. Finally, it drew on macro-substantivism and a variant of it that was deployed by 
defense mobilization agencies during the Cold War.  
While the emergence of the vulnerability reduction regime marks the combination of 
vulnerability reduction strategies of fiscal nominalism and macro-substantivism with systemic 
risk, The rise of vulnerability reduction nevertheless signifies a major rupture in the decades old 
nominalist project to govern the economy at the level of nominal flows with aggregate macro-
economic indicators. This project rested on the assumption that the economy could be governed 
without a knowledge infrastructure representing the economy’s substantive structure. This 
development, however, marks the return of a substantivist form of expertise concerned with the 
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material flows and their structure, reintroducing systemic substantivist techniques such as 
network analysis and stress testing to the domain of macroeconomic government.434 Their 
adoption symbolizes the remapping of the substantivist systemic elements that have been 
suppressed by both fiscal and monetary nominalists since the mid-1940s onto a financial 
ontology. Systemic risk regulation, therefore, rearticulates the monetary with systemic tools in a 
substantive form.  
The first two parts of the chapter trace the rise of monetary nominalism. Part one focuses on a 
struggle between monetary substantivists and monetary nominalists over the soul of the Federal 
Reserve as well as the framing of the Great Depression as a financial catastrophe. It examines the 
invention of monetary nominalism by Lauchlin Currie as part of the nominalist project to balance 
the economy nominally. Finally, it reconstructs the creation of the Fed as a modern central bank 
under the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935. Part two follows two groups of monetary nominalists 
that conglomerated around the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Committee for 
Economic Development and their cooperative techno-political project to implement Currie’s 
vision in the postwar period. After analyzing two critical research projects undertaken by Morris 
Copeland and Milton Friedman, it illustrates the birth of the aggregationist regime by zooming in 
on a comprehensive study of the financial system by the Commission on Monetary and Credit in 
                                                
434 The predecessors of these techniques were banished from the domain of macroeconomic governance after the 
defunding of the New Deal’s National Resources Planning Board in 1943. These analytical techniques were 
nevertheless continued to be developed within the domain of national security by the Cold War defense mobilization 
agencies in the postwar period. These techniques, particularly Wassily Leontief’s input-output modeling, nuclear 
attack simulations and network analysis, were developed to render the structural interdependencies of the economy 
visible. Utilized in conjunction with critical materials stockpiling, they were deployed for measuring and reducing 
the vulnerability of the economy to physical shocks such as nuclear attack, natural disasters and labor strikes. For 
more, see Onur Ozgode, “Logistics of Survival: Assemblage of Vulnerability Reduction Expertise” (M.Phil Thesis, 
Columbia University, 2009). 
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the late 1950s. Building on part one, I argue that the repeal of Glass-Steagall should be 
understood as a turning point in the monetary nominalist project to reregulate financial system 
under the aggregationist regime rather than simply as deregulation. Part three demonstrates the 
implementation of the financial emergency mitigation strategy of the aggregationist regime. It 
first focuses on a 1965 Fed study on the discount window and then the deployment of this policy 
instrument under the Fed’s financial emergency lending program in the 1970s and the 1980s. I 
argue that systemic risk gradually became intelligible to policymakers in this period as a 
catastrophe risk forming in critical financial markets due to emergent financial network 
interdependencies. Part four and five concentrates on systemic risk. Part four traces the 
emergence of systemic risk first as an epistemic category of financial emergency and then as an 
ontological category of economic pathology. Part five focuses on a series of reiterative reforms 
of the aggregationist regime to render systemic risk a manageable governmental problem and 
concludes with the creation of the vulnerability reduction regime under the Dodd-Frank Act.  
The.Fed.&.the.Great.Depression.
Today, the Fed is most commonly associated with governing the economy. When the Fed was 
established in 1913, this was not the case. In point of fact, there was no such object as the 
economy before the late 1920s.435 In its inception, the Fed was designed as a security apparatus 
that was inserted between material and nominal flows.436 In the words of Frederic Delano, its 
                                                
435 As I already demonstrated in Chapter 1, one of the earliest uses of the term “the economy” in its contemporary 
meaning took place in the 1929 report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes. Before Timothy Mitchell 
had already pointed to Keynes’s drafts of the General Theory from the early 1930s. “Economists and the Economy 
in the Twentieth Century.” 




first Vice Chairman who later served in the same role in the National Resources Committee in 
the 1930s, it would function as a “shock absorber” in times of emergencies, buffering cyclical 
and random disturbances on financial flows.437 If a shock were to trigger a financial panic, it 
would mitigate the emergency and prevent the panic from morphing into a full-blown 
depression.438 The Fed fulfilled this function by serving as a lender of last resort (LLR) to the 
financial system through two policy instruments, discount window lending and open market 
operations.439 The discount window was used to assist financial institutions facing liquidity 
                                                                                                                                                       
that the financial center of the West, San Francisco, had been destroyed by an earthquake and an ensuing fire. The 
news triggered a sell-off in New York and London stock exchanges and rapidly morphed into a financial panic in 
international financial centers such as New York and London. By the end of 1907, the panic had turned into a full 
blown crisis. The New York Stock Exchange had collapsed by a daunting 37 percent, and 25 banks and 17 trust 
companies had failed. The blueprint of the Fed was drawn by the National Monetary Commission of 1908, also 
known as the Aldrich Commission, in response to this event. The crisis, which was one of the worst financial 
crashes in history, demonstrated the inability of financial actors to mitigate financial catastrophes on their own. The 
Fed, thus, was conceived as a security apparatus to mitigate such panics and protect finance from catastrophic 
disruptions. Robert F Bruner and Carr, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm 
(Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007); Elmus Wicker, The Great Debate on Banking Reform: Nelson Aldrich 
and the Origins of the Fed (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005); Allan H Meltzer, A History of the 
Federal Reserve (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).  
437 As illustrated by the case of the 1907 panic, a random disturbance, i.e. a “random shock,” could be either the 
physical destruction of a financial center as well as the sudden spread of the information that such an event had 
taken place. In terms of the cyclical disturbances, the primary case was seasonal pressures on currency and credit 
during harvest. In times of harvest, increased demand for liquidity would put serious strain on the monetary system, 
including the Gold Standard. As Alan Meltzer points out, these issues were explicitly discussed in the congressional 
hearings on the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 that created the Fed. Frederic A. Delano, “The Federal Reserve Act and 
Its Place in American Finance,” Journal of the American Bankers Association 7, no. 9 (March 1915): 657; Allan H 
Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
438 Meltzer points out that the frequency and severity of banking panics in the US was the topic of discussion in 
every single session of the hearings on the creation of the Fed. While there was wide disagreement over the 
institutional shape the Fed should have taken, there was unanimous agreement on the need for reducing financial 
panics. Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, 68–69, 73. 
439 Lender of last resort was a governmental technique that was developed in England by British reformers Henry 
Thornton and Walter Bagehot in the early and late 19th century respectively. The technique rested on lending to 
illiquid financial institutions in a financial panic to protect the financial system from collapse. Meltzer points out 
that it is possible that policymakers did not have access to Thornton’s work, but they definitely acquainted with 
Bagehot’s work as OMPC minutes make reference to Lombard Street on an ongoing basis. Ibid., 281–82; Thomas 
M. Humphrey, “The Classical Concept of the Lender of Last Resort,” FRB Richmond Economic Review 61, no. 
January/February (1975): 2–9. 
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shortages on an individual basis whereas open market operations provided liquidity to the 
financial system at large. In response to an emergent panic and a system-wide liquidity shortage, 
the Fed would ease the stresses on financial institutions by the means of purchasing US 
Treasuries in the open market.440 After utilizing both mechanisms in its first two decades, the 
Fed abandoned the discount window in 1934.441 In the post-Glass-Steagall period, equipped with 
credit control instruments, the Fed sought to suppress speculation rather than mitigate its 
excesses with discount window lending.442  
The Fed’s ability to function as a shock absorber was tested between 1929 and 1933. In the wake 
of the Great Depression, the consensus in the emerging New Deal field of governmental reform 
was that the Fed had failed to pass this test, resulting in the failure of one in every five US 
                                                
440 This would inject liquidity into the balance sheets of troubled institutions and thereby prevent a collapse in the 
market value of government bonds due to a sell off, stemming the spread of contagion. 
441 In its first decade, the Fed exclusively relied on the discount window. In the 1920s, open market operations began 
to be undertaken, accounting for 37 percent of Fed lending between 1920 and 1937. In the period covering the next 
five years, they went up to 65 percent. Until 1966, discount lending accounted for no more than 2 percent of lending. 
The shift to open market operations was the outcome of an initiative to utilize the Fed’s monetary policy tools as a 
proactive countercyclical policy instrument to smooth out the business cycle. This initiative was undertaken by the 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (NY Fed), Benjamin Strong, who had just taken over the newly 
created Open Market Investment Committee to coordinate the open market operations of the Reserve Banks in the 
mid-1920s. There he instituted open market operations as the primary policy tool to govern material flows, 
particularly harvests and gold, as well as the disruptive impact of the fluctuations in these flows had on the nominal 
flow of credit and money. According to Alan Meltzer, Strong was trying to transform the Fed into a European style 
central bank like the Bank of England. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Reappraisal of the 
Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism; Report of a System Committee. ([Washington], 1968), 4; Meltzer, A History 
of the Federal Reserve, 71, 75–76. 
442 There were two reasons for this inactivity. First, bank failures were few in this period—only 42 banks failed 
between 1946 and 1960—and failures could be handled by the newly created Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. Second and more importantly, the Fed would practically close the discount window under a 1955 
reform initiative, which would make it very hard for banks to borrow from the window. This policy would be 
reversed in the late 1960s as will be demonstrated in Part 3. For an overview of the Fed’s lender of last resort 
operations, see Mark Carlson and David Wheelock, “The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 
Years,” (FRB of St. Louis Working Paper no. 2012); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), 
Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism; Report of a System Committee., 4. 
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banks.443 As a solution, two proposals were put forward by two groups of actors with conflicting 
explanations for what caused the Great Depression. The first group was led by monetary 
substantivists, Senator Carter Glass and his advisor Parker Willis. These actors blamed the 
depression on financial speculation and expansionary policies of the Fed. They launched a full 
frontal attack on the Fed as an emergency mitigator and proposed to replace it with a financial 
emergency prevention regime that came to be known as Glass Steagall. The second group was 
headed by monetary nominalists Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles and his assistant Lauchlin 
Currie. These actors also held the Fed responsible for the depression, but for an entirely different 
reason. They blamed the Fed for failing to act as a lender of last resort. Based on this diagnosis, 
they proposed a series of reforms that were intended to turn the Fed into an administrative 
machinery in charge of the monetary apparatus to govern the economy. They envisioned the Fed 
becoming a governmental space controlled by experts with training in monetary economics. As 
an alternative to Glass-Steagall, they advocated reconstituting the Fed’s shock absorption 
functions into a broader financial emergency mitigation strategy that formed the foundations of 
the aggregationist regulatory regime. 
In the field of New Deal governmental reform, Eccles and Currie’s diagnosis was framed as a 
marginal perspective. What made such a framing possible were the networks within which 
alliances were built. The network within which Glass and Willis built an alliance to institute the 
Glass Steagall was very robust and consisted of well established parties. Contrary to Eccles and 
                                                
443 In the span of three years, some nine thousand banks failed. David C. Wheelock, “Regulation, Market Structure 
and the Bank Failures of the Great Depression,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review Vol. 77, No. 2, no. 
March/April 1995 (March 1, 1995). 
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Currie who were newcomers to the field, Glass and Willis were heavyweights on the Washington 
policymaking scene. Glass’s alliance with Willis was no coincidence as both were leading 
proponents of the real bills doctrine and the commercial loan theory of central banking. In the 
early 1930s, Glass was a senior member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, the 
leading policymaking body on financial regulation in Congress, and Willis, then an economics 
professor at Columbia University, was the Committee’s chief expert. The alliance between Glass 
and Willis dates back to the 1910s. When Glass was the Chairman of the House Banking and 
Finance Committee, they drafted the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 that founded the Fed. As the 
Treasury Secretary in the Wilson administration, Glass then headed the Federal Reserve Board 
between 1918 and 1920. One of the most important policy-oriented economists of his time, 
Willis, served as the Board’s first secretary from 1914 to 1918 and then as the director of 
research until 1922. By the late 1920s, Glass and Willis had become increasingly critical of the 
Fed’s use of open market operations for expansionary and accommodating policies as well as its 
tacit recognition of affiliate banking as a legitimate business model. The outcome of this critique 
was a failed attempt on their part to pass Glass Steagall in 1930.444 As this failure demonstrates, 
Glass and Willis could shape neither legislative agenda nor public discourse in the absence of a 
broader alliance.  
By 1933, Glass and Willis gained new allies. The critical event that made this possible was the 
failure of the Bank of the United States in December 1930. The collapse, then the largest one to 
date, stripped thousands away from their savings, turned the spotlight of the press on the abuses 
                                                
444 Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, 429–30; Edwin J. Perkins, “The Divorce of Commercial and 
Investment Banking: A History,” The Banking Law Journal 88, no. 6 (June 1971): 483–528. 
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and unethical business practices in finance and stirred a great outcry. While the issue could have 
been framed as a idiosyncratic case of fraud on the part of the president of the bank, the press 
construed it as a problem inherent to affiliate banking akin to Glass and Willis’s critique.445 The 
continued failure of thousands of banks during 1931 and 1932 only reinforced and made Glass’s 
perspective increasingly pervasive among the public and the political establishment. As bank 
failures mounted to a catastrophe, the problem was no longer simply the loss of savings, but also 
the destruction of capital, the entity that is at the heart of the capitalist system of production.  
By the winter of 1932, both Republican and Democratic Parties reached the consensus that 
something had to be done to put an end to financial instability if the capitalist democratic order 
were to survive. While both parties pinned the blame on the affiliate system, they diverged on the 
right course of action. Republicans advocated regulation whereas Democrats adopted Glass’s 
perspective as the central element of their platform for the upcoming elections. Indeed, Glass 
was put in charge of crafting Franklin D. Roosevelt’s campaign message on the issue in the 
summer of 1932, and Roosevelt welded Glass’s perspective with his Brandeisian anti-trust 
tendencies. The outcome of this discursive combination was the production of Rooseveltian 
rhetoric that framed the depression as the result of the abuse of powerful and large Wall Street 
finance over the weak and small individuals of Main Street. Paradoxically, Glass’s zeal to 
prohibit affiliate banking was interpreted by Roosevelt and his fellow Democratic congressmen 
as a way to protect their voters and contributor small unit banks from the unfair competitive 
                                                
445 Perkins, “The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History.”  
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advantage possessed by large national banks.446 Once Roosevelt took over the presidency, both 
his first Brain Trust, consisting of proponents of overproduction hypothesis, and his Brandeisian 
anti-trust lawyers were enlisted in support of Glass’s perspective.447 In addition to these groups, 
securities industry and old investment banks joined this alliance in 1932.448 Finally, capitalists 
operating in commerce and manufacturing must have also found Glass Steagall appealing as it 
promised to divert financial flows away from financial speculation toward “productive” sectors. 
In a sense, Glass Steagall became the holy grail for the pursuit of financial stability on the part of 
a diverse group of actors in a moment when the New Deal was about to be formulated.  
The formation of this network was accelerated by a Senate investigation on the causes of the 
1929 stock market crash in early 1933.449 In January, Glass’s bill was under heavy attack from 
both sides of the isle under pressure from donors in the commercial banking sector. Glass was 
able to pass the bill in the Senate by restricting the section that liberalized the restrictions on 
nationwide branch banking. This political move pacified the opposition from small unit banking 
interests and co-opted these banks into the alliance.450 Now, the only obstacle in the way of the 
bill was large national banks.  
                                                
446 Ibid. 
447 Michael Perino, The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand Pecora’s Investigation of the Great Crash 
Forever Changed American Finance (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 2010). 
448Both of these groups saw Glass’s bill as an opportunity to isolate themselves from competitive commercial banks 
that were aggressively taking over their business. Perkins, “The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A 
History.”  
449 The investigation was launched by the Republican Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee 
Peter Norbeck in April 1932. Initially, Glass dismissed the hearings as a public spectacle on the part of Republicans 




This obstacle was removed in the course of the investigations in the spring. The investigation’s 
new Chief Council, Ferdinand Pecora, a former New York assistant district attorney, broadened 
the scope of the investigation from short selling in the securities markets to the broader illegal 
and unethical practices of commercial banks. In the course of public hearings between late 
February and March, Pecora questioned the managers and the chairman of the National City 
Bank. Pecora’s interrogations illustrated a broad range of manipulative and borderline illegal 
business practices in the bank’s securities business. By the end of the hearings in May, Pecora 
had reproduced Glass’s framing in the form of a ubiquitous truth regarding what had caused the 
depression. Within this framing, commercial bankers had engaged in unscrupulous practices and 
were held responsible for the depression. They had not only engaged in speculative investments, 
but also manipulated securities market, particularly the stock market.451 This framing established 
a causal relationship between the stock market crash and the depression. In the post-Pecora 
Commission world, these events were connected to each other through a latent causal factor, 
financial speculation. 
By the time Eccles and Currie entered the field of New Deal reform in 1933, the framing of the 
depression was already completed. Consequently, they found themselves isolated on the issue. 
Eccles, a Mormon from Utah, was the heir to a banking and industrial empire, and Currie was a 
Harvard trained monetary economist who subscribed to the banking theory of central banking. 
This meant that they were not only isolated due their institutional affiliations and personal 
backgrounds, but were also in the minority in terms of how the Fed should conduct monetary 




policy.452 While Harvard was severely underrepresented among the first cohort of  New Dealers, 
the banking theory’s central tenet of focusing only on the quantity of money and credit was in 
direct contradiction with Willis’s commercial loan theory and the findings of the Pecora 
Commission. Moreover, Eccles and Currie both entered the field from the Treasury Department, 
which was marginalized due to its close association with finance. Their only allies were Currie’s 
patron in the Treasury, Jacob Viner, and his University of Chicago colleagues who were entirely 
absent from the policymaking channels with the exception of Viner.453 Finally, even when Currie 
became the central figure within emerging fiscal nominalism in the late-1930s, his fellow fiscal 
nominalists such as Alvin Hansen and Gerhard Colm were convinced that monetary policy was 
an ineffective instrument to mitigate depressions.454 Thus, Eccles and Currie held a hybrid 
position in the field of New Deal reform that was both dominant and dominated. As detailed 
below, this was why they could pose a challenge to Glass’s assault on the Fed as a financial 
emergency mitigator, but could not dismantle the Glass Steagall regime. For that to become 
possible one would have to wait for Milton Friedman to disassociate the stock market crash from 
the depression and reframe the depression as a policy failure on the part of the Fed’s response to 
the crash.  
The Glass-Steagall regime was founded upon a juridico-disciplinary strategy that was designed 
to prevent depressions rather than mitigate them. This strategy interwove two distinct regulatory 
                                                
452 Sandilands, The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie. 
453 Ibid. 
454 See chapters 1 and 3 on the rise of fiscal nominalism and fiscal nominalists’ perspective on the monetary policy. 
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approaches that were in tension with each other. The first was formulated by Glass and Willis in 
the early 1930s with the purpose of preventing financial panics. It was instituted under the 
Banking Act of 1933 and was given its final form with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The 
former Act restructured the financial sector by means of a series of prohibitive rules and 
regulations and inserted restrictions on financial activity. In conjunction with the latter Act, it 
equipped the Fed with new credit control tools. These tools were intended not only to suppress 
speculation and excessive risk-taking but also to channel financial flows toward “productive” 
economic activity. The second approach was crafted by a group of Brandeisian anti-trust lawyers 
who were enlisted in Roosevelt’s New Deal to draft the Securities Exchange Act. Under the 
patronage of Roosevelt’s advisor Felix Frankfurther, Robert Landis and his team established a 
regulatory system to obviate market failures in the securities markets. This system relied on 
information to make markets transparent and rested on the assumption that transparency would 
institute market discipline as a mechanism to foster stability. This mechanism was reinforced by 
criminalization of fraud and market manipulation. Overall, the Glass Steagall regime was 
interwoven with two hybrid strategies to govern the catastrophe risk that financial panics posed 
on collective life within a liberal ontology.  
Glass and Willis sought to establish a regulatory system whose purpose was to channel financial 
flows to productive commercial and industrial activities in the form of credit. After departing 
from the Fed, they became increasingly critical of the Fed in the 1920s for diverging from the 
commercial loan theory of central banking as well as the real bills doctrine. The latter prescribed 
a tight, anti-inflationary monetary policy that prioritized the protection of the status of 
commodity-backed currency over easing stresses on economic activity. The commercial loan 
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theory favored controlling the quality of bank loans on an individual basis over their aggregate 
quantity in the system. They accused the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Benjamin Strong, for steering monetary policy unnecessarily toward eventually disastrous 
expansionary policies that not only accommodated but also fostered the “speculative orgy” of the 
1920s. The result of these policies was a boom in the long-term securities, which were 
considered to be high risk and speculative.455 According to Glass and Willis, the only way to 
prevent the next depression was to suppress speculation in securities before it amounted to a 
bust.  
In addition, Glass criticized the Fed for letting banks adopt a “department store” business model 
that allowed them to operate in multiple markets by establishing affiliates.456 According to Glass, 
this was an illegal development that contaminated the financial structure with “evil practices” 
and corruption. Contrary to what one might expect, the problem this development posed was not 
framed in terms of the Brandeisian anti-trust perspective. Instead, it was construed in terms of 
diversion of capital from productive uses. The affiliate model was fostering excessive 
competition and speculation. The ability to invest deposits in securities markets was fueling 
speculation and was creating incentives for market manipulation. This, in turn, was incentivizing 
banks to attract more savings at a higher cost by the means of increasing interest rates. The result 
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was an alleged increase in the cost of capital and thereby the diversion of capital away from the 
real economy associated with productive activities. Thus, as historian Edwin Perkins points out, 
Glass and Willis sought to tame competition, eradicate speculation and other ills to make the 
system safer rather than trying to create a fair and competitive system as Brandeisians would 
have done. This was why the problem was not rendered in terms of institutional size, economies 
of scale and unfair competitive advantage. It was instead problematized in terms of excessive 
competition, speculation, and moral ills.457 The solution sought, therefore, was prohibitionist and 
suppressive in its foundations and not concerned with restricting size and restoring competition.  
Anti-trust lawyers drafted the Securities Exchange Act in the spring of 1933. The patron of this 
group, Felix Frankfurter, was a Harvard Law School professor who was a close friend and 
disciple of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. The group consisted of three Harvard alumni 
who were trained by Frankfurter in Brandeisian anti-trust law, James Landis, Thomas Corcoran 
and Benjamin Cohen. While Landis provided expertise on formal design of administrative 
regulatory tools, Corcoran and Cohen supplied substantive expertise on the nature of securities 
markets and finance.458 Building on Brandeis’s pioneering ideas regarding openness and 
transparency as a strategy of regulation, they problematized financial stability around the 
problem of disclosure. According to Brandeisians, the securities industry was ridden with a 
culture of distrust and secrecy, which in turn resulted in nondisclosure and nonstandard 
                                                
457 Ibid., 498–503. 
458 After graduating from Harvard Law School, Landis served as a clerk under Supreme Court Justice Louis 
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acquiring familiarity with security markets. Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, 
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accounting practices. In the absence of transparency and an effective watchdog system to 
penalize wrongdoers, fraudulent and unsafe business practices had become a source of threat to 
the safety of investors and confidence in the integrity of markets. Brandeisians sought to foster 
financial stability centered around an information-based deterrence strategy that relied on 
mandatory disclosure rules and juridical penalties. The underlying assumption of this strategy 
was that transparency would render business practices of securities dealers visible to the 
regulators and investors and thereby facilitate a sound and ethical business environment. Those 
who go against regulatory and legal norms would either be disciplined by the market or be 
penalized by regulators and the law.459  
The first component of the Glass-Steagall regime was a set of structural walls and restrictions 
that formatted the financial sector into isolated islands of functionally-defined financial 
activity.460 As Glass and Willis envisioned, it erected firewalls between commercial and 
investment banking sectors and banned the former to participate in securities markets. This 
effectively outlawed the “department store” model of affiliate banking and forced banks to 
operate in only one sector. By isolating commercial banks, the Act sought to halt the spread of 
panics resulting from speculative, high-risk activity. Contrary to the calls by the Fed governors 
for the regulation of speculative activities of banks in securities markets, Glass insisted that a ban 
was necessary to prevent the accumulation and transmission of excessive and speculative risks 
from one part of the financial system to the rest. The functional firewalls were supplemented by 
                                                
459 Ibid., 165, 168, 173–75. 
460 On the concept of formatting, see Çalışkan and Callon, “Economization, Part 1.” 
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geographic firewalls that prohibited nationwide branch banking.461 Overriding firewalls was 
criminalized and other financial activities that threatened the safety of the banking system and 
investors were banned.462 As noted below, this was a critical point of contention between figures 
like Glass and Willis on the one hand and Currie on the other. This component, therefore, sought 
to reduce catastrophe risk by first isolating sectors that were associated with speculative risk-
taking from those that reallocated savings into capital and credit and then putting restrictions on 
financial activity within these isolated sectors.    
The second component of the regime consisted of two administrative machineries, the new 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and a reformed Federal Reserve Board. While it was 
initially intended to be located within the Federal Trade Commission, a brainchild of Brandeis, 
under Glass’s initiative it was set up as an independent agency. Nevertheless, it was dominated 
by anti-trust lawyers such as Landis and Pecora. SEC was supposed to ensure the safety of 
investors by ensuring fairness and eradicating fraud in securities markets. SEC was designed as 
the administrative machinery that collected and distributed financial information and thereby 
made markets transparent.  
                                                
461 This was the only provision in the Banking Act that was written in the spirit of Brandeisian anti-trust thinking. It 
was supported by Roosevelt and was actually opposed by Glass as the latter thought it would weaken the financial 
structure. With support from banks, Roosevelt, however prevailed. The main purpose of this provision was to 
prevent large national banks from sucking away funds from small localities and rural areas that needed these funds 
to sustain a vital local economy. Burns, The American Banking Community and New Deal Banking Reforms, 1933-
1935. 
462 One example of such a ban was the banks’ right to invest in long-term assets such as real estate. Such assets were 
considered to be high risk because from the perspective of commercial loan theory the length of an investment was 
considered to be in reverse correlation with its liquidity. Interlocking of bank directorates between these types of 
institutions was also prohibited. Sandilands, The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 51; Meltzer, A 
History of the Federal Reserve, 434. 
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The Fed, in contrast, was assigned the function of a risk suppression apparatus that channeled 
financial flows away from speculative activities toward productive ones. In the initial drafts of 
the bill, Glass sought to abolish the Fed’s lender of last resort function by outlawing the Fed’s 
open market operations as he considered this instrument to foster excessive risk-taking. Toward 
the end of speculative risk suppression, the Fed’s powers were greatly enhanced as it was 
equipped with credit control instruments. It was granted the authority to set capital reserve 
requirements on banks, interest rate ceilings (Regulation Q), and margin requirements on 
securities. The most drastic of the Fed’s new powers was the purview to intervene in banks’ 
internal affairs to curb risk-taking directly. If other governmental tools could not stem 
speculative behavior, then it could take directed corrective action against a bank. Such action 
ranged from vetoing a given loan considered to be risky to ousting the bank’s top 
management.463  
To sum up, the Glass-Steagall regime placed limits on the convertibility of financial activities by 
restricting and prohibiting certain financial activities that were considered to be destabilizing. 
Thereby, it sought to reduce the capacity of the system to serve as the medium that links the 
whole economic system. Equipped with new regulatory instruments, the Fed and SEC were 
given the role of administering financial regulations that were supposed to act as a medium that 
connects the economic system, rather than financial flows. In this new role, the Fed was expected 
to take a much more active and aggressive role in suppressing speculation and channeling 
                                                
463 Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, 430–34; Randall S. Kroszner and Raghuram G. Rajan, “The Role of 
Firewalls in Universal Banks: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities before the Glass-Steagall Act” 




financial flows toward low risk, productive uses. As demonstrated below, the Fed’s monetary 
control instruments and powers were first redeployed by monetary nominalists such as Arthur 
Burns, Gardiner Means and Morris Copeland into governmental tools to stabilize economic 
activity. They were then redeployed for a second time under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Regulation Reform Act of 2010 to regulate systemic risk. Under the vulnerability reduction 
regime of Dodd-Frank they were recast as vulnerability reduction instruments that were applied 
at critical points within the financial flow structure of the financial system. Finally, the 
transparency approach of anti-trust lawyers were also redeployed in Dodd-Frank to reduce 
systemic risk. By placing derivatives on exchanges, the Act sought to render the counterparty 
risk these financial instruments posed to financial actors manageable. Overall, regulatory 
techniques of Glass-Steagall were recombined in new ways within the vulnerability reduction 
regime of Dodd-Frank to enhance the resilience of the financial system to shocks whereas these 
instruments were initially designed under Glass-Steagall as speculative risk suppression 
instruments and market-making devices.  
In response to the efforts to deactivate the Fed’s emergency mitigation functions, a coalition of 
actors in the Treasury and the Fed sought to reconstitute the Fed as the administrator of a new 
monetary apparatus in the mid-1930s. At the center of this project was Currie, the mastermind 
behind the fiscal apparatus. Currie conceived this idea while working under monetary economist 
Jacob Viner in the Treasury in mid-1934. By the end of the year, he had become the assistant to 
the new Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles and the Fed’s deputy research director. In contrast to his 
fiscal nominalist allies, Currie argued that monetary policy could play a supplementary role in 
balancing the economy. While fiscal policy would stimulate recovery and national income, 
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monetary policy would foster stability and finance the recovery. The Fed would channel the flow 
of funds to imbalanced sectors while retaining its emergency mitigation functions.464  
In the New Deal field, Currie held a position diametrically opposed to Glass. Most significantly, 
he rejected the widely held conviction that speculation and accommodative policies of the Fed 
caused the depression. According to Currie, the depression was the consequence of the Fed’s 
policies that failed to distinguish money from credit.465 This failure caused the depression in two 
ways. First, monetary policy in the 1920s was misguided as it targeted quality of credit instead of 
the level of economic activity.466 He pointed out that guided by the commercial loan theory of 
central banking, the Fed encouraged productive and liquid loans. Yet, not only did the Fed fail to 
define what was productive, but it was also mistaken about which loans were liquid. By 
encouraging short-term loans Currie argued the Fed actually made the system more fragile.467  
This was a critical intervention as it made a distinction between the safety of a loan vis-à-vis the 
lender-borrower relationship and the security of the financial system vis-à-vis the aggregate 
composition of credit within the system. From the credit perspective, a loan could have been 
“safe” due to the short duration under which a debtor was subjected to risk. Yet, Currie 
                                                
464 This was relayed to President Roosevelt via a memorandum by Eccles. Sandilands, The Life and Political 
Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 56–57, 63–64. 
465 Currie developed this alternative account while writing his dissertation on the theory of baking at Harvard in the 
late 1920s. Ibid., 23, 28, 36; Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, 30. 
466 Currie argued that the Fed conflated the primary function of the banking system as a supplier and administrator 
of the payment system with its secondary function as an intermediary for loans. In the period between 1920 and 
1932, it had focused on the former while the latter should have been the object of intervention. Sandilands, The Life 
and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 45. 
467 Ibid., 34–35. 
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recognized what made a loan safe was not the duration, but the liquidity of the debt as an asset. 
A long-term loan was safer as it could be prematurely liquidated with ease.468 Thus, longer the 
average maturity of loans within a system, the less vulnerable the system was. For Currie, the 
vulnerability of the system was an aggregate magnitude that represented the totality of liquidity 
risk held in portfolios.469 The Fed, thus, should have been “concerned with the net inflationary or 
deflationary effect of many opposing forces […] that go to make up the industrial situation at any 
particular time.”470 
The Fed’s second failure was its unwillingness to act as a lender of last resort (LLR). Beating 
Friedman by three decades, Currie argued that depressions were caused by a sudden destruction 
of a substantial portion of the nation’s stock of money as a consequence of bank failures. The 
Fed could have prevented this by increasing the supply of money. In the absence of a LLR 
intervention, it was naïve to expect the price mechanism to provide automatic adjustment. The 
critical issue in mitigating a depression was timing. “Unless the depression [was] abnormally 
severe,” monetary intervention could stem the catastrophe.471 Thus, speculation for Currie was 
not an issue as far as security of the system was concerned. What was critical was the security of 
                                                
468 Ibid., 34. 
469 This would become one of the most basic tenet of financial regulation in the postwar period. As will be noted 
below, the Basel Capital Accords would be implemented under the guidance of the Fed Chairman Paul Volcker and 
NY Fed President Gerald Corrigan as a response to the drastic rise in the short-term assets in reserves of financial 
institutions to fulfill the newly instituted capital adequacy ratios in the 1980s. 
470 The implication of this argument was that the Fed would be responsible for managing “monetary incomes and the 
rate and character of their expenditure in relation to the output of consumers’ and producers’ goods.” In other words, 
the Fed would govern the economy. Lauchlin Currie, “The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 
1929-32,” Journal of Political Economy 42, no. 2 (April 1, 1934): 176-77. 
471 In such depressions, Currie acknowledged the need for supplementary mechanisms to arrest the depressive 
forces. Quoted in Sandilands, The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 48–50. 
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the total quantity of money in circulation. Since money was stored in banks, the security of the 
banking system was also paramount. 
In light of these criticisms, Currie drafted the National Banking Act of 1935 as a counterattack 
on Glass-Steagall. In the eyes of Currie, these reforms rested on an erroneous account of the 
depression and instituted a counterproductive regulatory regime, which reinforced the Fed’s 
focus on quality of credit. The geographic firewalls prevented banks from spreading risk 
geographically through branch banking.472 With its credit-centric policies, the Fed was 
intensifying the maladjustments in the economic structure “instead of operating as a 
maladjustment-compensating factor.”473 The essence of reform, therefore, should have been to 
establish the Fed as an institution capable of controlling the money supply at different phases of 
the business cycle. The object of intervention should have been the supply of money and not the 
quality of credit.  
This could be accomplished only if the Fed was turned into a powerful central bank in control of 
the money supply. The first step in this direction was to transform the Board into a governmental 
space administered by experts as opposed to former financiers turned governors. In its inception, 
the Fed was conceived as a confederation of independent regional Reserve Banks under the 
oversight of the Board. Within this system, the branches were under the control of local financial 
interests and their professional allies responsible for administering the daily affairs of the 
branches. For Currie, this posed a major obstacle to the creation of the monetary apparatus. 
                                                
472 Ibid., 51, 57. 
473 Quoted in ibid., 57–58. 
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Decentralized administrative scheme prevented the design and implementation of national 
monetary policy for national goals. It also resulted in the deployment of monetary policy 
instrument toward the special interests of financiers toward their local goals. Thus, Currie 
insisted that the Fed Board had to be turned into the central decision-making body. When 
crafting policy, the Board would take into account information on local economic and financial 
conditions as reported by branches and direct Reserve Banks in the implementation of policies. 
Currie’s project, therefore, shared concerns and goals that resembled those of the Brownlow 
Commission discussed in Chapter 2. The Banking Act of 1935 was a critical step in the 
reconstitution of the American state as a governmental space autonomous from local special 
interests and armed with impartial and “objective” scientific expertise.   
The second step was to establish effective control over the aggregate assets and liabilities of the 
financial system as a whole. The principle means of such control was to create a banking system 
with one-hundred percent reserve requirements on short-term deposits. This would not only 
prevent bank runs, but also enhance the control over the money supply. Elimination of excess 
bank reserves would force banks to be indebted to the Fed if they wanted to remain profitable. 
This, in turn, would increase the sensitivity of banks’ lending decisions to monetary instruments, 
making them a precise tool in managing the money supply. This scheme would establish firm 
control over money flows.474 
Currie’s efforts were successful to a large degree despite Glass’s efforts to sabotage the Act. 
Currie was able to introduce the necessary administrative reforms that enforced the Board’s 
                                                
474 Ibid., 63–64, 66; Ronnie J Phillips, The Chicago Plan & New Deal Banking Reform (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995), 96–98. 
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influence over the regions. The reconfiguration of the Board of Governors put the Board in 
charge of what became the Fed’s principal monetary control instrument in the 1970s, open 
market operations.475 The Act also expanded the range of assets eligible as collateral at the 
discount window. This was a remarkable step as it vastly enhanced the Fed’s emergency 
mitigation powers.476 Currie’s plans, however, were undermined with the US entry into the war 
in 1942 as the monetary apparatus was subordinated to the role of financing federal debt in an 
agreement between the Treasury and the Fed.477 
The significance of Currie extends beyond laying the foundations of the Fed as a modern central 
bank. His critique of the Fed’s credit-centric policies formed two fundamental tenet of the 
postwar project to govern the economy with the monetary apparatus. First, it established that 
financial risk within the system was the magnitude of aggregate risk born by all firms. This 
became the basis of the aggregationist regulatory regime. Second, it put forth that the Glass-
Steagall regime was distorting the flow of funds into the depressed parts of the economy and was 
exacerbating nominal imbalances. For the economy to reach its full growth potential it was 
necessary to direct the flow of funds to the underfunded parts of the economy. The problem, 
                                                
475 Before the Act, open market operations were undertaken in the Open Market Policy Conference, which was 
dominated by the Federal Reserve Banks. With the Act, this body was reconstituted as the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC). The new committee was composed of seven Board members and five representatives of the 
Reserve Banks. Sandilands, The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 66. 
476 The Act also gave the Fed the authority to adjust bank reserve ratios up to twice the minimum requirement as 
stated in the current law. Ibid.; Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, 484–86. 
477 For Currie, monetary policy should have played a supplementary role to resolving maladjustments by channeling 
flow of funds to unbalanced sectors, not support Treasury. The arrangement between Treasury and the Fed would 
end in 1951. In the post-1951 period, the new Fed Chairman, William McChesney Martin, however, would return to 
the credit-centric policies of the 1920s instead of following Currie’s program. Meltzer, A History of the Federal 
Reserve, 43, 46–47, 297.  
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however, was that the type of expert who would utilize the institutional and discursive 
mechanisms that Currie built into the law were absent from the Fed. These mechanisms, which 
survived to this day, were the basis upon which Arthur Burns revitalized Currie’s outline in the 
1970s.  
Reconstitution.of.the.Fed.as.a.Governmental.Apparatus.
Currie’s blueprints for constructing a monetary apparatus was turned into a techno-political 
project in the mid-1940s. This project was the result of an alliance between the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) and the Committee for Economic Development (CED). Under 
the direction of monetary nominalists Arthur Burns and Herbert Stein, NBER and CED built on 
the legacy of macro and sectoral substantivists in two research projects in the late 1940s. The 
first project was undertaken by Morris Copeland to explore ways to recraft the Fed’s new 
monetary control tools into countercyclical policy instruments. The outcome of this project was 
the construction of flow of funds tables and the adoption of these tables at the Fed as an 
information infrastructure to map out the flow of funds within the financial system as well as the 
economy. These tables were eventually incorporated into the National Income and Product 
Accounts System in the 1960s and were used for assessing the nominal imbalances in the flow of 
money within the economy. The second project was undertaken by Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz. The aim of this project was to explore the monetary aspects of the business cycle and 
to formulate a monetary explanation for the depression. As the first serious attempt to reframe 
the Great Depression along the lines of Currie, their work was a response to Glass’s framing.478 
                                                




Friedman and Schwartz disassociated the depression from the stock market crash and pinned the 
responsibility for the financial catastrophe on Fed officials’ mistakes in mitigating the 
emergency.  
NBER-CED collaboration culminated in the creation of the Commission on Money and Credit 
(CMC) in the late 1950s. CMC brought together the nation’s leading fiscal and monetary 
nominalists to undertake the most extensive examination of the structure of the financial system 
since the National Monetary Commission of 1908, whose findings resulted in the creation of the 
Federal Reserve in 1913. After an extensive review of the financial structure as well as the fiscal 
and monetary policy instruments, CMC concluded that the discretionary policy component of the 
fiscal apparatus had to be reformed and complemented with the monetary apparatus. Monetary 
apparatus was an indispensible element within the nominalist layer because it provided a much 
more precise and flexible form of intervention mechanism to balance nominal flows.  
CMC’s call for the reactivation of the monetary apparatus was a critical juncture for the 
emergence of systemic risk. Governing the economy effectively required policymakers to rely on 
the financial system as an extension of monetary policy. Since efficient allocation of capital and 
credit were critical processes for growth, policymakers conceived the system as a vital 
infrastructure to influence the expansion and the contraction of money flows. To ensure that the 
system contributed to growth optimally, they undertook two initiatives. First, they envisioned 
replacing Glass-Steagall with a new aggregationist regime. Second, they determined that 
                                                                                                                                                       
1930s, and this framing was black-boxed in the course of the Pecora Commission hearings in 1933. In the 1950s, 




suboptimal parts of the system had to be encouraged to take more risk. As a result, these two 
shifts reformatted the system by encouraging it to reconstitute itself in a way that can provide the 
necessary funds to finance growth. As part of these reforms, monetary nominalists resurrected 
the Fed’s emergency mitigation functions to prevent panics from morphing into depressions. The 
outcome of this reform process was the emergence of systemic risk as a problem of monetary 
government. With the full knowledge of the catastrophic impact of financial panics, 
policymakers intervened not only in the general liquidity crises, but in the limited ones as well. 
As experience of the 1970s demonstrated, such crises posed the risk of contagion and general 
crises, threatening the stability of the entire system.  
By the end of the 1950s, monetary nominalism was fully born. Monetary nominalists construed 
money as a hybrid entity that was one of, if not the most vital flow of the economy. Unlike other 
material flows, money was the nominal reflection of the value of things. It was also the store of 
value and thus was a substance with materiality. Money was not only distinct from income, 
which was purely a nominal flow, but it also had a pervasive influence on economic activity. The 
alliance, therefore, led to the reconceptualization of the economy as a monetary object and 
opened up the possibility from the vantage point of the Fed. Just like the Control Materials Plan 
of the War Production Board during World War II, the Fed would turn money supply into a 
monetary control instrument and govern the economy vertically from a distance. The object of 
this intervention was the quantity of money in the economy whose magnitude eventually 
determined the funds available to households, i.e. consumers, and firms, i.e. producers. At a time 
when the fiscal apparatus was facing unexpected administrative problems to the stickiness of 
budgetary pork and barrel politics of Congressional legislative process, monetary apparatus 
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provided an attractive alternative to govern the economy as balance of flows from a distance 
with minimal social and political friction.479 
The first step in this direction was taken in the mid-1960s when the Fed economists who had 
contributed to the development of Copeland’s flow of funds accounts introduced the first 
monetary macroeconomic aggregates (M) to the Federal Open Market Committee, the body that 
was created by Currie to conduct monetary policy, in 1965.480 These resembled the aggregates of 
fiscal nominalism and were deployed for the first time in 1966 to stem an inflationary upsurge. 
At this moment, however, FOMC was still under the control of Fed Chairman William 
McChesney Martin who was a subscriber of the commercial loans theory like Carter Glass and 
Parker Willis. As a result, the target of intervention was not directly the quantity of money in the 
economy, but bank reserves.481  
The year 1970 marked the first attempt to implement monetary nominalism as three critical 
developments took place. First, the Nixon administration shifted the locus of economic 
governance from the Council of Economic Advisors to the Fed and replaced Martin with Arthur 
                                                
479 As noted in the third chapter, the smooth functioning of the fiscal apparatus was already obstructed by 
Congressional partisan politics in the late 1940s. The final blow, however, would come in the mid-1960s. In the 
1960s, the obstacle was no longer simply partisan politics, but also pork-barrel negotiations with individual 
Congressman. As if this was not enough, the political calculations of the president were added when Johnson’s 
economic advisors called for a tax increase to stem inflation. Stein, The Fiscal Revolution in America, 529–30. For a 
detailed account of the challenges policymakers faced in passing legislation through Congress, see Zelizer, Taxing 
America. 
480 Stephen Axilrod, a policy economist in the Research Division of the Fed, recalls that the Fed’s research director 
Dan Brill introduced monetary aggregates to the Federal Open Market Committee meetings first circa 1964. Stephen 
H Axilrod, Inside the Fed Monetary Policy and Its Management, Martin through Greenspan to Bernanke 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 45. 
481 On the Fed’s monetary policy stance in the post-1951 period, see fn. 38 above. Meltzer, A History of the Federal 
Reserve, 43, 46–47, 297. 
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Burns as the new Fed Chairman. Burns undertook the first attempt to govern the economy with 
the monetary aggregates and money supply. After a period of experimentation with Friedman’s 
monetarist prescriptions, Burns deployed the monetary apparatus as a countercyclical policy 
instrument to enhance the economy’s growth potential with the support of Herbert Stein, now 
Nixon’s chief economic advisor.482 Again contrary to Friedman’s monetarism, Burns initiated a 
financial emergency program that reactivated the discount window into an emergency mitigation 
mechanism after nearly four decades of inactivity. Finally, Nixon created a President’s 
Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation as a sequel to CMC. The Commission, which 
consisted of Alan Greenspan and two other members, reaffirmed the conclusion of CMC to 
dismantle Glass-Steagall and launched a decade long congressional struggle. The result of this 
struggle was a reregulatory process that came to be called “financial deregulation” between 1980 
and 1999.  
Resurrecting.Currie’s.Vision:.CEDSNBER.Alliance.
In the 1940s, Arthur Burns at NBER and Herbert Stein at CED revived Currie’s vision into a 
proactive policy agenda. CED was founded in 1942 by a group of liberal corporate elites as an 
economic policy advocacy organization. Most of these actors spent the 1930s in the Commerce 
Department’s Business Advisory Council, advocating for compensatory deficit spending.483 
                                                
482 Bernstein, A Perilous Progress. 
483 Herbert Stein identified CED with so-called “commercial Keynesianism,” and scholars focused on CED’s 
proposals for reconfiguring the fiscal apparatus around the revenue side of the budget. [fix] Robert M. Collins, 
“American Corporatism: The Committee for Economic Development, 1942-1964,” Historian 44, no. 2 (1982): 151–
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Princeton University Press, 1992.), 56–57; Fourcade, Economists and Societies. 
 
 338 
Initially actors in both organizations were integral to the nominalist project. In the postwar 
period they gradually drifted away from fiscal nominalism. While Mitchell and Burns perceived 
the growing emphasis of fiscal nominalism on economic growth as misguided, CED economists 
considered the fiscal apparatus as an imprecise policy tool that was hopelessly entangled in the 
political and the social.484 In monetary policy, they found the potential for a more precise and 
efficient policy instrument to stabilize the economy and called for reactivating the monetary 
apparatus.  
What made CED a unique channel of policy advocacy was the composition of its research staff. 
The staff mostly consisted of University of Chicago economists who emphasized stability and 
the dangers of inflation at a time when growth and deflation were buzzwords. The research 
director was Theodore Yntema, a statistical economist who served as the director of the Cowles 
Commission before joining CED.485 Gardiner Means, an ardent proponent of monetary policy, 
was appointed in 1943 as its first Associate Director of Research. After joining CED in 1945, 
Stein took over Means’s position in 1948 and become CED’s Research Director in 1956.486 The 
                                                
484 Robert M Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964 (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 
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Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964; Rosenof, Economics in the Long Run, 74–75. 
 
 339 
CED’s Advisory Board included two Chicago economists, Jacob Viner, Currie’s lifelong friend, 
and Theodore Schultz, an ally of Milton Friedman at Chicago. A third member of the Board 
worthy of mention was Ralph Young, the associate director of research at the Fed. Young, who 
advised Fed Chairmen as director of research from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, proved to be 
a critical bridge between the institutions.487 
CED’s manifesto on economic policy, Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Greater Economic 
Stability, was issued in 1948 in response to the unprecedented upsurge in inflation in 1947.488 
The central concern of the pamphlet was economic stability. What distinguished CED from the 
fiscal nominalists of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) was its problematization of 
inflation as an autonomous governmental problem. As illustrated in the third chapter, fiscal 
nominalists construed inflation as a transitory phase precipitating depressions. CED, however, 
conceptualized inflation and depression as distinct forms of economic instability that were 
equally destructive.489 CED argued that moderate fluctuations were desirable as they provided an 
adjustment mechanism that enhanced the efficient use of resources by business. Therefore, the 
goal of stabilization should have been to prevent extreme instability, and not absolute stability.  
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CED’s analysis of instability rested on two analytically distinct forms of economic 
abnormalities, cyclical fluctuations and functional vulnerability. Depression and inflation were 
facilitated by procyclical behavior of changes in national income and total expenditure and the 
money supply and credit. As CEA argued, unless the imbalances between income and 
expenditures were mediated by the federal budget, changes in these magnitudes were prone to set 
off a “cumulative spiral,” precipitating a catastrophic “chain reaction.” The destabilizing impact 
of this process was reinforced by the procyclicality of the money supply and credit. As economic 
conditions changed, banks tended either to lend excessively or not enough. Extreme fluctuations 
were the aggregate outcome of these mutually reinforcing processes. What intensified 
depressions, however, was vulnerability, which depended on the “capacity [of the economy] to 
resist fluctuations.” CED identified the money supply and banking sector as the primary source 
of vulnerability. Bank failures were particularly damaging, because they disrupted the flow of 
money by destroying money stocks accumulated in bank deposits in the form of savings and 
thereby froze the flow of credit to business.490  
This diagnosis presented a challenging policy dilemma to CED’s agenda of stabilizing the 
economy with the monetary apparatus. While it was essential to strengthen the structure of the 
financial system to avoid depressions, a regime of financial regulation that obstructed the 
allocation credit could have rendered the monetary apparatus ineffective. To resolve this 
dilemma, CED outlined a two-legged reform agenda. First the Fed would take primary 
responsibility for stabilizing the economy and act as a lender of last resort in times of 
                                                
490 Similar to Currie, CED underscored the dangers of short-term debt as a source of vulnerability for the banking 
sector. Ibid., 11–13. 
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emergency.491 Second, CED commissioned a comprehensive study to examine the structure of 
the system as well as the fiscal and monetary policy tools.492 The recommendations of the study 
led to a four-decade long re-regulatory process to make monetary policy an effective policy 
instrument. 
Money%Flows%&%Flow%of%Funds%Accounts%
Currie’s vision to channel funds to the underfunded regions required the creation of a statistical 
interface to monitor money flows. This interface, termed flow of funds accounts, was the product 
of a research project that was undertaken in collaboration between NBER, CED and the Fed in 
the 1940s. It was intended to function as an interface between the Fed and the economy, allowing 
the Fed to monitor the capital formation and credit allocation processes in the financial sector. As 
a horizontally disaggregated accounting technique that resembled input-output tables, this tool 
allowed policymakers to analyze the structure of the flow of money within the financial system 
and assess the credit allocation capability of the sector to allocate credit into the economy.  
The idea of mapping out the flow of money was first conceived by Gardiner Means in his 
analysis of the structure of the U.S. economy for the National Resources Committee. As noted in 
the second chapter, Means conceptualized money flows as the layer of “financial overlay” on top 
of the material flows. The former was created by financial transactions that accompanied 
                                                
491 The Fed could utilize three policy tools at its disposal, bank reserves, discount window and open market 
operations, to govern the flow of money by manipulating inducing increases and reductions in excess bank  
reserves in a countercyclical fashion. In the face of a depression, it was providing banks with liquidity in order to 
prevent recurrence of a cascading bank failures. Ibid., 26–28, 31-32, 45-46. 
492 Ibid., 44, 15. 
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production. In contrast to material flows, which constituted the input and output relationships of 
production in the economy, money flows were not direct, but circular flows. While the former 
started with the producer and ended with the consumer, the latter behaved like a current that 
flowed in a “circuit time after time.” According to Means, the circular nature of these flows was 
the primary reason why financial flows were “so poorly understood.” Thus, Means underlined 
the need for precisely “measure[ing] the magnitude of [the] discrepancies in the circuit flow of 
money.” Because financial factors were of  “fundamental importance […] to the functioning of 
production,” the structure of money flows should have been studied extensively given the lack of 
sufficient data. Relying on Leontief’s 1929 input-output tables on the flow of materials between 
sectors of the economy, Means analyzed the flow of funds between consumers and producers 
and among producers. In the absence of data on capital formation, flow of money within the 
financial system was missing in the analysis.493  
Means found the opportunity to initiate a research project on money flows upon joining CED.494 
At CED, he persuaded Yntema of the merits of such a project. Yntema, also a director of NBER, 
arranged NBER to take on the project under CED financing while Means convinced Morris 
Copeland to direct it. NBER was the ideal place to undertake such a project, and Copeland was 
chosen due to his expertise in income accounting and monetary economics.495 As early as 1931, 
                                                
493 Ibid., 79-81, 84. 
494 Gardiner C. Means, The Heterodox Economics of Gardiner C. Means: A Collection, ed. by Frederic S. Lee and 
Warren J. Samuels, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), xxvii; Malcolm Rutherford, The Institutionalist Movement 
in American Economics, 1918-1947: Science and Social Control (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 112 fn. 15. 
495 Copeland had a unique trajectory that allowed him to combine income accounting techniques of Simon Kuznets 




Mitchell set NBER’s agenda to examine the “vital parts” of the economy that were “under 
pressure and strain” due to the depression, and the 1937 Program of Financial Research had 
called for a program to undertake a “comprehensive survey of the financial structure as a 
whole.”496 When CED funding ran out in 1947, the project was brought into the Fed and was 
completed by 1952.497 
The novelty of the flow of funds accounts was to provide a horizontally disaggregated 
representation of money flows. Flow of funds was a statistical representation of the movement of 
money within an economy as a result of the transactions different types of transactors, such as 
government, consumers, and banks, engaged in. In this respect, flow of funds was grounded 
upon a monetary understanding of the economy. According to Copeland, the modern economy 
was “a money economy where money flows play[ed] an important role in organizing economic 
activity” and therefore “business expansion and contraction [were] phenomena of a money 
                                                                                                                                                       
worked at the Fed’s Research Division, measuring the relationship between money and the business cycle as well as 
the volume of deposits in US banks. Copeland’s work in the Fed would result in an attempt to integrate money flow 
measurements into the income accounting format in the early 1930s. The result of this work was a consolidated 
balance sheet of the banking system. In the mid-1930s, Copeland would become a member of Simon Kuznets’s 
Wealth and Income group at NBER and would play an important role in the development of income accounts. 
Copeland would also serve as the Executive Secretary of the Central Statistical Board between 1933 and 1940. 
Under this role, he would play a critical role in the assemblage of the federal government’s statistical apparatus in 
the interwar period. With the Board’s transfer to the Bureau of the Budget in 1940, Copeland would become the 
Bureau’s Research Director. Rutherford, The Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918-1947, 2011, 
106–08. Morris A. Copeland, “Some Problems in the Theory of National Income,” Journal of Political Economy 40, 
no. 1 (February 1, 1932): 1–51; Morris A. Copeland, “A Study of Moneyflows in the United States,” (New York, 
N.Y.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), xiii. 
496  National Bureau of Economic Research, Report of the President and Report of the Directors of Research for the 
Year 1930, (New York, N.Y.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931), 12–13; John Linter, Finance and 
Capital Markets, (New York, N.Y.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972), 1–2. 
497 In addition to Means and Burns, Copeland’s work was also critiqued by major monetary nominalists such as 
Milton Friedman and Clark Warburton. Copeland especially acknowledges Burns’s contribution to the study. 
Copeland, “A Study of Moneyflows in the United States,” xv; Collins, “American Corporatism,” 165; Rutherford, 
The Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918-1947, 2011, 112. 
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economy.”498 For Copeland, Means’s electric circuit metaphor, therefore, was more apt than 
Irving Fischer’s hydraulic metaphor.  
Copeland conceived the flow of funds accounts as a tool to monitor and counteract monetary 
imbalances yielding depressions. Because the object of transaction was money and its substitute, 
credit, the flow of funds tables enabled monitoring the capital allocation process. With this 
statistical tool, policymakers could measure the cyclical impact of fiscal policy and determine the 
role banking and the monetary system played on economic expansions and contractions. The 
primary means of this analysis was an analytical distinction Copeland made between three types 
of economic behaviors, bulls, bears, and sheep. Bulls were actors who preferred to expand their 
expenditures and caused expansion in moneyflows. Bears hoarded their savings causing 
contractions. Sheep were passive actors who followed bulls and bears.499 By identifying the 
behavior patterns of transactors, one could measure the impact of one sector over the others.500 
Copeland’s analytical distinctions between types of transactors got to the heart of the primary 
challenge facing monetary nominalists: How could policymakers govern the lending behavior of 
banks in a countercyclical fashion? This question was specifically assigned to Copeland by 
Burns, who wanted him to analyze how to activate (or pacify) a given type of transaction 
                                                
498 Morris A. Copeland, “Social Accounting for Moneyflows,” The Accounting Review 24, no. 3 (July 1, 1949): 254; 
Copeland, “A Study of Moneyflows in the United States,” 5, 41–42. 
499 Copeland, “Social Accounting for Moneyflows,” 261. 
500 Since the crisis, the usefulness of flow of funds based econometric models has been raised by variety of actors, 
including the European Central Bank. Louis Bê Duc, “Flow-of-Funds Analysis at the ECB$: Framework and 
Applications,” 2009; Dirk Bezemer, “‘No One Saw This Coming’ – or Did They?,” VoxEU.org, September 30, 




behavior at different phases of the cycle. The challenge was whether this could be done without 
damaging the financial system. Unless the Fed’s monetary policy tools were reformed, the Fed 
could not be able to restrain a procyclical behavior of moneyflows without depressing asset 
prices. In a downswing, however, the Fed could have prevented the banks to cause a contraction 
in moneyflows by encouraging banks to identify and finance bulls.501 For banks to make such a 
lending decision, however, one first had to unleash the speculative spirit on the part of the banks. 
Accomplishing this task depended on overcoming two obstacles. First, the Fed had to redesign 
its policy tools, particularly the discount window. Second, regulatory structure of the financial 
system had to be reformed to provide a suitable environment for banks to take more risk. The 
Fed first effectively closed its discount window in 1955 to force large banks to rely on the money 
market and to take more risks, and then it reopened the window to encourage risk-taking 
behavior on the part of rural banks in the late 1960s.502 
Flow of funds accounts was never used as a macroeconomic policy tool by the Fed as Copeland 
hoped. However, it played a critical function as the primary source of data on capital formation 
and credit allocation in the financial system. First, it allowed policymakers to demonstrate that as 
Currie had warned the system was not efficiently allocating funds to the depressed areas. Second, 
it came to serve an unexpected role when policymakers realized that the only systematic data on 
risk exposures of firms at their disposal for systemic risk regulation was the flow of funds 
accounts. The problem with these accounts, however, was that they were not fully disaggregated. 
                                                
501 Copeland, “A Study of Moneyflows in the United States,” 294–95, 299. 
502 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount 
Mechanism; Report of a System Committee., 4. 
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Emphasizing the importance of horizontally disaggregated data for illuminating the vulnerability 
of the financial system, former Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn blamed “the aggregate nature 
of data in the national financial and real statistical accounts” for the inability of regulators to 
identify “the extent of the vulnerability that had evolved in the U.S. financial system.”503 Others, 
however, point out that flow of funds accounts indeed contained the position data on risk 
exposure that was necessary in systemic risk assessment.504 As proponents of systemic risk 
regulation and surveillance such as Markus Brunnermeir and Gary Gorton note, what needs to be 
done is to build a new statistical apparatus on the transaction position data contained in flow of 
funds accounts in order to construct a risk topology interface that allowed policymakers to 
analyze and monitor systemic risk on a real-time basis.505 This is precisely what the information 
infrastructure of the vulnerability reduction regime, the Financial Stability Monitor, does. 
Friedman’s%Reinterpretation%of%the%Great%Depression%
The importance of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United 
States cannot be emphasized enough. Since its publication in 1963, it provided a robust 
                                                
503 Matthew J. Eichner, Donald L. Kohn, and Michael G. Palumbo, “Financial Statistics for the United States and the 
Crisis: What Did They Get Right, What Did They Miss, and How Should They Change?,” NBER, December 13, 
2013, 7, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12518. 
504 In their “Remapping the Flow of Funds” paper that was presented at the NBER Systemic Risk conference in 
2012, Stanford economists Juliane Begenau and et al. point to the flow of funds accounts as a “crucial data sources 
on credit market positions in the U.S. economy.” While they admit that the accounts in their current form do not 
contain all the necessary features necessary for determining risk exposures of individual firms, they underline the 
fact that the data sets upon which the accounts are constructed do indeed contain much of the information one needs. 
Begenau, Juliane, Monika Piazzesi, and Martin Schneider. “Remapping the Flow of Funds.” In Risk Topography: 
Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, 57-64. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2012.  
505 Markus K Brunnermeier, Gary Gorton, and Arvind Krishnamurthy, “Risk Topography,” in Annual Conference 
on Bank Structure and Competition (presented at the Implementing Dodd-Frank: Progress to Date and 
Recommendations for the Future, Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2011). 
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reinterpretation of the underlying causes of the Great Depression upon which the Fed rested its 
emergency lending program.506 What made the book a powerful actant in the hands of 
policymakers was its ability to present findings in the form of what the authors called an 
“analytical narrative.”507 This representation provided an alternative account of the depression 
that rested on statistical as well as archival evidence. The underlying cause of the depression was 
the Fed’s unwillingness to mitigate the panic and the ensuing liquidity crisis in the banking 
sector rather than speculation and the stock market crash as the proponents of Glass-Steagall 
claimed. Thus, it was not that the Fed was an ineffective shock absorber, but that policymakers 
had misconceived its lender of last resort (LLR) function.508 The implication was that 
depressions could be avoided if the Fed played its LLR role by preventing destruction of money 
in times of financial emergencies. Overall, Friedman and Schwartz’s findings reaffirmed 
Currie’s vision and served as an incontestable fact in support of the reactivation of the monetary 
apparatus. 
The research project that led to A Monetary History was launched in 1948 at the intersection of 
NBER’s agenda for the study of the financial structure and business cycles. In their 1946 
                                                
506 By the 2000s, both Greenspan and his successor Ben Bernanke pointed back to A Monetary History as the 
foundational reference point for the Fed’s approach to mitigate financial emergencies. Ben S. Bernanke, “On Milton 
Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday” (presented at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, Chicago, Illinois, 2002), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021108/.  
507 Friedman and Schwartz point out that this was suggested to them by Walter Stewart who advised them in the 
planning phase of the project. Stewart had directed the Fed’s Division of Research and Statistics in the 1920s and 
was a proponent of the credit quality perspective. Friedman, however, rejected Stewart’s suggestion to pursue the 
research in this direction and formulated a research program on the quantity of money perspective along the lines of 
his Chicago teachers such as Jacob Viner, Currie’s lifelong friend and Henry Simons. Friedman and Schwartz, A 
Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, xxi; Rutherford, The Institutionalist Movement in American 
Economics, 1918-1947, 2011, 264. 
508 Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, 407–17. 
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Measuring Business Cycles, Mitchell and Burns set the agenda of business cycles research to 
explore the fluctuations in economic activity on a sectoral basis.509 Burns, then NBER’s research 
director, delegated the task of studying the effect of money on the business cycle to Friedman.510 
Like Copeland, Friedman was also an obvious choice. Not only was he a student of both actors, 
but he was also an expert on statistical methods. He was introduced to the long-lost tradition of 
monetary economics at University of Chicago by Henry Simons and Jacob Viner.511 Thus, 
Friedman was well equipped to test the effect of money and credit on economic fluctuations. 
What he lacked, however, was the necessary historical knowledge on US banking and regulatory 
institutions. This gap was filled by Schwartz, who was an expert on the topic.512 
                                                
509 Morgan, The History of Econometric Ideas, 51. 
510 Burns became Friedman’s mentor at Rutgers University and persuade Friedman to study economics. In his 
memoirs, Friedman says that “my greatest indebtedness, aside from my parents, was unquestionably to Arthur 
Burns, who was […] mentor, guide, and surrogate father for much of my adult life.” Burns was also the one who 
recommended for Friedman to chose University of Chicago for graduate school. Rutherford, ““Who’s Afraid of 
Arthur Burns?,” 127 fn 26; Johan van Overtveldt, The Chicago School: How the University of Chicago Assembled 
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and economic activity. Therefore, it would not be wrong to call Friedman a inductionist model builder who starts 
with data and identifies relationships between aggregate magnitudes. Milton Friedman, “The Quantity Theory of 
Money-A Restatement,” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 
1. On Friedman’s empiricist monetarism, see Thomas I. Palley, “Milton Friedman and the Monetarist Counter-
Revolution: A Re-Appraisal,” Palley, Thomas I. “Milton Friedman and the Monetarist Counter-Revolution: A Re-
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Friedman shifted the analytical register of business cycle analysis from endogenous fluctuations 
to exogenous shocks and this conceptual move had significant consequences for the 
problematization of financial system vulnerability within the monetary nominalist layer. In this 
work, Friedman focused on the impact of shocks, an aspect that was left out in the analysis of 
Mitchell and Burns. The objective of the latter was to identify the standard cycle and the 
endogenous factors that affected its behavior. This was why they made a methodological choice 
to exclude “monetary disturbances” as well as other “exceptionally powerful random factor[s], 
such as a great strike,” from the measurement of aggregate averages.513 This was the initial 
starting point of Friedman as he asked “whether control of the quantity of money or of its 
distribution [could] contribute to mitigating the severity of cyclical fluctuations.” Friedman, 
however, modified this question by the 1960s. His new question was how a random shock—a 
“random disturbance” in Mitchell’s terms—affected the monetary and financial system.  
By posing the question in terms of shocks, Friedman opened up a new dimension in the study of 
financial instability. Seen from this perspective, the problem was vulnerability rather than 
fluctuations. He argued not only that the cyclical nature of economic activity was not abnormal, 
but also that there was no ontological object such as the business cycle.514 As long as the total 
stock of money was not destroyed the cycle would come out of a trough with the help of an 
automatic stabilizing budget. The real threat to stability was the vulnerabilities stemmed from the 
rigidities built into the system.  
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The key to reducing a system’s vulnerability to shocks was enhancing its flexibility. Above all 
else, both the government budget and money supply should have provided a “built-in flexibility” 
to the economy by functioning as “shock absorbers.”515 Monetary policy would ease the strains 
on the monetary and financial system, preventing a panic from precipitating a cascade of bank 
failures. This mechanism was a response to the core rigidity that Friedman identified as the 
driving force behind depressions, the increased demand for liquidity. What made panics so 
dangerous was the emergence of an atmosphere of irreducible uncertainty. Under such 
conditions, economic actors faced a collective action problem. Since they could not control the 
monetary and economic environment, the only way to reduce uncertainty was to increase the 
certainty of their assets in terms of liquidity. Because cash was the most liquid asset within a 
monetary economy, there would be a surge in the demand for money. Compensatory spending 
would alleviate this psychological drive for certainty and loose monetary policy would ease the 
strains on the money circuit. In this process, the ultimate goal was to avoid a collapse in the 
banking sector, since such an event would destroy a substantial portion of the nation’s money 
stock, straining the flow of money further. 
From Friedman’s point of view, policymakers did not need to be concerned with the quality of 
credit for two reasons. First, the mechanism behind depressions was a drop in the quantity of 
money and not the quality of credit. Second, economic actors were capable of managing their 
own risks and such an intervention in credit would diminish flexibility, which meant higher 
                                                
515 Like Colm, Friedman favored a flexible government budget and temporary deficits as a remedy for the rigidities 
in the price mechanism that prevented automatic adjustment. Milton Friedman, “A Monetary and Fiscal Framework 
for Economic Stability,” The American Economic Review 38, no. 3 (June 1, 1948): 245–64. 
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vulnerability to shocks.516 This was why aggregationists celebrated the emergence of futures 
markets in the mid-1970s. Actors like Greenspan argued that these markets provided flexibility 
by allowing actors to trade their risks with those who were willing to bear them, which 
diminished the overall risk in the system.517 What they could not foresee, however, was the 
possibility that the interdependencies created by these new devices could pose systemic risk. 
This was the limit of the aggregationist approach as this phenomenon implied that enhancing 
flexibility might not necessarily reduce vulnerability. Nevertheless, in the 1990s and the 2000s, 
Greenspan took Friedman’s proposition to its logical limits and advocated near-complete 
deregulation to enhance the system’s flexibility and hence resilience against catastrophic shocks. 
Birth.of.the.Aggregationist.Regime.of.Regulation:.Origins.of.Deregulation.
The decision to govern the economy with the monetary apparatus was formulated by a coalition 
of leading fiscal and monetary nominalists in the late 1950s as part of a rising consensus to shift 
the locus of governance from CEA to the Fed. These actors were brought together under a 
Commission on Money and Credit (CMC) to study the structure of the financial system and the 
effectiveness of monetary policy tools. CMC’s report, issued in 1961, not only set the agenda for 
dismantling the Glass-Steagall regime, but it also contained the blueprints of the aggregationist 
regulatory regime that replaced it. The recommendations of the report facilitated the emergence 
                                                
516 The mode in which money supply would be managed was an item of disagreement between Friedman on the one 
side and Greenspan and Bernanke on the other. The latter two argued for a discretionary approach that rested on 
anticipating macroeconomic risks and thereby easing or contracting money supply in advance of the realization of 
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517 Alan Greenspan, “Economic Flexibility” (presented at the National Association for Business Economics Annual 




of systemic risk in two ways. First, CMC’s suggestion to reactivate the discount window formed 
the basis of a Fed study to reform the window, resulting in the Fed’s emergency lending program 
against limited liquidity crises posing systemic threats to the financial system. Second, CMC’s 
objective of enhancing the growth potential of the economy by increasing the efficiency of the 
financial system fostered the development of a banking system dependent on short-term liquidity 
sources such as money markets. This set the course for an economic growth strategy relying on 
risk-taking and financial speculation.518 
CMC was a decisive victory for the CED-NBER alliance. It was initiated in early 1957 by the 
Eisenhower administration’s Council of Economic Advisors, chaired first by Arthur Burns and 
then by NBER’s financial research director, Raymond Saulnier. Saulnier was the actor behind 
the decision. Facing rising inflation, he questioned the ability of monetary substantivists in 
control of the Fed to restrain inflation and of the financial system to finance growth.519 When 
Congress obstructed the administration’s plans, CED volunteered to organize the project.520 In 
this sense, the creation of CMC was a direct attack on monetary substantivists, their intrusive 
anti-speculative credit policies and their use of bank reserves as inflation-control tools as well as 
the substantivist Glass-Steagall.  
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CMC brought together fiscal and monetary nominalists as well as some of the leading former 
substantivists. The format of the commission was determined by CED’s research director Stein. 
NBER’s Burns and Copeland were recruited for the selection committee, and this committee 
formed an Executive Board to direct the study. The Board was composed of a group of 
financiers, former policymakers, and representatives of the liberal establishment and operated in 
the form of a series of task forces. The task force on the Fed and monetary policy consisted of 
Marriner Eccles, former Fed Chairman; Beardsley Ruml, former NY Fed President and a 
founding member of CED; and David Rockefeller, Vice-Chairman of Chase. Not surprisingly the 
group was dominated by Eccles who had effectively recreated the Fed in 1935. The task force on 
money’s relation to inflation and growth was assigned to Isador Lubin, the Labor Department’s 
former Commissioner of Statistics. Theodore Yntema, then Vice-President of Ford Motor 
Company, lead the group on financial regulation. Finally, an advisory board was established to 
coordinate research. This body was composed of experts such as Jacob Viner, Gerhard Colm and 
Paul Samuelson, and the research was undertaken by an army of economists, including leading 
monetarists Milton Friedman, Allan Meltzer and Clark Warburton.521 
At the heart of CMC’s report was a tension in the programming of the financial system as a vital 
sector of the economy. On the one hand, capital had to be formed and allocated efficiently due to 
its scarcity. On the other hand, the system had to be regulated in order to protect the money 
supply “against a sharp drop caused by widespread bank failures.” According to CMC, otherwise 
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one would face the risk of recessions “denegrat[ing] into financial panics, loss of confidence, and 
economic stagnation.” New Deal banking reforms, therefore, were a step in the right direction. 
The preceding regulatory regime had focused only on the “liquidity and solvency of individual 
institutions” and tried to ensure small investors that banks were prudently managed and well 
capitalized with the necessary reserves to absorb shocks.522 CMC recognized the shortcomings of 
this regime and applauded the New Deal reforms for “protect[ing] the liquidity and solvency of 
the system” in the face of “general economic distress rather than mismanagement.” (both 
emphasis in the original) While the 1935 Banking Act had strengthened the system by giving the 
Fed greater power to manage liquidity crises and introducing deposit insurance, the Employment 
Act of 1946 had enhanced the effectiveness of these measures by ensuring a stable economic 
environment.523  
CMC argued that Glass-Steagall, however, was a step in the wrong direction as restrictions on 
the system lowered efficiency and distorted capital allocation.524 This was most visible in access 
to credit. Geographic restrictions “limited interregional flows” of funds and put smaller 
communities at a disadvantage. Moreover, CMC pointed to the growing share of new types of 
financial firms. The emergence of entities such as credit unions and investment banks were a 
                                                
522 The goal of this pre-New Deal regime was to assure small investors that the banks that held their monies were 
managed prudently. This regime involved controlling and examining the quality and types of assets banks could 
hold and ensuring they were well capitalized with capital and reserve cushions. 
523 Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth: The Report 
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sign that the system was capable of adapting to a static, suppressive regulatory regime.525 The 
implication of these critiques was colossal: Glass-Steagall not only prevented the economy from 
fulfilling its growth potential, but also distorted capital formation and allocation without 
providing added security.526  
The second reason for CMC’s critique of Glass-Steagall was related to its agenda for reactivating 
the monetary apparatus as a governmental technology.527 In contrast to CED’s 1948 position, 
CMC proposed to deploy monetary policy for countercyclical stabilization as well as long-term 
economic governance. From this perspective, monetary policy was capable of exerting influence 
over macroeconomic variables. It “induce[d] economic growth by supporting a monetary 
climate” in which the banking system facilitated the growth of money supply by expanding 
credit.528 Especially in the area of discretionary policy, the shift in emphasis from fiscal to 
monetary apparatus was a necessity. CMC’s review of both instruments revealed the growing 
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1962.  
Karl Schriftgiesser, The Commission on Money and Credit: An Adventure in Policy-Making. (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 71–72, 80–82; Michael Donihue and John Kitchen, The Troika Process: Economic 
Models and Macroeconomic Policy in the USA, MPRA Paper (University Library of Munich, Germany, 1999), 3, 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/22216.html. 
528 This would be accomplished by letting an average rate of growth in the money supply consistent with high 
employment, stable prices, and adequate growth. CMC recognized that there may have been circumstances in which 
it might have been appropriate for money supply to grow at a higher or lower rate. 
Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth, 46, 60–61. 
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consensus among nominalists that fiscal policy was an inappropriate discretionary 
countercyclical tool due to its powerful and blunt nature under circumstances short of a 
depression.529 In the absence of legislative reform to enhance its flexibility, it was not possible to 
use it as an effective stabilization instrument. Monetary policy was superior, because it was 
flexible, precise, and reversible.530 Toward this end, the Commission advocated enhancing the 
effectiveness of the instruments of monetary control, particularly open market operations and 
discount policy.531  
Reforming these instruments by themselves, however, was not enough. The financial sector 
through which these instruments inscribed their effects on the economy had to be reformed as 
well. Unlike other sectors, finance was a vital infrastructure of capital formation and 
                                                
529 In report’s chapter on fiscal policy, CMC called for a series of reforms that would improve the flexibility and 
reversibility of the fiscal apparatus. Echoing Truman CEA’s final report, CMC underscored that discretionary fiscal 
policy was hardly used as a stabilizer, leaving automatic stabilizers to shoulder the major burden. To remedy this 
situation CMC recommended a discretionary authority for the president to raise and lower income tax without 
congressional approval. Unsurprisingly, congress would never grant such power to the executive branch and by 
Nixon administration hopes of disentangling the fiscal apparatus from political and social interests would run out. 
Ibid., 122; Karl Brunner, “The Report of the Commission on Money and Credit,” Journal of Political Economy 69, 
no. 6 (December 1, 1961): 618; Zelizer, Taxing America; Stein, The Fiscal Revolution in America.  
530 The reason for this was the fact that its conduct involved “pervasive and cumulative combination of a number of 
small effects.” 
Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth, 55, 57. 
531 CMC recommended replacing reserve requirements with open market operations as the primary policy tool. As 
part of this reform, CMC advised expanding open market operations to asset classes other than Treasuries. This was 
a direct message to the Fed, which exclusively relied on reserve requirements. According to Meltzer, the Fed’s 
response to this call was negative, since the Fed officials believed that interest rates were intertwined with other 
influences and therefore the influence they exerted on the flow of money was very weak. It should be noted that this 
view was the exact opposite that was held by Friedman in his 1962 piece, “A Program for Monetary Stability.” By 
1980, Friedman and CMC would prevail and under the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980, the Fed’s authority to change reserve requirements were curtailed to a great degree unless monetary 
policy requires such action. Ibid., 64, 67; Friedman, “A Program for Monetary Stability”; Meltzer, A History of the 
Federal Reserve Vol. 2, Book 1, 293, 295. 
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allocation.532 Not only were money flows accumulated as money stocks, i.e. savings, but also the 
flow of money was channeled and distributed to parts of the economy that could use such capital 
in the most productive and useful way. Therefore, the system was a mechanism of monetary 
policy transmission that was seen as an extension of the monetary apparatus.533 If monetary 
policy was to be effective, private institutions had to contribute.534 The implication was that 
Glass-Steagall’s suppressive strategy had to be abandoned. By gradually removing restrictions 
on financial activity, CMC hoped the system would adapt to the new environment of freedom by 
taking advantage of communication and calculative technologies. This would enhance the 
system’s ability to not only reproduce capital, but also allocate it. Such measures would  
increase the mobility of funds, which increases their efficiency in facilitating payments and 
stimulating savings, and which encourages them to accept appropriate risks involved in financing 
the types of investment most essential to growth [and thereby] strengthen their potential 
contribution to growth.535  
If all financial entities were subjected to uniform rules and regulations and geographic 
restrictions were lifted, ensuing competition would enhance the efficiency of credit allocation 
                                                
532 This argument was made by NY Fed President Gerald Corrigan in the early 1980s. Corrigan would later become 
the President of Goldman Sachs and launch Counterparty Risk Management Group, which would conceptualize 
systemic risk as a information asymmetry problem between bearers of risk and third parties. E. Gerald Corrigan, 
“Are Banks Special?  The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,” in Annual Report 1982 (Minnneapolis: Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1983); E. Gerald Corrigan, “Central Banks and the Financial System,” in Central 
Banking Issues in Emerging Market-Oriented Economies: A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, 1990. [double check] 
533 Robert Z. Aliber, “The Commission on Money and Credit: Ten Years Later,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 4, no. 4 (November 1, 1972): 915–16. 
534 Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve Vol. 2, Book 1, 291. 
535 Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth, 159. 
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and provide borrowers and savers with more options.536 CMC was effectively proposing to 
reformat the financial sector by letting the system reconstitute itself.  
This is why it is misleading to call this reformatting deregulation. CMC’s proposal should be 
seen as a call for unweaving the Glass-Steagall regime’s risk suppression elements. What CMC 
proposed was a process through which Glass-Steagall’s legalist suppressive tendencies were 
replaced with an aggregationist regime that combined the pre-depression prudential regime 
focusing on the safety and soundness of individual institutions with the system-focused measures 
that were introduced in 1935 Banking Act. This, therefore, was a recombinatorial moment in 
which elements of a prior regime of financial regulation were assembled together into a new 
one.537 It involved strengthening prudential regulations and enhancing the Fed’s emergency 
lending functions.538  
The complex event characterized as “deregulation” is often rendered tantamount to the neoliberal 
project to strip the state from its powers to intervene in the economy and simply let economic 
actors govern themselves. It is true that such a justification and framing has been formulated by 
certain actors with anarcho-liberal or neo-liberal tendencies as well as some monetarists. From a 
genealogical perspective, however, there is no one origin but multiplicity of paths, and the latter 
narrative clearly identifies one such thread that played a justifying role in the passage of a series 
of legislations between 1980 and 1999. The thread that I traced so far points to an alternative 
                                                
536 Ibid. 
537 On the concept of recombinatorial, see Rabinow, Anthropos Today Reflections on Modern Equipment. For an 
application of the concept as an analytical tool, see Collier, “Enacting Catastrophe.” 
538 Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth, 158. 
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condition of possibility that allowed the birth “deregulation.” From this perspective, monetary 
nominalists proposed deregulation as a response to the inability of the fiscal apparatus to 
facilitate recovery and growth in underdeveloped and depressed parts of the economy. CMC’s 
nominalist coalition blamed the Glass-Steagall regime for the inability of the financial sector to 
effectively allocate funds to these parts of the economy. 
The aggregationist regime rested on two axes of emergency preparedness. First, emergency 
prevention dimension depended on the ability of individual institutions to manage their risks. 
Prudential regulation would induce a firm’s “financial management to make their own provisions 
against illiquidity and insolvency in the normal course of events.”539 This proposal led to the 
system-wide institutionalization of emergency preparedness in the form of risk management at 
the firm. The central concern was to ensure that a failure did not pose a systemic threat. Toward 
this end, CMC proposed that the Fed take over all responsibility for safety and soundness 
supervision and regulate the entire banking system.540 While the Fed instituted the prudential 
supervision apparatus under the auspices of Basel Capital Accords in the 1980s, the Fed’s 
regulatory authority eventually extended to the entire financial system with the Dodd-Frank Act 
of 2010. 
                                                
539 Ibid., 159. 
540 Under CMC’s proposal, the powers of the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation would be transferred to the Fed. This proposal would be repeated by various reform initiatives in the 
next five decades. Most recently, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson would envision an overhaul of the 
regulatory structure, making the Fed a “market stability regulator” responsible for regulating systemic risk. Against 
this vision, monetarists, most notably Friedman, would insist this function to be performed by an alternative agency, 
insisting that monetary policy should be separated from regulatory functions in general. This perspective was 
articulated most recently by John Taylor during the Dodd-Frank hearings in opposition to assigning the Fed 
systemic risk regulation functions. Friedman, “A Program for Monetary Stability”; John B Taylor, “Monetary Policy 
and Systemic Risk Regulation: Granting the Fed New Regulatory Power Will Negatively Affect Its Independence,” 
Defining Ideas, no. 1 (2010): 13–17; Schriftgiesser, The Commission on Money and Credit, 93-94. 
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The second axis of financial emergency preparedness in this new regime was emergency 
mitigation. CMC proposed to revitalize the Fed’s discount window and underlined its potential 
utility as a stabilization tool and “a source of temporary credit.” CMC urged the Fed to be 
transparent about its plans to deploy this instrument as a source of liquidity in times of economic 
distress. In this vein, CMC was anticipating the enhanced role this tool would play with the 
deregulation of the financial system.541 The question that remained to be answered was in which 
mode this facility should have been used.  
The implementation of the aggregationist regime began under the Nixon administration in 1970. 
That year two important developments took place. First, Burns, now the Fed Chairman, instituted 
a financial emergency program. Second, Nixon created a President’s Commission on Financial 
Structure and Regulation. This commission, which included Greenspan, repeated the 
recommendations of CMC, initiating a decade long legislative struggle to disassemble the Glass-
Steagall regime. Finally, the first step was taken in 1980 with the passage of Depository 
Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, which eased restrictions on financial activity and 
abolished Regulation Q. This small step led to a series of legislation between 1980 and 1999 that 
demolished Glass-Steagall’s firewalls. 
In light of CMC’s emphasis on financial emergency preparedness, there remains one intriguing 
question: Given the absence of any bank failures since the Great Depression, why put so much 
emphasis on the possibility of an economic catastrophe? (See Graph 6 below.) A skeptical reader 
might respond to this question by asking if this could simply be a smokescreen and argue that a  
                                                
541 Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth, 64–66; 
Schriftgiesser, The Commission on Money and Credit, 104. 
 
 361 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
nonexistent threat was emphasized because CMC wanted to deregulate the financial system 
under ideological pretenses. This skepticism, however, overlooks three critical aspects of CMC. 
First, it discounts what one might call the expert ethics. While one’s ideological position within 
the field of power may be correlated with one’s expert perspective on substantive matters, this 
does not mean that experts lack the moral and intellectual integrity as well as the capacity to 
reflect on issues and formulate judgments based on their expertise. Second, it should be 
underscored that at this moment even figures like Milton Friedman were not calling for complete 
deregulation. The main tenet of monetarism was that the Fed should focus on managing the 
money supply while another agency should be concerned with prudential regulation.542 Finally, 
                                                

























































































Bank Failures, 1934-2012 
Failed Assisted 
Graph 6 - Bank Failures, 1934-2012 
 
 362 
one should not forget that CMC consisted of a coalition of monetary and fiscal nominalists. With 
the exception of Currie, as late as 1954 the latter group had considered Glass Steagall as a critical 
“institutional damper” lowering the vulnerability of the economy against the risk of depressions. 
And yet, in the final report of CMC they raised no objection to the call for “deregulation.” 
In contrast to this hypothetical response, my answer is the following: Policymakers continued to 
take the risk of a depression very seriously. Concern with economic resilience and vulnerability 
was not limited to a small group of economists in Truman’s Council of Economic Advisors. 
CMC continued from where the Council left off in 1953. It pointed out that “automatic 
stabilizers have already greatly reduced our vulnerability to downward cumulative processes.” 
This, however, did not mean that “there [was not the] danger that the decline [in income would 
not] lead to a cumulative downward spiral.”543 The economy, thus, was seen as a vulnerable 
object. Given the emerging consensus that bank failures had greatly exasperated the depression, 
if not caused it, nominalists knew very well that transitioning from Glass-Steagall into the 
aggregationist regime brought with it the risk of financial crises. In the absence of (speculative) 
risk-taking, however, the economy’s sluggish growth performance could not have been 
overcome. If they wanted to utilize the potential growth capacity of the economy, such a risk had 
to be taken. This was why CMC was pondering how to mitigate financial crises at a time when 
there were no such events. In a sense, they knew growth would necessitate a less risk-averse and 
thus more leveraged financial system. This, in turn, would increase the risk of depression-
inducing financial panics and catastrophes. The aggregationist regime and its emergency 
                                                
543 Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth, 253. 
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mitigation strategy, therefore, was a response to this governmental conundrum of balancing the 
risk of a financial catastrophe against the need for enhancing economic growth to remedy 
society’s economic and social problems.  
Financial.Emergency.Mitigation.Strategy.
Arthur Burns may be the most overlooked and underappreciated policymaker in the history of 
economic governance. While his successor Paul Volcker almost always receives the credit for 
initiating monetarism in the Fed, Burns’s term is characterized as a colossal failure that nearly 
cost the Fed its independence. As a result, the legacy of Burns as Fed Chairman is rendered as an 
insignificant and transient episode.544 As already implied in this genealogical account, Burns, 
however, was a central figure in the rise of monetary nominalism, and his most important legacy 
is the institution of a financial emergency lending program at the Fed in 1970.  
Burns conceived the emergency lending program as a way to protect the financial system from 
potentially catastrophic events that could not only destabilize the economy, but also yield a 
depression. The program was particularly concerned with limited liquidity crises in critical 
financial markets such as the money and capital markets. Its introduction not only signaled the 
Fed’s coming of age as an institution that protects the entire system. It also led to the 
problematization of systemic risk in the face of repeated limited liquidity crises in the 1970s. The 
                                                
544 James L. Pierce, “The Political Economy of Arthur Burns,” The Journal of Finance 34, no. 2 (May 1979): 485; 
Michael A Bernstein, A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Greta R Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins 
of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011); Allan H Meltzer, A History of the 
Federal Reserve. 1970-1986 Volume II, Volume II, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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underlying rationale of the program, thus, was to address the vulnerability of the system.545 The 
challenge policymakers faced from the beginning were variations of a governmental problem 
that came to be called “too interconnected to fail,” the failure of one firm or market causing a 
destabilizing chain reaction.546 By the late 1980s, the architects of the program identified 
systemic risk as an economic pathology that needed to be accounted for just like other 
governmental problems such as inflation.  
The establishment of the Fed’s emergency lending program was a response to the credit crunch 
of 1966. This limited liquidity crisis, which was the worst to date in the postwar period, was a 
vivid demonstration that the nominalist growth project was reaching its limits.547 It was triggered 
by a sudden increase in bank reserve requirements by the monetary substantivists at the Fed. The 
Fed’s contractionary policy was a response to sharp increases in defense spending for the 
Vietnam War and rising inflation. The unexpected outcome of this action was a scramble for 
liquidity by affected banks, which in turn precipitated a short but severe liquidity crisis in money 
and capital markets.548 Given the fact that the “Keynesian” guidepost policy to manage inflation 
had collapsed on the onset of this inflationary upsurge, the Fed was aware that it had to take 
responsibility to manage inflation. The issue was how to accomplish this without damaging the 
                                                
545 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount 
Mechanism; Report of a System Committee.; Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve Vol. 2, Book 1, 654–58. 
546 This notion was popularized after the rescue of Continental Illinois in 1983. Irvine H. Sprague, Bailout: An 
Insider’s Account of Bank Failures and Rescues (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1986). 
547 Florida, “The Origins of Financial Deregulation,” 57. 
548 For an historical analysis of the event, see Albert E. Burger, “A Historical Analysis of the Credit Crunch of 
1966,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, no. September 1969 (September 1, 1969). 
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financial sector. Using the discount window to alleviate the undesired effects of contractionary 
monetary policy was first discussed on the onset of this event.549 
The second and conceptually more intriguing reason was Burns’s conceptualization of the 
economy as a vulnerable object. Despite being a nominalist, Burns, a protégé of Mitchell, 
continued to subscribe to the substantivist conceptualization of the economy as an organic and 
dynamic composite of material and nominal flows.550 In a 1968 article on the business cycle, 
Burns noted that if one were to “look beneath the surface of aggregate economic activity,” one 
would find an economy in which “some industries and communities growing rapidly, others 
growing only gradually, and still others declining.” Because “plans and decisions [were] made 
independently by millions of business firms and households,” it was inevitable for “some 
imbalance […] to occur” between factors of production. What made these imbalances dangerous 
was the difficulty in predicting them.551 In this vein, Burns shared sectoral substantivists 
conviction for the existence of pockets of invisible imbalances underneath the blanket of 
prosperity ready to burst. 
Burns was a visionary in recognizing the critical importance of the financial system in 
transforming economic fluctuations into depressions. For Burns, these imbalances and their 
transformation was the causal mechanism that produced economic “fluctuations that [were] 
                                                
549 Meltzer pointed out that this event haunted policymakers in the Fed Board when making a contractionary 
decision in the coming years. Allan H Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve Vol. 2, Book 1 Vol. 2, Book 1 
(Chicago, Ill. [u.a.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2009), 559, 656 fn. 250. 
550 This conceptualization was developed by Mitchell and his colleague Edwin Gay in the final report of the Recent 
Economic Changes study in 1929. See chapter 1 for more detail. 
551 Arthur F. Burns, “Business Cycles,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968. 
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widely diffused throughout the economy.” He pointed out that recession and depression were 
ontologically distinct entities and therefore in theory a normal downward cycle was not supposed 
to turn into a depression. However, in practice one was faced with the uncertainty that such a risk 
might be realized. In a depression a downward spiral in economic activity reached such a 
magnitude that “a decline in one sector reacts on another,” resulting in the collapse of the entire 
economy. According to Burns, the probability of this happening depended on a wide range of 
factors. One of these factors was “the organization of the financial system and its ability to 
withstand shocks.” Implicitly referring to Friedman’s findings, Burns underscored that “[i]f the 
onset of the contraction is marked by a financial crisis or if one develops somewhat later, there is 
a substantial probability that the decline of aggregate activity will prove severe and perhaps 
abnormally long as well.”552 To prevent this from happening, one could either reduce the 
vulnerability of the system to shocks or mitigate emergencies. Burns and his successors, Paul 
Volcker and Alan Greenspan, chose to follow Burns’s path and dealt with systemic risk by 
mitigating emergencies. Only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, was vulnerability 
reduction combined with systemic risk and put into practice.  
Fundamental.Reappraisal.of.the.Discount.Window.
The emergency lending program was the outcome of a Fed study initiated in mid-1965.553 The 
                                                
552 For Burns, other factors included the quality and magnitude of credit growth and the extent of speculation. Ibid. 
553 The Committee that undertook the study was chaired by Fed Governor George W. Mitchell and the research was 
conducted under the leadership of Bernard Shull, a member of the Fed’s research division. An important part of the 
study was a series of research projects that were done by academics. This aspect of the study was managed by Lester 
Chandler, the chairman of the Princeton economics department and a former member of the Commission on Money 
and Credit’s Advisory Board. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Reappraisal of the Federal 
Reserve Discount Mechanism; Report of a System Committee. 
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study was organized to redesign the discount window to improve the effectiveness of monetary 
policy as part of the broader project to enhance growth. Initially, the objective was limited to 
transforming the window into a mechanism to improve the ability of banks to allocate credit. 
After the 1966 credit crunch, the project’s purview was expanded to emergency credit assistance. 
The motivation behind the study was to address the reluctance of rural unit banks to take risks. 
According to the Committee, these banks were disadvantaged because they could not diversify 
risk geographically and lacked access to money markets as a source of liquidity. In the absence 
of a reserve adjustment mechanism, the situation resulted in an undersupply of credit to large 
parts of the country. Lacking access to reliable liquidity, they held excessive liquid assets as a 
buffer against volatile swings in the outflow of deposits.554 As a result, they could only operate 
“at the cost of excessive liquidity.” This meant that “a significant limitation on the credit 
resources they make available to their communities.” This situation, however, was not simply a 
local matter. It was also a critical issue for the economy, hindering the “optimum performance of 
the banking system.”555  
As a solution, the Committee proposed to reactivate the window, which had been idle since the 
1930s.556 The window would provide reliable short-term funding to inefficient parts of the 
                                                
554 According to the study, the volatility could have been as large as 10 percent of deposits. 
555 According to the Committee, this problem was only worsened by the fact that in the postwar period the volume 
of liquid assets had diminished and as a result banks had become more vulnerable to unexpected deposit 
fluctuations. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve 
Discount Mechanism; Report of a System Committee., 5–7; Bernard Shull, Report on Research Undertaken in 
Connection with a System Study (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1968), 52–
56. 
556 The Committee admitted that the Fed was partially responsible for this situation. Between 1934 and 1951, the 
window was rarely used by banks which were extremely weary of indebtedness and therefore extremely liquid. Only 




system without jeopardizing monetary control. It would allow the Fed to undertake more 
aggressive open market operations and bolster stability by cushioning the disruptive effects of 
such operations. It would encourage banks to take riskier positions, resulting in an increase in the 
volume of loans at a lower cost.557 The window, therefore, was seen as a way to unleash risk-
taking on the part of disadvantaged banks. 
The Committee’s call for using the window for emergency credit assistance signaled the 
realization of Currie’s vision for the Fed as an emergency mitigator. The Committee defined the 
Fed for the first time as “the ultimate source of liquidity to the economy.” In “general or isolated 
emergency situations,” the window would serve as a liberal supply of liquidity to member banks. 
Under extreme conditions, it would be used “to provide circumscribed credit assistance to a 
broader spectrum of financial institutions.”558 This was a remarkable step as it implied that the 
Fed had come to see itself responsible for the wellbeing of the entire financial system, and not 
just to its members.  
What was revolutionary about the Committee’s proposal, however, was a categorical distinction 
between two types of financial emergencies, general and limited liquidity crises. As also 
advocated by Friedman, the Committee acknowledged the satisfactory status of open market 
operations as the principle means to ward off general crises. These operations, however, were not 
                                                                                                                                                       
risk appetite and thereby their need for liquidity. The Fed’s response to this new development was the reform of the 
window in 1955, which made it a much stricter lending device. While large banks responded to this move by 
beginning to rely on the money markets, the smaller banks became more conservative. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism; Report of a System 
Committee., 3–4. 
557 Ibid., 1–7. 
558 Ibid., 2. 
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suitable for limited crises in which individual or a group of institutions were distressed. The 
Committee warned that random asymmetrical events such as local calamities, management 
failures, unforeseen changes in economic conditions and the unexpected impact of policy 
changes could also adversely affect financial institutions, a financial substructure or even a sector 
of the economy. If the Fed were to “play an effective role as ‘lender of last resort,’” it would 
have to develop a more precise intervention capability. The need for such a mechanism became 
more pressing as the credit crunch of 1966 had revealed the growing “interdependence and 
interaction among [financial] institutions.”559 The Fed’s emergency lending program, therefore, 
was conceived in its origins as a response to the phenomenon of systemic interdependencies 
which came to form the conceptual basis of systemic risk in the 1980s. At this moment, however, 
the question of whether interdependencies caused systemic risk or merely transmitted shocks was 
not yet determined. The answer to this question eventually led to a bifurcation within monetary 
nominalism and resulted in the emergence of a new fraction with a non-aggregationist, systemic 
form of thinking. 
Two.Tactics.of.Emergency.Mitigation:.Containment.&.Liquidation.
The emergency lending program consisted of two emergency mitigation tactics that the Fed 
utilized to respond to financial emergencies over the next four decades. The first tactic, which I 
call containment, was utilized against sudden and unpreventable events that could create a 
liquidity crunch in systemically important markets. The program consisted of providing excess 
liquidity to affected parts of the system. The objective of the intervention was to build a wall of 
                                                
559 Ibid., 16–17. 
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liquidity by bolstering the reserves of affected banks and absorb the shock. The goal was to 
prevent the disruption of the flow of credit into the economy and to ensure the continued 
operation of the affected market. The second tactic, which I will call controlled liquidation, was 
used for preventing the failure of systemically important financial firms to protect the system. It 
was reserved for cases in which the impact caused by the failure of one institution could not be 
contained by the containment approach. Because it was not legal for the Fed to rescue an 
insolvent firm, the discount window was used to facilitate the merger of the failing firm with 
other firms willing to rescue it. What was common to both approaches was the assumption that 
the Fed had to protect the system at all costs against the risk of a financial catastrophe. 
The Fed activated its emergency program when the Penn Central Railroad Company became 
insolvent in 1970. Upon an appeal by the company to Nixon for a bailout, the Fed evaluated the 
situation and determined that its failure would have destabilizing effects on the system.560 
According to Andrew Brimmer, a Fed governor who played a key role in the decision, this 
assessment was based on the realization that the company had a sizable presence in the 
commercial paper segment of the money market. This market was critical for economic stability 
because it was the main source of liquidity for commercial and industrial companies. Thus, the 
company’s failure could have triggered a limited liquidity crisis and had severe consequences for 
                                                
560 Nixon asked initially Congress for an emergency legislation to save the company. Having lost faith in the ability 
of Congress to act promptly, Nixon pleaded to the Fed to extend direct credit to the company. The appeal was made 
on the basis that the company was playing a vital role in national defense by providing national defense 
transportation services. Andrew F. Brimmer, “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central Banking 
and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 2 (1989): 5. 
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the economy.561   
The Fed’s instinct was to prevent the failure by lending directly to Penn Central. While the Fed 
had such an authority, the law permitted only short-term loans to creditworthy firms in exchange 
for collateral. When it became clear that Penn Central was not qualified, the Fed decided to lend 
to commercial banks instead. The rationale behind this was the prediction that if the money 
market froze, commercial banks would be the only source of short-term credit for nonfinancial 
companies in need of liquidity. Reinforced with informal contacts between the Fed and relevant 
banks, the discount window lending acted as a de facto government guarantee on the bank loans 
to companies like Penn Central. At a time when the Fed was using its open market operations 
and reserve requirements to restrict the flow of money in the economy, this intervention would 
temporarily bolster bank reserves and make banks more likely to lend at cheaper rates. This 
preemptive action would ease the strain on bank credit and facilitate the continued flow of credit 
from the financial sector into the economy.562 The Fed’s emergency lending program was 
deployed as a security mechanism to prevent a disruption in the credit circuit in a way that was 
unforeseen by monetarists such as Friedman.563 
                                                
561 Ibid., 6–7. 
562 The assessment was jointly made by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Philadelphia. Andrew F. 
Brimmer, “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital 
Markets,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 2 (1989): 5-6. 
563 In his 1960 “A Program for Monetary Stability,” Friedman had argued to effectively get disband the discount 
window. From his Bagehotian perspective, he considered the open market operations as a sufficient means of 
providing emergency credit to the financial system at large to offset the effects of disturbances. His 1968 call for a 
monetarist monetary policy, thus, did not even mention the discount window. Milton Friedman, “The Role of 




The second time the Fed undertook such an operation was in response to the stock market crash 
of 1987, also known as Black Monday. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had the largest percentage decline in its history. From 
a Friedmanite perspective, the Fed was supposed to respond by loosening the money supply, 
which was enough to protect the money circuit. Instead, the Fed deployed the discount 
mechanism in the containment mode. According to Brimmer, who was then the Public Governor 
of the Commodity Exchange, the reason for this was systemic risk. The problem policymakers 
worried most about was not the sudden drop in stock prices. The Fed considered the primary risk 
to be the strain the crash had caused on the commodity futures markets. In the 1980s, NYSE and 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (MCE) were integrated to allow investors to hedge their risks 
in the futures markets. This meant that the clearing and settlement system of the MCE was now 
exposed to disruptions in NYSE. On the morning of October 20, this risk was realized. Dozens 
of brokerage firms and their banks had not received balancing payments in return for the credit 
they had extended to meet margin calls. Realizing that money center banks such as Citi were 
unwilling to lend, the Fed persuaded these institutions by guaranteeing their access to the 
discount window, which essentially insured them against a loss.564  
This event turned out to be a turning point in the trajectory of systemic risk. Until this moment, it 
was a relatively obscure problem with which mainly the Fed was concerned with. However, after 
1987 it was transformed into a central governmental problem for nearly all government agencies 
responsible for financial regulation. Despite this elevation in the status of systemic risk as a 
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problem, until the global financial crisis of 2007 emergency mitigation remained the primary 
strategy to manage it. Despite certain limited efforts to reduce the vulnerability of financial 
system infrastructure, these efforts did not exceed anything more than ad hoc responses and were 
not institutionalized within a comprehensive vulnerability reduction strategy until the institution 
of Dodd-Frank. 
The second tactic centered on facilitating the orderly liquidation of a failing firm to prevent a 
chain reaction. This tactic was deployed in the cases of the Franklin National Bank (1974) and 
the Continental Illinois Bank (1984), the twentieth and seventh largest banks at the time of their 
failures. In both cases, the Fed lent billions with the knowledge of their insolvency.565 It often 
involved supplementary financing by other banks at the Fed’s request. The objective was to 
delay the failure until the bank could either merge with another company or be wound down by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The aim was to prevent the failure from morphing 
into a systemic event, since postponing bankruptcy diminished the failure’s impact on the 
system. While a merger muted the threat, a delayed liquidation would ensure the shock to be 
absorbed in the least damaging way. 
Writing in 1976, Brimmer defended the Fed on the grounds of what one would today call 
systemic risk. According to Brimmer, to grasp the decision to lend to a bank whose failure was 
almost certain, one had to conceive the LLR function “beyond the simple conception of the 
Federal Reserve as a lender to member banks in distress.” The lending program was an essential 
part of the Fed’s “fundamental responsibility for the health and functioning of the financial 
                                                
565 In the case of the Franklin, the Fed lent $1.7 billion ($8.1 billion in today’s dollars) directly to the bank.  
 
 374 
system as a whole.” Because both banks were part of a “[h]ighly developed network of banking 
relationships which constitute the domestic and international money markets,” the failures posed 
a grave risk to not only the national banking system, but also the international financial system. 
The rationale behind emergency lending, thus, was not to bailout the failing companies, but to 
protect other financial institutions that had a strong presence in what was considered to be a 
critical market for the system. 
The Fed’s diagnosis of the risks posed by the failure of Franklin National and Continental 
Illinois was critical for the problematization of systemic risk in two ways. As these episode 
reveal, at the heart of the emergency lending program was the implicit recognition that certain 
markets played critical roles within the system. A market like the money market was seen as a 
way to increase the efficiency of the allocation of savings into productive uses. The certificate of 
deposits segment of the market allowed banks to loan out their excess deposits to other banks on 
a short-term basis. This process was supposed to cheapen credit and promote growth. It, 
however, brought with it a new source of vulnerability as banks came to count on easy access to 
short-term liquidity. Under conditions of increased competition, this turned into a dependence 
over time, posing a source of vulnerability in the case of a freeze in the market. The second way 
in which the money market made the emergence of systemic risk possible was its facilitating role 
in the formation of new interdependencies between banks in the form of an extended debit-
liability network. This network was what made possible the failure of a bank to trigger a chain 
reaction, bringing down an entire chain of banks exposed to each other’s counterparties along the 
network. This precipitated a panic and caused a credit crunch for the entire system. Thus, it 
should not have come as a surprise to Fed officials to see the market freeze when they let 
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Lehman Bothers fail in 2008.566 
As policymakers recognized in the 1980s, the banking system became increasingly more 
leveraged beginning with the mid-1960s. One might argue that the aggregationist regime’s rise in 
general and the institution of the emergency lending program in particular were important factors 
that reinforced the tendency of the system to become not only more interconnected and hence 
interdependent, but also more leveraged. It is conceivable that the lending program performed 
rural banks to adopt a business model that favored risk-taking while the aggregationist strategy 
created moral hazard on the part of large money center banks. Rather than trying to halt the 
formation of interdependencies and restricting leverage, let alone reducing the system’s 
vulnerability, policymakers neutralized the excesses such a financial structure produced and 
tacitly encouraged banks to take more risk. As William Cline came to recognize on the onset of 
the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, this choice contributed to the formation of a highly 
developed and complex global financial network. This network connected rural and other small 
and medium-size banks with large money center banks such as Citigroup and Continental Illinois 
in the form of lending syndicates to developing countries, particularly the Latin American 
sovereigns.567 Now, the farmer in Ohio who depended on his local bank for financing the 
harvesting of his crops was linked to the macroeconomic conditions that affected the ability of 
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the Brazilian government to service its sovereign debt to Citigroup. As we will see in the next 
section, this was the conditions under which systemic risk was reframed as an ontological 
category as opposed to an epistemic category of financial emergency.  
Birth.of.Systemic.Risk.
Between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s systemic risk was constituted as a governmental 
problem. In the 1970s, policymakers at the Fed began to discern systemic risk as an epistemic 
category of financial emergency. From this perspective, systemic risk was a situation of 
emergency that erupted in times of limited liquidity crises. Policymakers were aware that the 
system was vulnerable in the 1970s, however, they assumed that such events threatened the 
system only on a temporary basis. As systemic risk became intelligible, they insisted on seeing it 
as an emergent and temporary problem that could be resolved as the system’s ability to manage 
and distribute risk improved. A series of limited liquidity crises in the 1980s led to the 
reconceptualization of systemic risk as an ontological category of economic pathology. This 
allowed policymakers to perceive systemic risk as a permanent structural property of the system. 
Considered from this perspective, policymakers recognized that one cannot govern systemic risk 
unless the system’s vulnerability to shocks were reduced to an optimal level. 
Systemic.Risk.as.an.Epistemic.Category.of.Financial.Emergency.
A perfect case for demonstrating the situational conceptualization of systemic risk is the 1975 
New York City default which took place before the term systemic risk existed. Having been 
barred from the municipal debt market since the spring, state and city officials appealed to the 
Ford administration for a rescue package in September. Earlier they had tried to draw an analogy 
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between the city’s situation and that of Penn Central to no avail. This time they argued that the 
bankruptcy would have a catastrophic effect on the banking system, “trigger[ing] a long line of 
falling dominoes” as they put it. While Burns dismissed this argument as a scare tactic initially, 
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller feared that the unprecedented default would elevate 
uncertainty in markets.568 By the end of the month, the issue was no longer a domestic one as 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Giscard d’Estaing warned Ford about 
the impact of the default on the international financial system. Noting the risks the failure of 
Herstatt Bank of Cologne and Franklin in 1974 had posed to the system the previous year, 
Schmidt argued such an event would lead to a “domino effect, striking other world financial 
centers.”569  
By late October, Burns came to accept the doomsday scenario. At a congressional hearing, he 
pointed out that prolonged debate would only “keep markets uncertain and in turmoil” and urged 
Congress to arrive at a decision before a panic ensued. NYC’s problems had already spread to 
the State’s finances, and other state and local governments were affected as securities dealers and 
underwriters were reducing their exposure to municipal bonds. The loss of confidence reached 
such heights that many credit-worthy communities and agencies were facing financing 
difficulties. The adverse effects of uncertainty were also beginning to strain many financial 
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institutions holding municipal securities as collateral. Burns warned that unless the situation was 
resolved, recovery from the previous recession would be impaired.570 Confident of the Fed’s 
ability to contain the impact of the default, he told Congress that the Fed had contingency plans. 
Under these plans, the Fed would lend to commercial banks freely and purchase government 
securities through open market operations.571 
At the hearings, New York State Superintendent of Banks, John Heimann, deployed the narrative 
device of absolute indeterminacy to equate systemic risk to a situation of emergency.572 He 
highlighted that only Merlin with “an unclouded crystal ball” could determine the impact of an 
event like the NYC default in an interdependent society such as the US. The tolerability of the 
default, therefore, was unknown. The relevant issue was “whether the risk in permitting this 
default [… was] worth taking.” The answer depended on what was at stake. As Heimann asked 
“is it the whole system by which we finance state and local governments? Or is it the capital 
structure of the free world?” Since exact stakes could not be known in advance, he argued the 
worst had to be assumed.573  
As late as October 29, the Ford administration was determined to veto any legislation to rescue 
NYC. The administration’s views changed only after a Fed study, issued in mid-November, 
revealed the extent of the vulnerability of New York’s large money center banks. While a small 
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portion of the banking system had a sizable exposure to a potential default, the city and state 
securities held by the largest eleven banks amounted to nearly thirty percent of their capital. The 
main source of concern was not the general vulnerability of the system but rather the possibility 
of a limited liquidity crisis that the default would trigger in the money market.574 The decision to 
rescue NYC, therefore, depended on whether the event posed a threat to a critical market. 
The strategic significance of the conceptualization of systemic risk as an exceptional situation 
became clear in a hearing on the Hunt brothers silver futures market speculation in 1980. The 
hearings featured the nation’s top bank regulators, Paul Volcker, Fed Chairman, and Heimann, 
now Comptroller of the Currency. Paradoxically, while these actors defended their actions to 
rescue silver brokers on the basis of systemic risk, they resisted calls for regulating this rapidly 
growing market on the grounds that these markets were supposed help distribute risk and lower 
aggregate risk in the system. 
Starting in the early 1970s, the Hunts, heirs to a multibillion oil empire, invested heavily in silver 
futures markets.575 In 1980, fearing the formation of a bubble, the Exchange imposed restrictions 
on silver trading, resulting in a sharp fall in prices. This situation put securities brokerage firms 
that had extended credit to the Hunts and other speculators in a difficult position. As prices 
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plunged, these firms found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy.576 Realizing the systemic 
consequences of this event, Volcker persuaded a consortium of banks to lend to the Hunts in 
return for their silver.577  
At the hearings, Volcker and Heimann defended their actions on the basis of two key notions, 
“chain reaction” and “systemic risk.” According to Volcker, the bankruptcy of the Hunts would 
have “trigger[ed] massive liquidation of silver positions to the peril of all creditor institutions, 
and indirectly placing in jeopardy the customers and creditors of those institutions in a financial 
chain reaction.” (Emphasis added.) Volcker argued that “the potential vulnerability of banks and 
other intermediaries” to such an event required the Fed to intervene to prevent “severe financial 
disturbances.” A similar conclusion was reached by Heimann. While the banking system was not 
the direct source of financing for the Hunts, there was a potential risk that their settlement 
difficulties could have affected the system indirectly. According to Heimann, this posed 
“systemic risks” to the system.578 For the first time an actor was construing the threat under a 
succinct term as opposed to convoluted metaphors such as “domino effect” and “financial chain 
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reaction.” This term allowed policymakers to efficiently convey the rationale behind their rescue 
operations to politicians and the public for the next three decades. Systemic risk, thus, was 
invented as a discursive strategy to ensure that monetary apparatus would not face the 
administrative difficulties the fiscal apparatus faced.  
The question that remains is why both actors cautioned against regulating futures markets. The 
answer lies in their diagnosis of the crisis and the role they attributed to future markets. 
According to Heimann, the episode was the result of “extreme speculative manipulation.” 
Therefore, the events as a source of systemic risk were not a property of the system, but a 
deviation from the norm of ideal market arrangements and financial conduct. This meant that the 
recurrence of such events could be minimized by enhancing market discipline. Heimann pointed 
out that restrictions would “significantly impede the ability of the [futures] market to function 
efficiently.” This would be a grave mistake, since these markets fulfilled “entirely appropriate 
roles of providing liquidity and translating or limiting risk.”579 Thus, systemic risk in its 
inception was coined as the signifier of the dangers of an extraordinary and yet controllable 
situation. As Greenspan also claimed later, both actors implicitly argued that derivative markets 
lowered aggregate risks in the system in the long-run. In the face of limited crises, the 
government could play the role of a crisis manager and prevent the spread of an emergency.580 
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For vulnerability reduction regime to emerge as a complement to the aggregationist regime, 
systemic risk first had to be conceptualized as an economic pathology that could be reduced. 
This problematization was made in three domains in the 1980s. First, on the onset of the Latin 
American debt crisis of the early 1980s, William Cline, a policy economist at the Institute of 
International Economics, problematized systemic risk as the structural vulnerability of the 
banking system. Then, a group of policymakers at the Fed came to conceive it as a property of 
the large-value payment and settlement systems that markets relied on for settling transactions. 
Finally, another group of actors at the OECD formulated systemic risk as an irreducible form of 
risk in the financial sector in the late 1980s. Cline’s solution to the vulnerability of the banking 
system formed the basis of the US response to the debt crisis and materialized into the Basel 
Capital Accords. The Fed’s concerns with settlement systems resulted in the first attempt to 
reduce systemic risk in a critical infrastructure of the financial system. Finally, OECD’s 
problematization of systemic risk came to serve as the contemporary understanding of systemic 
risk as a sui generis economic pathology that is a permanent feature of a financial system.  
Latin%American%Debt%Crisis%
The first critique of the Fed’s problematization of systemic risk as an epistemic category came 
from Cline.581 When the debt crisis erupted in August 1982, Cline had already warned about the 
prospects of such an event and developed a policy framework to analyze it. This framework was 
a direct attack on the way in which the Fed regulated the banking system and managed systemic 
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risk within the aggregationist regime. From Cline’s perspective, this regime contained two 
critical weaknesses. The first was the regime’s exclusive focus on the national scale. Despite the 
fact that systemic risk episodes such as the failure of Franklin National in 1974 were closely 
linked with the rise of extra-national markets such as the London Euro-Dollar money market and 
the consequent globalization of finance, policymakers continued to mitigate financial 
emergencies within national arrangements.582 The only exception to this was the creation of the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision in 1974. While this institution brought together 
central bankers from so-called developed countries, it did not go beyond an inter-national 
communication platform.583 In the face of the oil shocks of the 1970s, former policymaker and 
renowned economic historian Charles Kindleberger had called for transforming the International 
Monetary Fund into an international lender of last resort toward the end of the 1970s with no 
prevail. As a result, when the crisis broke out, there was no mechanism with the purview to act 
as an international financial emergency mitigator. 
This brings us to the second weakness. The Fed’s strategy relied on the assumption that systemic 
risk could be mitigated and thus managed. In this instance, however, the magnitude of the threat 
was so large that the impact of the shock on the system could not be mitigated. Ideally, the Fed 
should have reduced the structural vulnerability of the financial system with the anticipation of 
such a catastrophic shock. As noted below, the system’s exposure external and internal potential 
sources of threat as well as its aggregate leverage should have been reduced ex ante. In other 
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words, Cline was invoking the option of vulnerability reduction that Burns had insinuated in 
1968. By the time the crisis began to unfold in the summer of 1982, however, Cline argued that it 
was too late to pursue this strategy since an attempt to reduce vulnerability would have 
catastrophic consequences.  
As an alternative, Cline argued that the threat had to be first stopped so that the system’s 
vulnerability could be reduced gradually. Toward this end, he devised a hybrid mitigation tactic 
that welded the Fed’s containment and orderly liquidation tactics. Within this approach, IMF was 
given the role of an international financial emergency mitigator as Kindleberger had intended. It 
would undertake lender of last resort operations by lending to the insolvent sovereign states in 
order to delay the impact of a default on the US banks. This plan was adopted under the 
auspicious of the Baker Plan, named after the US Treasury Secretary James Baker, in the mid-
1980s and allowed the Fed to reduce the vulnerability of the banking sector by 1988 when the 
Basel Accords were implemented.584 
In his 1984 International Debt: Systemic Risk and Policy Response, Cline used the term 
“systemic risk” to highlight the threat of sovereign default.585 At the heart of Cline’s 
conceptualization were two interrelated concepts, interdependence and vulnerability. In the face 
of the energy and raw materials shocks of the 1970s, these notions were turned into guiding 
                                                
584 While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it should be noted that the other element of the response to the 
Latin American debt crisis was structural adjustment reforms in Latin American countries and other heavily 
indebted developing nations. While the Fed reduced the US banking system’s vulnerability,  Structural adjustment 
reduced the vulnerability of the economies of these nations to catastrophic shocks. See Ch 8 on the Latin American 
Debt Crisis Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank. 
585 William R Cline, International Debt: Systemic Risk & Policy Response (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1984). 
 
 385 
principles of national security policy by Henry Kissinger.586 It was not a coincidence that one 
finds a problematizations of vulnerability in terms of interdependence in the thinking of one of 
the central figures of the national security. Between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s, macro-
substantivism and the governmental techniques associated with it were remapped from the 
domain of economic governance onto the newly founded domain of national security. In this 
domain, a series of defense mobilization institutions were created to serve as a calculative 
apparatus for the new National Security Council (NSC). As noted at the end of Chapter 2, the 
National Resources Planning Board was recreated in 1947 under the title of National Security 
Resources Board (NSRB) with most of its personnel in tact. NSRB’s successors Office of 
Defense Mobilization (ODM) (1950-1960) and Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) (1960-
1973) were equipped with substantivist resource planning techniques such as linear 
programming, input-output modeling and network analysis under ODM.  
These techniques were combined with the Critical Materials Defense Stockpiles and were used 
first for optimizing defense production and logistics systems to minimize the demand shock on 
the civilian market economy in the instance of a limited war mobilization. Later, they were 
rearranged to enhance the resilience of the economy against a nuclear attack. The principle 
means through which this was done was vulnerability reduction. In the 1960s, once nuclear war 
ceased to be a meaningful threat to which one can prepare for, these techniques were once again 
recalibrated and was used for reducing the vulnerability of the economy against supply shocks. 
This was done in a fashion that greatly resembled Gardiner Means’s emphasis on enhancing the 
                                                
586 Daniel Sargent, “The United States and Globalization in the 1970s,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in 
Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 49–51. 
 
 386 
resilience of the economy by enhancing the flexibility of prices of critical commodities such as 
steel. Throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s, OEP undertook a broad range of projects to 
reduce economic vulnerability that ranged from establishing a structural inflation vulnerability 
surveillance program to designing survivable infrastructure networks. The logic that was 
common to all these projects was the analysis of the vulnerability of these systems in terms of 
vulnerability of certain points in the system that were called “critical nodes.”587 
Cline was exposed to structural vulnerability thinking through his collaboration with Fred 
Bergsten, the Institute’s founding director who had worked at NSC as Kissinger’s assistant in the 
early 1970s.588 In a 1976 piece, they warned that growing interdependence between national 
economies were making them vulnerable to price shocks in critical materials such as oil, food 
and raw materials. As a remedy, they called for policymakers to develop models that could 
account for the destabilizing effects of these disturbances.589 While Bergsten launched a 
campaign to turn the Critical Materials Defense Stockpiles into economic buffer stocks to isolate 
the economy from critical materials price shocks in the late 1970s, Cline turned to nominal 
sovereign default shocks in the early 1980s. 
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Cline developed a systemic risk assessment framework based on these two concepts. The 
objective was to evaluate “systemic vulnerability” of the banking system. In the midst of 
growing concerns over the ability of developing nations to service debt, Cline designed an 
analytical technique that came to be called stress testing. This technique rested on a type of 
analysis that focused on what Mary Morgan calls “what if” scenarios. As Morgan notes, “what 
if” scenarios has been an essential aspect of economic modeling since the 19th century. This 
approach to economic analysis, however, took an entirely new aspect with the invention of the 
economy as a governmental object in the 1930s. As demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, Gardiner 
Means combined the what if scenarios with linear mathematical modeling technique and 
invented projection analysis. Presumably, projections would have allowed macro-substantivists 
of the National Resources Planning Board to predict the advent of depressions and mitigate 
them. Building on Means’s projection technique, Gerhard Colm developed macroeconomic 
forecasting analysis first in the Fiscal Division of the Bureau of the Budget and then in the 
Council of Economic Advisors in the 1940s. Colm’s made it possible for fiscal nominalists to 
simulate the future state of the economy under certain scenarios that imagined what future 
macroeconomic conditions would be and how the economy’s components would react to them.  
Finally, under Colm’s guidance nominalist forecasting was re-crafted into its final form by 
Marshall Wood, one of the inventors of linear programming, in the National Planning Agency in 
the 1950s. Under a contract from ODM, Wood built around Colm’s forecasting technique an 
information infrastructure called Program Analysis for Resource Management (PARM). At the 
National Damage Assessment Center of ODM, a former colleague of Wood from the US Air 
Force, Jerry Horton, intended to use PARM to test the resilience of the national economy to a 
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nuclear attack. In the hands of Wood and Horton, Colm’s forecasting was combined with Monte 
Carlo simulation methodology. At ODM’s successor OEP, PARM and its subcomponent models 
were utilized for what OEP called “impact analysis” to analyze the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructures such as pipelines and railroads as well as vital components of the economy such 
as the price system. These substantivist forms of vulnerability analysis were essentially a form of 
stress testing that tried to assess the vulnerability of a given system to an adverse scenario that 
would disrupt the flow of recourses in different parts of the economy.590 
The first part of the analysis involved testing whether a debtor would default under different 
adverse scenarios. Under the base scenario of stable macroeconomic conditions, Cline’s model 
did not predict any problems. However, under two adverse scenarios in which an oil price shock 
was introduced, his model indicated a high likelihood of default for Brazil and Mexico, the two 
largest holders of debt to the US banking system.591 The second part of Cline’s analysis consisted 
of assessing the system’s vulnerability to a default at a given aggregate magnitude. To measure 
vulnerability, he developed three indicators, the size of debt, the debt exposure of banks, and 
leverage.592 While the nine largest US banks, including Continental, had an exposure of 227.7 
percent of their capital to these countries in 1981, 80 percent of this exposure was to Brazil and 
Mexico. The damage a default would cause would be multiplied several-fold due to the highly 
leveraged capital structure of banks. A default, therefore, was likely to wipe out one-fifth of the 
                                                
590 Ozgode, “Logistics of Survival: Assemblage of Vulnerability Reduction Expertise.” 
591 William R Cline, “External Debt- System Vulnerability and Development,” Columbia Journal of World Business 
17, no. Spring (1982): 4, 6-7. 
592 Cline initially used the first two indicators in the 1982 paper; leverage was added in the 1984 pamphlet. Ibid., 9; 
Cline, International Debt. 
 
 389 
large banks’ capital, cause major liquidity problems, and leave some insolvent.593  
Based on these results, Cline called for reducing the vulnerability of the system. He pointed out 
that “[a]nalysis of financial crisis is something like analysis of strategic defense.” The system’s 
first line of defense was emergency lending by the Fed and deposit insurance. However, since 
banks were so large, this mechanism might not have been enough to bail them out. Foreseeing 
the rescue of Continental as well as the financial crisis of 2008, Cline pointed out that the Fed’s 
emergency lending program would have to be used to save the banks. As an alternative, Cline 
proposed to reduce the system’s vulnerability to systemic risks through a series of measures over 
bank capital. Even if “the probability of a crisis may be low,” pointed out Cline, “the costs that 
can result from its occurrence are so large that the expected cost (probability times cost) is 
considerable.” Thus, whatever its costs may be, reducing systemic risk was justified.594  
Cline’s problematization of the debt crisis was a formative moment in the emergence of systemic 
risk. The significance of his analysis was the formulation of systemic risk as a structural property 
of the banking system. Systemic risk was not just a temporary situation of emergency as 
Heimann thought; rather it was a permanent state of systemic vulnerability. To confront this 
problem, one needed more than emergency mitigation mechanisms. The individual attributes of 
financial institutions that posed vulnerability to the system had to be reformed. The institution of 
the Basel Capital Accords after the crisis in 1988 was a response to this problem. The Accords, 
                                                
593 The system’s total exposure was 151.1 percent in 1981. In 1977, this figure was 131.6 percent for the system and 
188.2 percent for the largest nine banks. Cline, “External Debt- System Vulnerability and Development,” 9; Cline, 
International Debt, 32–34. 
594 Cline, “External Debt- System Vulnerability and Development,” 9. 
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however, tried to address the problem of systemic interdependency and thus vulnerability by 
focusing on the risk attributes of individual institutions and did not try to map out systemic 
vulnerabilities in a horizontally disaggregated fashion as macro-substantivists would have done.  
Systemic%Risk%in%Payment%&%Settlement%Networks%
A second surface of emergence for the ontological conceptualization of systemic risk was large-
value payment and settlement (LVPS) systems. Starting with the late 1970s, policymakers began 
to consider LVPS systems to be a critical infrastructure for the financial system. They realized 
that as financial institutions became more dependent on markets such as the money market, they 
began to rely on these systems more and more for closing transactions that were initiated in such 
markets. As a result, the security of these systems became increasingly more critical for the 
stability of the financial system. While structural interdependencies within these markets had 
become intelligible to policymakers in the mid-1970s, it took another decade before the Fed to 
conceive the systemic risks such interdependencies could create as a structural feature of LVPS 
systems.  The source of this revelation was a Fed study on settlement risks embedded in these 
systems in the mid-1980s. Undertaken in the wake of the Continental failure, the results of the 
study formed the basis of a reform initiative to enhance the resilience of  LVPS systems under 
NY Fed President Gerald Corrigan’s leadership. The reform of LVPS systems was the first 
initiative to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system. 
Policymakers at the Fed began to worry about systemic risk in payment systems in the early 
1980s. Writing in 1984, Vice President of the Cleveland Fed, Edward Stevens, pointed out that 
this concern was precipitated by the realization that there had been an astronomic rise in both the 
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volume and value of payments in these systems since the early 1970s.595 According to Stevens, 
such risks were particularly acute in the privately operated Clearing House Interbank Payments 
System (CHIPS), which was, and still is, the nation’s largest LVPS system along with the Fed’s 
FedWire.596 In contrast to FedWire, which operated on a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) 
regime, CHIPS depended on a settlement regime called deferred net settlement (DNS). While 
DNS systems were less costly and more efficient compared to RTGS-based settlement systems, 
they were more vulnerable to the risk of a settlement failure that could morph into systemic 
risk.597 Stevens underlined that since the Fed had a responsibility to “protect the resilience of the 
banking system to an unexpected settlement failure,” the Fed had to manage such systemic risks 
even if they were in a privately operated system.598 
The reason DNS systems contained systemic risk was due to three factors. First, in such regimes 
there existed a temporal gap between a transaction and its settlement. Second, payments in this 
                                                
595 Between 1970 and 1983, the combined volume annually handled by the FedWire and CHIPS, two of the most 
widely used payment systems in the US, had grown from $20 billion to $520 billion. This equaled to a compounded 
growth rate of 24 percent on an annual basis. In contrast, the overnight reserve account of banks in the system 
stalled at a mere $20 billion, about only 4 percent of the volume in 1983. E J Stevens, “Risk in Large-Dollar 
Transfer Systems,” Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, September 1984, 11–13. 
596 At the time, CHIPS was handling an average value of $3 million daily ($6.75 million in todays dollars) whereas 
the Fed’s FedWire was handling $2.4 million ($5.4 million). Today, CHIPS accounted for 95 percent of all US 
dollar payment transactions, amounting at $1.5 trillion a day, in the world. “CHIPS,” accessed March 6, 2014, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed36.html. 
597 While settlement risk characterized a situation in which a bank cannot meet its net obligations it owes to other 
banks at the end of a settlement day. Apart from settlement risk, there were three other types of risk in a payments 
system, credit, operational and legal risks, and each of these risks could potentially cause a settlement failure. 
Operational risk described the likelihood of a physical malfunction in any part of the settlement infrastructure. 
Credit risk was the risk a bank took when it extended an overnight loan to a customer for an unsettled account by the 
end of the day. Finally, legal risks referred to the possibility of fraud or unintentional accounting mistakes. David 
Burras Humphrey, “Payments System Risk, Market Failure, and Public Policy,” in Electronic Funds Transfers and 
Payments: The Public Policy Issues, ed. Elinor Harris Solomon (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Pub., 1987), 83–109. 
598 Stevens, “Risk in Large-Dollar Transfer Systems,” 16. 
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regime were provisional, meaning that the payer may decide not to finalize the payment by the 
time settlement took place. Third, because these regimes worked on a netting basis, as opposed 
to the gross settlement principle, the failure of one firm to settle could have disrupted other 
settlements. The combination of these factors exposed the system to settlement risks that could 
turn into systemic events. Because participants were sequentially interdependent in such systems, 
an isolated failure could have resulted in a cascade of settlement failures. Consequently, such 
risks could rapidly morph into “counterparty risk” and result in the “vulnerability of many banks 
directly or indirectly to a single counterparty’s failure to settle.” Such a domino effect would 
result in “systemic risk” and inflict significant damage on the system.599  
Stevens was disconcerted by the growing prominence of CHIPS among financial institutions—
the share of FedWire had fallen by almost a third from 88 to 54 percent of the total volume of 
large value payments since 1970. He believed that a change in CHIPS settlement rules worsened 
the situation. In 1981, CHIPS shifted from next day to same-day basis to reduce the duration of 
bilateral exposure between companies. According to Stevens, while this change reduced 
settlement risk, it increased systemic risk. This was a significant breakthrough as it recognized 
that an attempt to reduce one type of risk could indeed increase systemic ones.600 The implication 
of this subtle distinction was that systemic risk was not simply a situation precipitated by the 
realization of other risks. It was a structural property of the payment regime that could be 
reduced or increased depending on institutional arrangements. He even argued that “[s]ystemic 
                                                
599 Stevens, “Risk in Large-Dollar Transfer Systems,” 2, 8, 15. 
600 Ibid., 15. 
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risk was absent” in RTGS based systems like FedWire because of the finality of settlements. 
(Emphasis added.) This was a clear sign that in the early 1980s policymakers still conceived 
systemic risk as a problem restricted to knock-on effects.  
The challenge facing policymakers like Stevens was a paradoxical one. While they were 
convinced of the existence of systemic risks in payment systems, in the absence of a systemic 
event it was not possible to prove such a truth-claim. The only option available to experts, 
therefore, was to conduct a virtual experiment in the form of a simulation.601 This was done for 
the first time by the Chief of the Financial Studies Section of the Fed’s Research and Statistics 
Division, David Humphrey, circa 1984. Humphrey, a collaborator of Stevens, undertook three 
simulations of a failure in CHIPS. The analysis demonstrated the possible effects of a settlement 
failure by a large settling participant in the payments system. The simulations relied on actual 
transactions that took place on two randomly selected business days in January 1983. In the first 
two simulations, all payments to and from the “failing” firm were removed and the positions of 
all other institutions participating in the settlement system were calculated for pre- and post-
failure. The third simulation demonstrated the effects of the failure of a second large participant 
triggered by the primary failure. The overall conclusion was that the failure of a major bank 
participating in the system to settle could have disruptive effects on nearly half of the 
participants and one third of the value of the transactions. According to Humphrey, the “degree 
of systemic risk” a default posed on the system was correlated with two factors. First, the source 
and the nature of “the shock […] determine[d] the context in which the default occur[ed].” As 
                                                
601 On simulation as a form of experiment, see Mary S. Morgan, “Simulation: The Birth of a Technology to Create 
«evidence» in economics,” Revue D’histoire Des Sciences 57, no. 2 (2004): 339–375. 
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the suddenness and unexpectedness of a shock increased, the vulnerability of the system 
increased since institutions with an exposure to the default would have less time to reduce their 
exposures. Second, the impact of the shock depended on the number of affected institutions, the 
magnitude of their exposure and the size of the failing institution.602 Because Humphrey relied 
on an iterative simulation model, the problem of interconnectivity could not be analyzed in its 
full scope. Iterative simulations were very capable of undertaking “what if” scenario analysis. 
One could test whether the failure of a specific firm would result in knock-on effects. This 
technique, however, could not be used in mapping out the structural vulnerabilities of the 
financial system and determining vulnerable nodes within the system ex ante. For this to happen, 
iterative simulations had to be combined with network analysis. 
The significance of Humphrey’s findings was not limited to illustrating the existence of systemic 
risk in CHIPS. Because the banks that relied on CHIPS were also the participants of FedWire, 
his results meant that the solvency of the Fed was also under risk. This revelation coincided with 
growing concern in the Fed regarding the increasing reliance of banks on daylight overdrafts in 
the FedWire.603 This was alarming because in FedWire the Fed was tacitly the insurer of all 
settlement failures. Any unfulfilled settlement had to be accrued by the Fed. As a response, in 
collaboration with the New York Clearinghouse operating CHIPS, the Fed introduced net debit 
limits and limits on daylight overdrafts in 1984 and 1986 respectively.604 
                                                
602 Humphrey, “Payments Finality and the Risk of Settlement Failure,” 102–08. 
603 This was a situation that arises when a bank exceeds its reserves at the Fed and does not close this position until 
the end of the day. 




The reason for the coordinated effort was the double-bind the Fed was in. This paradox was the 
central issue of the final report of a Task Force on Controlling Payment System Risk that was 
created in the summer of 1987. The Task Force pointed out that while it could singlehandedly 
reduce, or even eliminate, the vulnerability of the FedWire and protect itself from credit risk, 
such a move would result in increasing systemic risk in CHIPS.605 The implication was that the 
Fed was trapped in a structural position that necessitated subsidizing the cost of liquidity for 
banks for the sake of ensuring the resilience of the financial system. As a solution, the Task 
Force proposed to charge a penalty price for overdrafts just like the discount window. This 
would lower systemic risk in CHIPS by correcting the mispricing of credit risk in the market. 
Finally, the Task Force recommended the adoption of the finality principle for CHIPS. While the 
penalty pricing was instituted in 1994, CHIPS moved to a hybrid regime that relied on the real 
time intraday netting regime in 2001.606 
In Stevens and Humphrey’s thought, two critical elements of systemic risk were absent: liquidity 
gridlocks and “too-interconnected-to-fail” problem. Building on Humphrey in the mid-2000s, a 
new generation of experts analyzed these problems with the help of analytical models.607 An 
                                                                                                                                                       
(1987): 839–52. 
605 David Lindsey et al., Controlling Risk in the Payments System - Report of the Task Force on Controlling 
Payments System Risk to the Payments System Policy Committee of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, D.C.: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1988), 4–5. 
606 Ibid., 54; Antoine Martin, “Recent Evolution of Large-Value Payment Systems$: Balancing Liquidity and Risk,” 
Economic Review, no. Q I (2005): 42, 50–51. 
607 Humphrey’s simulations would remain the only analytical analysis of systemic risk until a series of studies were 
undertaken by experts at the Fed and other central banks around the world in the mid-1990s. These studies, however, 
would not go beyond replicating that of Humphrey. In contrast to Humphrey’s results, these studies failed to find 
any evidence of systemic risk in payment systems. McAndrews, Wasilyew, and Federal Reserve Bank of 




exemplar of this effort was the work undertaken by Fed experts Morten Bech and Kimmo 
Soramäki. First, they showed that RTGS regimes were not devoid of systemic risk as their 
predecessors assumed. While the likelihood of cascading failures was low in such regimes, they 
were prone to liquidity gridlocks. Because they incentivized economizing liquidity, settling 
institutions were likely to hoard liquidity and delay settling under conditions of distress and 
uncertainty.608 Second, they reconceptualized systemic risk as a problem of structural 
interdependency between institutions embedded within a financial network.609 From this 
perspective, certain nodes within the system were seen as systemically important due to their 
position within the network structure. Modeling transactions in FedWire in the form of network 
topology, they demonstrated that small but highly interconnected firms, occupying such a 
position, could become a source of systemic risk. Their simulation of the system’s response to 
the September 11 attacks revealed that the network structure underlying the system had become 
more fragile in the wake of the attacks. The increase in the fragility of the system not only 
enhanced the criticality of these nodes, but also transform non-critical nodes into critical ones. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Netting System”; Kuussaari, Systemic Risk in the Finnish Payment System; Northcott, Estimating Settlement Risk 
and the Potential for Contagion in Canada’s Automated Clearing Settlement System. 
608 Bech and Soramäki’s liquidity gridlock analysis rested on a liquidity simulator Soramäki developed at the Bank 
of Finland in the late 1990s. Bech would move to the NY Fed in the early 2000s and enlist his collaborator as a 
consultant at the NY Fed. Harry Leinonen and Kimmo Soramäki, Optimizing Liquidity Usage and Settlement Speed 
in Payment Systems, Discussion Paper (Helsinki: Bank of Finland, November 12, 1999); Morten L Bech and Kimmo 
Soramäki, Gridlock Resolution in Interbank Payment Systems (Helsinki: Suomen Pankki, 2001); Morten Bech and 
Kimmo Soramäki, “Liquidity, Gridlocks and Bank Failures in Large Value Payment Systems,” E-Money and 
Payment Systems Review, 2002, 113–16; Morten Bech and Rod Garratt, “Illiquidity in the Interbank Payment 
System Following Wide-Scale Disruptions,” 2006. 
609 This work was initially undertaken by Bech in a NY Fed staff paper that modeled liquidity gridlocks as a game. 
Bech pointed out that while such an approach was useful, it was an over-simplification. As a remedy, he introduced 




This process, in turn, accentuated the vulnerability of the system. A distressed system, therefore, 
was highly prone to systemic events that could be triggered by the collapse of any firm 
occupying a critical node, regardless of its size.610 
The implication of these two sets of interventions was daunting. First and foremost, RTGS 
regime-based systems could pose a systemic risk to the financial system in the absence of the 
initial failure. Unless settlement systems, private or public, were monitored on an ongoing basis, 
liquidity crunches could have resulted in the collapse of perfectly solvent, but illiquid scores of 
banks and even segments of an entire market that relies on such systems for settlements. 
Systemic risk, therefore, was not only a property of the system. It was also an imminent threat 
that could easily be triggered at all times. As Heimann pointed out in 1975, it was a phenomenon 
of absolute indeterminacy and yet it was not a temporary state due to market imperfections. It 
was a structural property of both RTGS and DNS regimes. Regardless of which settlement 
regime policymakers preferred, one could not eradicate systemic risk. In either world, central 
bank had to play the role of an emergency responder to contain systemic risk. Second, the 
implication of the 9/11 simulations was that the Fed’s role as the lender of last resort to the 
system had to be recast. In addition to preventing the failure of systemically important firms, the 
Fed had to take on the responsibility to jump-start the system and get banks to begin lending and 
                                                
610 This research was conducted in collaboration with systems analysts working at the National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) of the Department Homeland Security’s Infrastructure Protection 
Program. The analysis, which was the first of its kind, was presented to a group of policymakers, including Fed 
Governor Donald Kohn and NY Fed President Timothy Geithner at a systemic risk conference jointly organized by 
the NY Fed and National Academy of Sciences in 2006. Kimmo Soramäki et al., “The Topology of Interbank 
Payment Flows,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 379, no. 1 (June 1, 2007): 317–333; Kimmo 
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Needs, Risks and Efficiency in Payment Networks, 2007; John Kambhu, Scott Weidman, and Neel Krishnan, New 
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settling again. Only such a proactive approach would reduce the system’s vulnerability under 
extreme distress. In both instances, the Fed had to adopt the role of monitoring and managing 
liquidity in the system, which required a recalibration of the discount window.  
1987%Stock%Market%Crash%
The 1987 stock market crash constituted the third critical moment for the formation of systemic 
risk as a concept. It was a watershed moment for aggregationists such as Alan Greenspan as it 
revealed that sophisticated and efficient markets could collapse and pose a threat to the financial 
system. This event also revealed that seemingly unrelated markets were actually interconnected, 
thereby transmitting disturbances to parts of the system thought to be isolated. Furthermore, the 
speed at which the events unfolded raised questions as to the adequacy of the system’s primary 
line of defense against market-based systemic threats. In light of these unsettling conclusions, 
policymakers spent the next decade pondering what systemic risk was and how to govern it. 
Systemic risk was elevated to the heights of top level policy agenda for the first time by the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which was formed in 1988 by Ronald Reagan 
to investigate the crash. In addition to Greenspan, the Group consisted of the heads of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission and the 
Secretary of the Treasury. Although it was conceived as a temporary arrangement, it became a 
permanent body that was used for managing domestic and international financial emergencies in 
the next two decades. 
The Working Group’s final report established the central policy objective as reducing systemic 
risk. This assertion was based on the conclusion that stock, options and futures markets, which 
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were traditionally isolated, were now linked. As a result, they allowed the rapid spread of 
financial distress within the system.611 The question was how to deal with this problem. The 
group objected to calls for banning or restricting certain trading strategies. It warned that 
“undo[ing] the changes in financial markets or market strategies brought by improvements in 
telecommunications and computer technology” was “unrealistic and perhaps counterproductive.” 
As an alternative, it proposed to strengthen the financial infrastructure to enhance the resilience 
of “vital linkages within credit markets.” It advocated improvements in the operations of such 
systems, the institution of a “circuit-breaker” mechanism across all markets, and to review 
capital adequacy of financial institutions. These reforms would enhance the ability of the credit, 
payment, and settlement systems to withstand “extraordinary large market declines” and allow 
policymakers to mitigate an emergency before it turned into a panic. Finally, the group 
constituted itself formally as an emergency management body responsible for contingency 
planning.612 In this role, it played a critical function in the rescue of the Long-Term Capital 
Management in 1998 and in response to the financial crisis of 2008.  
Despite its call for reducing systemic risk, the Working Group failed to define this concept. The 
first attempt to do so was in 1989 by the OECD Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Securities Markets, 
which brought together central bankers from developed countries to investigate the crash from a 
                                                
611 This conclusion was arrived at by the group’s predecessor, the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanism. 
This task force was established in November 1987, a few weeks after the crash, and was headed by Nicholas Brady, 
who would become the Treasury Secretary in September 1988. United States, Report of the Presidential Task Force 
on Market Mechanisms: Submitted to The President of the United States, The Secretary of the Treasury, and The 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, (Washington, D.C.: The Task Force, 1988). 
612 United States, Interim Report of the Working Group on Financial Markets: Submitted to the President of the 
United States (U.S. G.P.O., 1988), 1–3. 
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global perspective.613 Deciding to approach the issue through the lens of systemic risk, the task 
of defining the term fell on Sean O’Connor, an economist from the Bank of Canada. According 
to O’Connor, the concept was “still very fuzzy.” He noted that “most discussions focused on the 
principle outcome—contagion leading to a sequence of defaults on settlement obligations.” The 
group instead decided to take an approach similar to the Working Group that focused on 
“underlying structural and behavioral causes for systemic risk within the financial infrastructure 
arrangements for ‘securities’ markets and between securities and other financial asset markets.” 
The objective of the group was to illuminate the interdependencies between different markets 
and the credit-liability networks that linked these markets.614 
In a 1989 report, O’Connor provided the definition of systemic risk that became the basis of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. According to O’Connor, systemic risks were system-wide financial risks that 
could not be borne by financial actors and therefore could not be managed by them. The issue 
therefore was not the mismanagement of risk by individual firms or the devices with which such 
risks were managed. The challenge was the fact that these instruments allowed the transmission 
of abnormal “shocks throughout the financial system via a network of market interrelationships” 
that connected firms in different parts of the system. As a consequence, actors were exposed to 
risks that were not visible to them. This meant that a theory such as efficient-markets hypothesis 
could not have addressed the problem as it focused only on informational efficiency under 
normal conditions. Instead, the relevant issue was “operational efficiency” of markets under 
                                                
613 Ad Hoc Group was organized by the Committee of Financial Markets of the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD). 
614 Email correspondence with the author. Date: August 8, 2010. 
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stress. The behavior of the system under abnormal conditions, in turn, depended on the 
institutional and structural arrangements of markets. Systemic risk, thus, was produced by  
the externalities associated with [factors such as] broad and deep market interdependencies, 
inefficient transaction system related to order processing, execution, clearing and settlement, 
information content and distribution problems regarding market prices, and inappropriate 
regulation or enforcement. 
From a regulatory standpoint, problematization of systemic risk as a multi-dimensional set of 
externalities meant that regulating such risks posed a unique challenge. O’Connor underscored 
that it was not possible to eliminate systemic risk altogether because such an attempt would 
result in an infeasible market arrangement. Therefore, the task of regulation should have been to 
control and manage systemic risk. From this perspective, one could try “to manage this risk 
under the existing arrangements or […] alter the market arrangements to reduce the risk or re-
allocate it in a more desirable fashion.” Regardless of which route policymakers took, however, 
they would still face such risks, because, as O’Connor put it, “[c]hange the regulations and the 
systemic risk [would also] change.” Therefore the primary goal should have been to reduce 
systemic risk to a socially acceptable point.615 What O’Connor failed to recognize, however, was 
the possibility that systemic risk could pose a layer of opacity not only to market actors, but also 
to policymakers. These dual layers of opacity meant that one needed a vantage point from which 
systemic risk could be monitored. This was nothing but the dream of Wesley Mitchell. This 
vision, which was brought to the Fed by the initiative of Burns, was finally be realized under the 
                                                
615 Sean O’Connor, “Systemic Risk in Securities Markets: A Concept in Search of a Definition.” (Ad Hoc Group of 
Experts on Securities Markets, Committee on Financial Markets, OECD, Paris, October, 1989), 3, 13, 16, 18. 
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Dodd-Frank Act with the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). For 
Mitchell, the object of surveillance was general imbalances; for Burns, it was the vulnerability of 
the financial system; and finally for the creators of FSOC it was both financial vulnerability and 
systemic risk.  
Governing.Systemic.Risk.
The 1980s was a decade of extreme financial instability out of which systemic risk emerged as a 
central category of macroeconomic governance. (See Graph 7 below) Under both fiscal and 
monetary variants of nominalism, the primary concern of governance was the relationship 
between macroeconomic aggregate variables such as GNP, inflation and quantity of money. The 
advantage of this approach was to enable policymakers to filter out the substance of the 
economic activity one governed and focus on the macroeconomic environment within which 
such activity took place. Systemic events of the 1980s, however, disrupted the faith in the ability 
of policymakers to filter out the real. Each event highlighted a new dimension of the system’s 
vulnerability and revealed that markets might behave in unexpected ways, posing risks to the 
system. In light of these experiences the question of how to manage systemic risk haunted 
policymakers over the next two decades. The initial response was to intensify the aggregationist 
regime so that the overflow of the real could be stopped. This involved enhancing its prudential 
aspects and rethinking the Fed’s emergency lending strategy. Only after these twin strategies ran 
their course in the wake of the crisis of 2008, a new regulatory regime, vulnerability reduction, 
was established to complement the aggregationist regime. The objective of this new regime was 
to preempt the overflow by reducing vulnerability of the financial system to shocks in advance. 
Vulnerability, therefore, was elevated to the status of a central macroeconomic indicator that   
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served as a proxy for governing systemic risk.  
Reintensifying.Prudential.Regulation.S.Basel.Accords:.
The main objective behind the reintensification of prudential regulation was to enhance the 
resilience of the banking system. In the spirit of aggregationism, the Fed sought to reduce the 
probability of the failure of firms by enhancing their resilience to shocks on an individual basis. 
The primary instrument chosen for this purpose was capital adequacy requirements (CARs) that 
were set up by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision.616 CARs were first introduced as the 
main pillar of the Basel Capital Accords in 1988. The Accords assumed financial risk to be a 
multifaceted phenomenon and categorized it into risk buckets representing risk attributes carried 
by firms. Until the late 2000s, the implicit assumption behind the Accords was that systemic risk 
was the byproduct of fundamental risks such as credit and market risks. Only in the wake of the 
crisis did the Accords come to recognize systemic risk as a product of interdependencies 
embodied within the system and not a feature of individual institutions.  
The decision to implement CARs was a strategic response to a dilemma facing the Fed in the 
early 1980s. The Fed was confronted with a crisis in the prudential regulation pillar of the 
aggregationist strategy. As the architects of the monetary nominalism intended, the average 
capital ratios of the banking system had been declining since the early 1960s, indicating the 
willingness of banks to take more risks and lend less stringently.617 Speaking at a House Banking 
                                                
616 The Basel Committee was created in the wake of the Herstatt Bank failure in 1974. The failure was precipitated 
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not be solved on a national scale. Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011. 




and Finance Committee hearing on capital requirements in 1987, Volcker stated that this trend 
reached a worrisome point by the early 1980s. Faced with intense competition with other 
international institutions, the profit margins of large banks came under pressure while trying to 
expand their overseas loans. The situation was worsened by growing domestic competition and 
the deregulation of interest rate ceilings in 1980. Regulators were alarmed by the increased risks 
in the banking system. Highlighting the shock absorption function of bank capital, Volcker 
pointed out that the situation was disconcerting due to “capital’s role as a buffer to absorb 
unexpected losses.” Since “the likelihood of bank failures” was correlated with capitalization, 
eroding capital levels were a threat to the system in the long run. For the banks to “fulfill [their] 
strategic role […] in our economic and financial system,” stated Volcker, the banking system had 
to remain strong, competitive and profitable.618  
Regulators introduced formal capital guidelines in 1981 as an initial remedy to the situation. For 
the first time these guidelines set numerical minimum capital requirements in the form of a 
simple ratio of primary capital to total assets.619 Until 1981, prudential regulation was conducted 
by judgment-based evaluations of banks’ capital adequacy. A key component of the evaluations 
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was a regulatory technique called comparative benchmarking, which allowed regulators to 
measure capital adequacy of a bank by comparing it to comparable institutions. This approach, 
however, was designed for a closed banking system protected from domestic and international 
competition. In the 1970s, two developments led to the birth of an open system. First, 
technological innovation began to blur the boundary between banks and nonbank financial 
institutions that provided bank-like services, exposing banks to new competitors. Second, 
geographic restrictions imposed on finance were lifted with the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
monetary system in the mid-1970s.620 As a result, by the late 1970s, regulators were supervising 
a system in which benchmarks were outside their jurisdiction.621 In such a world, Volcker 
pointed out that the role of regulation was to balance the drive for short-term competitive 
advantage against the long-term safety of the system.622 Thus, the role of regulation was to put a 
floor upon which the market could function without posing a vulnerability for the system.  
According to Volcker, while this intervention was successful at raising the average ratio to a 
level well above the mandatory minimum, it led to two unexpected distortions.623 The first was 
the creation of an incentive on the part of banks to increasingly rely on new financing and 
hedging techniques to move costly exposures off their balance sheets, leading to invisible 
liabilities not factored in the ratios. The second issue was more challenging since it was a design 
                                                
620 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy. Page no 
621 Wall, “Capital Requirements for Banks,” 16–17; Larry D. Wall, The Adoption of Stress Testing: Why the Basel 
Capital Measures Were Not Enough (Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, December 2013), 2–3. 
622 Investigations, Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 7–8. 
623 For the largest 50 banks, this figure had gone up from 4.7 percent in 1981 to 7.1 percent in 1986. Ibid., 4. 
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defect. Because standards failed to take into account the differences between asset classes in 
terms of liquidity and riskiness, they implicitly encouraged banks to shift the weight of their 
portfolios to illiquid, higher-risk assets, magnifying the system’s vulnerability.624 The solution to 
this looping effect was the development of risk-adjusted capital ratios, which formed the basis of 
the Accords.625 
This new framework was developed under Corrigan’s initiative as part of the project to replace 
Glass-Steagall with the aggregationist regime. Corrigan believed the system was undergoing a 
revolutionary change due to innovation. The issue was how to respond to this change. Ruling out 
two obvious alternatives, reregulation and deregulation, as infeasible and undesirable, he 
advocated a third alternative: intentionally letting the boundaries set up under Glass-Steagall to 
blur while continuing to treat the financial sector, especially banking, as a special sector in the 
economy.626 This meant that the system would continue to be protected by the Fed’s emergency 
lending program. In addition, prudential regulation component of the aggregationist regime was 
going to be reconstituted as a supervisory apparatus centered around risk-adjusted CARs. CARs 
were intended to play an essential role in boosting confidence in the system at a time of assumed 
fragility due to increased “degree of operational, liquidity and credit interdependency.” The 
                                                
624 Ibid. 
625 According to Goodhart, such a risk-based approach was initially developed by the Basel Committee under the 
leadership of the Committee’s British Chairman Peter Cooke in the early 1980s. Goodhart points out that only once 
Volcker put his weight into the issue in 1984, the work gained momentum. It should be noted that Corrigan and his 
team developed the basic framework that would become Basel Accord in collaboration with their colleagues from 
the Bank of England. Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011, 146–51, 167–170. 
626 E. Gerald Corrigan, Financial Market Structure: A Longer View (New York, N.Y.: Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 1987), 6, 10. 
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reason for implementing standards was not only psychological, but structural as well. Given the 
increasing temporal and spatial complexity of markets, regulators were witnessing the emergence 
of a system that accrued mega credit exposures and were realizing that these exposures were 
increasingly connected through what Corrigan called an “intricate web of interdependencies.” 
The purpose of CARs was to strengthen the system structurally without undermining its ability to 
serve its critical functions for the economy.627   
In the Accords, CARs were defined as the ratio of bank capital to the total risk-weighted assets. 
When instituted in 1988, they were restricted to credit risk linked to a borrower’s default. In the 
mid-1990s, they were expanded to market and operational risks. Bank capital was divided into 
two, Tier 1 (core) and Tier 2 (supplementary). Core capital included only the most liquid assets, 
cash and equity, and was required to be no less than half of the bank’s capital. Supplementary 
capital covered other liquid assets.628 Assets were classified into five risk categories with weights 
ranging from zero to one hundred percent. While assets assumed to be risk-free, such as cash and 
developed country debt, were assigned a factor of zero, “high risk” assets, such as claims on 
private sector debt, were given a factor of one.629 The emergence of CARs implied a shift from 
                                                
627 Ibid., 3, 21, 26–27, 30, 42. 
628 These were undisclosed cash and asset revaluation reserves, hybrid (debt/equity) instruments, and subordinated 
debt. Due to the lower quality of these assets, there were certain restrictions on to what degree each type of asset a 
bank could hold. Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation 
(Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute, 2008), 56–57. 
629 Other risk levels were 20 percent for assets such as developed country bank debt, short-term non-developed 
country bank debt and 50 percent for moderately risky assets, which included only one type of asset, residential 
mortgages. The fifth category was a so-called “variable” category that covered claims on domestic public sector 
entities and its weight ranged from 0 to 50 depending on regulator’s discretion. Bryan J. Balin, Basel I, Basel II, and 
Emerging Markets: A Nontechnical Analysis, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, May 10, 2008), 3. 
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bilateral trust-relationships between the lender and borrower to a system in which the safety of a 
bank’s loan profile was tied to the riskiness of formally defined asset categories. As Fed 
Governor Daniel Tarullo points out, under this framework an established company like General 
Electric was treated the same as a start-up with no credit history.630  
The Basel Committee initiated the work for extending CARs to market risk under Corrigan’s 
chairmanship in the early 1990s. Having witnessed the across the board collapse in asset prices 
during the 1987 crash, Corrigan was cautious about the nature of the new system. Addressing 
international regulators in 1992, he noted that their central concern should be the astronomical 
growth of off-balance sheet activities relying on derivatives and not the inter-linkages produced 
by them. Ironically, these risk management devices resulted in the accumulation of new pockets 
of risk, and only a few banks had the capacity to manage them. Corrigan urged supervisors to 
“operate on the assumption that systemic risk may be greater” in the future.631 The problem, 
therefore, was not the interdependencies, but accumulation of risk in opaque corners of the 
system. After joining Goldman Sachs as its chairman in 1994, he spent the next two decades 
organizing reform initiatives to remedy this situation by providing more information to financial 
actors against counterparty risk.632 Ironically, monetary nominalists like Corrigan were back to 
square one in terms of problematizing the problem of imbalance. Like sectoral substantivists of 
the 1920s, they sought to remedy such imbalances by means of transparency and enhanced risk 
                                                
630 Tarullo, Banking on Basel, 58–59. 
631 E. Gerald Corrigan, “Challenges Facing the International Community of Bank Supervisors,” Quarterly Review-
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 17 (1992): 6; Glyn A. Holton, History of Value-at-Risk: 1922-1998, (Boston: 
Contingency Analysis, 2002). 
632 Corrigan’s efforts were undertaken through his Counterparty Risk Management Group. 
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management capacity on the part of the firm. 
In 1996, CARs were modified to account for market risk facilitated by idiosyncratic risks such as 
interest rate risk and asset price volatility. The Accords mandated the use of a risk management 
technique called value-at-risk (VaR) to manage such risks. VaR was supposed to monitor the 
probability of a sizable loss a firm might incur at any given time.633 It rested on a normal 
distribution of events. In other words, it was an indicator of normal loss, since the likelihood of a 
catastrophic event taking place in a normal distribution was considered negligible. Thus, VaR 
was a tool that was designed to be used on a daily basis to manage firms’ operations under 
normal market conditions. 
The task of preparing the firm for extraordinary conditions was delegated to stress testing. The 
objective of this technique was to anticipate the vulnerability of firms to exceptionally low 
probability but plausible events that posed the risk of a catastrophic loss. This allowed firms to 
“evaluate the capacity of [their] capital to absorb” shocks. This was done by two types of 
scenario analyses, historical and hypothetical. In the former, risk managers would establish the 
historical relationship between macroeconomic variables such as GDP and their impact on the 
company’s portfolio. Then one would develop scenarios based on historical periods of 
“significant disturbance” such as the 1987 crash. Finally, one would simulate the effects of such 
adverse conditions on the bank’s portfolio were simulated. This was done by plugging in the 
stress scenarios and the characteristics of bank’s portfolios into the models built on historical 
                                                
633 VaR was developed by banks in the 1980s. One of the most common used VaR infrastructure was developed by 
JP Morgan in the late 1980s and was turned into a commercial service called RiskMetrics. This system allowed the 
bank management to monitor the effect of several hundred risk factors on the firms profitability. Tarullo, Banking on 
Basel, 61; Holton, History of Value-at-Risk. 
 
 411 
data. In the hypothetical scenario, one would formulate plausible events and test their effects on 
the price characteristics of the bank’s portfolio. This could be done in the form of either 
individual risk factors, such as a spike in oil prices or interest rates, or comprehensive 
catastrophe scenarios.634 The deployment of stress testing within the framework of augmented 
Basel Accords in the mid-1990s was novel in two ways. First, in contrast to VaR and trading 
models, they focused on situations in which prices were expected to behave in a non-linear 
fashion. Second, rather than relying on normal distribution, they modeled these events in the 
form of non-normal statistical distribution models with “fat tails,” also known as power laws.  
Contrary to claims by critics of financial modeling, the problem with bank risk management was 
not technical per se, but a political economic one.635 In its inception in the mid-1980s, the 
Accords were conceived as a security mechanism. CARs were designed to promote a safe 
financial structure that incentivized long-term and, thus, liquid loans. What was novel about this 
approach was the reconceptualization of bank capital as a stockpile that contained assets with 
                                                
634 Larry D. Wall, Measuring Capital Adequacy Supervisory Stress Tests in a Basel World, (Working Paper Atlanta: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, December 2013), 5–6; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Bank for 
International Settlements, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (Basel, 1996), 46–47; 
Bank for International Settlements. BIS and Committee on the Global Financial System, Stress Testing by Large 
Financial Institutions: Current Practice and Aggregation Issues. (Basel, 2000), 2; Group of Ten, Committee on the 
Global Financial System, and Bank for International Settlements, Stress Testing at Major Financial Institutions: 
Survey Results and Practice (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, 2005), 6. 
635 This should not be interpreted to mean that there were no problems in the risk management apparatus within the 
firm. While this is beyond the scope of this work, there has been two main sources of criticisms against risk 
management in the aftermath of the crisis. First, the models were short-sighted in the sense that they covered only 
last twenty years of extreme events and that they were not imaginative enough to anticipate a catastrophe such as the 
crisis of 2008. Second, issue has to do with the corporate business model the banks adopted. Prior to the crisis, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that risk management had an inferior status to traders within the hierarchy of the firm. 
Most serious critique of VaR was developed by Richard Bookstaber, who is now affiliated with the Office of 
Financial Research at the Treasury, during the Dodd-Frank hearings. See, Richard Bookstaber, “The Risks of 
Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown before the House Committee on Science and Technology, 
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,” September 10, 2009. 
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varying risk qualities. These stocks were supposed to function as shock absorbers composed of 
assets with varying degrees of absorption capacity. This capacity, in turn, depended on the 
degree to which one could design the composition of the capital base so that the stress induced 
on capital from its environment could be minimized relative to the system-wide distress. In this 
sense, building a resilient capital base was a matter of preventing the overflow of the boundary 
that separated a firm’s environment and the inside of the stockpile holding its capital. This, 
however, was a costly undertaking. The relevant question, therefore, was not whether this could 
be done, but to what point were firms willing to bear such costs. A case in point was Goldman 
Sachs. Robert Rubin, the company’s former Chairman, noted that the firm made a conscious 
decision to exclude systemic risks from its risk management parameters.636 As long as firms like 
Goldman avoided preparing for systemic events, the only option available to policymakers was 
to reduce such risks proactively. This necessarily involved intervening in the day-to-day trading 
decisions of firms considered to be systemically important like Goldman.  
The Accords took this step on the onset of the 2008 crisis. The revised Accords, issued in 2010, 
finally acknowledged the importance of addressing systemic risk head on. Leveraging the crisis 
as a source of political legitimacy, in coordination with the US policymakers the Basel 
Committee took the obvious step to determine not only the nature and composition of the shock-
absorbing stockpiles held by firms, but also their size. The Committee, however, did not simply 
try to re-intensify CARs. Instead, it reconfigured the conceptual foundations of the Accords by 
introducing two entities as the new loci of the supervisory apparatus, “systemically important 
                                                
636 Robert Edward Rubin and Jacob Weisberg, In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to 
Washington (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 2003).  
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banks” and “interconnectedness.” The Accords pointed to the “excessive interconnectedness 
among systemically important banks” (SIBs) for facilitating the crisis as this financial ontology 
allowed the transmission of “shocks across the financial system and the economy.” For this, the 
Accords proposed reducing leverage, as Cline called for in the early 1980s, and enhancing CARs 
for SIBs.637 Now, the central logic of the Accords was systemic vulnerability and not the 
vulnerability of individual financial institutions in aggregate. 
This was a critical step in the emergence of systemic risk regulation in the sense that before the 
crisis aggregationist fraction of monetary nominalism had insisted that interconnectedness in 
itself was not undesirable. In the thinking of aggregationists such as Corrigan and Greenspan, the 
problem was framed as market failure due to insufficient transparency in markets and inadequate 
risk management in the firm. While they acknowledged the existence of network 
interdependencies in the system, they chose to nurture these interdependencies. They considered 
the system’s tendency to become increasingly more complex to be not only a desirable but also 
an inevitable development. As a result, they emphasized the need for better risk management, 
especially in the area of counterparty risk, and more information to eradicate systemic risk.  
Once the power balance tipped toward non-aggregationists, now interconnectedness could be 
framed as the causal factor behind systemic risk. Within this framing, in order to sustain the 
resilience of the system, one had to ensure the resilience of the network structure of the financial 
flows upon which the system was constituted. Once resilience and hence systemic risk were 
                                                
637 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Bank for International Settlements, Basel III a Global Regulatory 




problematized as a systemic property of the system as opposed to individual institutions, the 
primary objective of financial stability became identifying systemically critical nodes in the 
system in advance. As illustrated above, before the crisis the concept of criticality and the 
existence of SIBs was intelligible to policymakers. However, they determined whether a firm 
was systemically important or not only ad hoc within the temporality of an emergency. In the 
post-crisis, this temporality was reconfigured. Under the new Basel Accord as well as the Dodd-
Frank vulnerability reduction regime, the elements that constituted the Fed’s emergency 
mitigation strategy were reconfigured and recombined into a vulnerability reduction strategy 
deployed in an ordinary, i.e. non-emergency, temporal mode.  
Rethinking.Systemic.Risk.Containment.
In the wake of the 1987 crash, the Fed adopted systemic risk as a central governmental problem. 
The first call to govern systemic risk came from former Fed Governor Andrew Brimmer in 1988. 
Speaking at the Joint Session of the American Economic Association and the Society of 
Government Economists, he underscored that the financial system was “so vital to the economy” 
that the Fed had to accept “responsibility in the containment of risks which threaten to disrupt the 
fabric of the financial system.” He pointed out that this would “extend[…] well beyond the more 
narrowly defined tasks of controlling the growth rates of the monetary aggregates or influencing 
the level and structure of interest rates.” For Brimmer, managing systemic risk entailed the Fed 
“fulfilling its strategic role as the ultimate source of liquidity in the economy at large.” Pointing 
to the crises of the 1980s, he alluded to the need for protecting critical markets and payment and 
settlement systems. The implication was that the classical lender of last resort (LLR) function, 
which limited lending to solvent banks, had to be adapted to the needs of a modern financial 
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system. In this regard, the Fed had to use LLR “to undertake a tactical rescue of individual banks 
and segments of capital market” as the failure of such entities “pose[d] unacceptable systemic 
risks.”638  
NY Fed President Gerald Corrigan and Fed Governor John LaWare shared Brimmer’s 
perspective. At a series of congressional hearings on the Fed’s emergency lending program in the 
early 1990s, they defended the Fed’s role as a crisis manager. Both actors argued that financial 
institutions were ontologically distinct from nonfinancial commercial entities. According to 
Corrigan, what distinguished the former from ordinary commercial enterprises was systemic risk. 
This was due to the fact that finance was highly prone to contagion effects as “problems in 
financial institutions can quickly be transmitted to other institutions or markets, thereby inflicting 
damage on those other institutions, their customers, and ultimately the economy.” Agreeing with 
Corrigan, LaWare stated that “[t]he only analogy that [he could] think of for the failure of a 
major international institution of great size [was] a meltdown of a nuclear generating plant like 
Chernobyl.”639 This implied that the sector most closely associated with (free market) capitalism 
had to be governed contrary to the most basic principle of the free enterprise system, private risk-
reward. As previously illustrated , the underlying reason behind this conviction was the decades-
old governmental norm embedded within the policymaking community to protect the flow of 
                                                
638 Brimmer, “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government,” 3-4, 16. 
639 A similar view was also vocalized in the early 1990s by the Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene Ludwig. 
According to Ludwig, “[t]he financial system [was] different from other sectors because of its centrality to the 
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money and credit at all cost. If the process of capital formation were to become a factor 
enhancing growth, it had to be leveraged, and a leveraged enterprise was by definition fickle and 
fragile. Unless policymakers gave up growth and returned to a low-leveraged system as 
envisioned by Lauchlin Currie and Milton Friedman, they would have to guarantee, if not 
subsidize, the risks born by financial institutions.640  
Fed officials were aware of the limits of their emergency mitigation strategy. In particular the 
orderly liquidation tactic was prone to foster moral hazard, encouraging imprudent behavior on 
the part of firms. To avoid this, Corrigan proposed a reinterpretation of LLR to resolve this 
dilemma. Implicitly denouncing Friedman’s revival of the classical LLR as a fixed rule, he urged 
“guard[ing] against the seductive appeal of ‘cookbook’ approaches” as “such a cookbook [did] 
not and [had] never exist[ed].”  Instead, he advocated a policy of “constructive ambiguity.” 
Under this approach, policymakers refrained from specifying the criteria for emergency lending, 
leaving it uncertain whether they would intervene in a developing situation. This uncertainty 
served as a technique to reinforce market discipline under ordinary conditions.641 The key in this 
approach was maintaining the illusion that market participants would not be rescued in a crisis. 
Members of the broader regulatory community, however, were not as certain as the Fed officials 
about what systemic risk was and how to manage it. As a step toward arriving at a consensus, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) convened a conference in 1994. At the 
                                                
640 Ironically, this point has been made by both the monetarist and neo-Marxist critics of the Fed’s emergency 
mitigation strategy. O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State; David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises 
of Capitalism, 2 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2010). 
641 Corrigan Gerald, “Reforming the U.S. Financial System: An International Perspective,” Quarterly Review-
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 15, no. 1 (1990): 14. 
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conference, three perspectives were discussed. The first viewpoint was the monetarist one 
developed by Anna Schwartz and Friedman. The second was the Fed’s perspective articulated by 
Frederic Mishkin, NY Fed Vice President and Research Director. Finally, the third view was 
OCC’s perspective presented by OCC Research Director Philip Bartholomew and his deputy 
Gary Whalen. While the monetarist view remained marginal to this day, Mishkin’s perspective 
formed the basis of the Fed’s crisis management strategy for the next two decades and that of 
OCC served as the foundation of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Schwartz provided the contrarian view against systemic risk. Denouncing it as inconsistent, she 
argued that the claim that the collapse of financial institutions or markets put the economy at 
danger was alarmist. For her, systemic events were confined to crises that resulted in a collapse 
in economic activity. Schwartz limited the scope of such crises to those in which a fear of 
extreme unavailability of means of payment resulted in a panic and trigger a run on the banking 
system. Any other form of instability should have been categorized as “pseudo-financial crisis” 
since such events “undermine[d] the economy at large no more than […] the devastation of a 
hurricane or flood.” From this perspective, the last time a crisis had taken place was in the early 
1930s and it was caused by the Fed. Thus, the only systemic risk was a collapse in the quantity 
of money. This implied that systemic risk did not need to be governed, since general liquidity 
crises could be mitigated by flooding the economy with liquidity.642  
Bartholomew and Whalen held a diametrically opposed position to that of Schwartz. Like 
O’Connor, they adopted an operational view, defining systemic risk as “the likelihood of a 
                                                
642 Anna J. Schwartz, “Systemic Risk and the Macroeconomy,” in Banking, Financial Markets, and Systemic Risk 
(Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1995), 20, 25–28. 
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sudden, usually unexpected, collapse of confidence in a significant portion of the banking or 
financial system with potentially large real economic effects.” Pointing to the structural limits of 
the Fed’s emergency mitigation strategy in terms of moral hazard, they advocated instituting 
“prompt corrective action” as a tool to reduce such risks. This instrument would allow 
policymakers to limit the risk exposures of firms and force them to take remedial action.643 
Implicitly criticizing the Fed’s conceptualization of systemic risk as an emergency situation, they 
warned against conflating systemic risk and “the events by which that risk manifest[ed] itself.” 
Thus, for them systemic risk was an ontological category signifying an underlying sui generis 
economic pathology. 
For these actors, systemic risk was composed of systemic events and risk. For an event to be 
systemic it had to affect “the functioning of the entire banking, financial, or economic system, 
rather than just one or a few institutions.” Whether a systemic event was significant depended on 
the magnitude and scope of the event’s impact. In short, such events were those that resulted in 
“a severe malfunctioning of the entire system.” Regardless of its source or how it was 
transmitted, any shock that caused a financial disturbance beyond an acceptable level was 
systemic.644  
What set systemic risk apart from other abnormalities was the nature of the risk. In contrast to 
phenomena occurring in regular patterns such as the business cycle, systemic risk was 
                                                
643 This authority was initially granted to bank regulators and FDIC under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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characterized by stochastic, random events. To measure this risk Bartholomew and Whalen 
proposed the variance in the distribution of aggregate loss as opposed to the mean. This implied 
that one would be concerned with the impacts of infrequent, but highly destructive events as 
opposed to high frequency, low impact ones distributed around the mean. In the domain of 
ordinary economic governance, one could have relied on models that produced “expected” 
outcomes due to the linearity of the phenomenon modeled. In cases of extreme disturbance, 
however, one could not use such models since the outcome of events were nonlinear, if not 
binary. A system would either withstand a shock or be destabilized and even collapse.645 This 
was not a sufficient measure since regulation had to take into account extreme instability as well 
as broader social and economic costs it would accrue. The acceptable threshold, therefore, was 
lower than a financial stability objective pointed to.646 From this perspective, systemic risk 
regulation involved reducing such risks to a socially acceptable level. This was precisely the 
spirit of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Mishkin provided a perspective that opposed both approaches. While he objected to OCC’s 
approach as too broad and imprecise, he found the monetarist view too narrow and restrictive. 
He feared the former could be used to justify harmful interventions in the economy. The 
weakness of the latter was its failure to address types of financial disturbances other than 
                                                
645 To illustrate their point, the actors gave the river metaphor. As they pointed out, while a river’s average depth 
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banking panics. Referencing Brimmer, he underlined that liquidity crunches in critical markets 
could have adverse effects on the economy without damaging the banking system. What was 
distinct about Mishkin’s take was his emphasis on markets as information processing 
technologies. A breakdown in these markets would result in a series of information problems in 
the form of information asymmetries, crippling the ability of economic actors to process 
information. This would, in turn, hinder the system’s capacity to “channel funds to those who 
have the most productive investment opportunities.” Systemic risk, therefore, was the probability 
of “a sudden, usually unexpected, event that disrupts information” flows in critical markets.647  
From this perspective, the Fed’s role as a crisis manager took on an entirely new dimension. 
Agreeing with monetarist criticisms of the Fed’s emergency lending program, Mishkin 
underlined the importance of relying on the containment tactic while keeping liquidation to a 
minimum. However, he opposed their call for abolishing the discount window on the grounds 
that it was the only tool with which the Fed could remedy information asymmetries without 
causing an inflationary upsurge.648 By lending to solvent banks, the Fed would delegate the task 
of screening out uncreditworthy borrowers to individual banks, which had extensive expertise in 
credit monitoring and information collection. Such lending had to be at a subsidy rate, below the 
banks’ loan interest rates in order to incentivize banks to borrow from the Fed and lend to 
creditworthy enterprises. According to Mishkin, the containment tactic, with a new focus on 
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correcting information asymmetries, would be sufficient in most cases to prevent the failure of a 
large financial institution from morphing into a catastrophe. 649 As the 2008 crisis demonstrated, 
Mishkin’s refashioned containment tactic could only be used in a system resilient enough to 
withstand the shock of the failing firm. 
The failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 and the financial crisis of 2008 
posed the most serious tests to the Fed’s emergency mitigation strategy that was revamped under 
the reforms introduced by Corrigan and Mishkin. When confronted with the near-collapse of 
LTCM, a relatively small hedge fund, the Fed shied away from following Mishkin’s advice. 
Instead, NY Fed President William McDonough and Alan Greenspan decided to deploy the 
controlled liquidation tactic and facilitated a rescue operation by a consortium of banks. The 
novelty of this case was the realization that a highly leveraged firm, regardless of its size, could 
pose a threat to the system due to its high degree of interconnectedness. Thanks to its reliance on 
derivatives to manage its trading risks, LTCM was linked to the nation’s largest banks that 
insured LTCM as counterparties. According to NY Fed’s Peter Fisher, who examined LTCM’s 
books on the onset of the collapse, the magnitude of the knock-on effects of the collapse was 
likely to be so high that the impact could not have been absorbed by the system. The risk, thus, 
was not simply a collapse in market prices. It was the possibility of a multiday seizure in the 
nation’s critically important markets due to extreme distress and volatility in prices and a 
collapse in trading volumes.650 In short, the Fed’s diagnosis was a combination of the 
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problematizations of systemic risk that was put together by Brimmer and Mishkin. 
The second test took place on the onset of the 2008 crisis. The crisis marked the limit of this 
strategy as the Fed faced the risk of losing its illusionary grasp on the “constructive ambiguity.” 
In an emergency meeting in January, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke conveyed his fear that a 
recessionary downturn, which he thought was very likely, “might morph into something more 
serious.” Just days before the Bear Sterns rescue on March 14, he noted that “[w]e are living in a 
very special time.” Thus, the Bear Stearns rescue was engineered within the framework of 
financial vulnerability that was instituted in the Fed by Burns in the 1970s. In the post-Bear 
Stearns world, however, NY Fed President Timothy Geithner communicated to the Committee 
his concerns regarding the situation the Fed found itself in on March 18. While he advocated the 
Fed serve its role as a lender of last resort, he also underlined the challenge of “try[ing] to do 
something that doesn’t increase the incentives so that we become the counterparty to 
everybody.” He noted the Fed had to “make sure that [emergency lending is] a backstop, but not 
a backstop that’s so attractive that they come, and that’s going to be a very hard line to walk.”  
Against this background, the Fed’s inaction in the face of the Lehman failure should be 
construed as part of an emergency response strategy to sustain the illusion of “constructive 
ambiguity.” Thus, letting Lehman fail was a calculated decision on the part of the Fed. In the 
Committee meeting taking place the day after the bankruptcy, Boston Fed President, Eric 
Rosenberg underscored that “it’s too soon to know whether what we did with Lehman is right, 
but we took a calculated bet.” (Emphasis added.) Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig’s 
comments also indicate that the rationale behind the Fed’s actions was disciplining the market. 
He said “what we did with Lehman was the right thing because we did have a market beginning 
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to play [sic] the Treasury and us.” Like LTCM, Lehman was also a relatively small hedge fund. 
The only difference between the two episodes was that in the latter the Fed could not discern the 
extent to which Lehman was intertwined within an interdependent network of counterparties. As 
Fed Vice Chairman Kohn recently noted, the Fed could not detect the failure’s impact on the 
system because it did not have the capacity to comprehend the interdependencies within the 
system.  In the absence of such a knowledge form, the decision to let Lehman fail was a 
necessary step to maintain the illusion of “constructive ambiguity.”651  
The outcome of this test was threefold. First, Corrigan and Mishkin’s fears were realized. The 
decision came at such a high price that both policymakers and market actors came to believe that 
no systemically important firm could be allowed to fail.652 Second, once the panic ensued 
Mishkin’s information brokerage approach was put to use. While NY Fed experimented with the 
discount window to get actors to start lending to each other in the money market, Geithner 
initiated a stress testing program for the nation’s largest financial institutions to bridge the 
information gap and boost confidence in the solvency of these institutions.653 Third, the crisis 
facilitated the emergence of a new regulatory regime to supplement the aggregationist regime. In 
congressional hearings on regulatory reform, House Financial Services Committee Chairman 
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Barney Frank and Geithner framed the Lehman episode as a systemic event that paralyzed 
critical markets and brought the system to the brink of collapse. In order to ensure the resilience 
of the system in the future, Geithner called for the creation of a complementary regulatory 
regime centered around reducing systemic risk in the system.654 
Before moving on to the vulnerability reduction regime created under the Dodd-Frank Act, there 
is one question that remains unanswered, namely why the limits of the aggregationist regime 
were reached on the onset of the 2008 debacle and not in the wake of the LTCM failure in 1998? 
The answer lies in social learning, framing, and contingency. In the period between 1998 and 
2008, three groups of policymakers drew three distinct conclusions from the LTCM episode. 
These perspectives were articulated at a Capital Markets Competitiveness Conference organized 
by the Treasury Department in March 2007. The first perspective was put forward by Greenspan. 
This perspective emphasized the adequacy of the Fed’s emergency mitigation strategy to stem 
financial emergencies. Building on Friedman’s problematization of vulnerability, Greenspan also 
advocated making the system more flexible in order to enhance the system’s resilience against to 
catastrophic shocks. The second perspective was also articulated by him in support of his 
primary position. This complementary perspective was advanced by Geithner and Corrigan in 
the early 2000s. While Geithner undertook a project to enhance resilience of credit allocation 
infrastructures such as payment and settlement systems and derivatives back-offices of banks, 
Corrigan, now the President and Chairman of Goldman Sachs, founded the Counterparty Risk 
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Management Group to increase transparency in derivatives markets and reduce counterparty risk. 
The final perspective was advanced by former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and was 
diametrically opposed to Greenspan and Bernanke’s position. Referencing Geithner’s initiative, 
Rubin called for reducing systemic risk by the means of reducing the entire system’s 
vulnerability.  
The Conference was convened by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and brought together the 
leading financial regulators and policymakers with the leaders of the financial services industry. 
The primary item on the agenda was the question of the competitiveness of the US financial 
sector in general and capital markets in particular in the face of financial globalization. Both 
financial sector representatives and policymakers were concerned with the strict and costly 
regulatory accounting rules that were legislated in the aftermath of the Enron scandal under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The majority of the Conference was spent debating whether a shift 
from rules-based regulatory system of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to a British-style 
principles-based regulatory system could be a solution to the conundrum of ensuring investors’ 
safety without hindering the efficiency of capital markets with inefficient across the board rules 
and standards. While Paulson, Greenspan and their supporters from the industry argued that a 
principles-based system would help New York City to sustain its competitive edge over other 
global financial centers such as London and Hong Kong, Paul Volcker; Arthur Levitt, former 
Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission; Warren Buffett and to an extent Rubin, now 
Chairman of the Citigroup, pushed against this view and defended the merits of the rule-based 
regulations. Despite this disagreement, however, among the participants there was a near-
complete consensus for the need for an overhaul of the regulatory structure. The regulatory 
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structure had been built in a haphazard way since the New Deal and hence was ridden with 
duplication, jurisdictional overlaps and consequent disputes and unnecessarily inefficient rules 
and regulations. In short, the regulatory system had to be overhauled and rebuilt from scratch. 
Contrary to what one would expect, the issue of systemic risk was raised by Rubin at the very 
end. The opportunity for Rubin to stir the discussion away from competitiveness and principles-
based regulation to systemic risk arose when Greenspan gave a philosophical soliloquy on the 
impossibility of regulating a complex system such as global finance. According to Greenspan, 
with the exception of minor exchange rate crises and occasional failure of cross-border capital 
flows, the system was working smoothly. This was a demonstration that “the vast proportion of 
international finance and therefore domestic finance [was] self-regulating.” Since regulators had 
no access to over the counter transactions that were not recorded for the vast majority of 
transactions, it was also not possible to “materially regulate this complexity which [was] getting 
ever more complex.”655 Apart from preventing fraud and reducing operational risk—as Geithner 
was doing in the NY Fed, all one could do was to enhance the system’s resilience by increasing 
its flexibility. Since regulations focused on potential threats that all actors worried about, he 
claimed that “[i]f I worry about them and other people worry about them, they won’t happen. 
The problems we confront are always something that come out of the left-field that we never 
anticipate.” His solution to this problem of absolute indeterminacy was to “create a degree of 
flexibility in this economy, in these financial systems and in the regulatory structure, so that we 
                                                
655 “U.S. Business Regulation,” C-SPAN video, 2:22:1, recording of the Treasury Conference on US Capital 




can absorb shocks in a manner which the system is not destabilized.” He pointed to the resilience 
of the economy and the financial system in the face of the September 11 attacks and attributed it 
to the system’s flexibility. While flexibility was a critical feature of a resilient system, regulation 
made the system less flexible due to its nature. This was because regulation was “essentially an 
endeavor to say ‘you cannot do certain things.’” This is why he insisted that regulation should 
have been restricted only to the areas of operational risk and fraud.656 
According to Greenspan, even if it was desirable to regulate the system, it was not possible to 
reduce leverage because “the degree of leverage in a system is what people wanted it to be.”657 
The only way to slow this process was to put very heavy clamps down the system. Furthermore, 
the complexity was an irreversible phenomenon as it would require firms to unlearn the 
technology and knowledge that they already possessed. In short of prohibition there was no way 
to suppress complexity, and such a thing was not possible in contemporary society. The only 
feasible option was enhancing flexibility to a sufficient degree to absorb a catastrophic shock.  
Rubin was the one who confronted Greenspan on systemic risk. Highlighting that he and 
Greenspan had been in stark disagreement on the issue since his term as the Treasury Secretary, 
he warned that the US was not prepared to another episode of severe market stress and volatility 
akin to the one that took place during the 9/11 attacks. According to Rubin, “[the] exponential 
increase both in magnitude and complexity [was] posing a whole set of issues that [policymakers 
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were] not simply facing and ultimately [would] face them, but the probability of serious damage 
may be small, but if it happens, the magnitude could be enormous.” He pointed out that twenty 
years ago, risk exposure was measured by leverage, but now “risk exposure has been delinked 
from leverage because of derivatives.” To this Levitt added that while there used to be some 
margin of error with stocks and bonds, with derivatives now there was none; it was totally 
eliminated. This meant that the system was much more vulnerable than Greenspan assumed. 
While Rubin agreed with Greenspan on the impossibility of repressing complexity, he pointed 
out that capital and margin requirements could have been vastly increased to reduce the system’s 
vulnerability to a catastrophic shock. He claimed many traders were simply ignorant on the 
nature of risk they were entangled in when they relied on trading strategies such as dynamic 
hedging. These strategies could have led to negative feedback loops and result in previously 
inconceivable systemic instabilities.  
Paulson’s response to this exchange was the launch of a deliberative process between national 
and international regulators in June 2007. Drawing upon the results of this process, Treasury 
finalized Paulson’s plans for a comprehensive regulatory overhaul and publicized them under a 
report, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, in March 2008, only two 
weeks after the Bear Stearns failure. The Paulson plan drew on the work of Claudio Bario, the 
head of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank of International Settlements, and 
Kansas Fed President Thomas Hoening on macro-prudential regulation and systemic risk 
reduction. Both experts emphasized reduction of systemic vulnerabilities due to 
interdependencies over the market failure perspective of aggregationist fraction of the monetary 
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nominalists.658 At the heart of the Paulson plan was the creation of a “market stability regulator,” 
which would be based in the Fed and regulate systemic risk by the means of vulnerability 
reduction. Paulson, however, conceived this plan as part of a long-term project that would be 
implemented over the next several decades. In the wake of the crisis, Geithner, replacing 
Paulson, appropriated the Paulson plan and pushed it through Congress as the Dodd-Frank Act 
with House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank’s help. Because of the AIG 
bonus scandal, the law ended up giving up the ambitions to turn the Fed into a systemic risk 
regulator and instead transformed the President’s Working Group into a Financial Stability 
Oversight Council. Nevertheless the Fed was granted the responsibility as a key executive arm of 
this new body in reducing systemic risk.659 
As this narrative demonstrates, policymakers formulated three alternative perspectives based on 
the LTCM and 9/11 episodes as a final round of reiterative problem-solving attempt. The most 
radical alternative among these solutions could only be implemented in the wake of the crisis. 
Thanks to the space of uncertainty and thus opportunity the crisis opened up, Geithner was able 
to frame this ‘chance’ event as a “systemic event” to provide the leverage against the 
aggregationist fraction of monetary nominalism to implement the new regulatory regime. As 
OCC’s Bartholomew had warned a decade and a half ago, the crisis was so costly in terms of the 
social, political and economic damage it inflicted on the nation that aggregationists were simply 
caught defenseless. Despite Greenspan’s objections that such a crisis could only occur once in a 
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century, at the end proponents of systemic risk reduction were able to prevail.660  
Reducing.Systemic.Risk.
The rise of the vulnerability reduction regime was a testimony to the failure of the aggregationist 
regime to govern systemic risk despite all the efforts to intensify the regime’s main pillars. The 
new regime was built on the premise that systemic risk could not be managed beyond a certain 
point. For it to be rendered governable, vulnerability of the system had to be reduced first. 
Toward this end, the Act created an apparatus that enabled regulators to identify emerging 
vulnerabilities and take corrective actions before they result in systemic events in the face of low 
probability, but high impact shocks. This apparatus is built on the premise that to govern 
systemic risk, one needs a vantage point from which policymakers can monitor both the inner 
workings of the financial system and its environment. This requires a knowledge infrastructure 
that enables policymakers to comprehend the matrix of risk exposures and interdependencies 
within a system.661 The apparatus, therefore, is intended to represent the flow of funds and credit 
in a horizontally disaggregated form similar to the flow of funds accounts. This is a critical 
feature of the apparatus, since to illuminate structural vulnerabilities one first needs to 
comprehend the degree of interdependencies between different component parts of the system. 
The objective of the apparatus, however, is not to eradicate vulnerability, but to reduce it to an 
optimal point that can accommodate plausible threats. This requires the apparatus to maintain a 
continuous threat assessment mechanism that will act as an early warning system against 
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emergent external and internal threats. This is a critical function as only against a range of 
plausible threats one can detect and measure vulnerabilities. 
The Act grants the responsibility to administer the vulnerability reduction regime to three 
institutions, the Fed and two newly created agencies, a Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR). FSOC is the central body charged with 
coordinating the vulnerability reduction efforts of regulatory agencies. It is designed as a policy 
forum in which substantive issues are discussed and reform initiatives are undertaken. It is 
chaired by the Treasury Secretary and its membership includes the heads of all regulatory 
agencies, most notably the Fed Chairman. It is intended to function as a financial crisis 
management body in extraordinary times, coordinating the emergency mitigation efforts of 
regulatory agencies.  
OFR, located in the Treasury, is the research and data processing arm of the apparatus and is 
staffed with financial engineers and economists specializing on systemic risk and financial 
instability. It is equipped with subpoena power to collect financial information from any 
financial institution. Its purview is to develop a statistical interface that will allow the FSOC and 
the Fed to monitor all financial flows within the financial system. It is also mandated to develop 
analytical tools for regulators to interact with the interface.  
The interface OFR is developing, Financial Stability Monitor (FSM), is intended for monitoring 
“vulnerabilities, typically exposed by shocks, that disrupt the functioning of the financial system 
and spread through it with adverse consequences for the economy.” According to OFR, FSM 
rests on a flexible financial stability framework which presumes that shocks cannot be prevented. 
Instead, FSM “focuses on vulnerabilities in the financial system.” Within this strategy, the 
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objective is “to strengthen the financial system at its point of vulnerability” so that the system is 
“more resilient when shocks inevitably hit.” Vulnerabilities are conceived as “determinants of 
instability” and shocks expose them. In line with the Basel Accords, FSM addresses six risks that 
manifest systemic risk: macroeconomic, market, credit, funding, liquidity and contagion. In 
contrast to the institution-centric view of the Accords, these risks are evaluated in terms of the 
vulnerabilities they expose to the system. FSM categorizes these risks to stability in two ways: (i) 
cyclical versus structural and (ii) internal versus external to the financial system. According to 
OFR, the ways in which these risks interact with structural vulnerabilities “leave the financial 
system more susceptible to adverse shocks.”662  
The tools OFR identified for analyzing vulnerabilities are very similar to those adopted in the 
Accords—balance sheet analysis, stress testing, financial market indicators and network analysis. 
OFR redeploys these tools at a systemic level to build “macro-financial models” that allow 
policymakers “to capture the complexity that stems from the interconnectedness of markets and 
institutions, feedback loops and other accelerants that may amplify an initial shock.”663 
Simulation analyses based on these models, in turn, enable policymakers to identify 
vulnerabilities and reduce them by instituting reforms. 
The Act reconstitutes the Fed as a systemic risk regulator responsible for ensuring the resilience 
of critical nodes within the financial system. Its regulatory jurisdiction is extended to the entire 
system, and it is given the authority to regulate any systemically important financial institution 
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(SIFI), market and financial instrument. It is tasked with identifying these entities and detecting 
emerging systemic risks. Toward this end, vast authority is granted to the Fed in deploying 
prompt corrective action measures on SIFIs to mitigate risks to financial stability. This authority 
covers a wide array of powers ranging from terminating and imposing conditions on activities to 
preventing mergers and acquisitions. Under the Act, the Fed can impose enhanced prudential 
standards on SIFIs by mandating stringent capital, leverage or liquidity requirements. In the case 
of noncompliance, it can restrict a company’s growth, activities and operations. Finally, the Fed 
is made responsible for the regulation of systemically important financial market utilities and 
infrastructure such as payment, clearing and settlement systems.664 
One approach to determine which firms are SIFIs is to combine network analysis with stress 
testing.665 This approach conceives the system as a network composed of financial flows and 
nodes. Firms and their financial transactions are modeled as nodes and flows constituting a 
network. Network analysis translates the infinite complexity of the real into the form of a 
network structure that can be used for analyzing the system’s interdependencies. The next step is 
to subject the network to stress tests to determine which nodes within the system are critical for 
the resilience of the network. Reducing the vulnerability, in turn, depends on strengthening the 
shock absorption capacity of these nodes by imposing enhanced prudential requirements such as 
heightened CARs or leverage limits. Finally, the same procedure is used to determine whether a 
firm poses a “network externality” to the system and if prompt corrective action should be 
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deployed to prevent the formation of vulnerabilities in advance.666  
How does the new regime differ from its predecessors and how should its emergence be 
conceived? It is critical to recognize that the new regime does not replace the aggregationist 
regime but complements it. Furthermore, it contains elements of the previous regimes. Prompt 
corrective action was introduced in the 1930s as part of the New Deal financial reforms. As 
noted, however, it is deployed within the new regime for an entirely different purpose, to reduce 
the vulnerability of the network structure. Stress testing and network analysis were also in 
existence before the crisis. Stress testing was an essential aspect of the prudential arm of the 
aggregationist regime, and network analysis was adopted in the early 2000s to provide a better 
understanding of the knock-on effects of failing firms and liquidity crunches in critical markets 
and payment and settlements infrastructures such as money markets and the FedWire, the Fed’s 
large-value payment and settlement system. In this regard, the rise of the vulnerability reduction 
regime was the result of a recombinatorial process through which the elements of a former 
regime of power are extracted and inserted into a new regime to serve new functions. 
It is tempting to construe the rise of the new regime, especially the Fed’s new prompt corrective 
action authority, as the return of the Glass-Steagall regime’s suppressive strategy. Such a 
characterization, however, would be a mistake given the structural vulnerability approach 
previously described. In Glass-Steagall, the suppression of risk was an end in itself and was 
applied at a systemic scale. Overall, risk-taking was shunned and banks were encouraged to hold 
excess liquidity. By no means is this the case in the new regime. Neither risk-taking nor leverage 
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are shunned at large. To the contrary, the architects of Dodd-Frank conceive the new regime as a 
way to prevent a return to Glass-Steagall. In this sense, the new regime is a response to the 
challenge of limited liquidity crises that were identified by the 1965 Fed discount window study. 
The goal is to maintain a system that is willing to take risk, support speculation and lend to the 
real economy in countercyclical ways throughout the business cycle. The challenge is to 
reprogram the system in such a way that it is less vulnerable to short-term liquidity crises, but at 
the same time can continue to lend at a socially and politically desirable rate. Unless such crises 
are prevented, as the architects of the aggregationist regime knew very well, one cannot sustain 
the monetary government of the economy, since such a strategy is prone to depressions as 
demonstrated by the recent crisis. 
The new regime radically departs from its aggregationist counterpart. In the latter, the source of 
the system’s resilience was considered to be the product of three factors: the ability of financial 
institutions to manage their risks, the degree to which information on counterparty risk was 
available to firms, and the system’s flexibility. Vulnerability reduction regime modifies these 
conventions in three ways. It rests on the assumption that systemic risks posed by structural 
vulnerabilities cannot be accounted by individual firms regardless of the sophistication of their 
risk management capabilities. In this vein, providing firms information on their risks is not an 
effective remedy against catastrophe risk. Most importantly, the assumption that the system’s 
capacity to absorb shocks is correlated with the system’s flexibility in a linear fashion is 
problematized. While the new regime still maintains flexibility as a source of resilience that 
enhances the system’s ability to maintain its form against “normal” shocks, it proposes that this 
relationship is not linear. As Geithner raised in 2006, the question is how the system would 
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behave under extreme stress.667 In other words, would flexibility be a source of resilience or a 
source of vulnerability in the face of a catastrophic shock? The behavior of the system during the 
2008 crisis suggests that flexibility may result in unanticipated and undesirable economic, social 
and political costs. The vulnerability reduction apparatus, therefore, is an important step toward 
accounting for the non-linear relationship between flexibility and resilience. While strengthening 
the financial infrastructure and critical markets will reduce the system’s structural vulnerabilities, 
enhancing the shock absorption capacity of systemically important firms will hopefully adjust 
flexibility to an optimal level.  
What remains to be seen is the course of action regulators will take in response to financial 
innovation. While innovation is an important source of efficiency in the allocation of capital, it 
can also become a source of excessive flexibility. As Richard Bookstaber, a financial engineer at 
OFR, noted during Dodd-Frank hearings, innovation may have unexpected and undesirable 
outcomes.668 It is true that the new law requires regulators to identify systemically important 
financial instruments. Unless regulators can develop an ex ante approach to evaluate the potential 
danger of innovation, it may simply be too late by the time they categorize new financial 
products as systemically important. This is probably the most significant weakness of the new 
regime.  
Such an anticipatory approach has to venture into the uncharted dimension of financial system 
                                                
667 Timothy Geithner, “Risk Management Challenges in the U.S. Financial System” (presented at the Global 
Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) 7th Annual Risk Management Convention & Exhibition, New York, 
N.Y., 2006), http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060228.html. 
668 Bookstaber, “The Risks of Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown before the House Committee 
on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight.” 
 
 437 
security, financial ethics. The new regime will likely to be modified with the introduction of a 
financial ethics supervision mechanism that will subject financial engineers to types of questions 
that have already been raised in other domains of innovation such as synthetic biology and 
weapons engineering. The primary question financial engineers and their firms have to answer is: 
should one create a device that will bring medium term-profit to a firm despite the risk of 
increasing systemic risk?669 While such a suggestion has not yet been made, one could conceive 
its implementation under the rubric of a new administrative machinery in the form of a Financial 
Security Ethics Bureau (FSEB). This bureau can draw from the example and experiences of the 
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created under Dodd-Frank. It can operate in tandem 
with OFR under the jurisdiction of the FSOC to develop a systemic risk cost-benefit framework 
to balance the long-term catastrophe risk a new financial instrument poses over its social, 
economic and financial benefits. FSEB would create a financial ethics certification system that 
would rely on voluntary certification of the financial engineering arms of financial institutions 
and signal regulatory compliance to the financial system. Firms refusing to go through 
certification can be penalized by higher supervisory requirements and/or taxes. OFR is already 
forcing systemically important financial institutions to standardize their financial instruments and 
assign regulatory codes to them. So, it is not unconceivable that this system can be expanded to 
financial innovation in the firm. Implementation of an effective financial ethics surveillance 
system may determine whether the Fed can continue to govern the economy with the monetary 
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apparatus and the extent to which it can tolerate systemic risk.  
Concluding.Remarks.
This chapter traced the emergence of systemic risk as the financial imbalance of the monetary 
economy of our present. The aggregationist faction of monetary nominalism problematized the 
catastrophe risk of the capitalist economy to be the financial imbalances that accumulate in the 
portfolios and loan-books of financial institutions rather than the ones in the inventories and 
balance sheets of firms in the real economy, administered prices in the price system, or the 
budgets of households. In contrast to the excesses of nominal income, substantive stocks or 
commodity flows, accumulation of risk in the financial system poses a novel challenge to the 
government of the economy. Initially, monetary nominalists such as Lauchlin Currie and Milton 
Friedman problematized this risk to be a purely monetary phenomenon that was realized with a 
collapse in the quantity of money circulating in the economy. Under the persuasion of a new 
generation of policymakers in the Fed in the 1960s, monetary nominalists came to consider 
financial crises to be the result of a collapse in the credit circuit due to limited liquidity crises in 
critical financial markets. From this perspective, in our financialized economy, financial crises 
are not a governmental problem just because they pose a threat to the money circuit. They are a 
problem because many aspects of collective life, including private enterprise, access to education 
and even social security, depend on the continuous, uninterrupted supply of liquidity in the form 
of credit flows. In this regard, our economy is a credit economy as much as one of money.  
The challenge that vulnerability reduction regime addresses, therefore, is the task of protecting 
the credit circuit without suppressing it. The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to accomplish this by 
enhancing the resilience of the financial system without impeding on the flow of credit into the 
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economy. This is a critical task because the Fed’s ability to govern the economy rests on the 
capacity of the financial system to act as a policy transmission mechanism. Therefore, as long as 
we insist on the Fed to target and manage growth rate along with that of inflation, the financial 
system will have to be treated as a critical infrastructure that is vital for the wellbeing and 
prosperity of the population. While this may seem to be a conservative position, it may 
nevertheless be the only progressive techno-political solution to the security-prosperity dilemma 
that is politically feasible.  
This dilemma is simultaneously a very old and new one. It is old because financial panics are 
nothing new—they can be traced back to as early as the 17th century.670 The invention of lender 
of last resort technique was indeed the first attempt to address this dilemma. As Walter Bagehot, 
British financier and policymaker who introduced this technique to the Bank of England in the 
late 19th century, pointed out in his Lombard Street, panics become a governmental problem 
when enterprises economize cash and rely heavily on credit that accrues “debts payable on 
demand.” In other words, financial crises are a pathology of a leveraged economy in which firms 
rely on credit for financing their everyday operations.671  
In the US, the creation of the Fed was precisely a response to this problem. The Fed was 
supposed to adopt Bagehot’s lender of last resort technique and act as a shock absorber to protect 
the flow of money and credit from cyclical and random disturbances. This arrangement, 
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however, was later framed as an insufficient measure against the catastrophe risk financial 
speculation posed on the economy by monetary substantivists Carter Glass and Parker Willis. 
The result was the erection of the Glass-Steagall regulatory regime that bracketed such risks by 
inserting firewalls between financial sectors and by equipping the Fed with credit control 
instruments. While this new regime resulted in a nearly four decade long period of financial 
stability in which only a score of banks failed, fiscal and monetary nominalists construed the 
price of suppressing speculation to be sluggish economic growth. According to monetary 
nominalists, the shock of the depression had made the banking system excessively risk-averse 
and the anti-speculative credit-centered policies of the Fed had reinforced this tendency. Glass-
Steagall, therefore, was blamed for causing geographic nominal imbalances by obstructing the 
flow of funds to depressed and underdeveloped parts of the economy. 
The aggregationist regulatory regime was a corrective response to the solution that the Glass-
Steagall regime gave to the security-prosperity dilemma. While monetary nominalists replaced 
the latter regime with the former, they implicitly and explicitly reinforced leverage and 
speculative risk-taking, especially on the part of rural and small banks. At the center of this 
looping mechanism was money markets that allowed banks to adopt an increasingly leveraged 
business model with an insatiable risk appetite. This was why while early on monetary 
nominalists such as Arthur Burns and Morris Copeland as well as the Fed’s Discount Window 
Study Group were concerned with encouraging risk-taking, later on policymakers such as Paul 
Volcker and Gerald Corrigan initiated reforms in the aggregationist regime to reduce the 
system’s vulnerability due to a secular trend in bank leverage. In this respect, the security-
prosperity dilemma was resurrected by the monetary nominalists after it was muted within Glass-
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Steagall. The institution of Dodd-Frank vulnerability reduction regime, thus, signifies an attempt 
to correct the balance within this dilemma back toward security without hindering prosperity.  
Whether vulnerability reduction will be successful will prove to be a critical juncture in the 
trajectory of macroeconomic policy. First and foremost, this will determine the fate of the 
financial system as an extension of the monetary policy. Because the system functions as a 
policy transmission mechanism under monetary nominalism, it is essential for the Fed to ensure 
financial stability. After all, each time a systemic event occurs, the reliability of the system as a 
component of the monetary apparatus as well as the ability of the Fed to govern the economy 
come under question. Second, the inability to reduce and control systemic risk may result in the 
collapse of the Fed into itself as a governmental space. As other commentators pointed out, what 
made the Fed a unique institution that allowed it to avoid the pitfalls of fiscal nominalism was its 
ability to isolate itself from the stickiness of the social and the political. One strategy that made 
this possible was relying on financial markets for the allocation and redistribution of resources in 
the form of credit. Instead of making substantive resource distribution decisions, policymakers 
let the market handle such contentious issues under the auspicious of supply and demand.672 
Unless vulnerability reduction ensures the resilience of the critical markets that allow the 
financial system to reallocate resources, monetary nominalists may find themselves confronted 
with unavoidable political questions to which they may not have an answer that will satisfy the 
stakeholders. What is at stake in the new vulnerability reduction regime, therefore, is not just the 
fate of the economy, but also the future of the Fed as a governmental space and hence the 
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In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and the nation’s 
leading policymakers in the Federal Reserve framed the primary force behind the crisis around 
the concept of systemic risk. According to this perspective, the crisis was facilitated by the 
accumulation of systemic risk within the financial system, making the system vulnerable to low 
probability but high impact catastrophic shocks. Before the crisis, policymakers such as Alan 
Greenspan had overlooked the catastrophe risk such shocks posed to the security of the system 
because they believed that such events were extremely rare, occurring no more than once in a 
century. Actors like Geithner and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, however, pointed out that these 
events were unacceptably costly in terms of their economic, social and political consequences. 
As a remedy, they proposed to enhance the resilience of the financial system by means of 
reducing its vulnerability to a point that would allow the system to withstand catastrophic 
shocks.  
The establishment of a systemic risk regulation regime to reduce the vulnerability of the system, 
therefore, was the only plausible and feasible response to the threat of systemic risk for two sets 
of reasons. First, while the infrequency and suddenness of catastrophic shocks made it 
impossible for them to be predicted, the speed in which they unfolded and propagated rendered 
them unpreventable. Second, the accumulation of systemic risk within the system posed two 
forms of opacities for financial firms and regulators. Due to the proprietary nature of financial 
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information and the spread of derivatives that increased the complexity of and interdependencies 
within the system, firms were unable to detect the accumulation of excessive financial risks in 
the portfolios of their counterparties. This situation was only made worse by the fact that 
regulators also lacked information on the risk positions of firms at a disaggregated level, which 
was necessary for them to monitor accumulation of risk and to detect interdependencies. They 
argued this was the reason why they were unable to foresee that letting Lehman Brothers fail 
would result in a systemic collapse. These two sets of problematizations of financial stability 
were combined into a governmental rationality that formed the basis of the systemic risk 
regulation regime introduced under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. The new 
regime instituted vulnerability reduction as the primary governmental logic of systemic risk 
regulation and created a governmental apparatus through which policymakers can monitor 
emergent systemic risks and reduce the vulnerability of the system to catastrophic shocks. 
In this dissertation, I traced the genealogy of systemic risk as a governmental problem. I argued 
that systemic risk is an old governmental problem that has been remapped onto a new object-
domain, monetary economy, since the 1970s. This problem in its broader form signifies a generic 
imbalance in a given part of the economy whose overaccumulation poses the catastrophe risk of 
a sudden, unpredictable and unpreventable system-wide collapse. I located the point of 
emergence of this problem to be the late 1920s. Since then, a small group of policy entrepreneurs 
and powerbrokers in the American state and in policy and research institutions in its orbit have 
been problematizing this problem recursively in distinct but interrelated ways. While all 
problematizations constructed it as a form of economic vulnerability that hindered the resilience 
of the economy, they located the locus of vulnerability in a different component of the economy. 
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As a remedy to a given vulnerability believed to be the underlying source of the catastrophe risk, 
these actors constructed governmental apparatuses to ensure the resilience of the economy. 
These apparatuses were assembled out of governmental expertise forms, intervention techniques 
and knowledge infrastructures. I argue that in the present, these elements are recombined with 
new elements to assemble systemic risk regulation. 
The first attempt to govern economic vulnerability was undertaken by an alliance of progressive 
reformers, Taylorite engineers and economists, which I called sectoral substantivists, in the late 
1920s. These actors were based in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the 
Department of Commerce. Under the leadership of Wesley Mitchell, NBER’s founding research 
director, and Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, sectoral substantivists conceptualized the 
economy as a dynamic and complex organism that consisted of material and nominal flows and 
stocks and strove to represent it in its full empirical detail. They framed the vulnerability of the 
economy to be caused by overproduction in the firm and overinvestment in certain sectors of the 
economy. In this respect, vulnerability was problematized as a problem of inter- and intra-
sectoral imbalances. While overproduction resulted in over-accumulation of inventories within 
firms and sectors, overinvestment led to excess capacity, thereby reinforcing the 
overaccumulation problem. From this perspective, depressions occurred in periodic downturns 
when firms canceled their orders and dumped their accumulated inventories at a loss in panic. 
Sectoral substantivists believed that if they could perform the behaviors of the businessmen and 
managers in charge of the firm by providing information, education, and monetary penalties 
against contract cancelations, they could stabilize the business cycle and minimize the risk of 
depressions. In the case of economic emergencies, they advocated countercyclical public works 
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investments to alleviate the impact of the depression on the unemployed and economically 
disadvantaged. In sum, sectoral substantivists conceived economic vulnerability and imbalance 
as an economic pathology, orthogonal to cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. They called 
for the creation of a vantage point from which policymakers could monitor emergent imbalances 
invisible to economic actors and obviate them before they burst and trigger deflationary spirals.  
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, sectoral substantivism was transformed into two 
distinct but complimentary projects to govern economic vulnerability. The first transformation 
occurred in the mid-1930s at the National Resource Planning Board (NRPB), which was created 
under the initiative of sectoral substantivists in 1933. At NRPB, Gardiner Means and his 
collaborators recast sectoral substantivism in a systemic form. While macro-substantivists such 
as Means also represented the economy in a substantive form, they problematized economic 
vulnerability as an imbalance in the price mechanism. In contrast to its classical archetype, the 
economy was no longer resilient as it had lost its ability to recover from depressions. The 
underlying reason for this was the inflexibility of certain prices in the economy that played 
critical roles in the readjustment process. Furthermore, these critical price inflexibilities, also 
called “administered prices,” rendered the economy more susceptible to depressions as cyclical 
downturns were less likely to be countered by automatic readjustment mechanisms of the market. 
As a remedy, macro-substantivists proposed to enhance the economy’s resilience in ordinary 
times and mitigate depressions during emergencies. They envisioned indirectly intervening in 
critical price inflexibilities by the means of commodity stockpiles just as the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration did in agricultural commodity markets. Enhancing the flexibility of 
the market prices of critical commodities would reduce vulnerability and revitalize the automatic 
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adjustment mechanism. Like their sectoral cousins, they envisioned mitigating emergencies with 
public works projects. The mutation of sectoral substantivism into a systemic form signaled the 
reduction of the problem of substantive imbalances into a problematizations of vulnerability that 
was centered around the idea of criticality of certain nodes within the economy. Just like 
systemic risk regulation, macro-substantivism attempted to map out the entire economy in the 
form of a set of intersecting substantive flows to determine which nodes were critical and sought 
to intervene in these nodes in the name of enhancing resilience.  
The second transformation, which brought into being fiscal nominalism, took place between the 
mid-1930s and the late 1940s. This recombinatorial process presented a radical break from both 
types of substantivism. In this process, the nominal elements of the economy were abstracted 
from its substantive parts and the problem of sectoral imbalance was folded into a nominal form. 
Fiscal nominalists were also closely associated with the original substantivists. Leading 
proponents of nominalism such as Simon Kuznets, Gerhard Colm, and Lauchlin Currie were all 
close associates of figures like Mitchell. These actors were instrumental in the creation of the 
Council of Economic Advisors within the Executive Office of the President as a governmental 
vantage point. They thought that representing the economy as an interdependent set of nominal 
flows and stocks was sufficient to govern vulnerability and thereby ensure its resilience. From 
the perspective of fiscal nominalism, the vulnerability lied in an imbalance between the 
consumption and production components of the economy, which could be measured in money 
terms. While vulnerability manifested itself in the form of either underconsumption or 
overproduction, overaccumulation of inventories, which sectoral substantivists identified as the 
source of vulnerability, was recast as the sign of a nominal imbalance in the economy. The 
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National Income and Product Accounts System was constructed as the information infrastructure 
that allowed policymakers to monitor and intervene in these imbalances.  
Like macro-substantivists, nominalists also endeavored to reduce the economy’s vulnerability 
under ordinary times and mitigate depression in times of emergencies. Because they conceived 
vulnerability in a nominal form, however, they intervened in the household budget in their 
attempt to balance the flow and accumulation of income within the economy. Such interventions, 
they hoped, would resolve maladjustments within the economic structure before they resulted in 
deflationary spirals. From this perspective, these spirals were imagined as chain reactions that 
spread from one sector to another, resulting in an economy-wide collapse. Contrary to their 
substantivist counterparts, what allowed the spread of deflation were weaknesses in the income 
component and not the overaccumulation of investment and inventories. In this sense, the 
solution to economic resilience was not to prevent the occurrence of a systemic event. It was to 
ensure that the economic structure could absorb the shock triggered by the event and the 
emergency could be mitigated in a timely fashion. In fiscal nominalism, therefore, one witnesses 
the assemblage of the governmental logics that were featured in sectoral and macro-
substantivism, vulnerability reduction and emergency mitigation, as an innovative strategy to 
neutralize deflationary spirals. 
While these three series contained all the necessary elements for systemic risk to be 
problematized in its contemporary form, for this problematization to take place one needed a 
type of policy entrepreneur who would recast the economy as a monetary phenomenon, i.e. 
monetary nominalists. Monetary nominalism was originally articulated by Currie in the 1930s as 
a complementary approach to fiscal nominalism to govern economic imbalances. In the 1940s, it 
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was pioneered by a coalition of monetary economists and the students of sectoral substantivists 
at NBER and the Committee for Economic Development (CED). The most prominent figure 
within this group was Arthur Burns, Mitchell’s protégé and Milton Friedman’s lifelong mentor 
and friend. Burns problematized the primary vulnerability of the economy to be the fragility of 
the financial system to shocks and pointed to financial panics as the underlying cause for the 
triggering of contagious deflationary spirals. To mitigate such financial emergencies, he 
instituted the Fed’s emergency lending program upon becoming the Fed Chairman in 1970. 
From the perspective of monetary nominalism, there were two forms of systemic events that 
could trigger such spirals, general and limited liquidity crises. While the former resulted from a 
system- or economy-wide panic and an exponential increase in demand for liquidity, the latter 
occurred in short-term lending markets such as money markets upon which financial institutions 
became increasingly dependent for financing their short-term liquidity needs.  
Beginning in the mid-1960s, Fed governors such as Andrew Brimmer came to recognize the 
formation of a new financial ontology within these markets. Within this ontology, previously 
unrelated financial institutions and markets became interdependent upon each other within a 
financial liability network. The result of this interdependence was the emergence of limited 
liquidity crises that unfolded in the form of a chain-reaction that had secondary and tertiary 
knock-on effects on perfectly solvent but illiquid financial institutions participating in these 
markets. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, policymakers in the Fed were confronted with 
subsequent financial emergencies in which they rescued a series of failing banks, acting as a 
lender of last resort. 
While these rescue operations were perceived by the public as the bailout of so-called “too big to 
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fail” banks and their financiers, they were actually undertaken as an essential part of a broader 
regulatory regime that I called the aggregationist financial regulation regime. The aggregationist 
regime was first conceived by Currie as a governmental strategy to prevent financial crises in the 
1930s and was fully articulated by a coalition of fiscal and monetary nominalists under the 
Commission on Money and Credit (CMC) in the late 1950s. After undertaking the most 
comprehensive survey of the financial system since the Aldrich Commission of 1907, CMC 
called for dismantling the firewalls and risk suppressors that were instituted with the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933. The nominalist coalition proposed to replace the Glass-Steagall regime 
with an aggregationist one. This new regime consisted of an enhanced prudential regulation 
strategy that would regulate aggregate financial risk in the system at the level of financial 
institutions and a financial emergency mitigation strategy at a systemic scale. The Fed’s 
emergency lending program, thus, was created as a central element of the latter strategy, 
providing an insurance mechanism against the failure of the former.  
The program consisted of two governmental tactics, containment and controlled liquidation. 
Under the containment tactic, the Fed tried to buffer the shock of the failure of a large financial 
institution by lending freely to its counterparties from its discount window. In cases in which the 
Fed believed the shock could not be contained, the controlled liquidation tactic was deployed. In 
such cases, the Fed either lent directly to the failing institution regardless of whether it was 
insolvent or facilitated the merger of the firm with another bank. In both tactics, the underlying 
justification of intervention was the assessment that the impact of the failure would trigger a 
chain reaction that would bring down a series of illiquid but perfectly solvent firms. What was 
alarming about these situations was the indeterminate uncertainty they posed to policymakers. 
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Contrary to the perception of the public and the Fed’s critics, such as monetarists Friedman and 
Alan Meltzer, what was at stake was not just individual banks and the moral hazard such 
interventions created on the part of the banks. It was the catastrophe risk that the knock-on 
effects could paralyze short-term lending markets and thereby result in the morphing of a limited 
liquidity crunch into a system-wide collapse, eventually causing a depression.  
In the face of repeated episodes of systemic risk, policymakers at the Fed recalibrated the 
aggregationist regime in two major ways since the 1980s. First, they strengthened the prudential 
strategy further between the early 1980s and the late 1990s. After introducing numerical capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) requirements for the first time in the early 1980s, these were replaced with 
risk-weighted CARs under the auspicious of the Basel Capital Accords by the end of the decade. 
The Basel Accords were further reformed to enhance the resilience of financial firms against 
catastrophic shocks with the introduction of risk management techniques such as Value-at-Risk 
and stress testing in the 1990s. Second, the emergency lending strategy was redesigned under the 
principle of what the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Gerald Corrigan 
termed “constructive ambiguity.” According to this principle, to offset the moral hazard created 
by the Fed’s emergency lending operations, the Fed would leave the decision to lend in a time of 
emergency uncertain on purpose and announce its decision to intervene in the instance of a 
systemic event. From the perspective of the Fed, the financial crisis of 2008 was a test of 
whether this enhanced aggregationist strategy could contain systemic risk. The outcome of this 
test, however, was negative. 
The emergence of the systemic risk regulation regime, therefore, became only possible with the 
acknowledgement on the part of policymakers in the Fed that systemic risk could not be 
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managed unless vulnerability of the financial system was reduced. This realization also pointed 
to a shift in the conceptualization of systemic risk from an epistemic category of financial 
emergency to an ontological category of structural vulnerability. While monetary nominalists 
discerned the existence of systemic interdependencies within the financial system since the 
1970s, they insisted on framing these interdependencies not as the cause of systemic risk but as 
the propagation channels through which shocks triggered by systemic events were propagated 
within the system. From this perspective, systemic risk pointed to a market failure on the part of 
financial institutions to manage their risks properly. As a result, actors like Corrigan believed, 
just like sectoral substantivists, that systemic risk could be eradicated if better information on the 
accumulation of risks within the financial system were provided to financial institutions. With 
the help of sophisticated risk management techniques such as stress testing, firms then could 
effectively manage their risks and further minimize the risk of a catastrophic failure.  
From the structural vulnerability perspective, however, systemic risk was problematized as an 
endogenous, structural property of the system. This implied that systemic interdependencies 
were not merely a transmission mechanism for shocks. They were the critical nodes within the 
system whose failure facilitated systemic risk. Like macro-substantivists, proponents of systemic 
risk regulation such as the former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner advocated reducing the 
vulnerability of systemically important nodes to enhance the resilience of the system. In this 
sense, systemic risk regulation redeploys the vulnerability reduction technology of macro-
substantivism and fiscal nominalism while remapping the inter-sectoral imbalance 
problematization of sectoral substantivism onto the new financial ontology of interdependency. 
In this new way of thinking about vulnerability, the substantive imbalances of the economy are 
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recast as financial imbalances that accumulate in the form of excessive risk in the portfolios of 
financial institutions in the financial system. What is distinct about systemic financial risk in 
contrast to the problematization of its non-financial counterparts is the claim that such risks 
cannot be born by any entity and therefore cannot be economized. As a result, financial 
institutions need a third party to manage and reduce that risk for them. This may very well be the 
key to what might allow vulnerability reduction to become an operational governmental 
technology for the first time after the failed attempts by fiscal nominalists and macro-
substantivists between the 1930s and the 1960s. 
Implications.
As social scientists, how should we approach systemic risk and the regulatory regime that has 
been instituted to govern this governmental problem? The first instinct has been to measure 
systemic risk and produce causal models explaining systemic risk as a “natural,” a priori 
economic pathology. The second and a more critical approach would be to declare systemic risk 
a socially constructed phenomenon and to attempt to unmask it as an ideological construct in the 
service of neoliberalism. There is no doubt that both instincts are legitimate endeavors within 
their own parameters.  
However, there are shortcomings to both approaches. On the one hand, the primary short-coming 
of the naturalist approach is the fact that policy economists in central banks enjoy a considerable 
competitive advantage over social scientists to study systemic risk with analytical tools and 
quantitative data. Furthermore, even if we can overcome our institutional disadvantages, policy 
economists are more likely to form alliances with economists and other types of experts with 
expertise in financial engineering and complex systems analysis.  On the other hand, 
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constructionist accounts carry with them the potential to push us to a cynicism that borders a 
destructive conservatism akin to the ideology of austerity. The danger of such an attitude toward 
systemic risk regulation has been demonstrated by the reaction of both left and right leaning 
economists to the Dodd-Frank Act. Self-proclaimed progressives such as Joseph Stiglitz and 
Simon Johnson and conservative monetarists such as John Taylor and Alan Meltzer fiercely 
objected to systemic risk regulation and belittled the Fed’s attempts to mitigate the financial 
crisis. From the perspective of these economists, systemic risk was only a façade that 
policymakers in the Fed used to hide behind. While empirically this may be the case, as this 
dissertation has shown systemic risk has been a governmental problem that policymakers have 
been trying to govern since the late 1920s. Regardless of it is a constructed or natural problem, 
there is one thing certain about it, namely that it is a remarkably persistent way of problematizing 
the catastrophe risk of depressions within a liberal political ontology. In the face of this 
persistence, therefore, it is unsatisfactory to simply discard systemic risk as an ideological 
artifact of neoliberalism. 
As an alternative to these two responses to systemic risk, I propose to engage with policymakers 
and integrate ourselves into the network of expertise that has been assembled by policymakers to 
govern systemic risk. This does not mean surrender as one might object. It may well be a critical 
but nevertheless productive one that will maintain a tension between sociologists and 
policymakers. This engagement might take various forms. Like this dissertation has done, it can 
help policymakers situate themselves within a historical continuity and remind them that they 
operate within a historical moment that has become possible only as the result of a long series of 
attempts to address a similar problem in different ways. It might also take the form of reflecting 
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on the conduct of policymaking at a sociological as well as a technical level and help them 
improve the conduct of policymaking. It might also provide policymakers ethnographic accounts 
of how financial firms operate and the ways in which practices within the firm might contribute 
to systemic risk. Overall, all of these accounts would enhance the expertise of policymakers and 
contribute to a better understanding of systemic risk as a governmental problem on the part of the 
broader public. This last impact might be the most critical way in which social sciences may 
contribute to policymaking. Given that systemic risk regulation puts policymakers at such a close 
proximity to the object of regulation, namely the capital allocation decisions within the financial 
firm, they are bound to make mistakes in their colossal effort to regulate systemic risk. As the 
cost of reducing the vulnerability of the financial system increases, there is no doubt that special 
interests, including various sectors of the financial system, are likely to launch an attack to 
dismantle or at least weaken the systemic risk regulation apparatus. Whether policymakers will 
be able to withstand such a shock might very well depend on whether they can communicate the 
significance and underlying rationality of systemic risk and its regulation to a broader public. 
Since “Fed-speak” will not facilitate such a communication, sociologists may as well act as the 
translators between the public and policymakers and enhance the resilience of the systemic risk 
regulation regime.673  
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